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PREFACE
Writing is a form of working out one's confusion.
To that aim these seven chapters in this investigation are 
dedicated. The challenge has been to offer a better under­
standing of the complex organism that General Electric was 
and still remains. Complexity, according to Webster, 
"suggests the unavoidable result of a necessary combining 
or folding and does not imply a fault or failure." To aid 
in the understanding of a complicated structure, such as 
this extremely large and diversified company, it is neces­
sary to simplify the subject for research purposes and then 
to convey an analysis which, if factual, will retain the 
complex substance of the study.
In Chapter I "decentralization" is defined. The 
term itself is truly an elusive one, having a multitude of 
meanings. In a strict definition, as Dale and Koontz 
point out, all organizations with more than one person are 
decentralized.^ Decentralization represents organizational 
structures with a variety of patterns. The succeeding 
chapters define “decentralization" as it is found in only cr 
organization— General Electric. The limited purpose is 
to discuss what decentralization has been and is at General 
Electric and not to make any claims that their decentraliza­
tion is the best, the most traditional, or the most progres­
sive.
One of the goals of this investigation is to show 
that the reorganization and decentralization structure
^See Chapter I.
developed at General Electric, especially during the period 
1950-19 70, is based on a great deal of thought, and that it 
is built upon a well-conceived philosophical foundation.
The decentralization structure within the company was not 
an accident; it was developed through the course of hundreds 
of man-years of planning. On the other hand, this disser­
tation will not attempt either to prove or disprove that 
General Electric developed the best in-depth managerial and 
organizational philosophy found in American business, a 
belief held by many academicians and practitioners.
The paper will try to show that General Electric 
was well organized, in both an academic and a practical 
sense. That is, it developed a plan for decentralization 
which was, perhaps, as detailed as any plan for corporate 
reorganization and, because of its place in time, it is 
more comprehensive than the Sloan plan for General Motors 
developed three decades before.^ No attempt will be made 
to claim that the organization structure at General Electric 
made the company the success it is. The company certainly 
is larger than it was before decentralization, but the 
dynamics of the environment prevent any realistic laboratory 
study to show the effects of organization change upon size. 
Certainly, the structure affected the financial, physical, 
and emotional situation of the company, but one cannot 
determine whether the overall effect was positive or nega­
tive. It should be noted that Theodore Quinn, retired Vice 
President, General Electric Company, believed that with the 
enormous capital and market power which the company possesses. 
General Electric could be the poorest managed company in the 
country and still be a high financial success, so great is 
its base.^
^Interview with Peter F. Drucker, New York, November 2,
1970.
^Theodore K. Quinn, Unaon8oi,ou8 Pubtio Enemies (New 
York; The Citadel Press, 1962), pp. 112-113.
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This paper will not attempt to investigate and 
examine the validity of the particular type of decentraliza­
tion which General Electric chose, as opposed to other possi­
ble types of structure. Such a concern is highly academic 
and would require examination of alternative decentralized 
structures. That topic is held for other investigations 
of the company. A return to centralization would be unthink­
able, from the standpoint of size and complexity found within 
the firm. The company cannot go back twenty years. It 
is almost a completely different organization, mentally and 
physically.
Chapter II of this paper presents a short history 
of the General Electric Company. For the most part, the 
company's growth has been a logical and organic process.
Since 1892, General Electric has been basically in the 
business of generation, distribution, and application of 
electric power. Drucker says that today the firm is the 
most conglomerate of all companies, yet it is still within 
the basic scope of the electric power industry.** In 1950,
GE was a highly centralized conglomerate company; by 1960, 
it was highly decentralized. The decade of the 1950's was 
an extremely turbulent period for the company because 
of the organizational changes, yet the firm doubled in size, 
growing from a $2.2 billion firm in 1950 to a $4.4 billion 
firm in 1960. The decade of the 1960's again saw the company 
double, growing to $8.8 billion in sales in 1970.®
Alfred Chandler, who has done extensive work in 
studying the history and the organization structures of 
American big business, explains that General Electric, before 
1939, was basically a functional organization with some
^Interview with Peter F. Drucker, New York, November 2,
1970.
^General Electric Company Annual Reports^ 1950,
1960, 1970.
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autonomous divisions, such as X-Ray, Carboloy, and so forth, 
attached to the structure. The Home Appliance area, being 
a profitable business, had a Merchandise Department which 
was distinct from the Sales Department of the company. The 
latter was used by the non-appliance departments of the firm. 
At first, the company developed home appliances only to 
increase the demand for electricity, and hence to increase 
the demand for the company's major products for the genera­
tion and conducting of electricity. Even though home 
appliances had a marketing organization, all designing, 
manufacturing, and assembling was supervised by the older 
functional departments. Thus, it can be said formally that 
the firm was highly centralized. Chandler says, "Until 
19 39, however. General Electric executives did little to 
relate the work of the Merchandise Department and the other 
more autonomous new product divisions with the older 
functional departments or the company's central office."®
The major organizational changes did not begin until after 
the first retirement of Swope and Young in 1940. Charles 
Wilson began to reshape the company but World War II delayed 
his plans. In a recent letter, Wilson commented, "My own 
design and desire, as early as 1930, was decentralization, 
but by the time I became President in 1940 we were on the 
verge of a world war."^ Such a statement is not idle boast­
ing by Charles Wilson, for in 1929 at the company's 
Association Island executive meeting he made a speech listing 
the advantages of and the need to decentralize. He advocated 
"a more complete decentralization of those departments which 
are now partly decentralized*• • (and) the adoption of vertical
®Alfred Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: 
Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise (Cam­
bridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962), p. 365.
^Letter from Charles E. Wilson, April 14, 1970.
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or decentralized type to the extent that it is practicable 
by other departments. . . ."®
The great reorganization of 1951 and its consequences 
as developed by Ralph Cordiner is the central point of this 
dissertation. Chandler says, "Cordiner's reorganization 
went further than those in any other company studied here 
(a list including most of the largest companies in America), 
both in the erection of a large number of relatively small 
administrative units, and in the methods developed to adminis­
ter these units."*
Most of this dissertation concentrates on the 
theory, knowledge, concepts, and planning at General Elec­
tric. Only Chapters IV and v make any real attempt to go 
beyond this to discuss the actual practice of management—  
the experience and expediency— which help to make the real 
world somewhat different from the philosophy developed at 
GE.
The investigation is offered in partial fulfillment 
of the requirement for the Doctor's degree at the University 
of Oklahoma. Sincere acknowledgment is made to the faculty 
of the College of Business Administration at the University 
of Oklahoma and especially to members of this author's doc­
torate committee whose substantial assistance made this 
work possible. This study was initially under the direction 
of Dr. L. Doyle Bishop who greatly assisted in planning the 
scope of the investigation. Because of reassignment,
Dr. Bishop was replaced by Dr. Ronald B. Shuman whose guid­
ance cannot be overstated. Other members of the doctorate 
committee, Drs. James Hibdon, William H. Keown, Marion C. 
Phillips, and Donald A. Woolf, should be cited as persons 
who have read and contributed greatly to the manuscript.
^Professional Management in General Electric Book One: 
General Electric's Growth (New York: General Electric Company,
1953), p. 3.
^Chandler, op. cit., p. 369.
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DECENTRALIZATION AT THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
WORLD WAR II TO 1971
CHAPTER I 
DECENTRALIZATION AND CONTROL
The objective of this investigation is to discuss 
the philosophy of decentralization at the General Electric 
Company. This opening chapter will concentrate on defini­
tions of decentralization and control. It will emphasize 
the academic approach in hope of laying a foundation on 
which to build a better understanding of General Electric's 
organizational structure and philosophy.
Defining decentralization is no easy task. Each 
company which claims to be decentralized defines it differ­
ently. Although General Electric, Westinghouse, General 
Motors, du Pont, and Standard Oil of New Jersey are perhaps 
the best well known firms connected with a decentralized 
managerial philosophy, they constitute only a few of the 
decentralized companies. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., whose 
outstanding and in-depth article, "Managerial Decentrali­
zation: A Historical Analysis," published in 1956, claims
that almost all of the fifty largest firms in the nation 
(size based on 1948 assets) were decentralized.^ He goes
^Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "Management Decentrali­
zation: A Historical Analysis," The Histovy of American
Management Seleotione from the Business History Review^ 
ed. by James P. Baughman (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1969). (First appeared Vol. XXX, June, 1956).
on to write about the few centralized giant firms as follows, 
"In 1955 a number of the most highly centralized organiza­
tions among the top fifty industrial firms were those still 
dominated by men well beyond the normal compulsory retire­
ment age.Chandler's long article studies decentralization 
by looking at ten different industries (chemical, electrical, 
automotive, steel, food, and so forth). He studies decen­
tralization by tracing its history starting with du Font's 
concentration on decentralization near the turn of the 
century and how du Pont influenced General Motor's organiza­
tional arrangement in the 1920's.^ Yet, Chandler does not 
define what he means by decentralization. In order to estab­
lish a definition of decentralization, the leading writers 
in the field should be consulted. They include Donaldson 
Brown** of du Pont and General Motors; Ralph Cordiner® of 
General Electric; Ernest Dale,® Consultant and Educator;
John Dearden,^ Educator concentrating on the financial 
control side of decentralization; and Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.,®
p. 241.
^Decentralization in American Industry can be traced 
before 1900 in the transporation, utility, and financial 
industries.
‘Donaldson Brown's most well known work is "Decen­
tralized Operations and Responsibilities with Coordinated 
Control," Annual Convention Series, No. 57 (New York: Ameri­
can Management Association, 1927).
®See especially. New Frontiers for Professional 
Managers (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1956) and
his two articles in the General Management Series, American 
Management Association, No. 134, "The Implications of Indus­
trial Decentralization," (1945); and No. 159, "Problems of 
Management in a Large Decentralized Organization," (1952).
®Ernest Dale's three leading works on organizational 
structure are: Planning and Develo'ping the Company Organi­
zation Structure, Research Report No. 20 (New York: Ameri­
can Management Association, 1952) . (This book is outstanding 
for its research.) Organizations (New York: American
also of General Motors. From these and various other 
contributors, this author will try to develop one usable 
definition for "decentralization" in terms of big business.
First, it must be noted that "decentralization" 
is not a precise or absolute term. Any attempt to make it 
an absolute term definitely would negate its value as a 
descriptive device. If the term is defined strictly in 
terms of General Electric philosophy, then it will not 
necessarily describe General Motors or Westinghouse. Yet 
more precision in definition should be offered than is 
currently found in the hodgepodge offered in the literature. 
The term does mean different things to different people. 
Starting from a pure definition and working towards a 
usable definition, we can begin by noting that decentraliza­
tion has at least two common meanings. One is geographic 
decentralization which refers to the location of factories, 
offices, the spreading out of the companies' physical plant 
facilities. The other generally held meaning is decentrali­
zation of authority and this refers to the spreading out of 
the authority, responsibility, and decision making to members
Management Association, 1957), Chapter 6. The Great 
Organizers (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1960).
His short but comprehensive article published in numerous 
books of management readings, "Centralization Versus Decen­
tralization," Advanced Management, Vol. XX (June, 1955), 
pp. 11-16 (Published under a different title in Europe in
1954).
^John Dearden, see "Problem In Decentralized Profit 
Responsibility," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 38, No. 3 
(May-June, 1960), pp. 79-86; "Problem in Decentralized 
Financial Control," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 
(May-June, 1961), pp. 72-80; "Mirage of Profit Decentraliza­
tion," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November- 
December, 1962), pp. 140-154; "Limits on Decentralized Profit 
Responsibility," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 40, No. 4 
(July-August, 1962), pp. 81-89.
^Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., see My Years with General 
Motors (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964).
of the organization other than the dominant executive.
The definition for this paper will exclude geographic decen­
tralization and concentrate on decentralization of decision­
making authority, what some authors term managerial decen­
tralization as opposed to geographic decentralization.* 
Ernest Dale claims that, "The term decentralization itself 
means the delegation of business decisions by the owners 
to their immediate representatives (the board of directors 
and the chief executive), and then to others further down 
in the management hierarchy."^® For practical purposes this 
is an unusable definition as all large organizations would 
be considered decentralized under this definition. Even 
those large business organizations which most managerial 
experts consider as having centralized management would be 
considered decentralized under the above definition. Per­
haps this definition was used by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., 
which allowed him to claim most of America's fifty largest 
firms are decentralized. In some sense all organizations 
are decentralized. Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell are 
in full agreement with Dale when they point out:^^
Decentralization of authority is a fundamental 
phase of delegation? to the extent that authority 
is not delegated, it is centralized. Absolute 
centralization in one person is conceivable, but
*See Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Organi­
zation StruoturBy op. cit.y Stage VI; H . J. Kruisinga, The 
Balance Between Centralization and Decentralization in 
Managerial Control (Leiden: H.E. Stenfest Kroese N.V., 1954),
p. 3; Dearden, "Mirage of Profit Decentralization," op. ait.^ 
p. 141; Deaentralization in Industry : Studies in Business
Polioyy No. 30 (New York: National Industrial Conference
Board, 1948), p . 3.
^°Dale, "Centralization Versus Decentralization,"
op. o i t . y  p. 11.
^^Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of 
Management : An Analysis of Managerial Functions y Fourth
Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1968),
p. 349.
it implies no subordinate managers and therefore 
no structured organization. Consequently, it 
can be said that some decentralization charac­
terizes all organizations. On the other hand, 
there cannot be absolute decentralization, for 
if a manager should delegate aZt his authority, 
his status as a manager would cease; his position 
would be eliminated; there would, again, be no 
organization.
Henri Fayol in 1916 stated that "centralization
belongs to the natural o r d e r , b u t  he was not using
"centralization" in the pure sense for he continued, "The
question of centralization or decentralization, is a simple
question of proportion, it is a matter of finding the
optimum degree for the particular concern."^^ Fayol ends
with his definition of decentralization:^**
Everything which goes to increase the importance 
of the subordinate's role is decentralization; 
everything which goes to reduce it is centrali­
zation .
Some managers have not read Fayol's definition well 
for they have assumed that the number of decisions made 
at lower levels determines the degree of decentralization.
It is not the number of decisions allowed to be made by 
subordinates, as so many executives incorrectly believe, 
but the importance of the decisions made at lower levels which 
matters. Delegating numerous little unimportant decisions and 
keeping one, highly influential decision at the top is not 
decentralization. Ernest Dale conducted a limited survey for 
the American Management Association and found that delegation
^^Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management, 
trans. by Constance Storrs (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and
Sons, Ltd., 1949), p. 33.
 ̂̂ Ibid.
^'*Ibid.y p. 34.
of decision making was more widespread in 1952 than in 
1942, and that decentralization was believed to be wide­
spread in 1952.IS But he was able to comment;^®
Despite all the talk we hear about decentrali­
zation and the delegation of decision making, an 
examination of the actual activities of chief 
executives discloses that they continue to make 
most or all major decisions, either directly or 
through a formal framework of strict rules, checks 
and balances, informal instructions, and through 
mental compulsion on the part of subordinates 
to act as the boss would act. Chief executives 
also make final decisions on matters which are 
relatively or absolutely unimportant.
Decentralization is not only the delegation of the 
unimportant decisions to the lowest possible level, uphold­
ing the principle of management by exception, but it means 
delegation of many major decisions to lower levels, again 
upholding the principle of management by exception.  ̂̂
The difference between what is advocated and what 
is practiced may vary widely as Dale, Henry Albers,Helen 
Baker and Robert R. France, ®̂ and Mayer N. Zald,^° among 
others, have found.
^®Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Organi­
zation Structure^ op. oit.j p. 118.
 ̂̂ Ibid.
^’The principle of management by exception is the 
belief that all decisions should be made at the lowest pos­
sible level and that only decisions can be moved up a level 
if the lowest level did not have the ability (authority, 
knowledge, and so forth) to make the decisions. It ulti­
mately means that decisions made by the president could not 
have been made at a lower level.
^®Henry H. Albers, Principles of Organization and 
Management y second Edition (New York; John Wiley and 
Sons, 1965).
^®Helen Baker and Robert R. France, Centralization 
and Decentralization in Industrial Relations (Princeton, 
N.J.: Industrial Relations Section, Department of Econo­
mics and Sociology, Princeton University, 1954).
^°Meyer N. Zald, "Decentralization--Myth vs. 
Reality," Personnel, Vol. 41, No. 4 (July-August, 1964).
Peter F. Drucker, in his landmark book, The Pvactioe 
of Managementt spurns the use of centralization altogether, 
in agreement with Dale's belief that all large organizatici: 
are decentralized. Drucker used the terms "federal decen­
tralization"— the organizing of activities into autonomous 
product businesses each having its own market and product 
and own profit-and-loss center— as the common meaning of 
decentralization; and the other term he uses is "functional 
decentralization" which is the setting up of integrated 
units handling a major and distinct stage of the business.
This last term is not the same as the traditional organization 
by functions— Marketing, Production, Finance, and so forth—  
or by related skills. "Functional decentralization" is 
organization by stage of process. Drucker says, "Some of 
the large companies are today engaged in thinking through 
engineering organization and in putting the engineering 
jobs where they belong according to the logic of the work 
to be done rather than according to the tools needed.
The weaknesses found for "functional decentralization" 
are the same as weaknesses found for any functional organi­
zation. Every functional manager tends to know his area 
well but not other areas. Each functional manager considers 
his area the most important— tries to build it up and may 
subordinate the welfare of other functions. Functionalism 
makes men specialists, and therefore a narrowing of vision 
may occur, making the specialist unfit for general managemast
Both "federal decentralization" and "functional 
decentralization" are found in most businesses. Drucker 
points out that they are not competitive but can be comple­
m e n t a r y . Y e t ,  because of the weaknesses in the use of
^^Peter F. Drucker, The Praotioe of Management 




solely functional organizational structure, the trend today 
is for the larger company to decentralize federally—  
organization by autonomous product lines. Of the two, 
federal and functional decentralization, federal is the 
more effective and more productive, according to D r u c k e r .  
Small firms do not need "federal decentralization" for they 
are an autonomous product business. The organizational 
problem for big firms was clearly defined by Donaldson 
Brown when, in 1927, he wrote, "That problem is to combine 
the economical advantages of modern business, with as little 
sacrifice as possible of that intimate control and develop­
ment of managerial ability that is the character of the well 
managed small b u s i n e s s .
Since World War II managerial decentralization, or 
federal decentralization, for those who prefer Drucker's 
terminology, has been adopted or developed by Ford and 
Chrysler, General Electric, and Westinghouse, all the major 
chemical companies, most of the oil companies, the largest 
insurance companies, and many of the larger banks (General 
Motors had it by 1923 and du Pont developed it by 1 9 2 0 ).
What is this managerial decentralization? Basi­
cally, it is the method of combining the advantages of large- 
scale operation with the advantages of a well managed small 
business. It is the development of a number of independent 
profit-and-loss centers within a larger organization. The 
profit-and-loss center allows top management to measure 
the ability of the managers of each section or division. It 
allows top management to control each section (a definition
^®Donaldson Brown, op. oit.j p. 14.
^®See Chandler, op. ait.; Dale, The Great Organisers, 
op. ait.; Drucker, The Praatioe of Management, op. ait.; and 
Drucker, Concept of the Corporation (New York: John Day,
1946) .
of control will follow shortly). Profit-and-loss centers 
allow each manager in the center to measure himself. The 
major decision which affects the profit and loss must be 
made by the manager who is being measured by the profit or 
loss. In other words, if profit and loss is one aspect of 
measuring a manager's value, then he must have the power 
to make as many decisions as possible which affect his grade, 
Thus, decentralization must push down not only minor deci­
sions, but major decisions as well; all decisions which 
affect the evaluation of a manager must be made by the 
manager being measured.
Although decentralization differs from firm to firm, 
three organizational principles have emerged for most of 
the decentralized organizations. They are, as Alfred D. 
Chandler, Jr., found:
1. A number of autonomous operating units whose 
managers handle the day-to-day operating deci­
sions are responsible for the financial per­
formance of their unit, and have the line 
authority and staff assistance commensurate 
with this responsibility.
2. The organization has built up a central advis­
ory staff of specialists which provide services 
to the operating divisions and help top 
executives carry out their functions, parti­
cularly that of coordinating the activities of 
the division.
3 . The organization includes a top management
group which not only coordinates but also super­
vises the divisions (by reviewing and analyz­
ing divisional operating and financial perform­
ances and by taking executive action on the 
basis of these analyses).
Decentralization relates to the authority to make 
decisions. Decentralization is a process as Bernard
^^Chandler, op. cit.j pp. 188-189, is quoted as 
found,changing only from past tense to present tense.
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Baum in his dissertation on Deoentralizati.on in a Bux>eauaraay 
notes, and "delegation is the technique for implementing this
riprocess." Therefore, a major principle of decentralizatio 
as widely stated, is "Authority to take or initiate action 
should be delegated as close to the scene of action as possi­
ble. "
Delegation is defined by Harold Stieglitz as "the 
act of entrusting to someone else (a subordinate) part of tiic 
job the person (superior) is expected to carry out."% *
Equally adequate definition is offered by Mooney and Riley: 
"Delegation means the conferring of a certain specified 
authority by a higher authority.
Decentralization relates to how authority is dele­
gated rather than to the grouping of activities. Decisions 
are delegated to the lowest level where authority, competency, 
and prestige can be found, to the level and manager who is 
responsible for the actual performance. This is what R. C. 
Davis terms the "Principle of Decentralized Decisions.
This must be done "without relaxing" as Stieglitz puts it, 
"necessary control over the policy or the standardization 
of procedure."  ̂̂
In discussing the nature of decentralization Dale 
stated that the degree of decentralization of authority in 
a company is increased by;^^
^®Bernard H. Baum, Deaentralization of Authority in 
a Bureauaraay (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: prentice-Hall, inc.,
1961), p. 22.
^^Harold Stieglitz, Organization Planning Basio 
Concepts Emerging Trend (New York: National Industrial
Conference Board, 1968), p. 5.
James D . Mooney and Alan C. Riley, Onward 
Industry! (1931), pp. 35-43, cited by Bernard H. Baum, 
op. oit.y p. 23.
s^Ralph Currier Davis, The Fundamentals of Top 
Management (New York; Harper and Row, 1951), p. 307.
^^Stieglitz, op, oit.y p. 20.
^^Dale, Planning and Developing the Company 
Ornanization Structure, op. oit.y p. 107.
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1. The greater the number of decisions made lower 
down the management hierarchy.
2. The more important the decisions made lower 
down the management hierarchy. For example, 
the greater the sum of capital expenditure 
that can be approved by the plant manager 
without consulting anyone else, the greater 
the degree of decentralization in this field.
3. The more functions affected by decisions made 
at lower levels. Thus, companies which permit 
only operational decisions to be made at 
separate branch plants are less decentralized 
than those which also permit financial and 
personnel decisions at branch plants.
4. The less checking required on the decisions. 
Decentralization is greatest when no check at 
all must be made; less when superiors have to 
be informed of the decision after it has been 
made; still less if superiors have to be con­
sulted before the decision is made. The fewer 
people to be consulted, and the lower they are 
on the management hierarchy, the greater the 
degree of decentralization.
At this time it is advantageous to take a look at 
the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization. It 
should be noted that an advantage of decentralization would 
be a disadvantage for centralization and vice versa. The 
virtues of decentralization have been heralded by numerous 
authors. A compilation of their views follows, and since 
most are self-explanatory, little added description is 
offered.
Advantages of Decentralization
A. Increases Flexibility in Organization
1. The more people are allowed ro make decisions about 
their own work, the more flexible the organization 
is in adapting to local conditions, and the quicker 
decision making becomes.
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It often means speedier and more locally appropriate 
decisions^** and allows adjusting to rapid environ­
mental changes because decisions are made at the area 
affected by the manager's effort. This is known 
as "natural decision making by management-on-the- 
spot."^^ Sayles and Strauss claim otherwise in 
saying, "Decentralized organizations may not be as 
effective in making quick decisions or in adjusting 
to rapid environmental changes."^®
The decisions can be made based upon daily observa­
tions and experiences by those who are on the spot 
and should be more valuable than decisions made at 
a distance from the problems and issues, claims 
Howard T. Ludlow in his widely studied Monarch Notes 
on Business Management
B. Illuminates Weaknesses
"The danger," claims Drucker, ". . .of allowing
unprofitable lines to be carried on the backs of the 
profitable ones, is much l e s s e n e d . O r ,  as he 
stated in 1946, "Decentralization means that weak 
divisions and weak managers cannot ride for any 
length of time on the coattails of successful divi­
sions. . .
C. Allows Top Management to Work on Broader Problems
1. A decentralized organization structure stresses
®^William R. Dill, Handbook of Organizations (Chic­
ago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 1097.
^®Lounsbury S. Fish, "Decentralization Reappraised," 
A Management Sourcebook^ ed. by Franklin G. Moore (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 254.
®®Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, Human 
Behavior in Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 461.
^’Howard T. Ludlow, Business Management^ Monarch 
Notes and Study Guides College Level (New York: Monarch
Press, 1965), p. 24.
^®Drucker, The Practice of Managementj op. cit.^
p. 209.
3*Drucker, Concept of the Corporation^ op. cit.,
p . 48 .
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delegation of authority closer to the scene of 
action and relieves top manager's load.
It allows management by exception--thus freeing 
top management.
"Decentralization multiplies management effective­
ness and firepower," to use Lounsbury Fish's phrase­
ology. "Instead of a single center of management, 
decentralization stimulates and multiples management 
initiative, resourcefulness, and the sense of profit- 
making responsibility throughout the organization."^^
Dale believes that, "The quality of decisions is 
likely to improve as their magnitude and complexity 
is reduced, and as major executives are relieved 
of possible o v e r w o r k . A s  President Dwight Eisen­
hower noted when he was General, "Full concentration 
on the chief problem at hand makes it possible to 
solve it; the details should be handled lower down 
the line. I never fired a man for delegating respon­
sibility, but I did fire men who held the reins too 
tight and irritated others by their preoccupation 
with minutia."**^
Decentralization should develop a more manageable scope 
of operations.**^
D. Develops Managers
The development of "generalists" rather than special­
ists is encouraged, thereby facilitating succession 
into positions of general manager.
Develops strong, self-reliant managers because it 
multiplies the opportunity for development by forcing 
low level managers to make decisions. That is, 
decentralization tests men in independent command 
early and at a reasonably low level so that his 
mistakes are not so costly. The more decentralization
**°Fish, op. oit.j p. 254.
‘*^Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Organiza­
tion StructureJ op. cit., p. 112.
* ̂ Ibid.
"*^Auren Uris, "Centralization vs. Decentralization,"
A Management Sourcebook^ ed. by Franklin G. Moore (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1964), p. 265.
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there is, the more the development of self reliant 
leaders. Fish comments, "It (decentralization) tends 
to produce leaders rather than learners ."** *
3. "Because of the great quantity of managers used in 
the total organization there is always a supply of 
good and experienced leaders able to take top 
responsibility." (Drucker)^^
4. Decentralization creates more chains of promotions, 
believes Auren Uris.**'®
5. Management by objectives becomes fully effective 
because the manager of the unit knows much better 
than anyone else how he is doing.
6. Howard T. Ludlow says, "More advantage can be taken 
of the principle of specialization."**^ Ludlow does 
not expand upon this and without further information, 
argument could arise that he is implying the develop­
ment of specialists which could conflict with point 1 
under this heading.
7. "Decentralization means the absence of 'edict 
management’ in which nobody quite knows why he 
does what he is ordered to do." (Drucker)**®
E. Aids Developing Positive Morale
1. The more people are allowed to participate in 
decisions about themselves, about their own work, 
the more satisfied they are.
2. Intimate personal ties and relationships are pro­
moted, resulting in greater employee enthusiasm 
and coordination.
3. The morale of the organization, both operative and 
executive, may be greatly improved as the result of 
broader executive "freedom to make decisions, free­
dom to use judgment, freedom to act."**®
**‘*Fish, op. ait., p. 254.
**®Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, as quoted in 
"Decentralization" by Drucker, Organizations: Structure and
Behavior, ed, by Joseph A. Litterer (New York; John Wiley 
and Sons, 1963), p. 68.
**®Uris, op. cit., p. 265.
** ̂ Howard T. Ludlow, op. cit., p. 24.
**®Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, op. cit.,
p. 48.
**®Davis, op. cit., p. 306.
15
4. . .permits the large company to enjoy the human- 
relations advantage of the small company," claims 
Leonard Sayler and George Strauss, noted human 
relations experts.
5. Decentralization gives added challenge, stimulus 
and importance to managers because managers are 
dealing with work for which they have full respon­
sibility and are accountable for the results.
F. Increases Efficiency
1. The degree of decentralization that is necessary 
and desirable tends to vary inversely with the 
degree of standardization of the situation that can 
be achieved and maintained.
2. Small decentralized plants can be run more efficiently 
than the large centralized unit, according to a 
survey taken by the National Industrial Conference 
Board in the middle 1940's.®^
3. "The amount and expense of paperwork by headquarters 
staff may be considerably reduced by delegating 
decision-making," Dale found in his AMA study. ^
4. "The expense of coordinating may be reduced because 
of the greater autonomy of decision-making," again 
quoting Dale.® ̂
5. Efficiency may be increased because there may be 
a better utilization of the time and ability of 
e x e c u t i v e s , c l a i m s  Dale.
6. Communications should improve within the organiza­
tion as larger firms may find it too big a task to 
maintain a proper flow of information throughout 
all levels of a large centralized firm. Lines of 
authority and communications should shorten under 
decentralization.^®
®°Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, Human 
Behaviov in Organization^ op, ait.^ p. 460.
^^Decentralization in Industry : Studies in Business
Policy, No. 30 (New York: National Industrial Conference
Board, 1948).
®^Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Organi­
zation Structure, op. cit., p. 112.
^^Ibid.
^‘*Ibid.
®®Uris, op. cit., p. 265.
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"Divisionalization (and its narrower subdivision 
decentralization) helps in fixing accountability. 
Since the division manager is responsible for both 
production and sales, he cannot explain away a lack 
of profit by blaming another group as functional 
managers of production and sales may do, sometimes 
with justification." (Dale)®®
"Efficiency is increased since the structure can 
be viewed 'as a whole' so that troublespots can be 
located and remedied easily." (Terry)
Disadvantages of Decentralization
Increases Diseconomies
1. Duplication of facilities is likely to occur in 
decentralization which may not be offset in cost by 
the other economies found in decentralization.
2. Extra costs or hidden costs are sometimes associated 
with decentralization. Particularly the increasing 
number of financial specialists that must be main­
tained and their costly battles with line officials 
over the "true" profit figures for each decentralized 
unit as has been detailed by John Dearden.®®
3. Similar to the above problem is the difficulty 
found in intracompany pricing of decentralized 
organizations. Joel Dean and Paul W. Cook, Jr., 
have written on what Dean calls the "Economically 
indefensible methods of intracompany pricing" as 
used in many decentralized companies. Although, 
they believe, the "losses" sustained from bad trans­
fer prices may not show upon the company books, 
there could be a misevaluation of each profit center 
and its true value to the total company.®®
®®Ernest Dale, Organization^ op. oit.j p. 114.
®^George T. Terry, Principles of Management (Home-
®®John Dearden, "Mirage of Profit Decentralization,"
wood. 111.: Richard D. Irwin, 1968), p. 352
op. cit.
®*Joel Dean, "Decentralization and Intracompany 
Pricing," Harvard Business Review^ Vol. 33, No. 4 (July- 
August, 1955), pp. 65-74, and Paul W. Cook, Jr., "Decen­
tralization and the Transfer-Price Problem," The Journal of 
Business^ Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (April, 1955), pp. 87-94.
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Inadequate utilization of specialist advice may 
occur in decentralization. Theo Haimann feels that 
under decentralization some executives of autonomous 
divisions may feel they no longer need to utilize 
the special staffs found at the headquarters, thus 
not getting the best available knowledge from the 
specialists and underutilizing the center staffs.
B. Increases Personnel Problems
1. Decentralization requires more top-grade executive 
talent than does centralization.
2. Decentralization may be ineffective and uneconomical 
if it is attempted without adequate personnel and
if personnel have not been properly indoctrinated 
and trained. R. C. Davis comments, "Managerial 
decentralization may be halted until the present 
subordinates can be developed to handle their 
increased responsibilities, or new subordinate 
leadership brought in."®^
3. A move to decentralization is usually associated with 
major changes in job design, especially in the top 
echelons of the organization.
4. Decentralization cannot be instituted overnight in 
firms which have been highly centralized, and during 
the changeover much friction among the personnel 
may result.
C. Emphasizes Short-Run Gains
Short-run gains may be maximized at the expense of 
corporate long-run goals to satisfy a need to make 
the division "look good." John Dearden puts it in 
terms of motivation when he says, "It is difficult, 
if not impossible, to set up a system that will 
motivate the divisional manager always to act in 
the best interest of the company."*^
®°Theo Haimann, ProfessionaZ Management Theoipy and 
Praatiae (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), p. 232.
®^Davis, op. oit.y p. 312.
®^John Dearden, "Mirage of Profit Decentralization,"
op. ait. i p. 142.
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D. Delegates Responsibilities Improperly
Improper decentralization may result in too much 
delegation causing abdication, whereby the manager 
relieves himself of some of his responsibility.
R. C. Davis notes that the "Principle of the Fiction 
of Responsibility and Authority," which can be 
stated as "the process of delegation relieves the 
responsible executive of none of his responsibility, 
authority, or accountability," may be broken if 
too much is delegated.®^
Once authority has been gained by men, many, if not 
most, hesitate to give any of it up.®** For decen­
tralization to work top executives must delegate 
authority--in reality not only in theory. Edgar G. 
Williams found in a study of some decentralized 
companies that: "There appears to be marked incon­
sistencies between executive intent and everyday 
practice in pushing decision making downward toward 
lower organizational units and getting really effec­
tive participation by subordinate personnel."®®
E. Decreases Control
1. Increased delegation of authority is the potential 
loss of control.
2. "Decentralization demands that all managers in the 
company share a common understanding of the methods 
and objectives of the organization; otherwise 
autonomy may lead to anarchy." (Sayles and Strauss] 6 6
6 3Davis, op, ait.3 p. 300
®**Keith Davis, Human Relations In Business (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1957), p. 348.
®®Edgar G. Williams, "The Influence of Managerial 
Decentralization on Personnel Relations," Advanced Manage- 
menty Vol. 24, No. 10 (October, 1959), p. 24.
6 6Sayles and Strauss, op, oit.j p. 461
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3. Many companies, as found by Dale, discovered after 
decentralizing that decentralization can move faster 
than controls could be established.®^ More will
be said about this below.
4. The autonomous divisions may actually begin to work 
against the interests of the company as a whole, 
such as was the case where the price fixing 
violation practices by some of the semi-autonomous 
divisions of General Electric, Westinghouse,
and so forth, in the early 1960's, adversely 
affected the "image" of the total corporation.
F. Increases Poor Decisions
"Decentralized organizations may not be as effec­
tive in making quick decisions or in adjusting to 
rapid environmental changes,"®® as noted by Sayles 
and Strauss, and a point which is in direct dis­
agreement with an often cited advantage, perhaps 
caused by situational variances.
The more decentralized the organization, the fewer 
innovations are adopted. This claim was made by 
James Q. Wilson, a Harvard political scientist, 
although he believes the more decentralized the 
organization, the more innovations are conceived 
and proposed.®®
Increased politicking and bargaining may take the 
place of rational decision making. (Zald)^°
G. Decreases Coordination
1. Lack of uniformity in policy and procedures and 
decisions are often found in decentralized organi­
zations .
2. Poor integration between decentralized units is 
known in decentralized organizations,
3. Inter-unit rivalry interfering with operations is 
found in decentralized organizations.
®^Dale, Organization3 op. ait.j p, 122. 
®®Sayles and Strauss, op. oit.j p. 461. 
®®Zald, op. oit.i p. 24.
7 0Ibid.j p. 26.
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Decentralization ia^not usefully applicable to all 
organizations nor will it in itself insure good management. 
The extent to which authority can be delegated, the extent 
to which profit centers can be organized, the extent to which 
operations can be coordinated, are determined by a number 
of factors. The most frequently mentioned determining 
factor by the writers is size. The larger an organization 
the more likelihood that decentralization is needed and 
will be found. There is a direct relationship between the 
size of an organization, in terms of numbers of peoples, 
and the numbers of decisions which must be made. Largeness 
of size and centralization of structure will raise the cost 
and lower the effectiveness of decisions. Decisions in 
centralized organizations are pushed toward the top where 
they accumulate, which means higher cost personnel will work 
on them and the decision will be made farther away from the 
point of the problem. Dale's research report No. 20 points 
out, "The cost of making decisions generally tends to be 
higher the farther away they are made from the point at 
which the problem arises. . .the decision itself may be 
less satisfactory.Dale,?^ Sisk,^^ and Koontz and 
O'Donnell’*' all note that with largeness is found complexity, 
which may result in overburdening top management and multiply 
the difficulties in the communications process.
The difficulties caused by size can be somewhat 
overcome by breaking the whole into sections which are of
’^Dale, Ptanning and Developing the Company Organi­
zation Struaturej op. oit.^ p. 110.
p. 111.
’^Henry L. Sisk, Principles of Management: A
Systems Approach to the Management Process (Cincinnati; 
Southwestern, 1969), pp. 328-329.
’^Koontz and O'Donnell, op. cit.^ pp. 352-353.
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a manageable size. Exact optimum size cannot be arbi­
trarily stated although some observers believe it to be 
1,000 persons; others go 2,500 or more; some claim 100 or 
so as being the best economic size for decentralized units.
A second factor in determining how much decentraliza­
tion is desirable is the philosophy of management, especially 
top management. It is not only a matter of their philo­
sophy, but their real actions. As George A. Smith, Jr., 
points out, "Many executives pay at least lip service to the 
ideal of a 'democratic' organization (decentralization); 
fewer are willing to foot the bill that they fear may be 
involved if they give subordinates more authority."^® 
Decentralization must be a way of life. It has been said 
that "decentralization is 95 percent an attitude of mind."^’ 
Decentralization, that is, cannot be a reality, no matter 
what the organization charts and manuals claim, unless top 
management and even middle management truly believe and 
practice delegation.
Management philosophy is closely tied with manage­
ment personalities. The organizational arrangement is 
modified by personalities^® found in each particular organi­
zation. As Lt. Col. Urwick has put it so well, the problem 
is one of personality— in part it is ■personal^ in part it 
is personnel. ̂ ® If any of the top management feels insecure
, p. 3 53 .
^®George A. Smith, Jr., "Centralization and Decen­
tralization," A Management Souraebooky ed. by Franklin G. 
Moore (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 257. Also
noted by Keith Davis, op. cit.y p. 348.
^^Fish, op. ait.j p. 252.
^®Defining personality as the sum total of the 
skills, abilities, interests, and personal characteristics.
^®Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Organi­
zation Structure^ op. ait.j p. 38.
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and cannot delegate, then decentralization stops at the 
top no matter what is considered corporate policy. On the 
other hand, willingness to delegate by the top may run 
into difficulties by unwillingness from the middle managers 
to accept delegation and to accept responsibility. The 
personalities of most of the managers and all of the key 
managers must be such that decentralization is not only a 
theory but a reality. It means that the supervisor must 
have confidence in the competence of the subordinate receiv­
ing the delegation and the subordinate must actually have the 
competence to make the proper decisions with his delegated 
authority.® ®
A major factor in determining the degree of decen­
tralization is cost. There are at least two types of cost 
affected by decentralization.®^ One is the added cost, in 
dollars and cents, caused by the added number of management 
personnel and the duplication of jobs found in decentralized 
organizations. The other type of cost may be intangible, 
such as a company's reputation, competitive position, and 
morale of employees which may be upset by a mistake made 
by a lower level employee's decision. The reputation 
effects on a firm can be seen by what happened to General 
Electric's and Westinghouse's total company image in the 
early 1960's just by the price-fixing practices of a few 
of its divisions out of the well over one hundred divisions 
which make up these two giant corporations. Delegation of 
decisions, therefore, is limited by the ability of subordi­
nates to make them, and by the image which incorrect
®®No attempt will be made to evaluate this in terms
of The Peter Principle: "In a hierachy every employee
tends to rise to his level of incompetence," Laurence F. 
Peter and Raymond Hull, The Tetei? Principle (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, 1969), p. 25.
®^The possible increased costs of communications 
is not to be overlooked as it too creates cost. This will
be discussed in Chapter III.
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decisions will inflict upon the organization. This is 
why decisions involving hundreds of thousands of dollars 
can be delegated to such surprisingly low levels in many 
firms, and why other companies allow only decisions involv­
ing less than five hundred dollars to be made at the same 
level.
A similar problem and often part of the cost factor 
is the need for uniformity of policy for the organization. 
Uniform policies have many advantages, such as standardized 
accounting, statistics, and financial records, which make 
it easier to compare departments, file for taxes, deal with 
unions, and staff personnel to "suggest" policy. Yet, many 
firms go to great lengths to make sure that some policies 
will not be completely uniform. Koontz and O'Donnell 
believe that :  ̂̂
When a company decentralizes authority to 
encourage individual initiative, certain business 
policies may be as varied as the individual mana­
gers make them. Many companies encourage this 
variety in all except major matters hoping that 
out of such nonuniformity may come managerial 
innovation, progress, competition between organi­
zational units, improved morale and efficiency, 
and a supply of promotable managerial manpower.
Information is a key to decision making. The 
person making a decision requires adequate information per­
taining to that decision. Therefore, delegation of decision 
making cannot be pushed below tlie level at which all infor­
mation pertinent to the decision is available.
The degree of the dynamics of the business situa­
tion has great impact on the amount of decentralization.
Old and well established or status businesses have a ten­
dency to centralize or recentralize. In these situations 
uniformity in policy is desired as fewer major decisions
8 2Koontz and O'Donnell, op, oit., p. 353.
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are made than are found in the more dynamic situations.®^
In contrast, Dale has found that when a firm hits hard 
times competition may well foster centralization as top 
management feels that the organization cannot afford mis­
takes and they greatly centralize the decision-making pro­
cess.
John G. Staiger, Vice President— Administration,
North American Operations, Massey-Ferguson Limited, in his 
article, "What Cannot Be Decentralized,"®® was able to draw 
up a list of those responsibilities that cannot be decen­
tralized at Massey-Ferguson. Although the list is custom 
tailored, many of the items may hold true for most other 
firms. The list is:®®
1. The responsibility for determining the overall objec­
tives of the enterprise.
2. The responsibility for formulating the policies 
(ground rules) that guide the enterprise.
3. The final responsibility for the control of the 
business within the total range of the objectives 
and policies, including control over any changes 
in the nature of the business.
4. The responsibility for product design, where a product 
decision affects more than one area of responsibility,
5. The responsibility for planning for the achievement 
of overall objectives and for measuring actual per­
formance against those plans.
6. The final approval of corporate plans or budgets.
7. The decisions pertaining to the availability and
the application of general company funds.
8. The responsibility for capital investment plans.
6 3Ibid.^ p. 357.
®‘*Dale, "Centralization vs. Decentralization," op. 
oit.y p. 13.
®®John G. Staiger, "What Cannot Be Decentralized," 
Management: A Book of Readings, First Edition, eds. Harold
Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell (New York: McGraw-Hill Company,
Inc., 1964), pp. 209-211.
p. 211.
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Professor Mayer N. Zald mentions two other points 
affecting the degree of decentralization. One is that the 
more disparate the production lines and technologies of 
the organization, the greater probability of granting more 
autonomy to the divisions. He also notes that the greater 
the profitability of a division, in terms of the other 
divisions, the more independence it will be given. It 
would then follow that if a major division suffers a rever­
sal, the crackdown of top management would be more likely 
than would be found in the lesser satellite.®’
Peter F. Drucker, with his astute perception, has 
discovered five basic rules which are essential for the 
structure of a successful decentralized organization. His 
first rule is that both the parts and the center must be 
strong. Although some people may believe that decentraliza­
tion means weakening the center by strengthening the 
decentralized units, such a belief is a mistake. Drucker 
points out, "Federal (managerial) decentralization requires 
strong guidance from the center through the setting of 
clear, meaningful, and high objectives for the whole."®®
The center, therefore, must demand a high degree of business 
performance and control by measurements. Control by measure­
ments shall be discussed shortly. The second rule is that 
each autonomous unit must be large enough to support the 
needed management, and at the same time "small enough," to 
use the words of Lounsbury Fish, "for that team to 'get 
its arms around' and do a first-class job."®® The third 
Drucker rule is that each decentralized unit must have 
potential for growth. Fourth, the jobs of the managers
®’zald, op. oit.i p. 22.
®®Drucker, Pvaotiae of Management^ op. oit.j p. 214,
8 9Fish, op. cit., p. 250,
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must present enough scope and challenge to each individual 
contributor. This point is valid for all jobs in centrali­
zed or decentralized firms. In decentralized firms it should 
be carefully watched to prevent breaking jobs and units down 
so far that the scope and challenge of the jobs are not 
large enough to allow the managers and units to grow.
Drucker's fifth rule is that each decentralized unit should 
exist with its own job, own market and/or product, and where 
decentralized units come in touch it should be in competition 
with one another— as is found in General Motors' Chevrolet 
and Pontiac divisions. When the units work together— and 
Drucker says they should never be required to do anything 
jointly— their relations must be based strictly on business 
dealings and not on their inability to stand alone.**
Trends. The decade of the 1950's saw a general 
trend of the larger American firms to decentralize. In 
1962 Theo Haimann was able to say "a decentralization pro­
gram has become something of a fad."* ̂ He cites an American 
Management Association^survey of one hundred large companies 
which showed more than a third of the companies reporting 
that they had recentralized after decentralizing.** Of 
the fifty-five companies who claimed they had not recently 
recentralized some had never decentralized in the first 
place.** Dale points out that "decentralization" and 
"recentralization" do not have the same meanings to all 
companies and that recentralization does not necessarily 
mean a return to a functional structure and away from
*°Drucker, The PTaotioe of Management^ op. aït.^ p. 216.
* "Haimann, op. ait.j p. 246, also see Gerry E. Morse, 
"The Swinging Pendulum of Management Control" Emerging Con­
cepts In Management^ ed. by Max S. Wortman (New York: Mac­
millan Company, 1969).
*^Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Organi­




divisionalization. He says, "It may have meant (recentrali­
zation) simply some curtailment of the powers of the division 
heads."® ®
One reason for recentralization appears to be economy, 
During profit squeezes and recessions companies begin to 
worry about duplication of effort within the organization. 
Another stated reason for recent recentralization, as found 
by Dale, is that decentralization entailed too much loss of 
control. A third reason offered by firms was changes in 
circumstances, such as market situations, as one firm noted 
its recentralization was caused by "changes consonant with 
changing market and product requirement."^® Lastly, a few 
firms claimed recentralization was attributed in part to 
the impact of electronic data processing equipment (EDP).*?
Many authors for a number of years have been predict­
ing that EDP will bring about a trend toward recentraliza­
tion. One article of particular note on this theme is the 
1958 Harvard Business Review, Harold J. Leavitt and Thomas L. 
Whisler, article entitled "Management in the 1980's."
The article presents a strong case for the proposition that 
the new information technology will reverse the trend toward 
decentralization and participative management. Leavitt 
and Whisler said:*®
One important reason for expecting fast changes 
in current practices is that information techno­
logy will make centralization much easier.
If centralization becomes easier to implement, 
managers will probably revert to it. Decen­




*®Harold J. Leavitt and Thomas L. Whisler, "Manage­
ment in the 1980's," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 36, No. 5 
(November-December, 1958), p. 43.
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motivated. Top managers have backed into it 
because they have been unable to keep up with 
size and technology. They could not design and 
maintain the huge and complex communication sys­
tems that their large, centralized organizations 
needed. Information technology should make 
recentralization possible. It may also obviate 
other major reasons for decentralization. For 
example, speed and flexibility will be possible 
despite larger size, and top executives will be 
less dependent on subordinates because there will 
be fewer 'experience' and 'judgment' areas in 
which the junior men have more working knowledge.
In 1964 Gilbert Burck** agreed that computers would 
reverse the trend toward decentralization. Disagreeing 
with this premise, Max Ways^°® in his Fortune article of 
July, 1966, "Tomorrow's Management," and H. Igor Ansoff^®^ 
in Harvard Business Review as early as 1965 took issue with 
the idea of recentralization being caused by the computers, 
John Dearden, considered by many as one of the top experts 
in this area, has stated, "I seriously doubt that the in­
creasing use of computers and related information technology 
will affect top management's ability to control divisional 
operations, and in particular that it will bring about a 
trend to recentralization." °̂̂  Dale found in the AMA survey
**Gilbert Burck, "Management Will Never Be The 
Same Again," Fortune^ Vol. LXX, No. 2 (August, 1964), pp. 124- 
126ff.
^°®Max Ways, "Tomorrow's Management: A More Adven­
turous Life in a Free-Form Corporation," Fortune^ Vol. LXXIV, 
No. 1 (July 1, 1966), pp. 84-87.
Igor Ansoff, "The Firm of the Future,"
Harvard Business Review^ Vol. 43, No. 5 (September-October, 
1965). Also see John P. Burlingame, "Information Technology 
and Decentralization," Decision Theory and Information 
Systems^ ed. by William T. Greenwood (Cincinnati: South­
western Publishing, 1969), pp. 630-640.
^®^John Dearden, "Computers; No Impact on Divisional 
Control," Harvard Business Review, vol. 45, No. 1 (January- 
February, 1967), pp. 99-104.
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that some companies did mention EDP as one of many reasons 
for their recentralization, but, he said, "So far it does 
not appear that EDP has sparked any general trend toward 
centralization. . .
Although we have been discussing some recentrali­
zation, it should be stressed that the majority of larger 
companies have never recentralized after decentralizing, 
and the AMA study shows the current trend is still toward 
decentralization. The study, based on one hundred firms, 
as developed by Dale, found that large companies were:^®**
Moving toward decentralization of decisions. . .54 
Moving toward centralization of decisions. . . .36
Others.......................................   10
100
For medium sized companies:
Moving toward decentralization of decisions. . .32 
Moving toward centralization of decisions. . . .26
Others.......................................   42
100
This survey does not purport to be very scientific, 
but it does give an indication of what is happening. 
Although when executives were asked what they thought 
was the general trend, it is interesting to note that 
33 percent of the large companies or executives surveyed 
believe that the general trend is toward decentralization, 
and 32 percent reported that they believe the trend is 
toward centralization or recentralization.^®
Control. Control is another term which needs some 
discussion. The term is frequently defined, in management, 
as a three-step process of setting standards, checking 
performance against the predetermined standards, and, 
thirdly, correcting any deviations. The word "controls" 
is not plural for the word "control" in managerial termino­
logy. "Controls" are the methods used to get control. 
"Controls" pertain to means and "control" to an end. This
■°^Dale, OrganizationsJ op. ait. ̂ p. 122. 
pp. 122-124. losjbtd.
30
may be better understood by looking at the achievement of 
the overall goals of the organization and how sub-goals 
for individual parts are related. Two problems arise.
One is setting the sub-goals and the other is seeing that 
they are achieved. The setting of sub-goals is the setting 
of controls. Information coming from the individual sub­
goals develops data which is used for two purposes. First, 
information is developed to make sure that people are 
following out the sub-goals set for them, and second, infor­
mation is developed to detect if the sub-goals are really 
right to attain the overall organizational goal.
Control, along with planning and organizing, is con­
sidered a basic function of management. Most authors take 
their basic managerial functions from the five offered in 
1916 by Henri Fayol, either adding to or subtracting from 
this basic list. Yet, a number of learned authorities do not 
accept the term "control" to represent a basic managerial 
function. Luther Gulick in the 1930's, Peter F . Drucker and 
Earl Brooks in the 1950's, and General Electric, IBM, and 
Chase Manhattan Bank all agree that the term "control" does 
not represent a managerial function. Gulick uses the term 
"Budgeting and Reporting" to cover the area. Drucker, Brooks, 
GE, IBM, and Chase all use the term "Measuring" to identify 
the work which the others term "Controlling."^®®
"Measuring" as used by these authorities, is a con­
cept, or an element, in the manager's work of leading and 
motivating which encompasses a fundamental method to satisfy 
every manager's growing needs to obtain, analyze, and under­
stand more and deeper information. This information is also 
directly available to, and used by, the man whose work is 
being measured.
Here is the difference from "Control." Under
^®®Ronald Greenwood, "Managerial Functions: A
Classification of Major Contributions," Arkansas Business 
and Economie Review^ Vol. 2, No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 14-17.
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Measuring philosophy the information is usually not given to 
some "higher" authority, either to second guess the man 
doing the work, or to take the real responsibility of the 
man's own work upstairs and away from him.
Measuring is a basic industrial, sociological, and 
managerial working environment concept fitted to the immed­
iate present and the future, and not the past. All people, 
including managers and non-managers at all levels are more 
and more seeing themselves as: (1) acting with initiative,
self-development, self-discipline, and competence as to 
both their personal work and voluntary teamwork, and as to 
two-way communication; and (2) needing an opportunity for 
seeing their individual job whole in its relationship to 
the work of others in their own area, in their company, and 
imaginatively and in true perspective, in the whole social, 
economic, and political world in which they exist.
Measuring effectively relates these natural individ­
ual motivation forces to the accomplishment of division and 
company objectives, as well as to the planning, organizing, 
and coordinating elements of the manager's work of leading 
and motivating.
Harry W. Moberg, Vice President— Treasurer of the 
decentralized operations and centralized controlled firm of 
American Hoist and Derrick Company, offers the following 
seven principles of central control of decentralized 
operations :  ̂® ̂
1. Centralize the control but decentralize the 
operational detail, placing authority and 
responsibility for performance on the mana­
gers of the decentralized units.
2. Draw the line of authority and responsibility 
and assign to the proper individuals.
^°^Harry W. Moberg, "Principles of Control for 
Decentralized Operations," N.A.A. Bulletin^ Vol. XLIII, 
No. II (July, 1962), p. 56.
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3. Make sure the assigned individuals participate in 
planning and make them feel they are part of a 
great team--not merely cogs in a wheel.
4. Develop controls stringent enough to flag danger 
signals of failure to perform, yet not so tight
as to discourage the legitimate aspirations of the 
individual in charge of the operation.
5. Recognize that well administered centralized con­
trol and satisfied personnel go hand in hand.
6. Retain authority and responsibility but also make 
positive delegations of authority and use sound 
methods of measurement.
7. Be aware that it takes a vigilant management, 
accurately informed by its audit group, to control 
decentralized operations. Complacency and 'blind 
faith' will force centralization later.
The control process must be built into the organiza­
tion structure and be part of the responsibility and 
authority design. Unfortunately, most control systems are 
designed separately from the organizational design. There 
is an attempt to "fit" the control process to the organiza­
tion. "Control and organization have generally been treated 
independently of each other," says Arnold F. Emich, "thus 
missing the point of how the organization is to work in 
practice. . . In designing the organization one has
to understand and analyze the actual control of the busi­
ness especially with respect to personnel decisions in 
promotion. "Otherwise one designs a system of 'controls' 
which does not lead to 'control.'" Drucker says, "One. . . 
has to think through the actual 'control' system, the per­
sonnel decisions, to see whether it really is in agreement 
with the true needs of the business. Otherwise there is 
no economic performance.
^Arnold F. Emich, "Control Means Action," Harvard 
Business Review^ Vol. 32, No. 4 (July-August, 1954), pp. 92-98.
^°®Peter F. Drucker, "Controls, Control and Manage­
ment," Management ControlSy eds. Charles P. Bonin, Robert K. 
Jaedicke, and Harvey M. Wagner (New York: McGraw-Hill
Company, Inc., 1964), p. 295.
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Centralized Control. To keep a decentralized 
organization from fragmentation, some central control must 
develop as a unifying agent. Without some control complete 
decentralization might permit one division to bankrupt or 
greatly harm the total firm. Henry Albers aptly puts it, 
“Organizations cannot survive without coordination and a 
unity of p u r p o s e . S u c c e s s f u l  decentralization depends 
upon the development of a system of controls that will 
permit the extension of the widest practical delegation of 
authority to lowest level management as possible. This is 
to say, delegation of decision making should be made to the 
lowest level without impeding the overall position of the 
organization. The centralized control allows the top of 
the organization to hold onto its parts without making all 
of the decisions. "Unfortunately," Rensis Likert claims, 
"decentralization usually stops at the plant or divisional 
level. In companies using decentralization, there is often 
more centralized control within the decentralized division 
than existed prior to the occurrence of decentralization."^^^ 
This, of course, might cause a morale problem when the 
stated philosophy of management is violated.
Management performs two types of control. The first 
is to set policy, although it is possible for policy to 
come from outside the organization; i.e., government rules 
and regulations, or customer specifications. The second 
type of control, and often a part of the policy making, is 
the setting of measurements and standards. Managers have 
the obligation to determine the modes of measurement, such 
as return on investment, competitive standing, cost versus 
output, and so forth. Once the mode of measurement is 
determined and more than one mode is normally used, then
^^°Albers, op. oit.  ̂ p. 174.
^Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New 
York; McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1961), p. 85.
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management must set standards of achievement by which to 
evaluate effectiveness of division, section, manager, 
or individual contributor. If management decides on return 
on investment as the measurement, it might then decide on 
15 percent as the standard.
There are a number of types of policy under the 
general heading of control. The coordination of activities 
within each operating division and the areas of inter- 
divisional relations is another major area for centralized 
control. As Donaldson Brown said in 1927, "There must be 
no undue conflict, competitively, between the product of 
one division and that of another. There are certain general 
policies which, if good for one division, are good for all 
divisions^^^ Then there is policy as a whole, rather than 
from the viewpoint of one division. Purchases may be more 
economical if conducted so as to combine the needs of all 
divisions. Engineering might also be more economical and 
useful if it reports to the company in general rather than 
to particular divisions. The organization might decide 
that advertising as one institution, rather than having each 
division advertise, is better. General Electric, Westing- 
house, du Pont and General Motors, to a more limited extent, 
advertise as an institution.
This setting of centralized control through cor­
porate policy does not seem to fit our original definition 
of control— setting standards, measuring results, and 
correcting deviations. The reason is that this is a differ­
ent type of control. Policy making and measuring are two 
types of controls. Policy making, of which setting standards 
is one type, deals with the future and comes under the 
managerial planning function. Measuring is a current and
1 1 2Brown, op. ait.j pp. 14-15.
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continuous function, even to the point of establishing new 
measurements as it becomes evident that more information is 
worthwhile. Measuring covers all types of functions of 
managers, planning, coordinating, and communicating.
Measuring decisions come within the broad framework of policy 
controls. The purpose of policy is to free up the time of 
managers and to establish common decisions across a broad 
spectrum. Policy frees the time of managers because they 
no longer have to search for answers and can spend time on 
other kinds of planning and decisions. Policy should be 
determined long before decisions are required for common 
purposes. Measuring should be determined as a judgment 
against predetermined standards.
CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Introduction
General Electric is the leading company in the 
electrical industry. Before tracing the history of this 
firm, a general discussion of the industry itself appears 
in order. IVhat is the electrical industry? According to the 
United States Bureau of Census, the industry "includes 
establishments engaged in manufacturing machinery, appara­
tus, and supplies for the generation, storage, transmission, 
transformation, and utilization of electrical energy.
The products of the industry have been divided by Jules 
Backman into four groups which are: (1) domestic applian­
ces: radios, televisions; (2) general electrical indus­
trial equipment: motors; (3) military electronic equip­
ment: data processing; (4) heavy electrical generating and
distribution apparatus: turbines and large transformers.^
Electrical manufacturing accounts for nearly one- 
twelfth of the total manufacturing activity in the United
^U. s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Census of Manufacturer: 194?^ Vol. II, p. 714.
2Jules Backman, The Economies of the Electrical 
Machinery Industry (New York: New York University Press,
1962), p. 4. The "military electronic equipment" groups 
include all data processing, military and non-military,' so 
perhaps this category is improperly named.
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States and perhaps three percent of all economic activity.^ 
The use of electricity has doubled every decade since the 
1880's and has grown three times as fast as the nation's 
economy. The industry is dominated by two firms, each 
having sales in excess of three billion dollars in 1969—  
General Electric, $8,448,000,000^ and Westinghouse, 
$3,590,153,000.® At the other end of the spectrum are 
hundreds of firms specializing in the manufacture of one 
or two products. The importance of the large firms can be 
testified to by the mere fact of size itself. In terms of 
sales. General Electric was ranked fourth in the nation for 
1969 and Westinghouse was ranked seventeenth, rising from 
eighteenth in 1967.^ Jules Backman notes that in 1960, 
"among the one hundred largest industrial companies there 
were twelve in this industry. An additional nine companies 
were among the second hundred largest. Forty-five elec­
trical machinery companies were included among the five 
hundred largest industrial companies."® The industry as 
a whole contributed 2.8 percent of the private national 
income in 1960.®
^Ibid.J p.23.
‘'Raymond J. Ziegler, Business Policies and Deci­
sion Making (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965),
p. 25.
^General Electric Company Annual Report 1969^
p. 24.
^Westinghouse Electric Corporation Annual Report 
2969, p. 24.
^"The Fortune Directory 1959," Fortune, Supple­
ment (May 15, 1959), p. 4.
®Backman, op. cit., p. 19,
^Ihid., p. 21.
38
The industry's growth is spectacular, to say the 
least. Andrew W. Robertson, past Chairman of the Finance 
Committee at Westinghouse, remarked, "The electrical manu­
facturers (have) synchronized their efforts perfectly. I 
know of no other way to account for the unparalleled 
growth of the use of electricity, a service which has 
doubled its output every ten years since 1910. . . ." °̂ 
Factory sales have grown from $9,000,000 in 1919 to 
$15,125,000,000 by 1963.^^ Innovation means progress and 
that has been the key to the industrial expansion. Stand­
ing still technologically could send a substantially sound 
company to the brink of bankruptcy. Carlisle is so correct 
in his reminder, "Woe, woe to him who stops to tie his 
shoestrings."
The electric industry has branched out into all 
corners of science. In medicine, electronics has facili­
tated many advances in surgical operations, the x-ray 
machine being only one of its developments. In the mili­
tary, the electrical industry has perfected radar, missiles, 
and so forth. There seems to bea never-ending line of 
innovation and invention for household products, from 
television, radio, electric stoves, and refrigerators to
^°The Industrial Counoil A Symposium: The Electri­
cal Manufacturing Industry^ Industrial Equipment-Appliances- 
Radio-Electronias-Television^ Vol. I (Troy, N. Y .:
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1953), pp. 40-41. The 
meaning of this remark should become very clear when 
Cordiner's "benign circle of electric power" is discussed 
later as they both have the same meaning, which is : The
development and sale of electric appliances create the need 
for more generators. That is, end use equipment creates 
need for electric production equipment.
"^^Eleotronic Industries Yearbook 1964 (Washington: 
Electronic Industries Association, 1964), p. 2. These 
figures must be for a much narrower designed industry 
than the one in which GE and Westinghouse operate as 
later figures will indicate.
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electric blankets and can openers. The leading products 
of the industry are many and have changed with the times.
In 1904 its largest category of products was insulated 
wire and cable; by 1929 radio apparatus and tubes led its 
industry product..̂  ̂ Today it is control apparatus and 
household appliances that lead the way. The industry has 
come a long way in its relatively short history.
The court physician of Queen Elizabeth, Dr. William 
Gilbert, coined the word "electric," and perhaps from his 
works we may trace the founding of the science of elec­
tricity, ̂  ̂ a science which was developed from the work of 
such geniuses as DuFay, Faraday, Galvani, Volta, Watt, 
Ampere, Ohm— men whose names have become part of the nomen­
clature of the science. In the 1870's-1880's, interest 
mushroomed and from the minds of Edison, Stanley, Westing- 
house, Thomson, and so forth, came the greatest develop­
ments to that date which for all practical purposes gave 
birth to the electrical industry.
Companies reaped great profits from this new 
science. The transportation industry traces its public 
electrification to 1884 when in Cleveland, Ohio, Bentley 
and Knight ran their first electric cars on Gordon 
Street.̂ "* Not long afterward came the electrified rail­
way when a section of the Baltimore and Ohio was success­
fully completed. The city of Cleveland led the way in 
electric street lighting when it arc-lighted Public Square 
in 1879, the same year Edison at Menlo Park developed the 
incandescent lamp— the basic development which vaulted the 
industry into national prominence.
^^Backman, op, oit., pp. 26-27.
^^The Industrial Council a Symposium. . op.
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History Leading to Merger
The history of General Electric cannot be accurately 
described without tracing a history of the two parent firms, 
the Thomson-Houston Company and the Edison General Electric 
Company, which merged in 1892 to form the General Electric 
Company. Leaving the more famous Edison firm for the time 
being we shall concentrate on the Thomson-Houston Company. 
For the most part, the information on the Thomson-Houston 
Company was obtained from Harold Passer's most enlighten­
ing work. The Eleotrioal Manufacturers 1875-1900.^^
Elihu Thomson and Edwin T. Houston were high school 
teachers in Philadelphia in the 1870's. They conducted 
experiments in 1875 "which disproved Edison's theory of 
etheric forces."^® From this, lectures and other experi­
ments, the fame of the two men grew and by 1880 they were 
asked to form a corporation by financial promoters. On 
July sixteenth of that year they helped to form The Ameri­
can Electrical Company to produce both arc lamps and also 
the dynamos to run them. The new firm had "capital stock 
of $125,000. Seventy percent of this stock was sold for 
cash ($87,500), and the remaining thirty percent was paid 
to Thomson and Houston for the use of their patents. In 
addition, Thomson and Houston together received $6,000 in 
cash."i? Furthermore, Thomson and Houston kept the 
right to withdraw their patents at will.
By the fall of 1880 The American Electrical Company 
was manufacturing in a two-story wooden building located
^®Harold C. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers 





in Connecticut. Productivity was poor, and output in 
this early period showed only about three dynamos and fifty 
arc-lamps per week.^® Thomson, as well as most others, 
was sure that the arc-lighting system was superior to any 
other system, especially over that incandescent lamp 
developed by Edison a few years earlier. But the firm 
soon ran into trouble. No sales force developed and one 
of the firm's most enthusiastic backers, Frederick H. 
Churchill, committed suicide. At this point a discouraged 
Thomson threatened to withdraw his patent. Houston had 
already gone back to teaching. In April of 1882 A. W. 
Stockley bought controlling interest but did not know, 
until after the purchase, that Thomson had the right to 
take back his patents. "As a result, a group of Lynn 
(Massachusetts) businessmen, including C. A. Coffin, 
formed a syndicate to buy American Electric. Stockley was 
willing to sell because Thomson threatened to withdraw his 
patents and himself, leaving American Electric with little 
value. The sale to the Lynn group was completed about the 
middle of 1882."i®
On April 17, 1883, the Connecticut legislature 
passed a new incorporation statute and this action may have 
contributed in some small way to the decision to advance 
the date to move the plant to Lynn, Massachusetts, soon 
after, changing its name from American Electric to the 
Thomson-Houston Company. C. A. Coffin took charge of the 
company and Thomson stayed on to form a sound team of 
salesman-organizer (Coffin) and keen scientist (Thomson).
The Thomson-Houston Company grew in leaps and 




system for the arc-lighting apparatus by promoting local 
arc-lighting companies in the same manner that Edison had 
organized for his incandescent lighting— a contract clause 
that the licensee company would use only supplies and equip­
ment from the licensor, in that case Thomson-Houston.
"The policy of requiring licensee companies to use only 
Thomson-Houston accessories and supplies in connection with 
its equipment was still in effect in 1891."^°
In 1883 Thomson-Houston won the top award at the 
Cincinnati annual industrial exposition, beating out both 
Edison and U. S. Electric Lighting Company. In 1885 it 
won the only gold medal awarded at the London (England) 
Inventors Exhibition. It was in 1884 that the company 
began to make incandescent lamps for the arc-light cir­
cuits and the next year made a complete incandescent system. 
It "had developed a new filament-treating process which 
made the Thomson-Houston incandescent lamps superior to the 
Edison.^
Thomson-Houston grew not only by building from 
within, but also by buying. In 1888 it bought out the 
Van Depoele Electric Manufacturing Company. In 1889 it 
acquired the Brush Electric Company and the Bentley and 
Knight Electric Railway Company. In 1890 it bought the 
Excelsior Electric Company. From 1884 to 1888 it controlled 
the Consolidated Electric Light Company which it sold in 
1888 to Westinghouse.22 "Thus, by 1890, Thomson-Houston 




22&rthur A. Bright, Jr., The Eleotria-Lamp Industry 
(New York; The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 82.
23passer, op. oit. ̂ p. 31.
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It can be rightly claimed that General Electric 
was given birth by the incandescent lamp and that came 
from the fertile mind of Thomas Alva Edison. Edison had 
not yet invented his lamp when the Edison Electric Light 
Company was formed in 1878 (October fifteenth, to be speci­
fic) . Actually, it was formed with the expressed purpose 
of financing the experiments on incandescent lighting, 
with which Edison had toyed from time to time since 1873. 
Edison was not satisfied with the arc-lamp of his day and 
desired a system for the home, not streets. Therefore, he 
needed a lighting system using less voltage than the arc 
required. In 1879, Edison succeeded in inventing a work­
able incandescent lamp and, more importantly, "he developed 
a complete lighting system with generators, cabling, fuses, 
sockets. . .and all the other necessary i t e m s . T h e  
others had not gone this far. Edison brought electricity 
into the home. He did this by imitating the gaslight 
system of illumination as closely as possible.
This Edison Company not only had the wizard of 
Menlo Park but a host of other influential members. 
Grosvenor P. Lowery "can be correctly considered the 
founder of the Edison Electric Light Company,"^® claims 
Passer. He was "chiefly responsible for securing. . .the 
support of the Morgan partner, Egisto P. Fabbri. . . .
The importance of Morgan support of Edison Electric Light­
ing project can hardly be overemphasized. . . .Drexel 
Morgan and Company (was) the unquestioned leader among the 
New York investment-banking firms. The participation of 
Morgan firms in projects financing was a stamp of approval 
that gave it a privileged position in the New York 
capital market."^® Another great name in the financial
^‘Bright, op. cit.^ p. 76. 
^®Passer, op. oit.j p. 85.
 ̂̂ Ibid.
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world was also connected with the firm. He was Henry 
ViHard, and by 1880 he was on the Board of Directors and 
on the Executive Obmmittee of the Edison firm.
This initial Edison Electric Light Company, with 
its $3O0,O0j0^^ beginning capital, was first of a long line 
of Edison Electric lighting firms. By 1886 there were five 
separate companies under the Edison name with interlocking 
arrangements. In 1883 the Edison Machine Works was formed 
by absorbing the Edison Shafting Company and Edison Tube 
Company. In 1886 the Edison Electric Light Company 
absorbed the Edison Company for isolated lighting, and 
also in 1886 a new Edison firm was incorporated. The Edi­
son United Manufacturing Company, replacing Edison Lamp 
Company and Edison Machine W o r k s . T h e  Edison Lamp Company 
had already been formed (in 1880) to produce the lamps for 
the parent firm.^ *
After the incandescent lamp was in the home, it 
opened up the flood gates of electrical apparatus for the 
home. Edison wasn't always right, and in the great debate 
between Westinghouse and Edison over AC or DC current, it 
was fortunate that Westinghouse with his AC won out, as 
transmission of power over greater distance was made possi­
ble.
It was Edison who installed the first commercial 
incandescent lighting system in 1880 in the steamship 
Columbia which was owned by Henry Villard.** It might be 
of some interest that the standard 16-candlepower lamp was 
priced for several years at one dollar before a reduction 
occurred in 1 8 8 6 . ^ 1






Edison companies were plagued throughout their 
existence with patent fights and patent infringements.
The original Edison patent was finally tested in a suit vs. 
United States Electric Lighting Company. The case was 
initiated in 1885, came to a hearing in 1889, and judgment 
for Edison was handed down on July 14, 1 8 9 1 . But other 
patent suits were fought and patent infringement became 
commonplace.
Not only did Edison have problems with competitors,
but he slowly lost control of his firms.
Domination by financiers took place in 1889 with 
the merger of all the remaining separate Edison 
development and manufacturing companies into 
the Edison General Electric Company. Besides the 
Edison Electric Light Company and the Edison Manu­
facturing Company, the Sprague Electric Railway 
and Motor Company and Leonard and Izard Company 
were brought into the consolidation.^^
Henry Villard and Werner Siemens controlled over half of
the new company. Therefore, Villard was made President
and Edison withdrew, although he still was listed as a
Director.
Forrest MacDonald says that as soon as Villard 
became President of Edison General Electric he started to 
talk merger with the Thomson-Houston Company. The facili­
ties of Edison and Thomson-Houston were actually comple­
mentary and not really competitive, believes MacDonald, and 
he goes on to claim that "J.P. Morgan, who held a large 
amount of Edison General Electric stock, strongly favored 
the merger. Morgan, who disliked both Villard and Insull, 
the two top executives in the Edison Company, made it 
clear that he preferred the basic philosophy of Thomson- 
Houston over that of Villard."^**
p. 88. 
p. 81.
^‘Forrest MacDonald, Let There Be Light (Madison, 
Wisconsin: The American History Research Center, 1957),
p . 28.
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It may seem that all were in favor of the merger, 
but as time moved on, one by one members became apprehen­
sive. Edison General Electric became fearful that Thomson- 
Houston men would gain control. "Edison himself opposed 
it from the outset, on the general ground that monopoly is 
stifling to technological progress, and on the specific 
ground that he disliked (the) Thomson-Houston (Company)."^® 
Edison wrote to Henry Villard in April of 1889 on this sub­
ject. Edison said that
. . .the statement that they (Thomson-Houston)
ask no favors from the Edison Company might be 
met by the fact that having boldly appropriated 
and infringed every patent we use, there is 
very little left to favor them with, except 
our business, which they are now after.
Perhaps because of Edison's feelings and for some other
reasons which are not discernible, by 1891 Villard himself
openly opposed the merger.
Whatever the feelings of Villard, Edison, and Edi­
son workers might have been, Morgan and the Thomson- 
Houston officials were for the merger. MacDonald says 
that Edison General Electric was badly in need of cash 
and merger was one way to get it.^? Arthur Bright, the 
electrical industry historian, says that Thomson-Houston 
was also in need of working capital as it had considerable 
assets tied up in securities obtained in its efforts to 
sell goods by accepting large blocks of stock.
The merger was consummated by the work of Thomson- 
Houston's most able-minded president, Charles A. Coffin, 
and F. P. Fish, General Counsel for Thomson-Houston, and on 
the Edison side by H.M. Twombley, an influential stockholder
p. 29.
^®Bright, op. oit.^ p. 94.
47
and member of the House of Morgan. General Electric 
was incorporated in New York on April 15, 1892, and 
was truly a Thomson-Houston top-heavy firm in its upper 
management. Charles A. Coffin was made first president.
Of the eleven board members, Thomson-Houston had five 
men; and of the six Edison men, four were classified as 
Morgan people, including, J. P., himself. Only T. S. 
Hastings and Thomas Edison were not of the Morgan or 
Thomson-Houston block. Interesting enough. Coffin's 
successor was Edwin Rice who was Elihu Thomson's pupil and 
assistant in the early Thomson-Houston days. Figure 1 
lists General Electric's first top management.
The advantages of the merger were many. Each com­
pany had patents badly needed by the other. Edison Company 
was strong in DC but had no AC products. Thomson-Houston 
was very strong in AC products. The Edison firm also 
needed management talent for Villard had spent only part 
of his time with the electrical firm.
This consolidation cannot be classified as just 
another of the "Trusts" which were so prominent at this 
time. If the parties intended to form a trust, Westing­
house would have been considered, but he was not.
Of the two early inventors, Edison was made a 
Director but was inactive in the company. Elihu Thomson 
turned down a Director's position to stay close to the 
laboratory and was made head of the Lynn research labora­
tory.
General Electric Under Charles Coffin
Charles Albert Coffin was President of General 
Electric from its outset in 1892 until 1913, and thereafter 
was Chairman of the Board until 1922. General Electric's 
first organizational structure was centralized into five
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[From Harold C. Passer, The Eleotrioal Manufacturers 1875- 
1900 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953),
p. 323 . ]
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functional departments (Figure 2). This was by design 
because the formation of General Electric came about by 
combining two different entities. The internal workings 
of the firms must have been somewhat decentralized in 
reality, for in the company's second annual report 
President Coffin, in January of 1894, stated that the 
"Board had little success in its efforts to centralize 
and simplify the organization.But Coffin, whose 
managerial ability should receive much of the credit for 
General Electric's early success, was able to pull the 
numerous divisions together into a centralized functional 
type of organization. Although General Electric was by 
far the largest firm in the industry, managerial ability 
and managerial know-how was not readily available nor 
were the product lines large enough to warrant any other 
type of organizational setup. At this time the company 
only had three plants— Schenectady, New York; Lynn, 
Massachusetts; and Harrison, New Jersey.
General Electric found a rocky sea in its early 
years as 1893 was a year of financial panic and depression, 
Sales dropped quickly in 1894 from over $16,000,000 in 
1893 to about $12,500,000 in 1894. They did not get 
back to $16,000,000 until about 1 8 9 8 . A debit balance 
of $14,800,000 was reported for 1894 and the common stock 
market price dipped from $115 in 1892 to below $30 by 
early 1895.“  ̂ Only the financial support of Drexel, Mor­
gan, and other New York and Boston bankers kept General 
Electric out of receivership. It was not until 1898 that 
General Electric was able to get an upward swing in its
^^Professional Management in General Eleotrio 
Book One: General Electric's Growth (New York: General
Electric Company, 1953), p. 4.
‘*°Passer, op. cit.y p. 328.
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sales and profits. In 1899 it wisely wrote down its 
assets in an attempt to reflect true value. ^
Even though General Electric did not come out of 
the depression until 1898, it still was considerably lar­
ger than any other firm in the industry. Passer says that 
"By 1897, when about 325,000 arc lights were in service. 
General Electric. . .accounted for about 300,000."**^ The 
only sizable arc-lighting firm not absorbed into General 
Electric was Weston, which eventually became part of 
Westinghouse. Westinghouse was the only really large in­
dustrial firm to compete with General Electric, and these 
two leaders locked horns for the first four years of 
General Electric's existence. It was in connection with 
the Chicago World's Fair of 1893 that the two companies 
first squared off on an issue above local competition.
Bids were asked for the lighting of the Fair. General 
Electric felt very safe behind its Edison patents and bid 
high, well over $1,000,000. Westinghouse devised a way 
around the patents and was awarded the contract with a 
bid of only $399,000.
When either company tried to expand their busi­
ness in almost any of their lines of products, they ran 
into patent conflicts with the other. It wasn't until 
General Electric was sure that Westinghouse held the con­
trolling patents in polyphase power, and Westinghouse was 
sure that General Electric held controlling patents in the 
electric railway business that the two firms could get 
together. March of 1896 the two signed a patent pool 
agreement. * ® The agreement came at a time when there 
were over three hundred patent suits pending against each
‘'^Passer, op. cit.t pp. 56-67. 
‘‘'MacDonald, op. ait.f p. 30. 
‘^Passer, op. oit. y p. 331.
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other.'*® It established at this time the pattern followed 
closely until 1945 and allowed General Electric, as leading 
member between these two firms, to retain its supremacy 
for over half a century. No price of product (price fix­
ing) agreements were negotiated, but with patent problems 
lifted, the two firms were able to compete more vigorously 
than ever. General Electric contributed 67>a percent of 
the value of the patents, and Westinghouse, 37*s percent as 
determined in the agreement.'*'' These figures are not out­
put quotas, but were used for royalty purposes. The 
firms could work without worry of patent infringement.
Of course, the position of Westinghouse and General Elec­
tric was stifling to small firms who were outside of the 
patent pool— the two firms had about 75 percent of total 
available business. The power position of General Elec­
tric and Westinghouse allowed them, at times, to write 
contracts preventing customers from using equipment 
bought from General Electric or Westinghouse with that of 
equipment manufactured by other firms.'*®
Four smaller firms found it more desirable to sell 
out to one of the two giants than to attempt to compete. 
Westinghouse purchased two of these smaller firms, and 
General Electric purchased Stanley and Sieman, and Lorain.**® 
The agreement did help considerably toward standardi­
zation of parts. This was badly needed as many pieces 
were not interchangeable, even when made by the same 
manufacturer. The use of 110 volts as a standard came 
from this agreement.®®
'*®Backman, op, cit., p. 106.
'*^Passer, op. oit. ̂ p. 331. Also see T. K. Quinn, 
"The Lamp Bulb Stranglehold," The New RepubZio^ Vol. 144, 
No. 9 (February 27, 1967), pp. 9-10. The values of the 
patents were negotiated by the firms.
‘*®Passer, Ibid. ̂ p. 333. '*̂ Ibid., p. 334.
®®MacDonald, op. ait. ̂ p. 32.
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Also in 1896 General Electric organized an associa­
tion, The Incandescent Lamp Manufacturers, for the specific 
purpose of fixing prices and alloting business to each 
firm. At this time. General Electric had half the lamp 
business.® ̂
General Electric went international, selling lamps 
in England and on the Continent. In 1904 it signed an 
agreement with Allgemeine-Elektricitats-Gesellschaft®^ 
which helped obtain patents used in the steam-turbine which 
later became one of General Electric's most profitable 
and important products.
With the endorsement of Coffin, and through the 
initiative of Edwin W. Rice, General Electric set up a 
research laboratory in 1900. The laboratory was first 
located in Charles Steinmetz' barn in Schenectady, New 
York.S3 Steinmetz, General Electric's most heralded 
scientist, first came to General Electric in 1892, three 
years after he left Germany. He worked under Director of 
Research Willis R. Whitney who left M.I.T. for the post 
and held this position until 1932. Also found in this 
skilled group was Dr. Irving Langmuir, Nobel prize recipi­
ent in Chemistry in 1932s'* and developer of Fluorescent 
lighting; Dr. William D. Coolidge and Willian Stanley who 
worked on X-Ray tubes; and Dr. Albert Hull who developed 
more electron tubes than any other man.®s At first. General
s^Bright, op. oit.j pp. 103-104; also see Quinn, 
op. ait. ® Ibid. 3 p. 155.
sSjohn Anderson Miller, Workshop of Engineers 
(Schenectady, New York: General Electric Company, 1953),
pp. 16-17.
s"*4 General Eleotrio Sorapbook History with 
Commentary (Schenectady, New York: General Electric
Company), pp. 33-34.
s®C. G . Suits, "Seventy-Five Years of Research in 
General Electric," Soienae^ Vol. 118 (October 23, 1953), 
p. 454.
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Electric attracted many engineers because of the patents 
in armatures held by the company, but "later they were 
heard to assert that a greater asset was a man, a little 
hunched up, carelessly dressed, cigar smoking, young German— 
Steinmetz."S* Charles Steinmetz, the great mathematician 
who developed the law of hysteresis, which governs losses 
in the magnetic circuit of an electric motor, was obtained 
when the newly formed General Electric Company bought the 
Eickemeyer firm in 1892.
Two companies were formed during the Coffin leader­
ship which later caused General Electric much court trouble. 
The first firm was the Electric Bond and Share Company, a 
holding company dealing in utility stocks. This firm later 
obtained great strength in the utility field and was able 
to expand a preferential market for General Electric equip­
ment. The other firm referred to is RCA. The Radio Corpora­
tion of America was organized by General Electric after it 
acquired control of the Victory X-Ray Corporation in 1919. 
General Electric brought into the RCA organization West­
inghouse and American Telephone and Telegraph. The three 
firms gave RCA radio patents and, using over two thousand 
of such patents, RCA tried to keep everybody else out of 
the radio field. General Electric and Westinghouse divided 
the manufacture of radio equipment 60-40 with GE again 
taking the larger share, and RCA as the sole seller of it.®’ 
Thirteen years after General Electric formed RCA, the major 
companies in the agreement signed a consent decree to 
dispose of their RCA stock. "The government had invited 
them to organize RCA in the first place, and," says David 
Luth, Swope's biographer, "some industry officials thought 
it was a double cross when the Department of Justice com­
plained that the relationship was a violation of the
®®David Loth, Swope of G. E. (New York; Simon and 
Schuster, 1958), p. 30.
®’Backman, op. oit.^ p. 108.
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anti-trust laws."®® RCA owed General Electric money after 
separating and gave General Electric as part payment the 
building at 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York, 
still used as the main office for General Electric.
Swope to Cordiner
May 16, 1922, Gerard Swope became the third Presi­
dent of General Electric. He took the reins of office 
during a depression which was hitting General Electric very 
hard. General Electric had laid off 20,000 men, almost 
a quarter of its 1920 force. Business had dropped from 
sales of $318,000,000 in 1920 to $179,000,000 in 1921.®*
The major problem of getting Swope, who at this time was 
President of International General Electric,®® into the 
presidency of the parent company was how to remove Presi­
dent Rice. Loth notes, "Coffin. . .never had felt that he 
could leave the reins in Rice's hands."®* "I never did 
know how Mr. Coffin persuaded him (Rice) to give up the 
Presidency," Swope says, "but Rice was used to taking 
Coffin's orders."®2 Rice was offered an honorary Chair­
manship of the Board created for him, and, to the surprise 
of everybody, he accepted. Swope and Chairman Owen D. 
Young, then led General Electric from being a major manu­
facturer into the retailing market, developing the company 
name into a household word.
At this time. General Electric was producing numer­
ous lamps under different names. Swope unified them under
®®Loth, op. ait.j p. 247.
®*J6 id., p. 4, 103.
®®International General Electric is a wholely- 
owned subsidiary whose main function is to market GE pro­
ducts outside the United States.
®*Loth, op. ait.j p. 103.
62'Ibid.t p. 109.
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one name: GE Mazda. Steinmetz was publicized in the
press as a General Electric genius. The General Electric 
stock was divided so that it could sell for around $ 1 0 0  
to $150 to allow more of the "masses” to own the company. 
The policy toward stockholders prior to Swope, and adopted 
by most corporate managements of that time, was "treat 'em 
rough and tell 'em nothing."®^ Swope quickly changed this 
as quarterly reports were sent out to all stockholders 
and news releases expanded.
Swope disposed of the Electric Bond and Share 
Company stock by distributing it as a bonus to stockholders 
Coffin, who had organized the firm, was very much against 
this move, but Swope didn't budge. Coffin was officially 
retired but still kept office hours.
Under Swope, General Electric organized the 
employees into company unions, and later allowed national 
unions to enter without a fight. Many people to this day 
insist that this was a major blunder. Under Swope, pen­
sion plans and unemployment compensation were adopted as 
company policy. Unemployment compensation was adopted 
four years before the federal law was passed. Insurance 
plans were continually expanded and strengthened by Swope. 
Dr. Whitney of the Research Laboratory once said of Swope, 
his "greatest contribution was in teaching industry how to 
treat people."®"'
The team of Young and Swope led General Electric 
through the post-World War I reconstruction into the boom 
of the twenties, through a prostrating depression into 
a second recovery preceding World War II. Sales passed 
$415,000,000 in 1929, fell below $137,000,000 in 1933, 




same time periods moved from $67,300,000 to $13,400,000 
and back to $63,500,000.®® Fortune magazine was able to 
say in 19 40, "During that eighteen years (with Swope and 
Young) at the head. General Electric had never been in 
serious trouble. They leave the company with no bonded 
debt nor any preferred stock outstanding. Their stock­
holders have never missed a dividend. Their labor has 
never really struck."®®
According to Theodore Quinn, but totally unsub­
stantiated, as early as 1933 or 1934, Gerard Swope, con­
templating retirement, considered Quinn, the top-ranking 
Vice President, as a possible successor. Quinn, in fact, 
was a Vice President who seemed to have become an embittered 
man toward American large industry, and suddenly resigned. 
Quinn reflects, "I submitted my resignation orally to a 
surprised and shocked Gerard Swope in the summer of 1935."®^ 
Since his resignation, Quinn has devoted his life to attack­
ing big business, and General Electric in particular. His 
book. Giant Business : Threat to Demoaraoy j  and his famous
article, "Why I Quit Monster Business,"®® were recommended 
reading by General Electric management at their management 
school at Crotonville, New York, in 1956. It was here 
that Quinn's successor story was ridiculed by GE executives, 
most of whom had never heard of Quinn who had resigned 
more than twenty years prior. Quinn wrote, "The company 
engaged in practices of which I could not approve, and 
while I might disclaim responsibility, there was a certain 
moral responsibility nevertheless. I'm not a prude and I 
had endured and been a party to many irregularities, but
® ®"GE's Third Generation: Wilson and Reed,"
Fortune^ Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January, 1940), p. 102.
^^Ibid.f p. 58.
®^T. K. Quinn, Giant Business: Threat to Demooraoy
(New York: Exposition Press, 1953), p. 159.
®®This article has not been located by this author, 
but he believes it comes from a 1944 issue of Journal of 
the School of Living.
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the question was now getting closer to me."®® He was 
referring to collusion between big businesses, and to the 
economic power wielded against small business. The later 
General Electric price-fixing scandal indicated that the 
practice extended far back into this time structure and 
could have been one of the things to which Quinn was 
alluding, if his remarks have any validity. Just as Quinn 
was offered a position whereby he might have changed what 
he felt to be irresponsible practices, he quit the com­
pany. The reason Quinn rejected his chance to rectify 
the firm's affairs, arises from his belief that big busi­
ness is so big that one man does not and cannot control it. 
He says, "These corporations are public institutions pri­
vately controlled. The executives are more like the gover­
nors of our various states. They come and they go, leaving 
only slight imprints."^® Yet, he spends much time in his 
book showing how Swope ran GE with an iron hand.
Quinn's resignation opened the door for Charles E. 
Wilson and Philip D. Reed. Reed was a young attorney in 
the Lamp Department. Quinn says of Reed:^ ̂
Someone who knew something about the highly 
profitable Lamp Department had to be made a 
principal officer, and Mr. Reed happened to 
be there at the time in the accidental way 
. . . .He had never managed any department nor 
employed anyone. He had no experience in 
manufacturing, engineering, sales or accounting, 
but he had an unusually pleasant and likeable 
personality and was made Chairman of the Board 
. . . .Charlie Wilson, the new president, 
appeared to have little regard for Phil Reed 
and paid little attention to him. Phil was not 
permitted to meddle deeply in the affairs of the 
company.
®®Quinn, Giant Business: Threat to Demooraoy^
op. oit.j p. 159.
’'̂ Ibid.̂  p. 236.
’^Ihid., p. 160.
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Chairman of the Board Young and Swope had picked 
Charles Wilson to succeed Swope as President in 1940.
From 1942 to 1944, Wilson and Reed left the firm to work 
in the War Department, and Swope and Young returned during 
these years to manage the company.
General Electric, before World War II, under 
Gerard Swope was not the enormously complex organization 
it was when Wilson became President. Swope was in complete 
command with dictatorial powers. Fortune termed his 
attitude and deportment as pure Prussian.The magazine 
went on to sketch the personality of Swope in order that 
the internal management of the firm could be understood. 
Fortune said:^^
There was never any possible doubt that he 
(Swope) was running it. Directors' meetings 
tended to be like a personally conducted tour 
of certain aspects of General Electric, which 
Mr. Swope was willing to reveal to the assem­
bled company. He gave no quarter to an advisory 
committee of high company officers. Below him 
there were in general two kinds of situations.
First, there were committees galore, the sub- 
presidential management resting largely with 
them rather than with responsible department 
heads. . . .(Second) a man with an idea that 
Swope approved could get authority to carry it 
out, plus a special new title and, probably, 
an office farther upstairs. . . .Thus, company
operations were forever being altered by men 
suddenly invested with new powers.
There was a definite lack of established management 
design in the firm. This led some to describe General 
Electric under Swope as paradoxically successful chaos.
By the end of Swope's reign, some in the company became 
alarmed at the lack of systematic management, and by the 
uncertainty and indirection of the vast bureaucracy.
"Mr. Wilson at Work," Fortune, Vol. XXXVI, No. 5 
(May, 1947), p. 123.
p. 166.
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Organizationally, the firm was not structured to fit the 
complex needs of the operations. Top management, Swope, 
specifically, gave much of its time to one of its impor­
tant products, large apparatus. The structure seemed to 
indicate little realization or top interest in the fact 
that it also had a great appliance business. General 
Electric was founded for the electrical apparatus field 
and built appliances to stimulate electrical consumption.
The role of General Electric was one built on "the benign 
circle of electric power" philosophy, so well stated by 
Ralph Cordiner:^ ®
A turbine generator installed in a power sta­
tion makes possible the sale of more lamps, 
appliances, motors, and other users of power.
And as more people buy lamps, appliances and 
so on, they create the need for another turbine 
generator and more transmission equipment.
Thus, each new use of electricity accelerates 
the turn of the circle--creating a bigger poten­
tial market for General Electric products, not 
only in end use equipment, but in equipment to 
produce, transmit, and distribute electric power.
Fortune's description of "paradoxically successful 
chaos" was best applied to the appliance business which was 
"conducted," they claimed, "in a fundamentally haphazard 
manner."’® For instance, the refrigerator had parts made 
in four widely separated plants before being finally assem­
bled. Although General Electric had a good showing in 
refrigerator sales, the operation was inefficient and costly, 
In smaller appliances— toasters, clocks, and so forth—  
General Electric was very inefficient compared with the 
small independent companies specializing in these products. 
General Electric was doing about 30 percent of its gross 
business in appliances, yet it was not managing appliances
’®Ralph J. Cordiner, New Frontiers for Professional 
Managers (New York; McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1956), p. 11
’®"Mr. Wilson at Work," op. ait., p. 168.
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as though it were a major contributor to the firm.^’’
Theodore Quinn, Chairman of the Sales Committee 
and top ranking Vice President under Swope, claims,
"General Electric proved to be a high cost, inefficient 
manufacturer. The company was never an efficient manu­
facturer of anything to my best knowledge, except lamps or 
articles produced by outside companies which we purchased.
Our position always depended upon capital advantage."^®
In 1938, Charles Wilson, Executive Vice President, 
and later to succeed Swope, moved to change this managerially 
unhealthy situation. He set up a Planning Committee con­
sisting of one or two key men from each of the firm's main 
departments, with the objective of giving General Electric 
a thorough overall review. The committee concluded that 
in order to progress efficiently the business must adopt 
two principles: in management, decentralization; and in
production, diversification and specialization.^® The 
importance of this committee's recommendation is not to be 
overlooked, for this is the beginning of GE's concerted 
efforts by top management to decentralize the managerial 
decision making to lower ranks. Although the term "decen­
tralization" was perhaps understood much differently in 
19 38 than in 1951 (or any later year), this recommendation 
is the real starting point for the company's decentraliza­
tion policy which culminated in Cordiner's reorganization 
in the 1950's. Wilson became President in 1940, and at 
once began to reorganize and decentralize, but World War II 
intervened and he and Chairman Philip Reed went to Washing­
ton for the war effort, being replaced by Young as Chairman 
and Swope as President.
^®Quinn, Giant Business: Threat to Demooraoy^ op.
oit.j p . 79.
^®Mr. Wilson at Work," op. oit. y p. 168.
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Peace brought Wilson and Reed back to their prewar 
positions, and also brought Ralph J. Cordiner, who, prior 
to the war was president of the Schick Company, to General 
Electric as Vice President and Assistant to the President. 
Under Wilson's leadership, Cordiner gradually developed the 
organization structure as shown in Figure 3.
Cordiner, Diversification, and Decentralization
Decentralization had its beginnings in General 
Electric as early as 1929, when some aspects of it were 
covered at a company convention of top and middle manage­
ment held at Association Island on Lake Ontario. The need 
for the General Electric type of decentralization stems from 
the complexity of problems inherent in the diversity of the 
company product lines. When General Electric was first 
organized, it was principally in heavy apparatus for utili­
ties, and light apparatus for street railways and lamps. 
"Today, it is the most diversified company in the country"®® 
claims labor expert and ex-General Electric employee, Herb­
ert Northrup. It is in almost every aspect of the electri­
cal equipment industry, as well as in metallurgy, glass, 
aerospace, and land-based nuclear power, and is one of 
the nation's leading chemical manufacturers.
In 1943, Ralph Cordiner was made Assistant to 
President Gerard Swope (Charles Wilson was still on the War 
Production Board) and his major assignment was to develop 
a plan for overhauling the management and organization 
structure of the corporation. After three years of study, 
he called for a complete reorganization. He said, "Unless
®°Herbert R. Northrup, BoulwariBm (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: University of Michigan, 1964), p. 3.
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v/e could now put the responsibility and authority for 
decision making closer in each case to the scene of the 
problem, the company would not be able to compete with the 
hundreds of nimble competitors. . . ."® ̂ At General 
Electric, decentralization meant to keep the strengths 
afforded by large organizations but adding the flexibility 
of smaller firms. The key to decentralization is placing 
responsibility and authority for making business decisions 
on the level where they are needed. Of course, upper 
management was retained for long-range planning, guidance, 
policy, and to delegate generally this authority to lower 
echelons. The latter was perhaps the greatest obstacle 
that Cordiner had to overcome when he first instituted 
decentralization.
After World War II the company began to implement 
its bold new program of total decentralization. By 1948 the 
company had passed the $1,500,000,000 sales level,and 
it had detected signs of operational immobility which 
Cordiner attributed to organizational design weaknesses.
Cordiner became President in December of 1950, 
and within two years General Electric was reorganized. 
Cordiner was not due to take over for another two years, 
but Wilson was called to Washington to team with Sidney 
Hillman to head up the Korean War Office of Defense Mobili­
zation. Because of the sudden departure of Wilson, Cordi­
ner was faced with the immediate problem of should he 
quickly implement his decentralization policy or should he 
slowly implement it.*® He chose the quick route. Some
®^Ralph J. Cordiner, op. oit.^ p. 16.
General Electric Company Annual Report 1948,
15
®®Interview with Harold F. Smiddy, retired Vice 
President, Management Consultation Services, General 
Electric Company, Cincinnati, Ohio, August 24, 1969.
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two thousand top manager jobs were created or redefined; 
twenty divisions were set up with about seven depart­
ments. The Functional Organization— Taylorism— was 
abolished. The staff or services employees were cut down 
to a relatively few, but highly experienced, number of 
men to render assistance and advice. This completely did 
away with the growing tendency found in American industry 
of allowing the staff consultants to make the actual 
decisions by virtue of their position. Figures 4 and 5 
show the evolution of General Electric's Executive and 
Services Organization structures.
The new philosophy and organization meant replac­
ing central control with decentralized control, and the 
essentially autonomous structuring of about eleven 
operating product departments. The emphasis was directed 
to removal of "security, complacency, and mediocrity®® 
and an installation of an incentive or reward system which 
was hoped to bring higher and tougher standards.
Under Ralph Cordiner, the decentralization acti­
vities followed his well-conceived plan which fit so well 
with the beliefs of the new generation of company leaders 
who had grown up during and after the Hawthorne experiments 
and therefore preached human relations. It brought a new 
concept of delegated authority, responsibility, and account­
ability. "Success would bring advancement and reward," 
noted one-time manager. Dr. Edward Currie, "Failure would 
be equally swift in its results."®® Concern for people is 
a hallmark of the corporate philosophy of decentralization.
®‘*Frederick W. Cleveland, Jr., and Clarence C Wal­
ton, The Corporations on Trial: The Eleotria Cases (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1964), p. 63.
®®Edward M. Currie, "The Importance of Human Rela­
tions in Decentralization: A Study of G. E.," unpublished






EVOLUTION OF GENERAL ELECTRIC'S OPERATING ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
1951
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in General Electric have evolved over many yean  to the (oUowing clear 
lepantiao o f tetpontibilities:
1. ExEctmvB O f f ic e m  are retpontibk principally for dedtlona concern­
ing over-all Company Objectivet and Policiet in the balanced beat intereat 
of an concerned with the Company': present and future productivity. The 
Executive OlBcen do not have day-to-day Operating responsibility.
2 . O fer a tin o  M anagers  are responsible principally for profitable eaccu- 
tiott at such Objectives and Policies in their particular compomeots and 
have complete accountability for performance.
3 . Sarvieea OEkers, Managers and Consaitants arc m pnntlhle prlneipaBy 
far piaaati lBg  and co— aairatlag best practkea la their paitfcalar fa n e  
fiaaal tsids, far aidfag la fomndalfaa of Objectiva and PoBcics, and f a  
advMag and ataM ag both Execatlve OiBccn and Operadag Managers 
ia s Ip e a tM e  waya.
1953
D e c e n t r a l i z e d  O p e r a t i n g  B u s i n e s s  C o m p o n e n t s
The Company’s plan is to decentralize Operating Decsion-Making to the 
General Managers of Separable Business Components as rapidly and as com­
pletely as possible. Each of these General Managers, as the “Chief Executive” 
of his component, has full operating responsibility and authority except as 
specifically reserved and withheld in writing by his immediate superior. Each 
has commensurate accountability for the performance of his component. This 
includes accountability for profit (or loss), return on investment, market posi­
tion and all other measures of operating and managerial performance.
The present general organization concept is to establish “Product Depart­
ment” as soon as reasonable foreseeable early business potential is of the order 
of around twenty million dollars per year with good growth possibilities and 
profit (or loss) and market position accountability can be established for the 
particular products involved. A General Manager is placed in charge of each 
such Product Department with complete responsibility, authority and account­
ability for his Deparment as a Separate Business Component, within over all 
Company Policy and except for specifically reserved authorities as communi­
cated to him by his immediate supervisor.
The Product Departments are the basic “building blocks" with which the 
Company's Organization Structure is formed. Their Managers and workers 
ctmsiitute the wide-awake, competitive teams charged with the responsibility 
for keeping General Electric out front in all of its Product Lines.
eotrio Book One^ General Eleatrio's 
Company, 1953), between pp. 48, 49.
The President was both the "Chief Executive Officer" and the "Chief Operat­
ing Manager." Responsibility for establishing Objectives and Policies and for 
Mimking Operating Decisions was centralized for all products and for all func­
tions. Only the Presideni and hit immediate subordinates had profit respon- 
iibilily and accounability. This was an efficient - angement for the economic 
ooodilions and the size of the business at thrt ti le.
1940-1950
G r a d u a l  D iv e r s if ic a t io n  a n d  D e c e .m t r a l iz a t io n
Beginning with the form:lion of the National Electric Lamp Association in 
1901, the Company gradaally moved toward decentralized operation of par- 
tieukr butinesaa, e.g., Edison Electric Appliance Company (1 9 1 8 ), Inter­
national General Electric Company (1 9 1 9 ), Loekc Insulator Corporation 
(1 9 2 0 ), Canadian General Electric Company (1 9 2 3 ), Trumbull Electric 
Corporation (1923). The “Chief Executive" of each of these decentralized 
components as it was formed or acquired had responsibility, authority and 
accountability for performance for his component except as specific Reserved 
Aulhorilia were withheld by the Executive Officers of the parent Company. 
Them Reserved Authorities had to do principally with Policy matters affecting 
the ryaations of the Company as a whole.
1940-1950
D e c e n t r a l iz a t io n  B y  S p l it t in g  O f f  C r o w in g  B u s in e s s e s
In dda period many separable business components were split of! from their 
parent busineasa and given decentralized operating status. This was a period of 
rapid growth in sake and diversification of the Company's Products. The evolu­
tion of General Electric’s decentralized Operating Organization Structure hat 
been gradual and continuoiis. Some Operating Components had responsibility 
for all six of die primary typa of functional work from the time they were 
established. Others took over their own functional and subfunctiooal work 
gradually over many years, as they became more compkteiy decentralized, 
auloaomoua sab-busineaaes. Some functional typa  of work were decentralized 
generally before others. P am  of a sinÿe funcdon were usually decentralized 
hcfate die entire funetiori.
"Professional Management," General El 
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The President was both the "Chief Executive Officer” and the “Chief Operat­
ing Manager." Responsibility for establishing Objectives and Policies and for 
making Operating Decisions was centralized for all products and for all func­
tions. Only the President and his immediate subordinates had profit respon­
sibility and accountability. This was an efficient arrangement for the economic 
conditions and the size of the business at that time.
1900-1940
G r a d u a l  D iv e r s if i c a t io n  a n d  D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n
Beginning with the formation of the National Electric Lamp Association in 
1 9 0 1 ,  the Company gradually moved toward decentralized operation of par­
ticular businesses, e.g., Edison Electric Appliance Company (1918), Inter­
national General Electric Company (1919), Locke Insulator Corporation 
( 1 9 2 0 ) ,  Canadian General Electric Company (1923), Trumbull Electric 
Corporation (1925). In this period, the degree of centralization or decentrali­
zation of functional services for these decentralized components depended 
largely upon particular conditions and varied from comp onent to component. 
Because of the necessity for uniformity, policies and met hods for financial and 
legal matters were determined by centralized agencies fo; the whole Company. 
On the other hand, the decentralized components took care of their own engi­
neering, manufacturing and sales functions, whereas other components not yet 
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D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  B y  S p l i t t i n g  O f f  G r o w in g  B u s i n e s s e s
In this period many separable business components were split off from their 
parent businesses and given decentralized operating status. This was a period of 
rapid growth in sales and diversification of the Company’s Products. The evolu­
tion of General Electric’s decentralized Operating Organization Structure has 
been gradual and continuous. Some Operating Components had responsibility 
for all six of the primary types of functional work from the time they were 
established. Others took over their own functional and subfunctional work 
gradually over many years, as they became more completely decentralized, 
autonomous sub-businesses. Some functional types of work were decentralized 
generally before others. Parts of a single function were usually decentralized 
before the entire function.
1951
R e s u l t  o f  E v o l u t io n  o f  G e n e i 
M a n a g e m e n t  P h il o s o p h y  a n d  C
From this chart it may be seen that Ma 
in General Electric have evolved over 
separation of responsibilities:
1 . E x e c u t i v e  O f f i c e r s  are responsib 
ing over all Company Objectives am 
of all concerned with the Company’s 
Executive Ofiicers do not have day-
2 .  O p e r a t i n g  M a n a g e r s  are responsi 
tion of such Objectives and Poiicie* 
have complete accountability for per
3. Services Officers, Managers and Co 
for pioneering and communicating b 
tioBai fields, for aiding in fonnulatio 
advising and assisting both Executif 
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îSULT OF E v o l u t i o n  o f  G e n e r a l  E l e c t r ic ’s
ANACEMENT PHILOSOPHY AND ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
From this chart it may be seen that Managerial and Organizational concepts
General Electric have evolved over many years to the following clear
laration of responsibilities:
I .  E x e c u t i v e  O f f i c e r s  are responsible principally for decisions concern­
ing over all Company Objectives and Policies in the balanced best interest 
of all concerned with the Company’s present and future productivity. The 
Executive OSiccfs do not have day-to-day Operating responsibility.
! .  O p e r a t i n g  M a n a g e r s  are responsible principally for profitable execu­
tion of such Objectives and Policies in their particular components and 
have complete accountability for performance.
I. Services Officers, Managers and Consultants are responsible principally 
for pioneering and communicating b e s t  practices in their particular func­
tional fields, for aiding in formulation of Objectives and Policies, and for 
advising and assisting both Executive Officers and Operating Managers 
la all possible ways.
Source : PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT IN GENERAL .ELECTRIC 
GENERAL ELECTRIC'S GROWTH (New York, Generi 
Company, 1953),between pages 50,51.
1953
C o m p a n y -W id e  S e r v ic e s  C o m p o n e n t s
The Company-wide Functional Services Components j 
talize on large Company facilities and know-how in all s 
areas. There has been a gradual evolution and separatio 
primary functions, namely:
1. Management Consultation




6. Employee and Public Relations
7. Legal and Corporate
The Vice President in charge, the Managers, the Consult: 
in each Company-wide Functional Services Division have 
functional field the responsibility for:
( a )  Aiding in formulation of Objectives and Pol
(b )  Functional service and advice to Executive *
(c )  Comprehensive functional service to all Op
(d )  Recruiting and professional development of 
specialists
(e )  Pioneering in new functional research and di
The over all objective of the distinct separation of duties beu 
Office of the President, the Decentralized Operating Coi 
Company-wide Services Components is to provide optimui 
long-range service and profit through alert, competitive, 
operating business teams assisted and supported by the Cor 
how of Services Specialists and Consultants in the balana 
share owners. Customers and Employees, Suppliers, Govemi 
lie -  all those interested in the Company’s continuing prodi
1950
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lany years to the following clear
I principally for decisions concem- 
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resent and future productivity. The 
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le principally for profitable execu- 
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1953
C o m p a n y -W id e  S e r v ic e s  C o m p o n e n t s
The Company-wide Functional Services Components are designed to capi­
talize on large Company facilities and know-how in all specialized functional 
areas. There has been a gradual evolution and separation into seven distinct 
primary functions, namely:
1. Management Consultation




6. Employee and Public Relations
7. L e ^  and Corporate
The Vice President in charge, the Managers, the Consultants and their stalls 
in each Company-wide Functional Services Division have in their particular 
functional field the responsibility for:
(a ) Aiding in formulation of Objectives and Policies
(b ) Functional service and advice to Executive Officers
(c) Comprehensive functional service to all Operating Managers
(d ) Recruiting and professional development of functional 
specialists
(e ) Pioneering in new functional research and development
The over all objective of the distinct separation of duties between the Executive 
Office of the President, the Decentralized Operating Components and the 
Company-wide Services Components is to provide optimum short-range and 
long-range service and profit through alert, competitive, small component 
operating business teams assisted and supported by the Company-wide know ­
how of Services Specialists and Consultants in the balanced best interest of 
share owners. Customers and Employees, Suppliers, Government and the Pub­
l ic - a l l  those interested in the Company’s continuing productivity.
Source: PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT IN GENERAL ELECTRIC BOOK G::F 
GENERAL ELECTRIC'S GROWTH (New York, General n l e c . r i c  
Company, 1953),between pages 50,51»
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In a 1945 statement concerning decentralization Vice Presi­
dent Cordiner stated:*^
In 30 years the areas most seriously demand­
ing management's immediate attention have gone 
through more than a complete cycle. First, 
it was the customer and the employee, and these 
two should have continued first. Then, it was 
the production backlog itself. Then, it was 
the customer--in the severest buyer's market 
of all times. Then, with war, it was production 
again. Now the equipment and facility problems 
are largely answered, and the personnel problems 
rising to an all-time high. In the belief that 
the personnel problem--or opportunity--is a 
series of intimate, personal, local cases, we 
are looking to decentralization to bring 
top management close to the employee.
In a 1946 paper Cordiner again emphasized the need 
for organizational discipline and leader skills in terms 
of human relations:®®
The problem in all larger companies is to 
have the members of the organization generally 
understand that the real test of a good mana­
ger is not the multitude of details and the 
amount of functional operations he performs, 
but, rather, how well he can visualize the 
over-all responsibility, assign the work to 
qualified people, and then see that the employee 
who is given the assignment, his associates, 
and the entire organization understands the 
organization structure and adhere to it.
Our joint objective should be the continual 
study to simplify, streamline, and strengthen 
our organization, which means our human relations 
and their interdependence. (Emphasis added.)
Edward M. Currie, Associate Professor of Accounting 
at the University of Hawaii, worked for General Electric 
through most of Cordiner's presidency, and for some of that
®*Ralph J. Cordiner, "The Implications of indus­
trial Decentralization," General Management Seriesj 
No. 134 (New York: American Management Association, 1946),
p . 26.
^^"Professional Management in General Eleotria 
Book One. . op. oit.y p. 42.
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time as Financial Analyst assigned to the President's 
Office. He tells us that the opportunities for college 
graduates mushroomed under decentralization. He says,
"To illustrate the magnitude, in financial terms, of the 
opportunities which unfolded, it is helpful to recall 
that a typical starting salary, in 1948, for a college 
graduate was $200 per month. GE's starting rate was $225.
A salary of $8,000 or $9,000 would represent an ambitious 
lifetime goal for most college graduates of that year.
The average pay of all company employees, at that time, 
was about $3,000. During the following fifteen years the 
average employee compensation was destined to pass the 
$8 , 0 0 0 mark, and the starting salary for a college graduate 
was to rise to $6,588. Enterprising executives were to 
be rewarded by salary levels of $30,000 and upwards in 
their rise through the vast new arena of middle manage­
ment."®® Today's average income per employee (wages or 
salary) is over $9,000.
Contrary to the preachings of decentralization, 
however, along with its implementation came an emphasis 
on conformity. Instead of developing a departmental 
approach to management philosophy, the departments relied 
heavily on "central intelligence." Company-wide incentive 
plans were put into effect. A formal structure of posi­
tion guides, job specifications, salary scales, and 
employee rating procedures, was for the first time estab­
lished. Today it may seem impossible for such a giant 
firm to have lasted so long without these essentials, 
but only with the managerial revolution inside the com­
pany did they become actually developed into practice. 
Attempts were made to install a bonus plan and control
®®Currie, op. oit.y pp. 2-3. The $8,000 average 
salary figure is the level reached in 1963. See General 
Electric Company Annual Report 1963^ p. 32. More precisely, 
the average salary in 1948 was $3,367, as figured from 
General Electric Company Annual Report 1948^ p. 2.
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system which could reflect performance in eight key 
result areas (to be discussed in Chapter 111).^° Chains 
of command were established with clearly defined channels 
of communications. Management courses were set up to 
inculcate the new concept of decentralization. Even top 
level management, as well as third and fourth level, went 
to school at the Company's Crotonville, New York, complex 
where Drucker, Dale, Argyris, Haire, Brooks, and so forth, 
were frequent instructors at this old Harry Hopf estate.*^ 
"Two-way" communications received emphasis. The inter­
dependence and the significance of authority, responsibi­
lity, and accountability were thoroughly developed, 
especially by the outstanding mind of Harold F. Smiddy 
and his Management Consultation Services Division. Regu­
lar reviews of results were conducted and an organized 
reporting system was put into place.
Managerial positions multiplied under decentraliza­
tion, and to combat the manpower need the company appealed 
to self-development, thus developing the firm's concept of 
self-control. That is to say, the firm believed that 
each manager must be able to evaluate himself, to be able 
to measure himself,using the same measuring devices as 
his superior would use. This concept is called self- 
control by GE managers. The results of this self-evaluation 
should be evident before the same conclusion can be drawn 
by his superior. Even with the self-development concept
®®The eight key result areas will be detailed in 
following chapters. The areas are: Profitability, Mar­
ket Position, Productivity, Product Leadership, Personnel 
Development, Employee Attitudes, Public Responsibility, 
and Balance Between Short-Range Goals and Long-Range Goals.
*^See "G. E. Institute Nears End of Run--Now 
What?", Business Week (March 4, 1961), pp. 50-56, and 
"G. E.'s 'College' Is Back in Session," Business Week 
(February 8, 1964), pp. 78-79.
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the philosophy continued to charge each manager with a 
responsibility for the development of subordinates. The 
decentralization reorganization needed so many new mana­
gers that management talent became more of a premium 
than it was before Cordiner. Yet, it was under Cordiner 
that the firm first developed the three-deep concept—  
that is, the firm likes to have three candidates for each 
potential opening in any three-year p e r i o d . The stated 
principles of self-development and self-control include:
1. Development is primarily the responsibility 
of the individual himself.
2. Manpower development is based on helping the 
individual to do his present job better-- 
"Our best way of getting a promotion is to 
deliver outstanding results on our present 
job."
3. Learning on the job is more important and 
more effective than learning by study and 
educational courses. "We can't learn to 
swim without getting wet."
4. Responsibility for the development of men is 
part of each manager's job.
5. The outstanding specialist has a responsibility 
to teach and develop the men around him.
6. A sound manpower program should be designed 
to help everyone develop to his maximum capa­
city; it should not be designed to help only 
the chosen few.
7. Manpower development plans must operate for 
and through the decentralized components.
8. The skills required for General Electric work 
can be learned and taught.
Professor Currie, in reviewing the company's manage­
ment philosophies during his tenure (1948-1961) said.
"Management Training: An Act of Faith," Dun's
Review, Vol. 92, No. 6 (December, 1968), p. 47. The defini­
tion of three-deep is GE's own and should not be confused 
with more traditional definitions.
'^^Professional Management in General Eleotria 
Book Two: General Eleatria's Organization (New York:
General Electric Company, 1955), pp. 290-291.
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One is impressed with their breadth of 
scope and their heavy reliance on the tenets 
of "scientific management" as developed ori­
ginally by H. L. Gantt, Harry Hopf, and 
Frederick W. Taylor, as long ago as 1885.
The injection of human relations emphasis by 
the Gilbreths and Mary Parker Follett is 
also given recognition.®**
By the time the decentralized philosophy was developing at 
GE, it was understood that "scientific management" had a
number of weak spots. Drucker, in his Practice of Manage­
ment^ a book which draws heavily on his association with 
Harold Smiddy and the auth jr's long hours as consultant 
to General Electric during the conceptual years of the 
firm's philosophy, notes ;® ®
. . .Scientific Management. . .has not suc­
ceeded in solving the problem of managing 
worker and work. . . .It has two blind spots 
. . .the first. . .is the belief that. . .the 
individual motion (is) the essence of good 
work organization. . .that the human being is 
a machine tool. . . .The second blind spot
is the "divorce of planning from doing". . . .
Planning and doing are separate parts of the 
same job; they are not separate jobs. . . .
There is no work that can be performed effec­
tively unless it contains elements of both.
It should be remembered that by 1950, and the years 
of formulation of the decentralized management philosophy, 
the prevailing schools of thought in management were 
heavily rooted in the "Scientific Management" school of 
Frederick W. Taylor, the "principles approach" of Henri 
Fayol, in the writings of Follett, and, particularly, at 
GE, in the works of Harry Hopf. Follett and Hopf seem 
to balance the scientific, principles, and relations 
approaches, for their times. Through the human relations
®**Currie, op. ait., p. 4.
®®Peter F . Drucker, The Practice of Management 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), pp. 282-284.
73
experiments of Mayo and Roethlisberger and the publication 
of Chester I. Barnard's Functions of the Executive in 1938, 
a new movement stressing human relations and behavioral 
science was launched.Inside General Electric it was 
Harold F. Smiddy who conceptualized the balancing of the 
various approaches into the corporate philosophy.
A look at some of the financial figures will give 
us a little more of an insight at what happened under 
decentralization at General Electric. It is not claimed 
that decentralization caused these results as that claim 
could not be substantiated. We can see what happened 
with decentralization but we cannot see what would have 
happened had General Electric not reorganized. We shall 
look at General Electric with respect to financial figures 
only superficially to get a general idea; no depth analy­
sis is attempted. A comparison of GE against Westinghouse 
is useful as Westinghouse is more like GE in terms of
products and organization structure than any other firm is.
Also, a comparison with the other four largest firms in 
the United States is of some value to see if General 
Electric has kept pace. The other four largest firms 
from 1947 to 1968 have been General Motors, Standard
Oil (N. J.), Ford, and U. S. Steel.
We shall look at GE in comparison with the firms 
mentioned above for three different intervals. Since the 
firm began its decentralization during the last few years 
of the Wilson tenure, the first figures cover 1947 through 
Cordiner's last full year as President in 1957. In 1958
®®The works of Munsterberg, L. Gilbreth and Lewin 
are not to be cast aside, but from the practitioners' side. 
Human Relations became a fad through the work of Mayo and 
Roethlisberger and the later researchers.
*^Ranked in terms of net sales. Recently, U. S. 
Steel has dropped below Mobile and Chrysler, but for most 
of the 1947-1968 period U. S. Steel was in the top five.
là
he became Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Offi­
cer and continued to be in control and did not seem to 
change policy. The second group of figures from 1957 to 
1964 was a period in which GE plateaued; that is, the 
growth was very slow as demonstrated in a paper on the 
financial development of GE by Professor Currie.®® The 
last group of figures is 1964 through 19 6 8 , the most 
recent available. It was after 1964 that the firm had 
major price adjustments, which were unfavorable to the 
firm; 1964 was also the year when the company adjusted its 
books to reflect the antitrust cases and changed the for­
mat of its Financial Statements.®®
The First Decade (1947-1957)
In 1947 General Electric had basically the same 
organization found in 1945 (Figure 3), one which was extreme­
ly simply in organization structure with only six operating 
departments. In December of 1950 it had ten major opera­
ting departments (Figure 6 ) with six service divisions.
This 1950 organization chart was the first overall organi­
zation chart made widely known in the history of the 
company.1®® Swope did not believe in them. In January 
of 1951 Cordiner jarred the organization by beginning a 
two-year shakedown in organization structure which created 
about two thousand new management assignments and ended 
up with twenty decentralized divisions containing seventy 
independent operating departments.  ̂® ̂ An operating
®®Currie, op. ait.j Part ll, "The Results--1947-
1964. "
General Eleotria Company Annual Report 2965jp. 22.
 ̂ ^Professional Management in General Electric 
Book One...J op, cit.^ p. 45.
^®^William B. Harris, "The Overhaul of General 
Electric," Fortune^ Vol. 52, No. 12 (December, 1955), 
p . 115.
Figure 6
3.950 ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (FIRST OFFICIAL CHART)
O TH tI AOMtNtSTIATfVT 
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OTHER O PERA TIN G  DEPARTMENTS
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department is a profit center, or an entire "business" 
unto itself, acting as if it were an independent company 
(see Figure 7). The 1952 divisions were organized into 
five groups which were:
1. Affiliated and Foreign Companies Group
2. Apparatus Group
3. Industrial Products and Lamp Group
4. Appliance and Electronics Group
5. Defense Products Group.
In early 1952 Fortune had the following quote 
from Cordiner: "All the basic change is behind us,"
and then Fortune commented, "Mr. Cordiner is in the habit 
of settling problems years ahead, and when he calls the 
new GE structure complete, he means complete, he means not 
simply for the present fifty-four departments, but for up 
to s e v e n t y - f i v e . B u t ,  by 1956,^°^ the company's 
organization had mushroomed into over one hundred and 
fifteen decentralized and semi-autonomous operating enti­
ties, arranged into twenty-two divisions and having nine 
more divisions of services with over sixty more depart­
ments (Figure 8 ). Currie, as an employee during these 
changes, proudly states.
The myriad of details and major decisions 
which accompanied these changes represented an 
almost incomprehensible network of complica­
tions in facilities and manpower adjustments.
The accomplishment of a depth reorganization 
of such awesome proportions, in a time of 
unprecedented expansion pressures, is a monu­
mental tribute to its planners and executors 
(particularly Cordiner and Smiddy).
^°^"Cordiner of General Electric," Fortune^ Vol.
45, No. 5 (May, 1952), p. 157.
^°^No organization chart was issued in 1957. No 
charts were issued between July 1, 1956, and July 24, 1958.
^Currie, op. ait, y p. 6., and "G. E. Rejiggers 
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Compared to other large corporations, such as 
General Motors, U. S. Steel, Ford, and Standard Oil (N.J.)» 
GE's sales growth during the 1947-1957 decade ($1.3 
billion^to $4.3 billion^®®) was impressive: 230 per­
cent versus 160 percent^®? growth of the other four. A 
similar advantage was achieved in the growth of net income, 
which increased 161 percent as compared to only 116 percent 
increase for the other c o m p a n i e s . W i t h  assists from 
both inflation and automation, GE's sales per employee 
more than doubled (from $7,400^°® to $15,380^^°)— a rate 
of increase which was slightly better than that shown by 
the other four companies.
Successful efforts in automation and mechaniza­
tion allowed the firm to obtain a large growth in sales 
with only a small increase in the employment level. The 
number of employees in 1947, 180,000,^^^ grew to 282,000^^^ 
by 1957, an increase of only 57 percent, as contrasted 
with the sales growth of 230 percent. The company had no 
major strikes, partly because of the revolutionary no- 
nonsense approach to bargaining which is widely known as 
"Boulwarism," after the designer of the mode of bargaining.
1 0 5
p. 31. 
p . 3 2.
General Eteotrio Company Annual Report 2555, 
^^^General Eleotria Company Annual Report 2557,






General Eleotria Company Annual Report 2555,
^^^General Eleotria Company Annual Report 2557,
^^^General Eleotria Company Annual Report 2555,
^^^General Eleotria Company Annual Report 2557,
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Lemuel R. Boulware, Vice President of Employee and Plant 
Community Relations.
In 1953 Harold F. Smiddy's staff completed an 
intensive study of management development— a nineteen 
volume, eleven hundred page report believed to be the best 
synthesis of information yet prepared on the subject.
In 1954 the company led the way by setting up a department 
of Operations Research and Synthesis under Smiddy and 
headed by Mel Hurni— today one of the most respected names 
in the field. ̂ ̂ *
By 1952, sales had reached $2.6 billion,nearly 
double the volume of 1947. In 1953, a ten-year forecast 
was made, ten-year forecasts are made annually, which 
called for a goal of $4 billion in sales for 1962 ($4 
billion was reached in 1956^^® just three years later).
The 1954 forecast^was a projection of more rapid growth 
expecting 1963 to have five or seven or perhaps even nine 
billion dollars. This did not appear to be unrealistic 
in view of the growth of 1947-1953, an increase from $1.3 
billion to $3.1 billion. The year 1963 turned out to 
have a $4.9 billion^and even 1968 failed to reach $9 
($8.4) billion.'1*
^^^General Electric Company Annual Report 1953^
p , 15.
^^‘*Hurni is most likely the author of The Next 
Step in Management. . .An Appraisal of Cybernetics^ 
General Electric Company, 1952.
General Electric Company Annual Report 19 52̂
2 .
28,
1 1 6General Electric Company Annual Report 1956^
^^^Ralph J. Cordiner, "The Development of Com­
panies," Responsibilities of Business Leadership: Talks
Presented at the Leadership Conferences, Association 
Island {He'v York; General Electric Company, 1954), p. 13.
^^^General Electric Company Annual Report 1963^
p. 32.
General Electric Company Annual Report 1969^
p . 36.
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By 1957, sales topped $4.3 b i l l i o n , it 
began to look as if the 1963 goal for sales was not only 
realistic but, perhaps, conservative. The 1947-1957 
decade was the most dynamic growth decade in the history 
of the company as determined by earnings per share. 
Earnings per share had never exceeded 75* before 1947, 
but after that year, it never dropped below $ 1 and grew 
almost constantly to $2.84 by 1957.
The Plateau Years(1957-1964)
As previously noted, the goals set back in 1954 
proved to be highly optimistic. Although the average 
annual growth in sales between 1947 and 1957 was nearly 
12 percent, the following seven years, 1957 to 1964, were 
to tell a different story, with an increase during this 
latter period of only 16 percent overall, or an average 
growth of only about two percent per y e a r , w e l l  below 
the growth in G.N.P. over the same period. In 1952 the 
firm set a goal of return of earnings-to-sales ratio of 
ten percent or a b o v e , a  figure never reached after 
1940.124 Yet, prior to 1940 the figure was normally 
between 12 percent and 20 percent. The highest return 
after 1957 was 6.4 percent (6.2 percent on new accounting 
methods) 12 5 1959.
p. 32. 
pp. 6-7
i2®ffeneraZ Eleotria Company Annual Report 1957,
General Eleotria Company Annual Report 1958,
i22currie, op. ait., p. 7. 
i2 3fhtd., p. 8.
General Eleotria Company Annual Reporta 2949, 
32, and 1968, pp. 36-37.
^^^General Eleotria Company Annual Reports 1957, 
32, and 1955, p. 31.
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During the years 1958-1963, General Electric's 
progress came to a virtual standstill. Sales increased 
only 19 percent (about three percent per year). The 
increased volume for the other four corporations— General 
Motors, Ford, U. S. Steel, and Standard Oil— was 59 per­
cent, or nearly ten percent per year. Profits grew only 
12 percent, or about two percent per year, as compared to 
a growth of 114 percent, or over 16 percent per year, for
the other f i r m s .
Those opponents to Boulwarism should take note 
that average compensation, per employee, increased from 
$6,568 to $8,0717 in the period 1958-1963, an increase 
of 23 percent, or nearly 4-1/2 percent per year. This 
increase is a little greater than the growth in sales, and 
about double the rate of profit increase. It is true, of 
course, that the higher proportion of management personnel, 
with their higher salaries and benefits, contributed 
significantly to the upward movement of the average com­
pensation. With the added managerial talent GE's net 
profit, per employee, increased from $972 to $1,030, or 
six percent.128 Assuredly, Parkinson would delight in 
these figures.
At General Electric, the Chairman of the Board 
has always been subordinate to the President. Cordiner, 
at the outset of the plateau years (195 8), promoted him­
self to Chairman and moved Robert Paxton to President.
These lean years are still part of the Cordiner reign, 
for when he became Chairman, the power position moved with 
him, and for the first time, the Chairman was superior 
to the President. In fact, Cordiner created another post, 
which he also put himself in as holder, called Chief
I28currie, op. oit.^ pp. 8-9.
General Eleotria Company Annual Report 1963^
pp. 3 2-3 3.
i2®Currie, op. oit.^ pp. 8-9.
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Executive Officer. The real power position at GE is the 
post of Chief Executive Officer. For, when Paxton was 
unable to ride out the antitrust storm in 1961, he gave 
up the presidency to Gerald L. Phillippe, who later 
succeeded Cordiner as Chairman in 1963, yet Philippe never 
held the number one position. When Cordiner resigned in 
1963, Fred Borch became the power when he was made Presi­
dent. Phillippe continued as Chairman. Technically,
Borch handled the operating divisions and Phillippe 
handled s e r v i c e s . B u t ,  the power reigned in operations, 
not services. Figure 9 shows the organization design 
just before Cordiner's retirement and compares it with the 
1952 organization chart.
Growth Again Under Borch (1964-1970)
Fred Borch became President of GE just fifteen 
months after he was promoted to Executive Vice President,
(a post originally offered to Smiddy).^^® Cordiner, 
in the only interview he has granted since retirement, 
explained how Borch was chosen. He said,
I told the Board, you know, we're going to 
have to make a change pretty soon, because 
I'm not going to stay here til I'm sixty-five.
I gave them a list of fifteen fellows whose 
ages were right. . . .They averaged about forty-
three, or something like that. Some of them 
were in their thirties. Then I cut the list 
down until we had five. I went over it very 
carefully with the Board. . . .They knew these 
fellows. I made it my business to see that 
they did. It finally came down to three, and 
then Fred Borch was chosen.
^29"General Electric: Two at the Top," Forbea,
Vol. 92, No. 8 (October 15, 1963), p. 17, and "G.E. Shifts 
Herald Harder Consumer-sell," Businese Week (October 12, 
1963), p. 88.
“interview with Harold F. Smiddy, Cincinnati, 
Ohio, August 24, 1969.
^^^"As I See It; An Interview with Retired G.E.
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Figure 9
GENERAL ELECTRIC ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHARTS 1952, 1963
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE
Over the past eleven years, Ralph Cordiner has made subtle 
and Important changes In GE's upper echelons. But the basic 
key to the com pany's successful m anagement of decentralize* 
tion has always been — and remains — the department m ana­
ger. The highly flexible organization structure is bound to 
undergo further changes in the future. It Is a fafe bet, how­
ever, that the departm ent manager will remain the fixed 
foundation of m anagem ent a t GE.
1 9 9 2  ORGANIZATION CHART
1 Board o> Director* |
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l i i r d  Chalrmu 
9 Executive Vice Presidents 
1 Vice President
7 6 General Managers operating semi-autonomous 
departments in Appliances, Electronics, Industrial 
Products, Lamps, Apparatus
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121 General Managers operating seml-autonomous 
departments in Aerospace, Defense, A p p l i a n c e s ,  
Utility Products, Industrial Products, Lamps and 
Electronics.
♦Source: "Management Ways of General Electric,"
Dun's Review and Modern Industry (Vol.82, 
no. 5» November, I963)» p.30.
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One of Borch*s early moves was to reshape some divisions. 
This was incorrectly interpreted by many as recentraliza­
tion. It was not recentralization. The major organiza­
tional changes occurred in two of the firm's biggest 
revenue producers ; the home appliances and electronic 
data processing equipment (EDP).^^^ January 1, 1966, 
all research, development, and production of major appli­
ances (kitchen and laundry equipment) were reorganized 
into one division, known as Major Appliance and Hotpoint 
Division. The division still kept separate sales forces 
for GE branded and Hotpoint branded products within this 
division. At the same time, all EDP operations were com­
bined into Information Systems Division. This division had 
control over domestic as well as foreign operations in 
this area, such as Olivetti-General Electric of Italy and 
Bull-General Electric of France. This type of organiza­
tion, although new to GE, is basically the type of decen­
tralization used in the auto industry.
One year later the first major organizational 
changes were made since the early Cordiner years. Again 
heralded as evidence of recentralization,^^^ the move 
was not a recentralization of the corporation. Borch 
reorganized the top echelon by organizing a team termed 
the "President's Office" which was the creation of a five- 
man executive "troika" similar to that of General Motors. 
President Borch, Chairman Phillippe, and three Executive 
Vice Presidents formed the President's Office. At the 
same time, the firm doubled its operating groups from five
Chairman, Ralph Cordiner," Forbes^ Vol. 100, No. 8 (Octo­
ber 15, 1967), p. 37.
 ̂̂  ̂ "G. E . Reshapes Divisions," Business Week 
(December 25, 1965), p. 20.
^^^"G.E. Expands its Top Echelon," Business Week 
(November 25, 1967), p. 26, also, "G. E. Prepares Major 
Shifts," Aviation Week and Space Technology  ̂ Vol. 87,
No. 23 (December 4, 1967), p. 23.
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to ten. General Electric said.
The former top executive team was felt to 
be too small to provide the leadership needed 
for the Company's projected future growth.
This expansion at the group level is being 
implemented by increasing the components at 
the division level from twenty-nine to forty- 
seven and by the formation of some forty 
new product departments.^®**
The expansion of top level management was pushed 
forth because of the company's expanding market after 
1963. The company, after the plateau period, was able 
to boost sales by over 60 percent in the five-year 
period after 1963.^®® The reorganization gave top manage­
ment more flexibility as the top quintet was concerned 
with "company-wide commitments and policies that have both 
short- and long-term impact on GE's worldwide business."^®®
The reorganization actually carried decentraliza­
tion a step further. It doubled the operating groups, 
increased divisions to nearly 50 and expanded the profit 
centers, the departments, from 110 to 150.^®’ By 1969, 
there were 170.®®® Since 1963 General Electric had added 
$2.9 billion in volume, which matched the 1967 total sales 
of Westinghouse, the firm coming the closest to being 
an across-the-board competitor. Borch says, "We had let 
things grow too big down where the work is done."®®*
He reorganized the faster growing operations, breaking 
them down into "pieces small enough for one man to get
^^'*General Eleatria Company Annual Report 1967j
p. 25.
®®®"A New Team Rewires G. E. for the Future," 
Business Week (March 30, 1968), p. 102.
® ® ®"G. E. Expands Its Top Echelon," op. cit.
®®^"A New Team Rewires G . E . for the Future," 
op. oit.j p. 106.
 ̂̂ ̂ General Electric Company Annual Report 1968j
p. 5.
®®*"A New Team Rewires G. E. for the Future,"
ot>. ait.
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his arms around,"^'*'’ Borch added, using a favorite Cordi­
ner expression.
Cordiner moved General Electric from a $2 billion 
company to a $5 billion one in thirteen years. Borch in 
five years has led it from $5 billion to an $8-1/2 billion 
company (value of sales made). Borch, a marketing man, 
increased GE's foreign volume 76 percent during the first 
four years after C o r d i n e r . T h e  sales mark of $8.4 
billion in 196 8 more than doubled that of a decade earlier. 
The company has been growing at a rate of $1 billion each 
year for the past three y e a r s . B u t  profits did not 
keep pace. Earnings as a percentage of sales ranged 
between eight percent and five percent through the Fif­
ties (averaging 5.9 percent) . ̂  ̂ During the Sixties the 
earnings as a percentage of sales ran between 5.7 percent 
and 4.1 percent, averaging 4.9 p e r c e n t . A f t e r  1963, 
only 1965 (5.7 percent) was above five percent, the average 
for Borch and the rapidly exp.anding sales was only 4.7 
percent. Borch is openly dissatisfied, as he says,
"We have not been doing as well as we would like in increas­
ing our earnings to match our recent sales growth.
It should also be noted that capital expenditures since 
Borch became President were up nearly five times by the 
end of 1967.̂ **® Figure 10 presents a cursory analysis of 
General Electric's growth. It is not offered as an in- 
depth study but to show how the company kept pace with 
Westinghouse and the other four largest firms in the
p. 109.
i‘*2pred Borch, "How Do You Keep Up with a Company 
That's Growing $1 Billion a Year?" Forbes^ Vol. 100,
No. 6 (September 15, 1969), p. 336.
^^^Genevat Eleatria Company Annual Reports 1950-1959.
^^'*General Eleatria Company Annual Reports 1960-1968.
"G.E.'s Heavy Armful," Time (January 31, 1969),
p. 60.
^**®"A New Team Rewires G.E. for the Future," 
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1,31*,797
4 . 9  
 lU i i_
O enem l Motors
Standard Oil
(N .J . ) Ford U .S . s t e e l
387,303 123,000 10154^ 286316
580,160 160,000 160000 271037
♦51.9 ♦30.0 ♦173 •5 .3
586,160 146,000» 277330 271037
660,977 147,000 336841 199979
♦12.9 ♦0.7 ♦21.5 -26 .2
660,977 147,000 336841 199979
757,231 151,000 415039 201017
♦14.6 ♦# .7 ♦23.2 ♦0.5
1947 an. 1330 9795 3815 2355 1502 2123
1957 « 0» 4335 30072 18969 7830 6839 4414
f  Growth ♦144.7 ♦225.9 ♦2079 ♦16.0 ♦232.5 ♦353.3 ♦107.9
1957 2009 4335 30764 10989 8522* 6839 4414
1964 2271 4941 42564 10997 11768 9670 4129
i Qrwth ♦13.0 ♦ 14 .0 ♦38.3 ♦54.7 ♦38.1 ♦41,4 •6 ,5
1964 2271 4941 42564 16997 11768 9670 4129
I960 3296 8381 56913 22755 15474 14075 4609
t Growth , ♦45.1 ♦ 69 .6 _____________233aZ_______ ... ------- 1 2 1 ^ . ♦4 5 .6 ♦ U .5
1947 57
1957 73
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7 .5 1 1 .4 4 .2 6 .0
7 .7 1 0 .3 4 .7 9 .5
7 .7 7 .3 * 4 ,7 9.5io«a 8 .0 5 .3 5.7
1 0 .2 6 .0 5 .3 5 .7
7 .6 8 .0 4 .5 5.5
18 .3 1 4 .8 14.3 7.4
1 7 .2 1 4 .0 13.2 14.0
1 7 .2 9 .3 13 .8 14.0
2 2 .8 1 1 .7 12 .6 6 .8
2 2 .8 1 1 .7 12 .6 ■ 6 .8
1 7 .8 1 2 .7 7.6
Earned on C ap ital 
In v esttd  R atio
1947 1 5 .4 1 6 .9
1957 8 .9 16.9
1957 8 .9 16.9
1964 7 .0 U .6
1564 7 .0 LL6






D ata h a t  b een  drawn ( r o t
G tf l t r a l  e i t c C r i c  C otnam y: Annual R e p o r ts  1 9 4 8 ,  
1 9 4 4 , 1 9 6 8 .
1 9 5 ) ,  1 9 5 7 ,
W tiC in g h e u s t  E le c t  i r e  C o r p o r a t io n  : A nnual R e p o r ts  1 9 5 1 ,  1957
1 9 6 4 . 1 9 6 8 , l e t t e r  f r e t  D .P . K ir b y , S u p e r v le e r ,  C o r p o r a te  
A c c e e n t in a .  D e e e t b e r  1 . 1 969
C e n t r a l  M otors C o r e o r a t le n :  A nnual R e p o r ts  1 9 4 7 , 1 9 5 7 ,  1 9 6 4 ,  
1 9 6 8 , l e t t e r  ( r e t  R . i .  S m ith , C e n t r a l  A a s l e t a n t  T r e a s u r e r , 
D ecem ber 2 0 , 1 9 6 9 .
•T he 1 9 5 7  S ta n d a r d  O il  ( N . J . )  and th e  1964 C e n t r a l  K l e e t r l e  f t a u r e a  
a re  l i s t e d  t o  r e f l e c t  b o o k k e e p ln p  e h e n g e a . T h e r e f o r e ,  th e  tw o  
row s o f  f l i u r e e  f o r  e a c h  y e a r  w i l l  n o t be i d e n t i c a l . The t o e  row 
o f  f i g u r a #  t a  b a a ed  on  t h e  e a r l i e r  a c e e u n t in p  p r a c t i c e s  and th e  b o t t o t  
row r a f l e c t a  c u r r a n t  a c c o u n t in g  t e t h o d s ,  i . e .  T o ta l  a e e e a t s  f o r  
G a a e r a l E l e c t r i c  in  1 9 6 4  i s  l i s t e d  a s  $ 3120  ( t l l l i e n ) ,  a f l a u r e  
e a n a i a t e n t  w ith  t h e  1957  b o o k k e e p in g  p r a c t i c e s ,  and S2543 ( m i l l i o n )  
th e  f i g u r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  1968 p r a c t i c e s .
(T he n u a b e r  o f  e m p lo y é e s  l i s t e d  f o r  fo r d  in  1047 i s  a c t u a l l y  t h e  1946  
t o t a l  a s  th e  1 947  f i g u r e  i s  n o t a v a i l a b l e .
S ta n d a r d  O i l  Company ( N . J . ) :  A nnual R e p o r t 1 9 6 6 .  l e t t e r  from
M atthew  f  K ane, m a n a g er , O f f i c e  o f  th e  S e c r e t a r y ,  S h a r e h o ld e r  
R e la t io n s  D i v i s i o n . D ecem ber 9 ,  1 9 6 9 .
fo r d  M otor Company : A nnual R e p o r t s .  1 9 5 $ , 1 9 6 6 . 1 9 6 8 .
U n ite d  S t a t e s  S t e e l  C o r p o r a t io n :  A nnual R e p o r ta  1 9 4 7 .  1 9 5 7 , 1 9 6 4 ,
1 9 6 8 .
f o r t u n e  M a a a s tn e . 'D ir e c t o r y  e f  th e  5 00  L a r g e s t  I n d u s t r i a l  C or- 
p o r a t i o n s  f o r  1 9 5 5 . 1 9 5 8 , 1 9 5 9 , 1 9 6 1 ,  1 9 6 4 ,  1 9 6 5 , 1 9 6 8 ,1 0 6 9 .
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economy— General Motors, Standard Oil (N.J.), Ford, and 
U. S. Steel— for the years 1947 to 1968.^“*̂
Gerald L. Phillippe died in October of 1968.
Fred Borch was promoted to Chairman of the Board and, 
like Cordiner before him, he took over the title of Chief 
Executive Officer but he vacated the presidential title.
Rumor has it that Borch was afraid of slighting one of 
the three Executive Vice Presidents— William H. Dennler,
Jack S. Parker, and Herman L. Weiss— so no man was designated 
as President. All three were made Vice Chairmen.^**®
Thus, the President's Office has no President, but is made 
up of the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the 
Board, both positions held by Borch, and the three Vice 
Chairmen, Dennler, Parker, and Weiss. The latter three 
were immediately "elected" to the Board of Directors.
Borch and his triumvirate are the only inside members of 
the General Electric Board, consisting of twenty members.
This organization style is similar to Westinghouse's 
style, only there the titles include one chairman of the 
board and four who are called president.
^‘^The rankings of the top five firms came from 
the Fortune magazine's listing of the "Directory of the 
500 Largest Industrial Corporations," published from 
1954 to present. U. S. Steel was in top five from 1954 
through 1960. From 1947 through 1953 it is an educated 
guess that Ford was in the top five. Ford was not lif.ted 
until 1955, but most assuredly was a top five firm from 
1947 on.
^‘*®"G. E. Redesigns at the Top," Business Week 
(December 28, 1968), p. 24.
"Westinghouse Organizes for Long-Range Growth," 
Westinghouse News Release (Pittsburgh; Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation, January 7, 1969).
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What does the future hold for General Electric?
Fred Borch recently noted.
Only a little over a decade ago, this was 
a $2 billion company. Now it's an $8 billion 
one. As we grow, more and more authority is 
pumped down. So this puts a real bite on us 
to fill positions of responsibility. One 
reason for decentralization that escapes many 
people is that pushing authority downward is 
the best method of developing good managers.
The need for decentralization is a function 
of size, rather than a function of the times.
Currently, authority is pushed downward. The Board of Direc­
tors must pass judgment on expenditures of $500,000 or
more. Borch passes on those above $2 5 0 ,0 0 0 .
A decade ago GE was a $2 billion company; today
it stands just short of $9 billion. General Motors is a
$20 billion company. Borch predicts that "in just three 
decades General Electric will become a $64 billion com­
pany ."^52
The appendix to this chapter contains copies of 
many organizational charts issued by the company through 
the years, including the most recent chart.
Summary
"General Electric was fortunate to enter the most 
sustained growth business of the twentieth century,
Cordiner once noted. At the time of its conception it was 
a large firm, as were most of the organizations put 
together by the house of Morgan near the turn of the
^®°Fred Borch, "How Do You Keep Up...," op. cit.
J. Borch, "Growth of the Company: 1900- 




century. Sales in the first year (nine months, April- 
December, 1892) were about $12 million; they rose to just 
over $20 million in 1900; in 1912 they rose over $100 
million level. Five years later that was doubled and by 
1920 the firm had sales over $300 million.^®** The depres­
sion years saw sales dip below $ 2 0 0 million once although 
the firm never missed a dividend. The first $1 billion 
sales year came during World War II in 1943. After 1943 
the firm failed to turn $1 billion in sales, only once, 
in 1946, a year the firm incurred a nine-week plant closing 
caused by s t r i k e . in 1951 the firm became a $2 billion 
company, 1953, a $3 billion firm, 1956, $4 billion,
1963, $5 billion, 1965, $6 billion, 1966, $7 billion, 
and in 1968 the firm went over the $ 8 billion sales level.
The growth of General Electric can easily be seen 
in volume of sales, or value of output, by balance sheets 
and P and L statements. The intangibles mingled with 
some tangibles are the reasons why this growth occurred. 
Without the managerial minds, the organizational structure 
and the spirit of the combination. General Electric would 
have been, to quote Owen D. Young, nothing but "a muscle- 
bound mass of mediocrity.G in 1963, a panel of presi­
dents and board chairmen, 300 in number, chose General 
Electric the best managed company in the United States. 
These men knew the history of the firm, its numerous anti­
trust suits, its labor problems, they also knew its 
research, leadership, and management organization. As a
Thirty Year Review of the General Eleotrio Com­
pany^ 1892-1922 (Schenectady, N. Y .: General Electric
Company, July 16, 1923), p. 4.
General Electric Company Fifty-fifth Annual 
Report and Yearbook 1946^ p. 9.
^®®Borch, "Growth of the Company; 1900-2000,"
op. cit.j p. 3.
i5 7„jhe Ten Best Managed Companies," Dun's Review 
and Modern Industry, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January, 1963), p. 86
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training ground for executive management. General Elec­
tric is perhaps outranked only by the Harvard Business 
School. There are so many high ranking executives in New 
York alone, trained by GE but no longer working for the 
firm, that they have formed a club and meet once a month. 
Paul B. Nelson, Jr., advertising vice president of North 
American Phillips says, "There's no better training program 
in the w o r l d . G e n e r a l  Electric may have staffed more 
executive positions outside the firm than has any other 
company, yet it staffed well its own organization.
The Cordiner-led decentralization is similar to 
what other firms have since done, on paper— the organi­
zation charts are similar, but few reorganizations have 
worked so well. "I think that the reason decentralization 
hasn't worked in other companies," said Board Chairman 
Phillippe, "is because although many of them put out 
organization charts and all the other trappings, and made 
the right noises, they couldn't bring themselves to the 
point of putting a man on the spot and giving him complete 
responsibility."^®” The next few chapters of this paper 
will delve into how the company seeks to give a man complete 
responsibility without losing control.
^®®"General Electric's Old-Boy Club," Dun's Review 
and Modern Industry^ Vol. 92, No. 3 (October, 1968), 
pp. 48-50.
^^^Ibid.j p. 49.
^®”john Thackray, "Management Ways of General 
Electric," Dun's Review and Modern Industry, Vol. 82,
No. 5 (November, 1363), p. 30.
CHAPTER III
THE GENERAL ELECTRIC PHILOSOPHY AND THEORETICAL 
STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL
This chapter will present the General Electric 
philosophy and theoretical structure pf organization and 
control. It will have two distinct sections, one center­
ing on the philosophy of the organization structure or 
design and the other concentrating on the control mechan­
isms which have been developed in theory. Some of the 
actual practices, present and past, will be mentioned, 
but only for the purpose of explaining how a particular 
aspect of the philosophy developed. The next chapter will 
explain the actual practices, whereas this chapter looks 
at the theory behind the organization.
The first section of this chapter on the philosophy 
of the organization structure has been broken down into 
four major parts. The first of these parts covers the 
"three principal branches" of the corporation: Executive,
Operative, and Services. It explains the distinct sepa­
ration of responsibilities of each and their relationships 
with each other. The second part, "managerial levels," 
shows that the firm uses a maximum of seven levels of 
managers between the highest ranking officer and the lowest 
ranking manager. It is important to understand that in 
General Electric's philosophy of decentralization, it is 
the third managerial level (below the Group and Divisional 
level) that is the true profit center, and it is this
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managerial level that has been given most of the final 
decision-making authority for each product. Part three 
explains the background as to why the company does not 
use or make provision for decision-making committees.
The last area dealing with organization structure explains 
why the company does not, in theory, have "Assistants" 
or "Assistants to" in title or in job position.
The second section of this chapter describes the 
company's goal setting or budgeting and measuring, which 
is the control function in the company philosophy. The 
company began a study in late 1951, not yet completed,^ 
on how to measure the work performed by departments, divi­
sions, and individuals. This measurement project, as it 
is called, is the key to understanding the philosophy 
behind the control function of the firm. This section of 
the chapter also includes the conclusions thus far drawn 
on how to budget and measure results.
Concluding the second half of this chapter is a 
discussion on budgeting and planning. Before decentrali­
zation (1951), planning and budgeting were top echelon 
operations and decisions made at this level were then 
handed down to subsequent levels until they reached the 
foreman level. Before decentralization managers below 
the vice president level were given their budgets. Such 
decisions were handed down, level by level. Decentraliza­
tion, in philosophy, changed this to what is called "bottoms- 
up" budgeting.
The Organization Structure Under Decentralization 
The Three Branches; The Executive Office 
The General Electric organization structure contains
^Interview with Hugh Estes, New York, July 30, 1959.
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two distinct concepts which must be comprehended ii the 
operations and control of the firm are to be understood.
The first concept is the sphere of authority of the Execu­
tive, Operative, and Services branches, respectively, of 
the organization. The second concept involves the roles 
played by the successive levels of the organization, 
the Group, Division, and Product Department.
The first concept of the three areas of the organi­
zation— Executive, Operative, and Services— is extremely 
important. These three distinct categories carry clear 
separation of responsibilities :^
1. Executive Officers are responsible principally 
for decisions concerning over-all company objec­
tives and policies in the balanced best interest 
of all concerned with the company's present and 
future productivity. The executive officers do 
not have day-to-day operating responsibility for 
the company's separate product businesses.
2. Operating Managers are responsible principally 
for profitable execution of such objectives and 
policies in their particular component operating 
business and have complete accountability for 
performance and profit.
3. Services Officers, Managers, and Consultants are 
responsible principally for pioneering and commu­
nicating best practices in their particular func­
tional fields, for aiding in formulation of 
objectives and policies, and for advising and 
assisting both executive officers and operating 
managers in all possible ways.
The Executive Office is therefore responsible for 
a company-wide view, for broad objectives, policies, and 
plans of the company as a whole, and for appraisal or 
control over the results in the interests of the various 
corporate publics. The evolution of the office began in 
1913 when Coffin moved from the presidency to Chairman of
^Professional Management in General Eleotrio Book 
One: General Eleotric's Growth (New York: General
Electric Company, 1953), p. 25.
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the Board, and he and President Rice were considered as 
the "executive office." From time to time a powerful vice 
president or two, having "the ear of Number One," would 
be included in the "executive office," although this was 
informal. Under Swope, a man who built committee upon 
committee, the establishment of the Executive Department 
in 19 36 was a major step in forming the Executive Office. 
By 1949, under Wilson, the concept was expanded so that 
all staff vice presidents were members of the Executive 
Committee. But it should be noted that from 189 2 to some 
time during Swope's tenure the President was both "Chief 
Executive Officer" and "Chief Operating Manager." During 
this period only the President and his immediate subordi­
nates had profit responsibility. It was under Swope that 
this concept of the President having control over opera­
tions, that is, profit responsibility, was found to be 
unrealistic in such a large diversified operating com­
pany . 3
Since Cordiner established the Executive Office in 
1951, this Office has included the President and/or Chief 
Executive Officer (title used at various times since 
1958),4 Chairman of the Board, Group Executives, and Ser­
vices Officers. The Executive Office was made up of all 
the top ranking officers from Operations and Services. 
Division Executives, many of whom were Vice Presidents, 
were not included in the Executive Office since they 
reported directly to a member, usually the Group Executive, 
an organization structure very similar to that used for 
the Group Vice Presidents at General Motors today.® The
^Ihid.
‘'The positions of President and Chief Executive 
Officer are distinct positions, although often held by the 
same man in General Electric.
®At one time, beginning in 1951, there was a group 
headed by Philip Reed, Chairman of the Board, who, in turn, 
reported to Ralph Cordiner, President.
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company believes that this organization
represents a practical arrangement for "lengthen­
ing the President's managerial arms" with res­
pect to groups of Operating components without 
interposing a separate level in the organization 
structure.
A short quote from Ralph Cordiner's paper presented at 
the General Management Conference of the American Manage­
ment Association in 1952 will help to explain further this 
concept and why it does not, in theory, constitute another 
layer of management. He said:’
This "executive Office" has been deliberately 
created and developed so that the top executive 
officers are increasingly able to free up their 
time to participate in planning and organizing 
. • . .You will observe that (the Group Execu­
tives) . . .do not constitute a "layer of manage­
ment." Thus these Group Executives have "line" 
authority and are never to be considered as 
"staff" or "service" officers. The Group Execu­
tives' authority is a substitute or delegated 
type of authority with equivalent responsibility 
and thus accountability. Hence, these officers 
do not have Operating responsibility as we 
have defined it, but actually are Administrative 
or Executive Officers. The highest Operating 
level is that of the Division General Manager, 
as the full profit-making responsibility for the 
individual Division and Department business 
rests on the respective General Managers of such 
decentralized businesses.
Instead, the Group Executives truly are 
Executive Officers, aiding the President in his 
over-all responsibilities, but each with respect 
to his particular Group of product businesses 
as distinct from the President's Executive 
responsibility for the complete enterprise.
They are really, therefore, an extension of the 
mind and arms of the President, working closely 
with him, familiar with his aims, plans and
^Professional Management in General Eleotrio Book 
Two: General Eleotrio's Organization (New York: General
Electric Company, 1955), p. 99.
’Ralph Cordiner, "Problems of Management in a 
Large Decentralized Organization," General Management 
Series, No. 159 (New York: American Management Association,
1952), pp. 13-14.
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organization concepts; and able to speak for 
him and in his stead in interpreting these to 
the Divisional and Departmental Operating 
Managers within their respective Groups.
. . .each Services Officer or Group Execu­
tive so organizes his other work as to be able 
to set apart a measurable portion of his time 
during which he can act as one of this group 
of officers, working together with the President 
and thinking in terms of the Company's over-all 
objectives, policies, organization, management 
personnel, plans, budgets, controls, and per- 
f ormance.
To the present time, none of the foregoing has been 
altered in the company's managerial philosophy. To some 
eyes, this Executive Office may appear to complicate the 
corporate structure. Cordiner had developed it to simplify 
the organization. He wanted top management to have more 
time to think, more time for forward planning. Before 
1951 and the organization of this office, GE used forty- 
seven management type committees to do the work which after 
the reorganization was done either by two committees 
linked with the executive office or by single individuals 
charged with the responsibility for those decisions.® The 
two Executive Office committees were the Advisory Council 
and the Appropriations Committee. The Advisory Council 
forms broad policies; the Appropriations Committee was 
later abolished when a written corporate policy was 
developed covering capital and expense authorities.®
Figure 11 was issued May 6, 1957, by the Management 
Consultation Services of General Electric. It is a concise 
statement of the role of the Advisory Council and Execu­
tive Office with excerpts from the company's Professional 
Management books, the writings of Ralph Cordiner, a
®"GE Gets the Small-Business Touch," Business 
Weeky April 19, 1952, p. 124.
®This policy will be described later in this
chapter.
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COMPARISON O F  CONCEPT OF THE P U R P 
O F F IC E " AND DUTIES OF ITS M EM BERS A 
O F F IC E  WITH TH E FUNCTION O F TH E AD'
CONCEPT OF TH E PU RPOSE OF THE "EX ECU TIV E O F F IC E :"  AND DUTIES O F  ITS M EM BERS AS M EM BERS O F THAT O F F IC E
E a r l y  in  1 9 5 1  a n  " E x e c u t iv e  O f f ic e "  w a e  e s t a b l i s h e d .  It in c lu d e d  th e  
P r e s i d e n t ,  t h e  g r o u p  e x e c u t i v e s ,  a n d  th e  s e r v i c e s  o f f i c e r s ,  in  th e ir  
c a p a c i t y  a s  f u n c t io n a l  a d v i s e r s  t o  th e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  th e  g r o u p  e x e c -
PM  I,p. 27
U nder th is  id ea , a s  a  m em b er of the "Elxecutive Office, " e a ch  S e rv ic e s  
O ff ic e r  o r  G roup E xecutive  so  o rg a n iz e s  h is  o th e r  work a s  to  be  ab le  to 
s e t  a p a r t  a  m e a su ra b le  p o rtio n  o f h is  tim e  during  which he can  act a s  
one of th is  g ro u p  of o ffic e rs , w orking to g e th e r w ith the P re s id e n t  and 
th inking  in t e r m s  of the  C om pany 's o v e r - a l l  o b jec tiv es , p o lic ie s , o r ­
g a n isa tio n . m anagem ent p e rso n n e l, p lan s , b udgets, c o n tro ls  and p e r ­
fo rm a n ce .
In th is  re s p e c t  h e  is  thus a  m em b e r  of the o v e r - a l l  Com pany M anage­
m e n t team , counselling  in the  b ro ad  s te e r in g , rev iew , con tinu ity  an d  
d i re c tio n  of the co u rse , g row th , p o lic ie s  and re la tio n s  of th e  Com pany 
a s  a  whole. And in th is  cap ac ity  ea ch  such  m an  h as  a resp o n s ib ility  
to  b e  an  exponent of com pany p o lic ie s  w h erev e r he finds h im se lf .
T h u s , w hile the P re s id e n t  n e c e s s a r i ly  re ta in s  th e  au th o rity  and  a cco u n t­
a b il i ty  fo r  the  C om pany 's o v e r - a l l  su c c e s s ,  w ith re sp e c t to  which he has 
a c c e p te d  d e leg a tio n  fo r  p e rfo rm a n c e  fro m  the  B o ard  o f D ire c to rs ,  h e  co n ­
s c io u s ly  bows to  the p h y sica l need  so to  m anage h is  own p e rso n a l  T im e 
th a t  he m ay c a r r y  such re sp o n s ib il it ie s  im ag inative ly , w ith an  eye to  
th e  d iv e rs e  re q u irem e n ts  of th e  com plex  fu tu re , and yet w ithout having 
n e e d  fo r m o re  ta le n t o r m o re  e n e rg y  than  should be expected  fro m  a  
s in g le  indiv idual.
R JC : A MA 1952
T h e  D secutive O ffice, a s  so  conceived  and c re a te d , has been  d esig n ed
to  a c co m p lish  th e  following p u rp o se s :
1. P ro v id e  fo r  adequate  C om pany-w ide, lo n g -ran g e  b u s in e s s  p lan ­
ning;
2 . P ro v id e  fo r  adequate  thought, r e s e a rc h ,  an d  d isc u ss io n  leading to  
w ise , lo n g -ra n g e  Com pany P o lic y  fo rm u la tio n  and adoption;
3. E ffectuate  d e c e n tra l isa t io n  o f o p e ra tin g  d e c is io n -m a k in g  to  the 
G en era l M an ag ers  and  Fu n ctio n a l M an ag ers  o f O p era tin g  co m ­
ponen ts;
4 . P ro v id e  fo r  adqquate m ea su r in g  and a p p ra is a l  of p e rfo rm a n c e  
w ith tho rough  study of both  fav o ra b le  and unfavorab le  d ev ia tio n s
of ach iev ed  r e s u l ts  f ro m  p lan s , f o re c a s ts ,  sch ed u les , and  budgets;
5. P ro m o te  indiv idual se lf-d e v e lo p m e n t on the  p a r t  o f a ll em p lo y ees, 
and p a r t ic u la r ly  on th e  p a r t  of h igh ly  sk ille d , p ro fe s s io n a l ind i­
v idual c o n tr ib u to rs  and  p ro fe s s io n a l  m an a g e rs  — m aking  Com pany- 
wide p ro m o tio n a l o p p o rtu n itie s  av a ila b le  to  a ll  who p ro v e  them ­
se lv e s  co m p eten t in th e i r  p re s e n t  jo b  and who seek  and e a rn  p ro ­
m o tions;
6 . T ake  fu ll  advantage o f a l l  r e s o u rc e s  and of a l l  b u s in e s s  op p o rtu n ­
i tie s ;
7 . A chieve "B u s in ess  S ta te sm a n sh ip "  so  th a t th e  G en era l EHectric 
Com pany w ill be . and w ill be  known to  be, a  good "C o rp o ra te  
Citim sn" d em o n stra tin g  o u tstand ing  p e rfo rm a n c e  in  p roductiv ity , 
p ro fita b ility , s e rv ic e , and  le a d e rsh ip .
PM  a  p p . 102. 103
The p r in c ip a l  re sp o n s ib ility  of each  m em b er of the E>ec 
of the  P re s id e n t  is  to  a c t  a s  a  m em ber of the o v e r-a ll  m 
fo r the  e n ti r e  Com pany and to  th ink through with the p rei 
fo rm u la te  o v e r - a l l  Com pany O bjectives and to  define Coi 
with r e s p e c t  to o rg an iz a tio n  s tru c tu re , m an a g e ria l p ers i 
«11 p lan s , budgets and  m ea su rem e n ts  of p e rfo rm a n c e .
The m e m b e rs  of the  E xecu tive Office of the P re s id e n t,  i 
and  co lle c tiv e ly , a s s i s t  and a d v ise  the P re s id e n t  regard! 
d ire c tio n  o f p ro g re s s ,  o v e r - a l l  grow th and in te r - re la t io i  
d e c e n tr a l is e d  b u s in e s s e s  and  for the  Com pany a s  a  whol< 
an ccd  b e s t  in te r e s ts  o f a l l  p e rso n s  and g ro u p s in te res ted  
p a n y 's  continuing  p ro d u ctiv ity .
PM  I. F ig
E ach  m e m b e r  of the  Execu tive O ffice spends roughly twe 
o f h is  to ta l  e ffo rt a id in g  the  P re s id e n t, b ecau se  of h is  ex 
and know ledge a s  a n  ind iv idual ra th e r  th an  b ecau se  o f th< 
t iv e  o r  S e rv ic e s  r e s p o n s ib il it ie s  w ith re s p e c t  to h is  assij 
o r  S e rv ic e s .
T h is  i s  th e  m ean s fo r  en lis tin g  th e  thinking o f the  Compa 
e n ccd  s e n io r  o ff ic e rs  in  p lanning the Com pany's lo n g -ra i 
c o u rs e  so  th a t  re q u is ite  s te p s  can  be tak en  with ap p ro p ri 
a n tic ip a te  fu tu re  n eed s, m ake fav o rab le  situ a tio n s , a voit 
o n es , and tak e  full adv an tag e  of a l l  po tential opportun itie  
p o se ly  reco g n ised  d u a l re sp o n s ib ility , th e re fo re , is  anot 
o f how G en era l E le c tr ic  is  p io n ee rin g  in  m an a g e ria l phil 
in  o rg a n isa tio n  s tr u c tu r e  a s  w ell a s  in o th er tec h n ic a l an 
e n d e av o rs .
In th is  lo n g -ra n g e . C om pany-w ide, co llab o ra tiv e  endeav 
f ic e r  th in k s  in  te r m s  o f vdiat is  b e s t fo r  the Com pany as  
p a r t ic u la r ly  w ith r e g a rd  to  p o ss ib le  conditions m any  yea 
T h is  i s  th e  c o lla b o ra tiv e  e ffo r t which is  d ire c tly  ta rg e te t 
lio n  an d  ad op tion  o f  th e  b e s t p o ss ib le  Com pany P o lic ie s  t 
p lan s  and a t  the tak in g  o f a l l  p ra c t ic a b le  s tep s  to  en su re  
f its  an d  continued  g row th .
PM  II. p.
A s in d iv id u a ls , and a s  s e n io r  o ffic e rs  of the C om pany, t 
o f  th e  E xecu tive  O ffice a r e  ch o sen  fo r th e i r  w ide and div 
o f e x p e rie n c e  and b re a d th  of v isio n . A lso  they  a re  a s  fr 
fro m  o p e ra tin g  d e ta i ls .  H ence, they can  co n cen tra te  on 
c h a rtin g  a  sound and  s tr a te g ic  lo n g -te rm  co u rse  fo r the 
t r i e  C om pany a s  a  w hole an d  can  help  to  an tic ip a te  and  t< 
to  c a p ita liz e  on the  t id e  of ev en ts  ra th e r  than  be "entrap] 
tim s  o f th e  to r r e n t .  "
PM  II. p.
T h ese  se v en  m e m b e rs  o f  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  Office, togethe 
n ine C om pany O ff ic e rs  in  c h a rg e  of the S e rv ic e s , fo rm  v 
a s  th e  E x ecu tiv e  O ffice . T h ese  Senior O fficers  d é lib é ra  
a s id e  ab o u t 20% of th e i r  t im e  to  se rv e , not a s  Elxecutivei 
p a r t i c u la r  a r e a s  o f O p e ra tio n s  o r  S e rv ices , but a s  a  wel 
g ro u p  o f g e n e ra l  Ehsecutives who adv ise  the P re s id e n t  on 
c o n c e rn  a l l  functions and  a l l  o p e ra tio n s  — in o th e r  word 
pany a s  a  w hole. In th is  way Ûie B iecu tiv e  O ffice  provid 
o f e x te n s iv e  b u s in e ss  ju d g m en t and  advanced functional k 
h e lp  th e  P re s id e n t  p lan  the  C om pany 's m anagem ent, g ro  
c o u rs e  te n  o r  m o re  y e a rs  ah ead .
R J C  ;  " N e w
Note: E x ce rp ted  f rd m  O v e r-a ll
Com pany O rg a n isa tio n  C hart, 
d a ted  Ju ly  1. 1956
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Figure 11
C O N C EPT O F  TH E PU RPO SE O F  T H E  "EX E C U T IV E  
T IE S  O F  ITS M EM BERS AS M EM BERS O F THAT 
IE FU NCTIO N O F TH E ADVISORY COUNCIL
OF THAT O F F IC E
f ea ch  m em b e r  of the  E xecu tive  O ffice 
m e m b e r  of the  o v e r - a l l  m a n a g e r ia l tea m  
th in k  th ro u g h  with the  p re s id e n t  and he lp  
Ib jec tiv ee  and  to  define  Com pany P o lic ie s  
t ru c tu re ,  m a n a g e r ia l p e rso n n e l  and o v e r-  
e m e n ts  o f p e rfo rm a n c e .
! O ffice  o f th e  P re s id e n t,  ind iv idually  
Iv iae  the P re s id e n t  re g a rd in g  con tinu ity ,
11 g ro w th  an d  in te r - r e la t io n s h ip s  for a l l  
fo r  th e  C om pany a s  a  whole in th e  b a l-  
s o n s  and  g ro u p s  in te re s te d  in th e  C om -
PM  I. F ig  15
! O ffice  sp e n d s  rough ly  tw enty  p e r  cen t 
re s id e n t,  b e c a u se  o f h is  e x p e rien ce  
1 r a th e r  th an  b e c au se  of th e  b a s ic  E xecu- 
e s  w ith  r e s p e c t  to h is  a ss ig n e d  C roup
g th e  th inking  of the  C om p an y 's  e x p e r i-  
Ing the  C o m p an y 's  lo n g -ra n g e  fu tu re  
c a n  be ta k e n  with a p p ro p r ia te  tim in g  to 
fav o ra b le  s itu a tio n s , avo id  u n fav o rab le  
of a l l  p o ten tia l o p p o r tu n itie s .  T h is  p u r -  
s ib ili ty ,  th e re fo re ,  i s  a n o th e r  in s ta n c e  
nee  r in g  in  m an a g e r ia l  p h ilosophy  and 
e ll  a s  in  o th e r  te c h n ic a l and  s c ie n tif ic
wide, c o lla b o ra t iv e  e n d e av o r, e a ch  o f-  
s b e s t  f o r  th e  Com pany a s  a  whole and  
s s ib le  c o n d itio n s  m an y  y e a r s  hen ce, 
t  w hich  i s  d ire c tly  ta rg e te d  a t  fo rm u la -  
o s s ib le  C om pany P o lic ie s  and o v e r - a l l  
r a c t ic a b le  s te p s  to  e n s u re  fu tu re  p ro -
P M I L  p .  1 0 9
o ff ic e r s  o f th e  Com pany, th e  m e m b e rs  
o se n  fo r t h e i r  w ide and  d iv e rs if ie d  ran g e  
i s io n .  A lso  th ey  a r e  a s  f re e  a s  p o ss ib le  
e, th ey  c a n  c o n c e n tra te  on p lanning  an d  
: lo n g - te rm  c o u rs e  fo r  th e  G e n e ra l E le c- 
;an  he lp  to  a n tic ip a te  and  to  sh a p e  and 
n te  r a th e r  th a n  be "e n tra p p e d  a s  v ic -
PM  II, p . 113
P r e s id e n t 's  O ffice , to g e th e r  w ith the 
rge of th e  S e rv ic e s , fo rm  what i s  known 
ic  S e n io r  O ff ic e rs  d e l ib e ra te ly  s e t  
to s e rv e ,  not a s  E x ecu tiv es  fo r  th e ir  
I o r  S e rv ic e s , but a s  a  w e ll-b a la n c e d  
rho a d v ise  th e  P re s id e n t  on  m a t te r s  th a t 
ip era tio n s  — in  o th e r  w o rd s , the  C om - 
the  E x ecu tiv e  O ffice  p ro v id e s  a m eld ing  
it a n d  a d v a n ce d  fu n ctio n al know ledge to 
m p a n y 's  m an ag em en t, g row th , and 
ad .
















T he function of the A dviiory Council it  to  provide an effective meam* through which the President 
may advise with and receive the advice of his principal associates in regard to  major m atters of 
general Company policy and operation, parueularly long-range planning, major organisational 
changes, new objectives and programs, and other matters of major importance to the Company as 
a whole: and to afford the members an effective means o f integrating their interests and widening 
their understanding of the over-all objectives, policies, plans, programs, problems, and operations 
uf the Company as a  whole.
O RGANIZATION
Membership of the Council:
President, Chairman
•Cfaaiman o f  the Board, V ice Chairman 
Executive V ice President— Distribution Group 
Executive V ice President— Apparatus Group 
Executive V ice President— Industrial Products and Lamp Group 
E xecutive V ice  President—Appliance and E lectroeks Group 
V ice President—Atomic Energy and Defense Products Grotip 
V ice President—Management Consultation Services 
V ice President and Director of Research 
V ice P resid en t-E ag isecr in g  
V ice President—Manufacturing 
V ice President—Marhetsng 
Comptroller
V ice President—Em ployee and Plant Community Relations 
V ice  President—Public Relations 
V ice President and General Counsel—Secretary 
Other individuals m ay be requested by the Chairman or V ice Chairman to  attend for d iscussion of 
specific matters, as necessary.
An Assistant Secretary of the Company w ill attend m eetings o f the Council and serve as its 
Secretary.
OPERATION
Regular meetings— W ill be held on  the Tuesday before the fourth Friday of each month, at lOfD  
a.ra., in the Board Room.
Special m eetings—W ill be held as called by the Chairman or V ice Chairman.
Agenda—A  member w ill notify the Secretary of the Council by net later tham Tucaday o f th e second 
w eek prior to  the m eeting, o f any matter which he desires to  bring before the meeting ,  a sfp ly ln g  him 
w ith a copy of any report or proposal thereon. The Secretary o f the Council will then prepare and 
send each member an agenda and a copy of any such report or proposal a  week before the meeting. 
Scope of M eetings—T h e business o f  the Council w ill be ccxifincd to  matters covered in th e agenda 
except as to  special matters requiring immediate consideration. Preeeatatsooa and d ftfitttitm t will 
be o f subjects of major sigaificaocc to  the Company and a ll members of the Council.
Special Studies and Report»—T he Chairman or Vice Chairman m ay raqueat a  member or members 
to prepare special studies and to report at subsequent m eetings o f dw Council in order to  conserve 
the time o f  Council members.
M in u tes-T h e  Secretary of the Council w ill distribute m inutes o f a ll m eetings to  the members o f the
Council.
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T oday, a  co m m ittee  m ay  be h e lp fu l a s  an a d v is o ry  g roup , s a d  in d eed  the 
E lsecutive O ffice  of th e  G e n e ra l E le c tr ic  C om pany  m e e ts  tw ice  m o n th ly  as 
a n  A d v iso ry  C ouncil fo r  th e  P re s id e n t.  In  any such  a rra n g e m e n t, how ­
e v e r, i t  m u st b e  m ade  ab undan tly  c le a r  th a t th e  a u th o r ity  fo r  any p a r t i c u ­
la r  d e c is io n  l i e s  w ith th e  re sp o n s ib le  ind iv idual, even  if  he  m ak e s  i t  while 
s ittin g  w ith th e  o th e r  C ouncil m em b er# .
Such a  d e lib e ra te  av o idance  of a ss ia ta n t#  and  d e c is io n -m a k in g  co m m ittee#  
is  d i re c t ly  in  keep ing  w ith  the d e c e n tra l isa t io n  philosophy , sdtich re q u ire #  
fu ll d e le g a tio n  o f  re sp o n s ib ility , a u th o rity , a n d  acco u n tab ility  to  th e  p e r ­
son  who is  b e s t  q u a lif ied  to m ak e  the  d e c is io n s  fo r  a  c e r ta in  a r e a  o f  w ork.
R JC  i "New F ro m tie rs "  book
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FU N C T IO N
The (unction of the Advisory Council is to  provide an effective means through w hich the President 
may advise with and receive the advice of hit principal associates in regard to  major rnatters of 
general Company policy and operation, particularly long range planning, major orgsniaationai 
changes, new objectives and programs, and other matters o l major importance to  the Company as 
a whole; and to afford the members an effective means of integrating their interests and widening 
their understanding of the over all objectives, policies, plans, programs, problems, and operations 
uf the Company as a  whole.
ORG ANIZATIO N
Membetvhip of  the Cooncil :
President, Chairman
•Chairman of the Board, V ice Chairman 
Executive Vice President—Distribution Group 
Executive Vice President—Apparatus Group 
Executive Vice President— Industrial Products and Lamp Group 
Executive Vice President—Appliance and E lectronka G n u p  
V ice President—Atomic Energy and Defense Products Group 
Vice President—Management Consultation Services 
Vice President and Director of Research 
Vice President-Engineering  
V ice President—Manufacturing 
V ice President—Marketing 
Comptroller
Vice President—Employee and Plant Community Rdatsona 
V ice President—Public Relations 
Vice President and General Counsel—Secretary 
Other individuals may be requested by the Chairman or V ice Chairman to  attend for discussion of 
specific matters, as necessary.
An Assistant Secretary of the Company will attend meetings of the Council and serve as its 
O PER A TIO N
Regular meetings—Will be held on the Tuesday before the fourth Friday o f each month, a t lOGO 
a m., in the Board Room-
Special meetings—W ill be held as called by the Chairman or Vice Chairman.
Agenda—A member will notify the Secretary of the Council by not later tham T acaday o f the second 
week prior to  the meeting, o f any matter w hich be desires to  bring before th e meeting, supplym g him  
with a copy o f any report or proposal (hereon. T he Secretary o f  (he C oaacif w ill Chen préparé and 
send each member an agenda and a  copy o f any such report or proposal a w eek before the meeting. 
Scope of Meetings—The business o f the Council w ill be confined to  m atters covered in the agenda 
except as to  special matters requiring immediate coeuideration. P r ia i i t i s i u i  and diacuasiona will 
be of subjects of major significance to  the Company mod all members o f th e Cotusdl.
Special Studies and Report»—The Chairman or Vice Chairmaa may m gusat a  member or members 
to prepare special studies and to  report at subsequent meetings o f the Council in  order to conserve 
the time of Council members.
Minutes—T he Secretary of the Council w ill distribute minutes o f  all m eetings to th e  members o f the
Council,
12/1/54 10/12/54
T o d a y , a  c o m m i t t e e  m a y  b e  h e lp f u l  a a  a n  a d v i s o r y  g r o u p ,  o a d  in d e e d  th e  
E x e c u t iv e  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  G e n e r a l  E l e c t r i c  C o m p a n y  monte t w i c e  m o n t h ly  a #  
a n  A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l  f o r  t h e  P r c e i d e n t .  In  a n y  s u c h  a r r a n g e m e n t ,  h o w ­
e v e r ,  i t  m u s t  b e  m a d e  a b u n d a n t ly  c l e a r  th a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  a n y  p a r t i c u *  
l a r  d e c i s i o n  l i e s  w ith  th e  r c a p o n e ib t e  in d iv id u a l ,  even i l  h e  m a k e s  i t  w h i le  
s i t t in g  w ith  t h e  o t h e r  C o u n c i l  m e m b e r # .
S u c h  a  d e l i b e r a t e  a v o id a n c e  o f  a e a i s t a n t #  a n d  d c c ia io n > r o a k in g  c o m m i t t e e s  
i s  d i r e c t l y  in  k e e p in g  w ith  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  p h i l e e o p h y ,  w h ic h  r e q u ir e #  
f u l l  d e l e g a t io n  o f  r e a p o n a ib i l i t y ,  a u t h o r i t y ,  a n d  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  p e r ­
s o n  w h o  i#  b e a t  q u a l i f i e d  t o  m a k e  t h e  d e c i s i o n #  f o r  a  c e r t a i n  a r e a  o f  w o r k .
R J C  : " N o w  r r o s s M e r e "  b o o k
a « i  o w M i t s
IP O # OIPICTOM
O F P I C I
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reproduction of a Function Guide of the Advisory Council 
(issued December, 1954), and a section of the organization 
chart showing the Executive Office concept. The specific 
responsibility of each member of the Executive Office is 
included in the position guide for his position; in the 
case of the President, Chief Executive Officer (not in 
existence in 1957), and the Chairman of the Board, these 
are specific position guides; in the case of the Group 
Executive and Services Officers, these are generic posi­
tion guides. Complicating the picture of the Executive 
Office for students of organization. General Electric, 
from time to time, uses two titles for those people who 
can act as president for particular groups. The first 
is the Executive Office comprised of the Chief Executive 
Officer, Chairman of the Board, Operating Group Vice Presi­
dents and Services Officers. When acting with line 
authority only (when Services were not included), the 
group is known as the President's Office. The only dif­
ference between the Executive Office and President's 
Office is that the President's Office handles problems 
and policies which do not affect the Services; therefore, 
it deals only with pure line operating policy. The old 
President's Office has been discontinued, but company 
jargon refers to the organization comprised of Chief 
Executive Officer Borch and Vice Chairmen Dennler, Parker, 
and Weiss, as the President's Office.
Harold F. Smiddy, with Cordiner, the principal 
designer of the Executive Office and its smaller section, 
the President's Office, was once asked the question:
"Aren't you just kidding us to count it as only 'one 
level,' as you do, for Organization Structuring purposes?" 
His answer, given in 1956, was:^°
^°Harold F. Smiddy and Paul E. Mills, "Discussion 
by Harold F . Smiddy and Paul E. Mills of Questions Raised 
by AMC-1956" (Crotonvilie, N.Y.: General Electric
Company, 1956), pp. 16-17.
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In the first p„ace, that a group that 
small, who dedicate themselves to doing so, 
can become able to work s u b st antia ll y "as 
one," even if t^ ey • e different words and 
have different persej alities. Now three years 
ago (1953) we said lat was the goal. But at 
that time you could talk to one Group Execu­
tive and then another, and you'd say "nuts"; 
because they not only didn't sound alike but 
they were really saying different things.
Today I don't think that's so. We con­
tact those fellows about as much as any of you 
and we go the circuit with them and tap the 
most diverse problems with them and can see 
just how they do tick. So what do we see?
Well, of course, they still have the different 
personalities and the different words. But 
there is a surprising uni fo rm ity in what they 
basically say, if you're listening, through 
their different phraseology and personalities. 
This is what I see. I think it is what you'll 
see too if you stop being pure skeptics a while 
and really look and really listen.
. . .(In the Executive Office) you do need
more than one man at the helm, even if we do 
the best we know how to prepare any man for 
that responsibility and to prepare successors 
and so on; and it is t'ue that the essential 
Executive work is sc u^.ique and at the same 
time so similar for oa h of the persons concerned 
that there is truly no "layer" or "level" than 
from an Organization Structuring standpoint.
Services or Functional Components
Each operating department in General Electric has 
full responsibility for engineering, manufacturing, market­
ing, finance, personnel and legal operations. It would be 
an exceptional department which did not, from time to 
time, encounter problems beyond the experience of its 
members. The Services components help to fill some of 
the need for specialists with depth knowledge. The company 
takes from operations "the most skilled, the most experienced.
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the most imaginative men"  ̂̂ and puts them into Services, 
claims Arthur Vinson, former Vice President of Manufactur­
ing Services and lat îr . -roup Executive. He goes on to 
add :  ̂̂
They will not oi,].v know how to do work in 
their respective functions but will also know 
how to seek better ways and to teach them, 
thus advancing and multiplying availability 
of knowledge in each function. Once found, 
such men are promoted from product operating 
organizations and put into company-wide func­
tional services divisions. If, on occasion, 
we fail to identify men of sufficient caliber 
for our needs in such respects, we do not 
hesitate to go outsida of our General Electric 
organization in this lunt for talent.
Figure 5 (in Ch&pter II) shows the evolution of 
General Electric's Services components. Very little change 
has appeared since the 1951 Cordiner organization. The 
three years listed in Figure 12 are representative of the
Services used in GE. The year 1951 was the first year of
Services as organization components, and they reported 
to President Cordiner. The 1960 group reported to Cordi­
ner as Chairman of the 1 ;ard and Chief Executive Officer. 
They did not report to I resident Paxton who was responsi­
ble for all operations. In 1970 the Services report to 
the new President's Office (realistically they report to 
Borch as Chief Executive Officer).
The General Electric Services concept, new to the 
company in 1951, is in fact an old concept found in the 
military and religion, as well as in corporate organizations. 
General Motors used this staff concept as early as the
F. Vinson, "General Electric's Services 
Divisions," Planning, Managing, and Measuring (New York: 
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terre of Pierre S. du Pont.*  ̂ Cordiner and Smiddy, in 
setting up the General Electric organization, wanted to 
develop the General Motors type of environment and struc­
ture. They must have been aware of what Drucker had 
written of General Motors in 19 46. For the following 
Drucker paragraph about General Motors can be found in 
concept in the philosophy writings of Cordiner, Smiddy, 
and most of the General Electric literature about the 
place of staff in General Electric theory. Drucker 
said: '
It should be emphasized that the staff 
agencies in their relations with the divisions 
rely on suggestions and advice, and that they 
have no direct authority whatsoever over the 
divisional manager and his policies. Of 
course, they might appeal to top management in 
a last attempt to force an obstructionist 
divisional manager into line; this, however, 
is a theoretical rather than a practical 
recourse. In the normal course of events the 
service staffs have to "sell themselves" to 
the divisional manager, and have to rely on 
their ability to convince the divisional 
management and on their reputation and achieve­
ments. No divisional manager is under compul­
sion to consult the service staff or to take 
their advice. Yet the relationship between 
service staffs and divisional managers is on 
the whole quite frictionless.
At General Electric the Services act as the central 
trust or clearinghouse for all the technical and specialized 
areas of the business. They are the consultants for all
^^See Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General 
Motors (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), especially
Chapter 3, "Concept of the Organization." Also see Ernest 
Dale, The Great Organizers (New York; McGraw-Hill Company, 
Inc., 1960), Chapter 3, "Contributions to Organization and 
Administration by Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., and G M ."
^‘peter F. Drucker, Conaept of the Organization 
(New York: John Day Company, 1946), p. 56.
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of GE's businesses and are, as John Thackray in Dun's
Review noted,
a strong force that keeps departments or divi­
sions from anarchy. They have no power of 
command; their job is simply to question, 
probe, inform, or advise the department men on 
the front line.^®
Gerald Phillippe, as President, once said, "The question 
of how you hold together a company when it's decentralized 
is a very serious problem. Our services are the mortar 
that holds the company together."^® These service organi­
zations are deliberately designed to act as social inno­
vators; that is, they are specifically organized to sys­
tematically diagnose social needs and opportunities and 
to develop concepts and designs to satisfy them. Drucker 
said in 1959 that General Electric was the only company 
he knew of that set up its headquarter service organizations 
to deliberately act as social innovators.^̂
Services do not carry line authority in Operating 
components. The authority of people in Services and any 
person outside his own component is indirect. Authority 
comes from the influence of suggestions and persuasion 
and comes from the "authority of knowledge," expertness.
It comes from advising and teaching in the functional 
field of particular expertise. The Services "authority" 
comes from keeping ahead in theory and method of the parti­
cular function, pioneering in knowledge, if need be. Ser­
vices are also responsible for developing and coordinating 
the firm's national and international associationships and 
relationships in each functional field. Within each
'■^John Thackray, "Management Ways of General Elec­
tric," Dun's Review and Modem Industvyj Vol. 82, No. 5 
(November, 1963), p. 68.
^^Ibid.
^^Peter F. Drucker, Landmarks of Tomorrow (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 41.
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functional field (Services), each separate Service component
is responsible for
doing any company-wide Operating work which, by 
its corporate or over-all nature, cannot be 
performed naturally and effectively in decen­
tralized Operating components.^®
Traditionally, only the following few activities have 
fallen into this category of operating functions which have 
not been decentralized but are in Services components at
General Electric: basic types of general research, general
engineering development, consolidated accounting, institu­
tional advertising, and union relations which are so 
required by contract.This kind of work found in Ser­
vices has been called "pooled operating work" so as not to
confuse the philosophy of the structure.
The Services also are responsible for doing some
"operating work for which specific Operating components 
wish to contract for and pay for. . . This intra­
company charging is rarer today than it was during the 
first few years after reorganization. William Greenwood, 
Consultant in Management Consultation Services for a decade 
under Smiddy, said.
When I was in General Electric we were the 
only Services component that really did charge,
and we did it for maybe only a couple of years.
I think Management Consultation Services, 
which was the name of our division under Smiddy, 
was able to do this because of the great need 
for knowledge in the whole field of organiza­
tion.^^
Becoming more specific, he continued.
As I recall, Smiddy's time went something like 
$500 a day--which, going back into 1952-1953
^^Pvofessional Management in General Electric 
Book Two, . ,j op. ait.3 p. 120.
Ibid.
^^Ihid.
^^Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, October 19, 1968.
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was pretty damn high! I forget what (Paul)
Mills' was, but I think it was $250 a day, and 
I think mine was only $100 a day. But that's 
plus expenses. Expenses, of course, means 
travel, living, entertainment, and things of 
that kind. Nobody objected to the payment, 
but it could have been out of fear of what 
might have happened. . . .Smiddy was in favor
of charging for the services on the grounds 
that, if you're any good, they come to you.
So far as to what the competition was charging 
at that time, well, those were the days when 
we were only paying Drucker about $250 a day.^^
This type of billing or charging for services did not last
long. In fact, Smiddy didn't even remember doing it when
questioned on this subject about fifteen years later.
Further questioning William Greenwood as to why this
billing was given up, he replied;^"*
The reason we gave it up. I'm not too sure, 
except that I have strong impressions that 
nobody would ask us to do anything for them 
if they were going to be billed specifically.
Since we wouldn't have any work, the chances 
are that no matter what objectives we had set 
for ourselves. . .nobody wanted us. I am 
quite sure that would leave a distasteful 
image in the eyes of the chief executive 
(Cordiner). So, Smiddy, very wisely, decided 
at that particular time (1953) that he 
wouldn't charge them either. On the other 
hand, once our time was charged out as an 
assessment against the total corporation, 
requests were so heavy that Smiddy had to 
increase his component by about ten times.
Services are considered to be of higher status in 
the organization structure than are operations of similar 
title. For instance, a man moving from the position of 
Operating Department General Manager to Services Manager
^^Interview with William J, Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, October 19, 1968.
^^Interview with Harold F. Smiddy, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, November 8, 1969.
^‘'interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, November 23, 1969.
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would be receiving a promotion in status and in compensa­
tion. The company-wide Services involve greater respon­
sibility and carry a greater possible impact on the per­
formance of the whole company than do the operating positions 
at corresponding l e v e l s . T h i s  higher status for Services 
work was later to cause a personnel problem, which will 
be discussed below.
The thirteen-page "Services Officer Position Guide," 
included in full in the Appendix, gives a more complete
understanding of the total concept of Services work. Quot­
ing from the opening paragraph, the Broad Function is 
that:
The Services Officer has Executive Officer 
and Services responsibilities. He is respon­
sible for Executive, Managerial, and Functional 
types of work, and for Services Functional and 
Appraisal work. He is accountable to the 
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer for the efficient managing of the Ser­
vices component, and for the quality of Ser­
vices Functional and Appraisal work.
The "Services Officer Position Guide" then goes on 
to detail the generic responsibilities, authority, and 
accountabilities for the position under the four broad 
functions: Services Functional and Appraisal Work, Execu­
tive Work, Managerial Work, and Functional Work (Operating). 
Figure 13 summarizes the generic responsibilities common 
to all Services work. These responsibilities are built 
into each specific Position Guide, as can be noted from 
the Appendix.
To detail the work of the service organizations, 
a close look at one of the Services is of some benefit. 
Marketing Services performs its function just as the other
^^Professional Management in General Electric 
Book Two. . ., op. cit. y p. 123.
"Services Officer Position Guide," General 
Electric Organization and Policy GuidSy issued by chair­
man of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, p. 1.
]nq 
F IG U R E  1 3
G e n e r i c  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
C o m m o n  t o  A l l  S e r v i c e s  W o r k
Managers and Consultants in Services work have the following funda­
mental and generic Company-wide responsibilities with respect to their 
particular subfunction; namely to
1. Study, seek and know functional principles and the best practices 
that have been developed either outside or inside the Company
2. Develop professional expertness and deserve and earn recognition 
outside and inside the Company
3. Contribute to the advancement of fundamental knowledge; and 
invent, pioneer, develop and formulate better principles and practices
4. Design and recommend pertinent patterns, systems, classifications 
and nomenclature
5. Develop, recommend and interpret functional objectives, policies 
and plans
6. Provide “clearinghouse” service; and communicate and teach func­
tional principles, theories, philosophies and practices
7. Measure, review and appraise present practices as requested or 
needed
8. Cooperate in voluntary teamwork toward the achievement of Com­
pany Objectives
9. Lead and teach by persuasion, example and the authority of knowl­
edge
10. Practice and encourage “Business Statesmanship.”
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Services perform their particular functions. The company 
is now organized into about one hundred and seventy 
separate product departments, each with a General Manager, 
a Marketing Manager, an Engineering Manager, a Financial 
Manager, and a Manufacturing Manager. Each department has 
a clearly defined scope of products and markets to be 
served. The Marketing Manager is expected to perform a 
major role in the preparation of business plans for his 
department. These business plans must reflect the company's 
budget objectives of volume, profit, and other aspects of 
the eight key result areas to be explained in greater 
detail later in this chapter. Although the products of 
some departments— mainly industrial components and 
"apparatus"— are sold jointly,decentralization has 
created more than one hundred clearly defined Marketing 
Manager positions in the company. These positions are in 
operating management and are not in or under the control 
of Marketing Services.
Then the question arises, where does Marketing 
Services fit, and what does it do? Fred Borch, long-time 
head of Marketing Services before becoming Number One in 
the company, once said part of its job is long-range 
corporate marketing thinking and planning. As a member 
of the Executive Office, it advises the Board and top 
m a n a g e r s . 28 Marketing Services also introduces and 
helps supervise corporate marketing policies. Borch 
emphasized in 1958, "Actually, however, the number of 
policies has been reduced sharply in the last five years.
^^Lawrence M . Hughes, "G-E Under Decentralization 
Reaps Record Sales and Profits," Sates Managementj  Vol. 80, 
No. 5 (March 7, 1958), p. 35.
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Only three have been added; on internal pricing, continued 
use of affiliated companies' trademarks, and on the sale 
of company products to employees.
General Electric does not have a company over-all 
pricing policy or resale policy. Each operating department, 
that is, has complete control over pricing its own pro­
ducts. Some departments "fair trade" their products; some 
do not. It is not company policy to "fair trade." Speak­
ing on the subject of corporate marketing policy, Borch 
said, "When we think that a new policy is needed, it is 
worked out on the services level only after we've obtained 
the opinions of operating management about it."^°
Advertising is carried on by both Operating depart­
ments and Services. When advertising is developed to sell 
a particular product, known at GE as "Sales" advertising, 
it is an operations function and Marketing Services coun­
sels but cannot direct the sales campaign. A department 
has the right to reject all of the counseling and if a 
department does not ask for counseling it will not receive 
any. Institutional advertising, on the other hand, is 
carried on by the Marketing Services. General Electric 
spends more money institutionally, advertising "GE," than 
all the operating departments spend collectively.
Marketing Services was originally set up in the 
1951 organization plan. John L. Busey was its first vice 
president. The objectives of the Services were then much 
smaller in scope than they are today. Originally, the 
Marketing Services job wasz^i
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to assist the President, Group Executives 
and Operating Management to obtain maximum 
sales volume and profits by helping to formu­
late over-all marketing objectives, policies 
and plans; providing marketing services, 
advice and counsel; conducting audits of 
effectiveness, economy, and efficiency of 
marketing performance; creating good customer 
relations, and promoting the usefulness and 
interchange of marketing information.
These objectives have expanded, and under Borch,
who succeeded Busey, the objectives were stated in both
long- and short-range terms, reflecting the eighth key
area of measurements.^^ The following can be found as
Marketing Services objectives :^̂
Long-Range :
To assure that marketing will (help to) guide 
the company toward its growth and profit 
goals.
That policies, strategies and practices anti­
cipate, and be compatible with, our constantly 
evolving social, economic and political 
environments.
To acquire, develop, and communicate the type 
of knowledge which will help raise the standards 
of marketing performance.
Short-Range :
To understand operating situations. Communi­
cate existing knowledge and develop new know­
ledge to help operating units to do a better 
marketing job.
To help to sense opportunities for cooperative 
activities among them, and to help in trans­
lating these opportunities into action.
^^The Eight Key Result Areas are discussed in 
detail later in this chapter. They are; Profitability, 
Marketing Position, Productivity, Product Leadership, 
Personnel Development, Employee Attitudes, Public Res­




Most of the other Services are organized similarly 
to Marketing Services. Marketing Services has research 
specialists who develop new knowledge about the company 
and its environment which should help in making marketing 
decisions. There are consultants who act as liaisons 
between Operations and Marketing Services. There are 
also "Marketing Specialization Consultants" who are aids 
to operating components on particular functions of market­
ing, such as marketing research, product planning, adver­
tising, and sales promotion, and even on organization 
planning and nomenclature.^** Marketing Services has 
organized a section which is concerned with marketing 
personnel development and recruitment. This part of the 
organization works with operations to help them on their 
manpower planning and development. It conducts college 
recruitment programs and runs training programs. The 
training programs are run only if a company-wide program 
is the most effective method or if a department particularly 
requests such a program. It holds Advanced Marketing Semi­
nars and has produced a basic training course. "On 
request, supplies names of individuals for specific openr- 
ings,"3 s The Advanced Marketing Seminars are conducted 
five times a year and are four weeks long. Two weeks 
are spent at the Seminar center, two weeks back on the 
job, and then back to the center for the final two weeks. 
Usually twenty students per class are selected from men 
nominated by division managers. The instructors come 
from within the company and from colleges. In 1958, 
one of the first years of the program, nineteen college 
professors were used, including D. Maynard Phelps of 




are not to be confused with the Crotonville School which 
was originally set up by Management Consultation Services 
to teach management, although the school now offers 
courses in a number of functional fields for many Ser­
vices. Three-day workshops relating to specific topics 
are organized at the request of a division or department.
Like the other Services, Marketing Services, in 
theory, is not supposed to initiate changes. One member 
once said, "We'd be glad, of course, to pass leads along, 
but usually we don't run into them."  ̂̂ the Services
are expected to make suggestions, but only after they 
have been asked for them. Services do not normally 
initiate. If Marketing Services believes a change should 
be made in operations, it has two courses of action 
available to it: it can counsel the operating department
and can try to "sell" its idea, or the head of Marketing 
Services can send the suggestion to the Group Executive.
If the Group Executive accepts it, the suggestion goes 
through the Division Manager to the Department Manager. 
This is how it works in the corporate theory; the problem 
with the implementation of the theory is left for discus­
sion in Chapter IV.
Operating Components
The decentralized businesses are found in the 
Operating components. The Operating components are respon­
sible for salable products and customer services.
Cordiner said that each Operating component has respon­
sibility for engineering, manufacturing, and marketing, 
"each of them bearing full operating responsibility and 
authority for the Company's success and profitability in
 ̂Ibid.
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a particular product or service f i e l d . T h e  Operating 
components have "line" authority and a division or depart­
ment general manager is, in philosophy, a "president" 
of a decentralized product Operating business. The 
Operating departments are grouped by similarities to form 
divisions, and these divisions are combined to form eleven 
operating groups. This will be further detailed later in 
the description of the layers of organization. The heads 
of the Operating groups are members of the Executive 
Office. Today, there are eleven groups, up from the basic 
five found throughout most of the 19 50's. The early 
evolution of the operating organization can be found in 
Figure 4 of Chapter II. The groups in General Electric
have been and are :  ̂®
1952
1. Affiliated and 
Foreign Companies
2. Apparatus
3. Industrial Products 
Company













3. Appliance and 
Television













3 8 , Cordiner, New Frontiers for Professional 
McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1956), p. 58.
'Ralph J,
Managers (New York:
^*See organization charts in appendix to Chapter II. 
Also see Business Week^ February 3, 1951, p. 25; Business 
Weekj June 9, 1951, p. 109; Business Week^ December 10, 1955, 
p. 128; Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 87, No. 23 
(December 4, 1967), p. 33; Business Week, December 25, 1965, 
p. 20; Business Week, April 13, 1959, p. 37.
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The Operating departments are the basic "businesses," 
the building blocks on which the whole decentralization 
scheme rests. Each Operating department is a profit cen­
ter. There are about one hundred and seventy departments 
today. Above the department level is the division level 
which coordinates the activities and needs of the many 
"businesses" which have similarities, enabling them to be 
organized into a particular division; currently there are 
about forty-five divisions. Above this level is the Execu­
tive layer headed by the eleven Group Vice Presidents. About 
98 percent of the employees of the company work in these 
Operating components at one level or another.^" The 
departments are reasonably autonomous "businesses" and 
are charged with profit responsibility. Therefore, each 
department has been assigned corresponding authority over 
all the functions which affect the results because GE 
feels that without this authority a manager could not 
fairly be held accountable for profits. The minimum 
requirements needed to develop an autonomous "business" 
status for an Operating department are, according to Smiddy:**^
(a) That it have both a distinct product 
line (or for a non-manufacturing business,
a distinct and salable service) and a distinct 
market (or customer identity); and
(b) That its "manager" have both authority 
and responsibility for all of those basic 
functional kinds of work really essential to 
determine profit results; which, as a minimum, 
need to be those concerned with the "distinct 
product" and "distinct market" characteristics
Professional Management in General Electric 
Book Two. . op. cit.t p. 135.
** ̂ Harold F. Smiddy, "Profit Accountability, and 
Relationships Responsibilities, of Decentralized Product 
Operating Components; and Especially of 'Non-manufacturing' 
Business Components," Addresses and Comments by Harold F. 
Smiddy on Organizing^ Managing and Related Subjects^
Volume II (New York: General Electric Company, (July,
1958), p. 1. /
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or specifically with applicable "engineering"
(including development) and "marketing" work 
and, where involved, the attendant "manufactur­
ing" (including purchasing), "employee relations," 
and "finance" (specifically, cash and credit, 
as distinct from accounting) work.
As "autonomous" businesses the Operating depart­
ments have broad objectives written into each General Mana­
ger's position guide. From these broad objectives, 
specific objectives can be derived by the General Manager 
himself, with "persuasion veto power" in the division 
manager's office. These specific objectives will define 
what the business component is to accomplish, as well as 
what it is to provide through what sales channels for 
what customers in what markets, in what product lines, with 
what resources, and with what scope of actions and functions. 
The corporate philosophy states that department general 
managers design their own specific objectives, which fit 
into the broad, general objectives of the product group.
This philosophy can be overturned by the personalities of 
the managers involved. Strong-willed division managers can 
and perhaps do run "rough shod" over weaker-willed depart­
ment general managers. This is contrary to the organiza­
tion philosophy and can cause decentralization on paper to 
be centralization in reality. This problem will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.
Each department general manager has the authority 
and responsibility to determine the organization plan 
for his component to meet the objectives. Within the 
framework of the broad objectives— which are found in the 
position guide, the department's function guides, and the 
"business charter of the department"— the general manager 
plans for new product lines, for expansion, for attaining 
a leading position, and for other changes of importance.
He has the responsibility for success or explaining failure 
in the eight key areas which are used to measure his 
effectiveness.
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From the broad and specific objectives— broad 
objectives are top down goals and specific are developed 
at the general manager level— each general manager must 
determine what work needs to be done and how to get it 
done. 2
Decentralization at General Electric is more than 
the geographic, product, or functional decentralization 
which was popular before 1950. It is much more decentrali­
zation of responsibility— the delegation of the decision­
making to the lowest possible level— the lowest level at 
which knowledge to make the decisions allows authority to 
be placed. This is what shocked General Electric managers 
when Cordiner first put forth his plan, claims Smiddy.
It was an attempt to put into practice the principle of 
"authority to decide must be brought as closely as possible 
to the point where action originates ,"** * one of Harry A. 
Hopf's guides to organization.
Ralph Cordiner, in an effort to show how low the 
delegated authority was placed at General Electric, wrote 
in 1956:^5
**^For a detailed discussion of the organization 
structuring and philosophy, General Electric prepared a 
manual of about 600 pages: Manual of Organization Struc­
turing Principles and Criteria Designed for Use in Opera­
ting Components of General Electric Company (New York: 
Management Consultation Services, January 21, 1955 (Reprinted 
December, 1957). The firm designed a like manual for 
Services Components (November, 1957).
^^Harold F. Smiddy, "Automation," speech at Atlantic 
City Management Conference, General Electric Company,
March 5, 1959. (Taken from recording of speech).
'*‘*Harry A. Hopf, New Perspectives in Management 
(Philadelphia: The Speculation, 1953), p. 194.
‘^Cordiner, New Frontiers for Professional Managers^ 
op. cit.3 pp. 58-60.
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To demonstrate that the responsibility, 
authority, accountability of these Operating 
Departments is real, not window dressing, 
consider their pricing authority. The price 
of a product can be raised or lowered by the 
managers of the Department producing it, with 
only voluntary responsibility on their part 
to give sensible consideration to the impact 
of such price changes on other Company products.
As further evidence of the freedom provided 
by decentralization to the Operating Departments, 
consider the fact that the operating budget 
of the General Electric Company is not a docu­
ment prepared by the Executive Offices in New 
York. It is an addition of the budgets pre­
pared by the Operating Department General 
Managers, with the concurrence of the Division 
General Managers and Group Executives. These 
budgets include planned sales volume, product 
development plans, expenditures for plant and 
equipment, market targets, turnover of invest­
ment, net earnings, projected organization 
structure, and other related items.
Because the department level was responsible for 
profits, each department head was given almost total authority 
in his area. In many situations, this gave him indepen­
dence for performance from those above him. The final 
evaluation of projects and directions taken by a department 
head was measured by superiors; nonetheless, a department 
head could go in a direction not desired by his immediate 
superior, for it is the department head who has final autho­
rity for the direction of his department. His forecasting 
ability or his judgment would be measured at a later date.
A decision, unpopular with a superior, might turn out to be 
a "stroke of genius" later on. Gerald Phillippe often told 
two success stories of department managers making decisions 
which ran contrary to what the corporate leaders recommended. 
Phillippe would say;'*®
**® "Lessons of Leadership; Part XXXIV: Inspiring
Teamwork," The Nation's Business^ Vol. 56, No. 3 (March, 
1968), p. 44.
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Years back, one of our department heads 
wanted to build an electric toothbrush; every­
body he talked to said he was out of his 
C O ttonpickin' mind.
Anybody too lazy to brush his teeth, by 
gosh, hadn't ought to be alive anyway.
He said, "All right, just give me the money 
to go into production, and we will see who is 
r i g h t . "
You can guess who was right; in the first 
two years we sold over a million units.
I am one of those who had told him he was 
crazy.
Another example is the portable dishwasher.
Every member of the then-existing Executive 
Office told that department general manager he 
was crazy to bring out a portable dishwasher, 
because we had had one before and it flopped.
But, he said, "This one is square; the 
other was round. This one is automatic; the 
other was manual."
He brought it out, and it was the best 
selling item we had the next three or four 
years.
Operating components as holders of line authority 
may encounter the often-voiced problem of not having real 
authority, as opposed to theoretical authority, often 
found in the staff or Services components. Chapter IV
will discuss this point in greater detail. It is suffi­
cient here to point out the philosophy of the independence 
of the Operating department in General Electric. At the 
General Electric Group Executive Management Conference in 
1952, it was carefully explained that the President and 
Group Executives supply leadership for the firm as a whole; 
Services components supply specialized advice and inter­
pret policies; and Operating management has the respon­
sibility for direct day-to-day operations. Whereupon the 
following question was raised:
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You mean these Services Divisions can't 
tell an Operating department what to do? I've 
heard there are some things we're doing because 
we've got to--orders from New YorkJ
The reply was made by one of the Group Executive 
Vice Presidents, who said:'*̂
If you heard that, it probably means that 
somebody is lacking in intestinal fortitude.
If an Operating Manager has good reasons for 
not accepting the advice of a Services Division, 
he doesn't have to do so. He is accountable
for results, not the Services Division. But
if he does accept the advice, he should make
it his own policy and back it to the hilt.
Let's cut out this buck-passing "orders-from- 
New-York" malarky! Now obviously, there are 
certain matters--such as Company wide labor 
relations, certain aspects of public relations 
and legal matters affecting corporate structure 
of operations--where we must have a common front, 
with policies recommended by the Services 
Divisions and approved by the President.
Further questioning indicated concern over what 
would happen if an Operating manager refused to accept 
recommendations from New York or Services. The Group Execu­
tive replied that recommendations are made directly from 
the Services component to the Operating manager, and that 
the Division and Group Executives would not be involved.
But, he said.
In case of a serious dispute, I might have 
to resolve it with the Services and Operating 
Managers. Or, if the Services Officer feels 
that the decision is one involving the interest 
of the Company as a whole, he can go with the 
Group Executive to the President.**®
**^"Excerpts from Distributed Reports of General 
Electric Management Conferences," Appendix J, Manual of 
Organization Structuring Principles and Criteria for 
Services Components of General Electric Company (New 




General Electric has a maximum of seven levels of 
management; six levels is normal, and five levels is the 
goal. The maximum of seven levels counts the Chief Execu­
tive Officer (or President) and Group Executive as the 
highest level. The second level is the Division General 
Manager and level three is the Department General 
Manager. So, there is only one managerial level between 
the top level and the profit center or business level in the 
organization. Figure 14 shows the seven possible managerial 
levels. In each department there is normally found to be 
five organizational levels. The Department General Manager 
is the top level; level two is made up of functional mana­
gers; level three (and four and five, if needed) is made 
up of component managers or supervisors; and the lowest 
level is the individual contributor employee. The individ­
ual contributor is defined by General Electric as the 
member of the organization who
makes his contribution to the Company's total 
output of goods and services through work done 
directly by his own personal efforts, whether 
as a researcher, engineer, salesman, artisan, 
specialist, expert, advisor, consultant, pro­
fessional, or as a clerical or manual worker of 
any kind, in any function or branch of the total 
business . ^
He is not a manager. A manager, on the other hand, does a 
kind of work in which the principal responsibility is for 
getting work done through other people. Both the manager
Individual Position and Organization Component 
Nomenclature (New York; Management Consultation Services, 
General Electric Company, August 10, 1956), p. 105. For a 
fuller discussion of the individual contributor, see 
Professional Management in General ElectriOi Book Four,
The Work of a Functional Indivi-duorl-Contributor (New York: 
General Electric Company, 1959).
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and the individual contributor work with other people, 
but the former is primarily responsible for securing results 
through the work of others, while the latter is measured 
in terms of his own personal output and productivity in his 
particular work field.
Short explanations of each level in the organization 
are useful. The fact that the Chief Executive (and Chair­
man of the Board and/or President) and Group Executives 
are counted as one level has already been explained in the 
discussion of the Executive Office.
The second level is that of the Division. Related 
divisions form the Groups. A division is composed of 
related Operating Departments having related and usually 
similar types of products, markets, or functions and for 
which over-all Operating managerial responsibility is 






Re-entry and Environmental Systems Division
Space Division
The third level is that of the Department General 
Manager who reports directly to the Division General 
Manager. Primarily this is the component representing a 
product or salable service having direct accountability 




Power Tube Department 
Receiving Tube Department 
Rectifier Components Department 
Semiconductor Products Department
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The number of levels through the General Manager 
of the Department level is three. Within the department 
level there may be two or three levels between the General 
Manager and the individual contributor, making a total of 
five or six levels above the individual contributor.
Before reorganization. General Electric had seventeen or 
eighteen layers in several Divisions.®® Peter Drucker 
claims, ". . .any business that needs more than six or 
seven levels between rank-and-file employee and top manage­
ment (vice president level?) is too big."® ̂ Smiddy 
responded to a question as to why General Electric has a 
goal of five managerial levels above the worker in the 
organization, as follows:
We have departmental businesses as small 
as five or six million dollars. . .others 
where business runs up well over a hundred 
million dollars annually. . . .In the first 
place, I don't think there's anything sacred 
about five. . . .How did five get into the
act? It came from taking a look at the prob­
lems of trying to get an optimum balance of 
spans and levels as the two Organization 
Structure design factors that influence, on 
the one hand, the best integrating and commu­
nicating and, on the other hand, the best 
achievement of actual performance of the 
particular work. Five came about by looking 
at where we were and seeing what might be a 
sound goal to shoot at. We knew that seven­
teen or eighteen layers. . .was too many for 
the reason that many levels factually pre­
vented good two-way communications. . . .
Later, Paul Mills, who helped to design the organi­
zational structure, added that you don't organize from the 
top down. He said:®®
®®Smiddy and Mills, op. ait., p. 5.
®^Peter F. Drucker, The Praotioe of Management
(New York: Harper and Row, 1954), p. 234.
®^Smiddy and Mills, op. ait., pp. 4-6.
Ibid. 3 p. 20. This statement is not to be con­
fused with Barnard's and Argyris' belief of bottoms-up 
authority.
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You need to start out with the actual work 
and with the people to do it from the bottom, 
and go on up. Forget the handles that they have 
on these levels; whether they are general mana­
gers, general foremen or what. Start at the 
bottom, the worker; go up and then see how many 
managerial levels you need for different kinds 
of managing work in depth and scope.
Below the department level there may be a section 
level, but this is not general. A section is a component 
within a department which in itself has a product or 
salable service and has accountability for profits. The 
section manager reports to the Department General Mana­
ger. Usually, a section is organized when the department 
develops a product which is similar to its generic pro­
duct, but which can stand alone. An example of this is 
sycachome which is really a plastic, but it has unique 
qualities so that it seems to be a distinct product. 
Frequently, these sections grow to a point where they can 
be spun off as separate departments. During the maturing 
stages the product development will be managed as a sec­
tion until such time the department and division manager 
deem it proper to organize it as a department.
Usually the next level below the Department General 
Manager, the fourth level, is that of the functional 
managers, such as Manager— Marketing, Home Laundry Depart­
ment or Manager— Finance, Home Laundry Department.
Below these Functional Managers is the lowest managerial 
level which has been termed supervisory level, such as 
General Foreman. Reporting to this last managerial 
level are the individual contributors, such as Auditors, 
Procedures Analysts, Drill Press Operators, Machinists, 
and so forth. A department would be set up a shown in 
Figure 15.
FIGURE 15




















*The "Procedures Analyst" and "Auditor" may, in fact, be individual contributors, although in large 
departments these will be supervisory positions, each having a staff reporting to them.
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Committees
In the foregoing discussions of the organization 
structure of the General Electric Company, it is worth 
knowing that there are no provisions for the use of 
committees as decision-making bodies, such as those 
found in General Motors.
In writing the four books on ProfessConal Manage­
ment in General Eleotrio  ̂ Harold Smiddy developed the 
philosophy of management issued under Ralph Cordiner's 
name as the official philosophy of the firm's top manage­
ment. Soon after the release of these books many top 
executives found innumerable areas of disagreement with 
the philosophy, but Cordiner and Smiddy planned to persuade 
all to their philosophy. The Professional Management 
series was written not only to set down on paper the 
corporate philosophy but to be used as a guide on how to 
manage, to help educate and further the study of manage­
ment, and to help organize the investigation of the area 
so as to upgrade the philosophy through greater in-depth 
reasoning.
Smiddy developed sixteen principles relating to 
the process of Delegation, reprinted as Exhibit 16. The 
fifth principle explains why General Electric does not 
have decision-making committees. The principle states that 
a "Responsibility, like authority, is personal and cannot 
be shared by a group of individuals or a committee. Con­
fusion results if this is attempted.
The corporate philosophy is that committees 
cannot be responsible for making decisions. This con­
clusion is drawn from the belief that decisions are acts
Professional Management in General Electric 




T u e  Pr o c e s s o f  Estarlisiiing W o k k i n c  A g r e e m e n t s  
B e t w e e n  a M a n a n d  t h e  M a n a g e r  t o  W h o m  H e 
R e p o r t s in a n  O r g a n i z a t i o n St r u c t u r e  
* $ * *
Two-Waj)i Understanding Is Required
1. Assigning responsibility for work and teamwork, transferring authority, and accepting 
corresponding accountability are three inseparable, complementary parts of the process o f 
D ele g a tio n  of work. They arc not separate. Independent concepts.
2 . Being complementary parts o f one process, such responsibility, authority, and account­
ability are bounded by the same limits in time and in scope and are evaluated in the same 
units o f measurement. They are simultaneous, co terminous, and commensurate.
3 . The rc.sponsibilitics, authorities, and accountabilities inherent in each position in an 
Organization Structure are detailed in its "Position G uide," in order that they may be 
clearly understood by all concerned. Responsibilities so defined include both duty and 
relationships-that is, both "w ork" and “ teamwork"—responsibilities. A  team, unlike a 
committee, has assigned positions and individual responsibilities for both work and 
teamwork.
4 .  These represent a "meeting o f the minds," and working understanding and arrange­
ments, between two individuals only —a man and the manager to whom he reports.
5 .  Responsibility, like authority, is personal and cannot be shared by a group of in­
dividuals or a committee. Confusion results if this is attempted.
6 . I'hc definition o f the areas o f responsibility must be clear, precise, and complete 
so as to avoid confusion, omissions, or overlaps. I f  there is to be assurance that the work 
will get done, each area must be assigned by a manager to an individual, who in turn  
understands and accepts accountability fo r performance.
The M an ’s Part
7 . The incumbent o f a particular position automatically accepts the obligation o f 
accountability to his manager for performance of all responsibilities —all duties and rela­
tionships—assigned to him  when he accepts a particular position, and as long as he holds it.
8 . W hen the incumbent o f a particular position voluntarily accepts the obligation and 
the accountability for carrying out the defined responsibilities —for both work and team­
w o rk-inh eren t in that position, he is autom atically endowed w ith the authority which 
goes with the position as so designed, and which is needed to do the designated work. Such 
authority is inherent in the position in the organization structure. It  is a mantle worn by 
the incumbent as long as, but only as long as, he occupies the position.
9 .  A n  individual should have only one boss, the manager to whom he reports.
7'he Manager's Part
1 0 . The manager, to whom the incumbent o f a particular position reports, assigns the 
designated responsibilities and relationships, transfers from  his own position to the posi­
tion o f the men who report to him all authority needed to do the designated work, and 
rightfully expects accountability for performance o f such assigned responsibilities and 
relationships.
1 1 . An individual has a responsibility or he docs not have it. A n  attempt to assign partial 
responsibility doc.s not w oik. F a ilia l responsibility is contusion.
1 2 . A uthority  cannot be transferred and retained at the same time. A n  attempt to transfer 
partial authority does not work. Partial authority is confusion.
1 3 . Lim its to and boundaries o f responsibility and relationships, o f authority, and of 
accountability arc set by the manager, and need to be co terminous with each other.
1 4 . T o  allow for m aximum individual initiative, limits to or boundaries o f responsibility 
and authority should he as broad as possible. Those necessary to achieve unity o f action in 
the over-all balanced best, or common, interests o f all concerned should be stated clearly, 
and preferably in writing so as to avoid misunderstandings and to perm it working together 
to achieve the corresponding common purposes.
1 5 . W ith in  such designated limits and boundaries, the process o f delegation and each of 
its inseparable parts must be clear-cut, complete, and understood i f  delegation is to be 
effective and the needed work and teamwork is to be accomplished.
1 6 . Delegating responsibility fo r an area o f work to a man who reports to him  does not 
relieve the manager from  the responsibility fo r being sure that the work gets done. I f  the 
man to whom the work was delegated failed in its performance, the manager must assume 
the blame since his act o f delegation did not relieve him  o f his own accountability for 
getting the w ork done. Delegation is not abdication.
130
of mind and will, and only individuals have mind and will.
Nor can a committee effectively be held accountable for 
results. The process of delegation between a manager and 
another individual involves responsibility and account­
ability as two aspects of that process. Committees 
cannot be held accountable for results, thus the delegation 
of responsibility must be from one individual to another 
individual and it is clearly stated in the General Elec­
tric philosophy.^® This does not rule out committees es 
advisory organizations.
The elimination of decision-making committees in 
the early 1950's was one of the most significant changes 
in the General Electric philosophy under Cordiner. Under 
Wilson and quite historically under Swope, the General 
Electric Company was a committee-oriented organization.
When Cordiner studied the reorganization of the company 
he decided that he was going to, quite obviously, decen­
tralize; but he hadn't concentrated on what this would do 
to committees as part of the philosophy and structure. It 
was not Cordiner, but Smiddy, who developed the original 
thinking on this subject.®® Harold Smiddy was quite 
vehement in his belief that committees produced a weak 
organization because of the inability to pin responsi­
bility for decision-making on any one incumbent of a 
position. He felt that you could not share responsibi­
lities, and that shared responsibilities promoted the 
weakest kind of decisions.
After Cordiner accepted this philosophy, he formali­
zed it and it was included in the Professional Managementhoo'ki’
®®Z6id., pp. 197-199.
®®Interview with William J. Greenwood, Honolulu,
Hawaii, February 4, 1970.
®^Particularly Book Two.
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which were written by Smiddy and his staff. Thus, all 
decision-making committees were abolished. Immediately, 
there was an outcry by a number of managers that the 
Advisory Council was nothing more than a decision­
making committee.®® The Advisory Council is explained in 
greater detail in Figure 11. The Advisory Council is just 
a committee to advise the President or Chief Executive
Officer (Cordiner during the decade of the '50's).
Cordiner answered the perplexed managers about the status 
of the Advisory Council by saying:**
When it comes to policy decisions, dis­
cussed at the Advisory Council, I make the 
decisions. But I am not so stupid that I 
will not listen to pros and cons. But, they 
could be all against me. I will still make 
the decision. It is my decision to make. I 
won't depend on a vote to determine whether 
or not we will do this, that, or the other 
thing» But, I want to get the benefit of
everyone's counsel. And there is a difference
between advisory (thinking) and decision­
making. When I have the responsibility I 
will accept it.
To clear the status of the Advisory Council, the 
President issued the "Advisory Council Function Guide" 
which reflected Cordiner's above thoughts. This Function 
Guide is reproduced as part of Figure 11.
Later Cordiner wrote:*®
General Electric structure has no place 
for committees as decision-making bodies. It 
is my feeling that a committee moves at the 
speed of its least informed member, and too 
often is used as a way of sharing responsibi­
lity. Before decentralization, an official 
tried to get on a great number of committees.
®®Interview with William J. Greenwood, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, February 4, 1970.
®*Interview with William J. Greenwood, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, February 4, 1970.
®®Ralph Cordiner, New Frontiers for Professional 
Managers^ op. ait.j pp. 70-71.
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He would lead a very calm, safe, orderly 
life. Not much would happen, but nothing 
would ever happen to him.
Today (1956), a committee may be helpful 
as an advisory group, and indeed the Execu­
tive Office of the General Electric Company 
meets twice monthly as an Advisory Council 
for the President. In any such arrangement, 
however, it must be made abundantly clear that 
the authority for any particular decision lies 
with the responsible individual, even if he 
makes it while sitting with the other Council 
members.
One other committee was very powerful at the outset 
of the decentralization program and that was the Appro­
priations Committee. The Appropriations Committee passed 
on the advisability of providing large expense or capital 
funds to the various operating components. Detailed 
documents written in the form of appropriation proposals 
were sent to this committee. The material was always 
furnished by the financial staff of the division which was 
responsible for requesting the money. The Manufacturing 
Services component was especially powerful as it would, 
with the aid of representatives of other Services, make 
the decision on the proposed appropriation. Harold Smiddy 
pointed out to Ralph Cordiner that this was in fact a 
decision-making committee and as such was in violation 
of the corporate philosophy against the use of decision­
making committees.G1 The Appropriations Committee was, 
therefore, abolished and was replaced by a very strong 
policy (Appendix Exhibit 3-2) approved by Cordiner and 
issued over his name on what the authorizations would 
be to the various divisions, what they had to do, and how 
much approval in dollars would be made at each level. It 
was found that most of the appropriations that had gone to
Interview with William J. Greenwood, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, February 4, 1970,
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the Appropriations Committee could be handled at the local 
level, thus increasing decentralization. The larger 
dollar requests, which were not many, were reserved for 
Cordiner and the Board of Directors, but these money 
amounts were spelled out very specifically. These dollar 
amounts are explained later in this chapter in the section 
"Budgets."
The General Electric concept of all employees work­
ing together on the same team is distinctly different from 
the "group effort" approach to work. "Group responsibility 
and group decision-making imply a fallaciously comforting 
anonymity," says one internal paper, "making it possible 
for each individual in the group to avoid personal respon­
sibility for results.2 The company doctrine reflects 
the belief that no one person is then really accountable 
for the action of the group, and the alleged desirability 
of unanimity of action of a committee more often than not 
results in a course of action most secure, least risky, 
least courageous, perhaps with the highest probability of 
success but with limited r e s u l t s . R a y  Brown notes that 
managers like decision-making committees. He says, "They 
will use 'group decide' as an administrative fox hole in 
which to hide. Fearful of the administrative dark, they 
venture out only in the company of a committee."^'* Later, 
he pointed out that committees "become an escape mechanism 
for those administrators who can't take the organizational 
heat and who resort to presiding in order to avoid the 
personal responsibility of deciding."®® The theory that
"Designing Work Into Positions and Grouping 
Positions Into Components," without publication data, inter­
nal General Electric working paper (pre-1960), p. 20.
®**Ray E. Brown, Judgment In Administration (New 
York; McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1966), p. 43.
^^Ibid.y p. 77.
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individuals desire the comfortable anonymity of group 
action is, of course, counter to the belief that each 
individual wants to assume sole responsibility for his 
own actions and thus, to make the greatest possible con­
tribution to the objectives of the component and the 
business enterprise.
This concept does not rule out the use of meet­
ings and conferences for informative or stimulative pur­
poses. There are committees in General Electric, such 
as safety committees, salary committees, and so forth, 
but these committees are for the purpose of determining 
or recommending what policy should be. They are not 
decision-making committees. One man is always respon­
sible for the attainment of outcome. If seven people 
are on an advisory committee, only one man— whether he 
is a member of that committee or not— and only that one 
man is held one hundred percent accountable for the deci­
sion that is made. Cordiner felt that advisory committees 
must get the best minds that can be utilized on any parti­
cular subject, but only one man can make the decision.
That is good business. Thus, the popularity of "brain­
storming" sessions is well earned. Their value for idea 
generation has been proved in practice. But these "brain­
storming" sessions should be considered for what they 
really are: group stimulation of individual efforts. One
internal document said that these committees "can often 
be the catalyst helping create ideas more quickly than by 
individual thinking in isolation."®®
Assistant and Assistant To 
Lt. Colonel Lyndall Urwick, who is an advocate of the
®®"Designing Work. . .," op. cit., p. 21.
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"assistant to" position, wrote this writer that,
It is extremely difficult to make "assis­
tant to" positions work smoothly in business.
This is not because they are unnecessary: 
many Chief Executives are grossly overworked.
And their undertakings suffer in consequence.
But, they (the superiors) can't get their 
immediate subordinates to accept communica­
tions from an "Assistant to," because such 
communications appear to infringe the unoffi­
cial status symbolism of the undertaking--a 
Captain is ordering a Colonel about (to use 
a military parallel).
Although Urwick admits business has had some difficulty 
with the "assistant to" position, he nevertheless advocates 
its use. Urwick and Dale correctly note that "assistant 
to" is normally inferior in status to his chief's immediate 
subordinates, has no authority of his own, issues instruc­
tions only as a representative of his chief's authority, 
and cannot replace his chief in his absence.®®
Theoretically, without responsibility or autho­
rity, "assistant to" positions are found in many business 
and military organizations. In the military, the "assis­
tant to's" function is primarily to convey the decisions 
and orders of his chief and he is known as a general staff 
officer. Urwick says, "An 'assistant to" position involves 
an officer of junior status (rank) sending instructions to 
his superiors in status."®® Continuing, Urwick says:?®
In Armies everyone accepts the Fiction that 
they are his superior's orders, even when the 
recipients are perfectly well aware that his 
superior has never seem them. That is because
®?Personal letter from L t . Col. Lyndall Urwick, 
June 24, 1969.
®®Ernest Dale and Lyndall F. Urwick, Staff In 
Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1960),
p. 159. This statement does not always apply and does not 
apply to subordinates to the "assistant to."
®®Urwick letter, op. oit.
’^Ihid.
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status is defined by rank. And it is so 
unthinkable that an officer of inferior status 
should be issuing orders to an officer of 
superior status, say a Captain issuing orders 
to a Colonel, that Colonels at a lower echelon 
accept that a Staff Officer is merely acting 
as a Post Officer (or a Secretary) to his 
General.
Personally, I am convinced that a great
deal of the personal friction which occurs in
civil establishments can be traced to the 
fact that they have not yet "grown up" in this 
particular. Men are concerned about status. .
. .They build unofficial status symbols. Any 
arrangement which appears to ignore or run 
counter to this symbolism excites resentment 
and retaliation.
(He ends by adding) Smiddy won't agree
with a word of this.
Urwick does believe that the "assistant to" should 
be given a dignified status. He says, "Nothing deteriorates 
the morale of an assistant to more than becoming known 
as a bronze key to the president's toilet.
There were a number of reasons why General Elec­
tric used "Assistant" or "Assistant to" positions before 
1953. These reasons were:^^
1. To relieve excessive load on the Boss.
2. To train the man in broader duties.
3. To give the man a special title or status.
4. To give the able man more work to do and to
challenge his ability.
5. To give authority to check others in detail.
6. To provide an "understudy" for the Boss.
7. To break in a successor to take over the Manager's
job.
 ̂̂ "Can Management Be Managed?" Fortune^ Vol. 48,
No. 7 (July, 1953), p. 141.
'^Harold F. Smiddy, "Some Notes on the Subject of 
'Assistants' For, and To, Executives and Managers," July 5, 
1952 (New York: Management Consultation Services Division,
General Electric Company). (From notes made September 14, 
1951.)
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Each one of the above reasons for using an "assis­
tant" was easily ruled out under the new philosophy. An 
overloaded boss must learn to delegate. A man can train 
and broaden his duties by the use of staff meetings, 
proper job placement, and rotation. A man can be rewarded 
by higher pay and a more challenging job, with appropriate 
title. A man can get a bigger and more responsible job 
within the company's basic organization structure by 
assigning him to a specialist job or to a managerial job 
of stature commensurate with his full ability. Men need­
ing detailed checking should be replaced with competent 
performers who won't need to be so checked or audited; 
it's not sound economics to pay twice for getting work 
done right once. The use of such a "title" instead of a 
more specific designation of work, makes job titles unclear 
and adds to organizational confusion. In addition, a man 
has more pride when he is a manager on his own feet than 
an "assistant" to someone else. An understudy should be 
designated as an "understudy" and he should act when 
needed. There is no need to have the "understudy" on 
"make work" projects all the time. When breaking in a 
successor to take over a manager's job it is sound business 
to allow a man to act as an "assistant" only for a limited 
period when the actual succession is imminent and the 
"assistant" must really get into all the phases of the 
Boss' job. This type of short-termed "assistant" position 
must be removed and not be refilled when the "assistant" 
moves into the Boss' chair. Even this latter argument 
was not acceptable in General Electric: the successor
was appointed immediately, and the incumbent was removed 
and used as a consultant, when necessary. This maintained 
clear relationships and pinpointed responsibility.
During the early years of formulating the philo­
sophy of management at General Electric, a number of
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management practices were discovered which did not fit 
in with the emerging philosophy. As Smiddy was develop­
ing the principles of delegation (Figure 16), it became 
clear that these principles ran counter to some of the 
structure used by the enterprise. "Assistant" and "Assis­
tant to" positions were counter to the developing philosophy 
for two major reasons. First, it was felt that these 
positions were not the best way to get work done under the 
principles of delegation and of organization structuring 
which had developed. Second, there was a better organi­
zation structuring of positions for stimulating self­
development of individuals.
The first major point in reference to the principles 
of delegation, can be seen from reading Figure 16. A 
responsibility cannot be shared by two or more individu­
als (point 5). An individual has responsibility or he 
does not have it (point 11). If the assistant has respon­
sibility for helping his manager by doing part of the 
work, then General Electric philosophy claims "he is 
simply being a clerk, a messenger, or 'leg man.'"^^ If, 
on the other hand, a manager truly delegates a piece of 
work to an "assistant," then that "assistant" is no differ­
ent from any other subordinate reporting to the manager.
If a subordinate is not given specific work to do, 
for which he is accountable, then a man would take on some 
unknown responsibility and confusion would reign as no one 
would know for what the subordinate is accountable. Also, 
other men reporting to the manager would not know the 
relationship between themselves and the "assistant." Thus, 
in the General Electric philosophy, assistants are believed 
to violate a number of sound principles of delegation;
^Professional Management in General Eleotrio 
Book Two. . .J op. oit.y p. 189.
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responsibility is not clearly defined; their commensurate 
accountability is unclear; assistants may add another 
level of management; other subordinates may be unable to 
identify the relationships and at times believe they have 
more than one boss.
The second general reason that these positions 
violate corporate philosophy is that the firm feels the 
position structure inhibits self-development of individ­
uals. The following four points are used by General 
Electric to demonstrate this belief:^**
1. Men who are acting as errand boys for their 
managers may gather much information by 
observation; but they do not have the stimu­
lating opportunities to "learn by doing" as 
far as making their own decisions are con­
cerned, coupled with the sometimes painful 
mind--and judgment--sharpening experience
of having to live personally with the 
results of those decisions.
2. Men who get in the habit of gathering infor­
mation requested by their manager so that he 
can make better decisions, run the risk of 
also getting in the habit of letting him do 
the thinking as well as the deciding.
3. The best men will not let themselves get 
stuck for long in "assistant" positions, 
because they are not satisfied unless they 
are responsible and accountable for work 
which is uniquely their own.
4. Experience has shown that men develop their 
managerial abilities and their self-confidence 
and belief in themselves faster and more surely 
if they have complete personal responsibility 
and accountability for a particular piece
of work, even, though it be small, than they 
do when they have some unknown and necessarily 




General Electric had thousands of "assistants" in 
1952. At that time, Harold Smiddy and William Greenwood, 
both working on an organization structure project, went 
to Ralph Cordiner and asked him if he would mind giving 
up his assistant.
Cordiner asked, "Well, Harold, what for?"  ̂̂
"Why do you need the position?" asked Smiddy.
"Well, I need an assistant. Good Lord,
I'm out of New York many, many times, travel 
quite a bit and when I'm not around I got a 
lot of things that have to be taken care of 
right away. And I need a very capable assis­
tant. "
And Smiddy says, "Well, what important 
decisions do you permit him to make when you're 
out of town?"
Cordiner at this time was preaching management by 
exception, so it was implied that decisions made by 
Cordiner could not have been made by the Executive Vice 
Presidents. Cordiner's assistant was a knowledgeable young 
man, modestly paid, and considered very bright. However, 
no one would have even entertained the thought that this 
assistant could have made decisions on issues which 
were above the capabilities of the Executive Vice Presi­
dents .
Cordiner answered Smiddy by saying, "I'm beginning 
to get your point. What you're telling me is that I need 
a male secretary, possibly."
"That's right. And that goes for the rest of the 
company, too," added Smiddy. "I don't understand why 
anyone needs an assistant."
Cordiner immediately decided to remove the assis­
tant positions throughout the company's organization
^®The following is from William J. Greenwood's 
memory of that meeting. Interview, Honolulu, Hawaii, 
February 5, 1970.
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structure. At this time there were thousands of assis­
tants ; nearly every one of them was a very capable man 
and Smiddy thought these capable men were rotting on the 
vine. In fact, within a year after the discontinuation 
of these assistants jobs many of the incumbents had 
become section managers; some had become general managers 
of departments. Many were to rise to the executive level 
after a few years. These people had been given their 
title of assistant because they had earned them, and these 
were capable individuals.
When Smiddy went to the Chairman of the Board, Phil 
Reed, to talk with him about Stan Holme, his assistant,
Reed said, "Yes, I was talking to Ralph about that. I don't 
know what to do with Stan. He's a very capable individual 
and one of the most knowledgeable persons in the company, 
but I can't see him as a manager, thought. He's just a 
great thinker." Smiddy said,, "Fine, I'll take him."
Smiddy appointed him as a consultant and assigned him 
to many tricky research problems in management. He proved 
to be an extremely capable man and was quite happy in his 
new environment where he could be on his own.
Smiddy felt that "assistant to" and "assistant" 
positions were fictitious in many instances. Such posi­
tions were brought into being because superiors wanted to 
reward someone who had been doing outstanding work and 
didn't know how to give him a proper award other than 
making him an assistant manager or assistant to somebody; 
and in doing so. General Electric forgot that one of the 
greatest developers of people is to give them problems, 
team projects, responsibility and high pay. Unfortunately, 
many of these assistants, while they received good money, 
did not receive extraordinary pay in any sense. Smiddy's 
philosophy always was, "Pay the man and pay him well."?*
?®Interview with William J. Greenwood, Honolulu,
Hawaii, February 4, 1970.
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Shortly after Smiddy's conversation with Cordi­
ner, Cordiner announced through Smiddy's urging that all 
people who became department managers, section managers, 
or became consultants in the various Services, were going 
to get extremely high pay because they were now in heavy 
risk positions. If they made errors, they were going to 
be released from their position and no one was going to 
take care of them. Because they were in such vulnerable 
positions, Cordiner said, "I'm going to pay you well and 
if you don't measure up I'm not going to worry about it. 
I'll get someone else who can do the job." So it 
was with that kind of offer that these individuals 
came into Services and others became general mana­
gers. ̂ ’
Frequently when you have five or six people 
reporting to a man, and you reach down and elevate one 
of these men to an assistant spot, essentially what you 
have done is to eliminate competition among those who 
remain because you have appointed the man who ultimately 
will take over. The heir apparent to the throne has been 
selected, thereby killing initiative in the pack that is 
left. Smiddy had always contended, though, that an 
assistant makes work, especially if he is working for a 
very capable manager. The capable manager will continue 
to make the decisions and will use this assistant as an 
errand boy, one who runs around getting information but 
never making decisions. He gets out of the habit of 
making decisions. In time he loses his effectiveness so 
that if he, after several years as an assistant, goes out 
into the real world of decision-making, he is incapable of 
making decisions.
^^Interview with William J. Greenwood, Honolulu,
Hawaii, February 4, 1970.
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General Electric found that when a man became 
an assistant and he was working under a capable depart­
ment manager whom he was being groomed to replace ulti­
mately, he frequently hired a secretary because this was 
a status symbol and he had to have one for his own image. 
Since the department manager was strong and capable there 
was insufficient work for the assistant. To give him 
something to do, he initiated a project of his own. Once 
the project got going, the assistant would decide that 
what he needed were some analysts or some young people 
to get information and analyze it. He wasn't going to 
do the whole project by himself. Besides, you should 
always delegate to the lowest level of competency. He 
would hire one, then two, while he was thinking of a new 
project. In time, maybe five years, he might have a staff 
of as many as fifteen or twenty people. When he took over 
the general manager's job or the manager to whom he 
reported, he would continue the assistant position because 
if his predecessor needed an assistant, he certainly did, 
too. "It was self-perpetuating, so that when General 
Electric got rid of about ten thousand assistants," says 
Greenwood, "whatever the number might have been, they 
actually got rid of maybe fifty thousand or sixty thou­
sand jobs. (Much of this work was reorganized into other 
parts of the structure.) That was the ultimate impact in 
streamlining the company."’®
At first the argument, of course, was "I'm working 
overtime now: I do need an assistant." It is true that
people at times have a lot of work to do, and it is true 
that they sometimes get themselves somebody whom they 
call an assistant to take part of the load off their own 
back, but the key to it is always better organization.
^®lnterview with William J. Greenwood, Honolulu,
Hawaii, February 4, 1970.
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It seems that there are some men who, if they had one 
assistant, would work, eighty hours a week; and even if 
they had forty assistants they would continue to work 
eighty hours a week. "In a study that was conducted oy 
Management Consultation and other Services," says William 
Greenwood, "it was pretty well proved that people who 
hired assistants in the past on the basis of being over­
worked themselves found that the assistants never cured 
that situation. These men, for the most part, continued 
to work the same number of hours as they did before 
because some people would make eighty hours' work out of 
boiling w a t e r . O r ,  as Parkinson notes, "An official 
wants to multiply subordinates, not rivals."®®
One of the death-dealing considerations for the 
assistant position is that an assistant usually is one 
who speaks for the boss, or at least it is assumed he 
is speaking for the boss whether or not he is. Those 
who have worked for managers who had assistants were 
always in a bind, especially when they were given conflic­
ting orders and this was not rare. William Greenwood 
comments :®̂
Conflicting orders were a way of life and I 
received more than my share, especially while 
I was in the financial area. This did not 
surprise me because it was a well-known fact 
that usually the Assistant tried to usurp 
power. He tried to convey power that he did 
not have; he tried to be very important. And 
since he had really no job, no real job with 
any authority, in order to maintain his own 
status, his own respectability, he became a
^®Interview with William J. Greenwood, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, February 4, 1970.
®®Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law and Other 
Studies in Administration (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1957) , p. 4.
®^Interview with William J. Greenwood, Honolulu,
Hawaii, February 4, 1970.
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pompous ass very, very frequently, and usually 
it occurred immediately following his appoint­
ment. The two went hand in hand.
Urwick contends that Smiddy and General Elec_ric 
really deplored the "Assistant to" concept, not because 
of the fact that the above reasons are untrue, but because 
General Electric and Smiddy couldn't make the zoncept 
work, and therefore they contend the concept is wrong.
He says,
GE put up the old Accountants' argument.
Because status is ill-defined in civil life, 
having an "Assistant to" became a status 
symbol in G E . So, all kinds of people started 
appointing "Assistants to," not because they 
needed them but because having "Assistant to" 
in a box below them on the organization 
chart was as good as adding a crown to their 
two stars. It gave them a push up in their 
status symbolism. That was expensive. So, 
the accounting viewpoint stepped in and it 
was classified as "unnecessary."®^
Whatever the case, the titles and positions of "assistant" 
and "assistant to" are not presently acceptable to General 
Electric organization theory. Ralph Cordiner said, in 
reference to "assistants to" and "administrative assis­
tants ":®®
It is our firm belief that such titles 
or positions create confusion as to respon­
sibility, authority, and accountability, 
and tend to retard the growth of men and 
the Company. If a position is too big for 
one person and appears to require assistants, 
then the work should be divided up and reor­
ganized into as many positions as are required 
to do the work efficiently. Each position in 
the Company should be able to "stand on its 
own," with a specifically defined area of 
responsibility, authority, and accountability.
®^Urwick letter, op. oit.




Ralph Cordiner underscored the importance of measure­
ments when he defined the concept of professional manage­
ment as
the task of administration of a business 
enterprise through the leadership of its 
personnel to achieve its objectives by plan­
ning, organizing, measuring, and integrating 
its human and material resources.®**
In the latter part of 1951, he raised a question 
with the Advisory Committee as to whether the measurements 
area was not of sufficient importance to the company's 
future to warrant a comprehensive study. In early 1952, 
Management Consultation Services Division was assigned the 
responsibility for investigating measurements. In May,
1952, Vice President Harold F. Smiddy appointed Fred J.
Borch, and subsequently Robert W. Lewis in late 1952, to 
develop the intensive research of this essential area.
Until early 1953, the measurements project was a coopera­
tive effort of the Management Consultation Services Divi­
sion and the Accounting Services Division. On May 1, 1953, 
when Fred Borch returned to the Lamp Division, the Account­
ing Services Division took responsibility for the project.®® 
The objectives of the Measurements Project were 
five in number:®®
®"*Ralph J. Cordiner, Problems of Management. . ., 
op. oit., p. 7.
^^Measurements Project, Part I (Schenectady, N.Y.: 
General Electric Company, January, 1954), p. 5.
®®Robert W. Lewis, "Measuring, Reporting, and 
Appraising Results of Operation with Reference to Goals, 
Plans and Budgets," Planning, Managing, and Measuring the 
Business : A Case Study of Management Planning and Control 
at General Eleotrio Company (New York; Comptroller- 
ship Foundation, 1955), pp. 29-30.
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1. To find methods to measure the performance 
of the organizational components, not of 
individuals.
2. To find common indexes of performance but 
not to develop common standards; i.e., 
rate of return on investment is a common 
index, but the standard in terms of what 
percent is wanted as a return on investment 
is not a concern of the project.
3. To realize that the measurements are designed 
for supplementing, not supplanting, judgment.
4. To find measurements which can be used both 
for current results and future projections.
5. To keep measurements at a minimum for 
each level of the organization.
This Measurement Project is the key to understand­
ing the control function within the firm. Out of this 
project came most of the quantitative control mechanisms 
and some of the qualitative controls used today. There­
fore, a deeper study of the project appears warranted.
The project was divided into three sub-projects :
1. Operational measurements, of which there are 
eight, identified as key result areas.
2. Functional measurements--engineering, manu­
facturing, marketing, finance, employee and 
plant community relations, and legal.
3. Measurements of the work of managing-- 
planning, organizing, integrating, and 
measuring (General Electric's definition 
of the work of a manager).
In developing operational measurements, a search 
of specific areas for which measurements should be designed 
was attempted. When a tentative area was being investi­
gated to see if it were vital to the organization, the 
following test question was applied:®^
will continued failure in this area prevent 
the attainment of management's responsibility 
for advancing General Electric as a leader in 
a strong, competitive economy, even though 
______results in all other key result areas are good?
p. 30.
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within operational measurements, the project 
leaders concluded that there were eight areas of such 
vital importance to the welfare of General Electric as to 
merit the development of measures for each of them. The 
eight key result areas as developed by Fred Borch and 
subsequently reconfirmed by Lewis are listed below along­
side of Peter Drucker's eight areas in which objectives of 
performance and results have to be set. The similarity 
of the lists is striking, but not so striking when it is 
realized that Drucker was, during the early '50's, one 
outside consultant assisting General Electric in the 
Measurements Project, and was, therefore, in close contact 
with Vice President Harold F. Smiddy, head of Management 
Consultation Services, Fred Borch, and Robert Lewis, as 
head of the Measurements Project.




1. Profitability 1. Profitability
2. Market Position 2 . Market Standing
3. Productivity 3 . Productivity
4. Product Leadership 4. Innovation
5. Personnel Development 5 . Manager Performance 
and Development
6. Employee Attitudes 6 . Worker Performance 
and Attitude
7. Public Responsibility 7 . Public Responsibility
8. Balance Between Short-
Range and Long-Range Goals
8. Physical and Finan­
cial Resources
Profitability 
Profitability is considered by many, especially
pp. 30-31.
®®Drucker, The Praatiae of Management^ op. oit..
63 .
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economists and accountants, as well as the less sophisti­
cated public, as the ultimate measurement of business 
performance in our competitive, free economy. Drucker®® 
sees two other purposes for profits: not only is it
the ultimate test of the performance of a business, 
but it also is "the risk premium" which covers the costs 
of staying in business and market risk. And, thirdly, 
profits make possible the funds for expansion and research- 
for self-financing out of retained earnings or for provid­
ing inducement for new outside c a p i t a l . H e  goes on to 
correctly note that
none of these three functions of profit has 
anything to do with the economist's maximiza­
tion of profit. All these three are indeed 
"minimum" concepts--the minimum of profit needed 
for the survival and prosperity of the enter­
prise. A profitability objective, therefore, 
measures not the maximum profit the business can 
produce, but the minimum it must produce.®^
Thus, as one of the many measurements of business perform­
ance, profitability has value; that is, value is derived 
if we understand what profitability is measuring and what 
it is not measuring. Used as the only measure of busi­
ness performance, profitability will distort and be forced 
to do something it is incapable of doing.
In any business enterprise, profits are produced 
by the combination of capital and work. There has been a 
tendency to consider profits in relation only to the 
capital invested; hence, return on invested capital has 
been a time-honored business measurement of performance.
®®Peter F. Drucker, The New Society (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1950), Chapter 4.




A high rate of profit in terms of invested capital is a 
sure way of attracting new outside capital. However, any 
perceptive manager realizes that the efforts of the organi­
zation, that is, the work performed, in combination with 
the invested capital produces profits. Since an executive 
manager has the responsibility to change the relationships 
and amounts of both, he is interested in measuring the 
results of his action. In complex large organizations, as 
is General Electric, with numerous and diverse product 
lines, the manager must weigh not only the physical 
resources utilization among the various businesses or 
product lines, but also how the human resources should be 
utilized.
The stockholder's point of view is that of maximi­
zation of profits in relation to his investment. The 
shareholder's only contribution is his investment; there­
fore, it is only natural that he measure the profits of 
the business in terms of earnings in relation to his 
investment.
When General Electric sets up a profitability index 
it is in answer to the question, "What profitability index 
gives a properly weighted consideration to both capital 
and work, as seen by the share owner and executive mana­
ger?"* ̂
From the viewpoint of the executive manager and 
share owner. General Electric developed indexes of profit­
ability under the criteria that profitability measurement 
must recognize the contributions of both capital and 
work. The Measurements Project, after studying the 
problem, developed four criteria which the firm has
‘̂^Measurements Projeet, Part II, Operational 
Measurements Key Result Area No. 1: Profitability
(Schenectady, N.Y.: General Electric Company, Budgets
and Measurements Service Department, Accounting Services 
Division, January, 1954), p. 3.
151
followed since 1954. The four criteria for profitability 
measurement are ; ®
1. Does the index recognize that capital 
investment has contributed to the profits?
2. Does the index recognize that the work per­
formed by the business has contributed to 
the profits?
3. Does the index recognize the corporate 
"facts of life"?
4. Most important, will the use of the index 
work to guide decisions in the company's 
best interest?
The third and fourth criteria point out that the 
measurement index must possess the following character­
istics : ® ®
It should be realistic.
It should be understandable.
It should have the confidence of operating
management.
It should be consistent with the organizational
philosophy.
There are a number of methods of computing a figure 
called "profit." Such terms and relations as (a) control­
lable profits, (b) incremental profits, (c) real economic 
earnings, and (d) book profits as recorded under conven­
tional accounting procedures are all some type of "profit" 
figure. General Electric concluded that the "book profit" 
concept was and still is most appropriate for measuring the 
performance of its business.
It is easy to understand why the controllable pro­
fits and incremental profits were discarded as an over­
all measure of the performance of the business or product 
line. For under these two concepts only the "controllable"
p. 4.
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or "variable" costs are deducted from revenue to arrive 
at profit and this is not realistic in terms of the third 
criteria, that the corporate 'facts of life" must be con­
sidered. A business must be held responsible for the 
"non-controllable" or "fixed costs" as well.
Real economic earnings, which are, simply, book 
profits adjusted to a replacement cost basis, was discarded 
as a proper measure of business success for two reasons. 
First, the theory of replacement cost is unreal in that 
it is unlikely that existing facilities will be replaced 
in kind; and, secondly, there is no practical method of 
computing replacement cost values on which there is general 
agreement as to its validity. Therefore, the economic 
earning concept would not be consistent with the "facts of 
life" and would not have the confidence of the operating 
managers.
It must be remembered— and, hopefully. General 
Electric understands— that operating managers will inevi­
tably try to make profit decisions that will improve their 
results in terms of the profits measurement selected.
That is to say, if the measurement index is "the ratio of 
profits to X," then the manager will strive to make this 
index look good. While the "ratio of profits to Y" is 
also important to the business, it, too, should be incor­
porated as an index by which results are to be measured. 
This must be the thinking of General Electric as more than 
one index is used as a gauge. General Electric uses book 
profits as the general type of index for internal control 
of product lines in the operating units. It has three 
indexes of book profits which are: (1) Residual Dollar
Profit, (2) Percent Residual Dollar, (3) Profit to Con­
tributed Value.
To understand how these indexes are used as con­
trol mechanisms and the value which can be or is attributed
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to them, a look at the conventional book profit indexes is 
of value. In looking at conventional indexes of profita­
bility for strengths and weaknesses, profitability should 
also be evaluated, as General Electric did, in terms of 
the four criteria which the firm set up.*^
The following measurements of profitability are 
used by some firms :
1. Total Dollars of Profit
2. Percent Profit to Sales
3. Rate of Return on Investment (ROI)
4. Percent Profit to Contributed Value
5. Percent Profit to Value Added
6. Percent Profit to Total Employee Costs
7. Percent Profit to Professional Employee Costs.
Each of these methods to measure profits and to
control the work of product executive managers has merit; 
yet, there is weakness in each which must be understood 
if proper evaluation and measurement interpretation is to 
be expected.
Total dollars of profit is usually dismissed by 
accounting texts as a sound control measure. It can be 
dismissed because it does not fulfill two of the four 
criteria: it does not recognize capital investment, nor
does it distinguish between the work of the business itself 
and that of its suppliers. Yet, it is important. Divi­
dends are paid out of profit dollars, as Robert Lewis 
aptly puts it, "Dividends are paid from profit dollars—  
not ratios— and for complete concentration on maximizing 
profits, there is no better index than Total Dollars of 
Profits.
^^Ibid.3 Sections I and II. 
p. 7.
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Percent profit to sales is a popular accounting 
favorite, yet it also fails to recognize capital invest­
ment. This is important because if percent profit to 
sales is used as the sale index, it would encourage the 
business to improve its percent to sales by using depre­
ciation as the only determinant in deciding investments 
in plant and equipment. It would encourage the overlook­
ing of inventory and other working capital. By the second 
criterion, the ratio does not distinguish between the work 
of the business and its suppliers because it measures 
profit in relation to the market value of the combined 
efforts of the vendors and the business. Percent profit 
to sales could dampen the incentive for the more profitable 
business to grow. A department with a profit ratio of 
seven percent to sales will add new products on which it 
can make eight percent, while a department with a ratio 
of twelve percent will tend to turn down products on which 
it expects to make eight percent. Thus, the total company 
might tend to expand in the least profitable direction, 
because each department has a different yardstick or goal.
The most widely used index of profitability is the 
rate of return on investment (ROI). It is especially impor­
tant as a measuring and control device because it relates 
profits to the capital invested in the business and, 
therefore, gives an accounting of the effect of managerial 
decisions to the shareholder's interests. ROI does reflect 
the contribution of capital; that's its design. On point 
number two, however, it muddles the contribution of the 
firm with its suppliers. Also, it may force concentration 
on short-term profit returns at the expense of the long 
run. ROI has the effect of averaging down the over-all 
company rate of return, just as the percent profit to 
sales does, as previously mentioned.
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The rate of return (ROI) index is subject to the 
criticism that each profit center or division tends to 
regard its own current rate of return as the criterion 
against which to measure investment decisions with the 
result that a decentralized firm will have as many differ­
ent criteria as there are profit centers. John Dearden 
emphasizes this point in one of his attacks on the ROI in 
the Harvard Business Review:
In a decentralized company, there may be 
wide variations in the rate of return expected 
from the different divisions. It is not 
uncommon, for example, to find divisional 
rates of return on investment varying from 
zero (or even a negative rate) to as much as 
30% after taxes. This situation creates a 
problem because the division with the 30% 
profit objective will be worse off for under­
taking any capital project that earns less 
than 30%, while any return at all on a project 
will benefit the division with the zero profit 
objective.
This means that the possibility exists that a high 
return division may well turn down investments on which a 
greater return could be realized than on other investments 
being added at the same time by a low return division. 
General Electric feels that the capital charge concept 
will overcome this problem found in the Rate of Return 
Index (ROI) by the mere fact that all department profit 
centers will evaluate decisions against the relatively 
simple criterion of whether or not the result of decisions 
will be to increase dollar profit beyond an amount needed 
to cover the capital damage.
Residual profit has the advantage of greater 
sensitivity in that it declines more slowly, pro­
portionately, than does the rate of return (ROI).
John Dearden, "Limits on Decentralized Profit
Responsibility," Harvard Business Review^ Vol. 40, No. 4
(July-August, 1962), p. 82.
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Exhibit 3-3, an appendix to this chapter, illustrates 
this point.
The measurements team researched each operating 
component (division) for the years 1951 through Budget 
1954, comparing results in terms of the proposed indexes 
under the firm's conventional indexes (i.e., percent net 
income to sales, return on investment, residual dollars, 
profit and percent residual profit to contributed value). 
The results are shown in Appendix Exhibits 3-4 and 3-5.
The comparison showed that in the majority of instances 
residual dollar profit (RDP) and rate of return (ROI) 
reacted in the same manner— that is, when ROI increased,
RDP increased and when ROI decreased, RDP decreased. But 
the survey found over twenty instances in which the indexes 
conflicted— ROI decreased while RDP increased. It was 
felt, from evaluating the conflicts found, the residual 
dollar profit was an index showing a better indication of 
profitability than was rate of return, and it would 
encourage growth and expansion.**
The last four measures of profitability— Percent 
Profit to Contributed Value, Percent Profit to Value 
Added, Percent Profit to Total Employee Costs, and Percent 
Profit to Professional Employee Costs— all have major 
drawbacks. The percent profit to any one of the selected 
bases tends to regard depreciation as almost a sole 
determinant for the decision to invest in plant and equip­
ment. It overlooks the tie-up of capital in inven­
tories, plant and equipment, and receivables. All four 
fail to meet the fourth criterion— guidance in operating 
decisions. General Electric says :  ̂°"
(An) area of weakness for all these indices 
is the undesirable effect that any "measure­
ment by ratio" tends to have on growth and
^^Measurements Projeotj Part IJ, op. cit. ̂ p. 37. 
loofhtd., pp. 24-25.
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balance. . . .Briefly, we feel that if a
"ratio" measure is the sole criterion of pro­
fitability, decisions will be made by each 
business in terms of the effect that the deci­
sion will have on the particular business' 
current ratio without consideration of the 
dollar profits involved. The business with 
a high percent profit to contributed value, 
for example, would tend to turn down proposals 
which yield a lower profit ratio than that 
currently earned even though the lower ratio 
might be higher than the company-wide average.
After an exhaustive research on possible indexes 
of profitability, the measurements team developed two 
indexes which are basically out-growths of several of the 
indexes mentioned above. The project team recommended 
the use on a company-wide basis of :
1. Residual Dollar Profit as a primary index
2. Percent Residual Dollar
3. Profit to Contributed Value as secondary 
index.
These were recommendations, as the project was 
a Services Division Study and, therefore, could be used 
only as a suggestion to the line or operations divi­
sions. Also, with a true decentralization philosophy, 
the executive group felt that operations must have the 
final say on how they should be measured. Maurice Mayo, 
presently manager of general accounting in the New York 
office, claims that even today there are no uniform measur­
ing devices and that the only reason for having some 
accounts kept in uniformity is for tax purposes.  ̂° ̂
Examination of these measurements is helpful in 
order to understand how they act as control devices. 
Residual Dollar P r o f i t ^ i s  an index which represents
^Interview with Maurice Mayo, Manager--General 
Accounting, New York, July 30, 1969.
following is taken from the previously 
mentioned Measurements Project report on Profitability 
(January, 1954).
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the net book profit minus a capital charge. That is. 
Federal taxes (normal tax and surtax) shall be deducted 
from income to give net book value.
The capital charge will be expressed as a percent 
of each department's average net investment, and it is 
recommended that it represent a minimum aooeptable return 
after taxes (normal tax and surtax only). It is desirable 
that the charge be set as closely as possible to the 
point at which discontinuance of the business will be 
considered. The implication will be that a business 
which is not returning the capital charge and has no 
prospect of doing so over a reasonable period of time is 
an unsatisfactory one from the viewpoint of Executive 
Management and the Share Owner and, therefore, considera­
tion should be given to its discontinuance.^®^
The measurement project team considered four 
figures as possibilities for the capital charge. These 
figures are taken as factual through 1953, but not neces­
sarily the same as would be used through 1970. The four 
possibilities were;'®^
13-1/2% - the historical average of GE's rate of return
since 1929; more recently, it has approximated 
18%
10% - the estimated current cost to GE of equity
capital; in other years it might range from 8% 
to 25%
5% - the minimum rate of return under the Incentive
Compensation Plan as approved by the share 
owne r s
1-1/2% - the approximate cost of debt to GE, ranging
from 3% to 4% before taxes. (Obviously, 
much too low in today's tight market. )
1 0 3Ibid.3 p. 27.
^®^Parenthetically, it should be noted that three 
of these figures have never been released by the firm, nor 
is it possible to figure them from accounting data as 
released by General Electric.
^^^Measurements Project report on Profitability^
op. ci b.
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The measurement project team recommended five 
percent as the minimum acceptable return on investments 
as it was three times what was then the cost to borrow 
funds from outside and about half as large as the cost to 
float equity capital. Also, it was the figure proposed 
by the Board of Directors, and accepted by the stockholders, 
as the minimum acceptable return which the company must 
earn before management shares in profits through the incen­
tive compensation plan.^“® Naturally, the recommended 
rate would change through changes in the environmental 
conditions.
The secondary index. Percent Residual Dollar Profit 
to Contributed Value, is a ratio with half of the ratio 
centered on contributed value. Again, contributed value 
is simply the difference between sales revenue and the 
aggregate cost of materials and parts ("direct material") 
purchased from others for incorporation in the finished 
product for resale. The subtracting out of the cost of 
purchased raw materials and parts is sensible according 
to the theory of "value added in manufacturing" account­
ing.^®’ Drucker wrote on this subject as follows:^®®
The single major cost category that is 
usually clearly identifiable with respect to 
a specific product is irrelevant to the 
revenue contribution and to the share of the 
cost burden. This is the cost for purchased
^®®This is not to imply that the shareholders are 
not rubber stamps for management, for they are!
’waiter Routenstrauch and Raymond Villers, 
Budgetary Control (New York: Fuhk and Wagnalls, 1957),
p. 158. Also see Harold Bierman, Jr., and Allan R. Drebin, 
Managerial Aooounting: An Introduation (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 224-247.
^°®Peter F. Drucker, Managing for Results: Eoono-
mio Tasks and Risk-Taking Decisions (New York: Harper
and Row, 1964), pp. 29-30. Perhaps the example is drawn 
from General Electric.
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raw materials and parts. A simple example-- 
taken from a company making small electrical 
household appliances such as toasters, coffee 
makers, and flat irons--will illustrate this:
Purchased materials and parts account 
for sixty percent of the manufacturer's 
price in the case of product A, for thirty 
percent in the case of product B. Both sell 
the same volume. Profit margin is ten per­
cent of manufacturer's price for both prod­
ucts. Both therefore are believed to do 
equally well. But actually the manufacturer 
makes one dollar in profits for any three 
dollars worth of his own resources and 
efforts invested in product A; he has to 
spend six dollars worth of his own resources 
and efforts to make one dollar on product 
B. If both products had a ready market for 
a larger output at the same price, though 
the manufacturer had resources to expand 
only one, he would get twice as much addi­
tional output by putting his resources into 
product A rather than into product B. An 
additional unit of product A requires only 
thirty dollars worth of resources against a 
requirement of sixty dollars for product B.
He would therefore get twice as much profit 
through expanding product A rather than 
product B.
The question might and should arise, do the indexes 
meet the four criteria as set out by the company? The 
fact is that no one index meets the criteria, but the 
double index approach does.
The first criterion is the recognition of capital 
investment, which is met by the Residual Dollar Profit 
index, to use General Electric terminology, or the more 
common name of "value added" approach. As was previously 
stated, most indexes tend to encourage decisions which 
consider only operating costs and to overlook the tie-up 
of capital in inventories and other assets. Using a fixed 
minimum acceptable capital charge overcomes this.
The second criterion, recognizing the work of the 
business, is also satisfied by the two indexes. The
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residual dollar profit index alone does not fully recog­
nize the work of the business. Even when the percent 
residual dollar profit to contributed value is used, it is 
not a full measure of performance. General Electric 
feels, "It is the best available measure of the value 
placed by the marketplace on the combined human and machine 
effort expended by the business.
Recognition of the corporate facts of life is the 
third criterion and General Electric's subjective judgment 
is that the two indexes show just that and that they 
will have the confidence of operation managers. Lewis 
reports, "In our opinion the concepts which we are recom­
mending approximate, as closely as is practicable, what 
the facts would be if each business were a separate cor­
porate entity.
The last criterion, a guide to making decisions 
in the company's best interests, is met according to the 
firm, although some outside accountants might take issue 
with this.111
The residual dollars profit index encourages con­
centration on improving the dollar profit rather than the 
improvement of ratios. "Under the proposed index," claims 
the measurement project team, "management will be encouraged 
to make decisions which will improve dollar profit rather 
than the ratio to selected base."ii^
Residual dollar profit index has the inherent 
drawback that many managers may believe that the attainment
1 0 9
30
Measurements Projeatj Part IIj op. oit.^
iiOfbtd.
iiiHarold Bierman, Professor of Managerial Account­
ing, Cornell University, has mentioned some disagreement 
with General Electric's overall accounting methods, inter­
view, August 12, 1969, Ithaca, New York.
^^^Measurements Project, Part IJ, op. oit.y
p. 31.
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of the percent of net investment at which the capital 
charge is fixed represents a satisfactory performance.
To avoid this, the measurement team suggests that it should 
be made clear that:^ ̂ ̂
1. The capital charge is a minimum acceptable 
return.
2. Any business (profit center) which cannot see 
its way clear to meet this "subsistence 
level" of return will be carefully studied
as to whether we should continue in that 
business.
3. The standard of profit performance will be 
expressed as Dollar Residual Profit; i.e., the 
dollars of profit above the capital charge.
With establishment of the concept of residual 
dollar profit and the secondary index— percent residual 
dollar profit to contributed value— General Electric next 
faced the problem of setting standards. The method 
of measurement is only half of the first step of control.
Once the method is determined, the problem of what is 
considered par for the course must be faced. Setting 
standards is at least as difficult as developing the 
measurement itself. Standards are judgments— subjective 
goals based on forecasts. Standards are tied to budgets. 
Companies do not or should not start with a rate of 
return and work back. They start with a forecast of 
what can be expected in sales and what, therefore, is 
needed for sales and inventory. Then the cost is evaluated. 
This is an oversimplification of budget preparation, but 
the point is that ultimately all the planning is converted 
into dollars and a standard of performance is produced 
by examining the inputs and outputs of each item contribu­
ting to the end result. Lewis writes, "And in the final 
analysis you must exercise judgment as to what is the 
optimum you can expect under the particular set of conditions
1 1 3Ibid.t pp. 33-34.
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with which you are faced."^^'* The particular standards 
as used today are of no importance to this study, even if 
they could be published. The particular index standards 
are not important; only how they are developed and used is 
of significance.
It should be restated, and the project report 
emphasized, that the proposed indexes did not overcome 
one important weakness. A weakness of all known indexes 
is that they help develop a desire to realize immediate 
profits at the expense of future profits. For as many 
years as any person interviewed can remember, when pre­
paring annual budgets. General Electric executives have 
forecasted for at least five years. Of course, there may 
be slight resemblance between actual results for 1974 and 
a budget for 1974 prepared in 1969 because of environmental 
changes. But management must subjectively, at least, not 
let the standards pressure them toward present profits 
at the expense of the future. The discussion on this 
subject will be expanded when we look at key result area 
No. 8, "Balance Between Short-Range and Long-Range 
Goals."
Market Position
The second area of control for operating managers 
is in the measurement of market position. Market position 
measurements reflect the total business. It is a 
measurement of "the acceptance of a company's products 
and services by the market and thus reflects the value of 
the company's products, its distributing and promotional 
policies, and its technological contributions."^^®
 ̂̂  '*Ibid. j p . 36.
^^®"Excerpts from the Measurements Project,"
(New York: Measurements Services Department, Accounting
Services Division, General Electric Company, January, 1954), 
fourth page (pages unnumbered).
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Therefore, measurement of market position is essential 
in order to receive indications of progress being made 
toward the attainment of growth and leadership which are 
two of the company's objectives (see Appendix 3-12 for 
GE Objectives).
Although the marketing function may have a pre­
dominant interest in the measurement of market position, 
the results achieved are dependent upon the contributions 
of all the functions. Marketing must be properly under­
stood as the only revenue producer of the operational 
functions; the others are all cost centers.
Management's first responsibility is for the 
survival of the enterprise. It is having the right pro­
duct, at the right price, at the right place, at the 
right time, with a public having this knowledge which 
ensures the survival of the firm. Which means that the 
final focus for business activity has to be the end cus­
tomers. This is a well-recognized marketing concept 
which is described as "a way of managing a business so 
that each critical business decision is made with a full 
and prior knowledge of the impact of that decision on the 
customer."  ̂̂ ®
In the course of testimony before a Congressional 
Sub-committee in 1949, the president of one of our great 
American companies said;^ ̂ ̂
It is the customer, and the customer alone, 
who casts the vote. . . .The regulations laid
down by the consuming public are far more potent 
and far less flexible than any code of law, 
merely through the exercise of the natural forces 
of trade.
^^®Charles E. St. Thomas, "A Basic Guide to Market­
ing," Modem Marketing Thought^ eds. J. H. Westing and 
Gerald Albaum (New York; The Macmillan company, 1964), p.
^Quoted by Harold F. Smiddy, "The Customer and 
the Business Process," speech delivered to Rotary Club, 
Louisville, Kentucky, January 13, 1955.
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The object of measuring the market position is to 
compare a product's actual sales with the opportunity avail­
able to that product for making sales. It is a partial 
control device helping to measure the effectiveness of 
the management. "The purpose of a business is to create 
a customer," has been pointed out by Drucker on a number 
of occasions.119 ^he firm sees the creation of a customer 
as selling a product. The customer sees the other side of 
the coin; he sees his buying as satisfying a need. There­
fore, a firm cannot properly conceive its market in terms 
of products, but it must define the market according to 
customers' wants and needs.
Drucker demonstrates that market standing must 
be measured against the market potential.ii® The measure­
ments team reflects Drucker's belief by recommending that 
the total market available to a product be the basis for 
measurement. The measurements team recommended that the 
total available market be segregated into two major 
classifications which they designed as served markets and 
unserved markets.i^° Markets are defined in terms of 
customer wants or in terms of uses to which the customer 
puts the products. This is the most intelligent method 
of defining markets— in terms of customers, rather than 
in terms of production. As Drucker notes:i^i
To be able to set market-standing objec­
tives, a business must first find out what 
its market is--who the customer is, where he 
is, what he buys, what he considers value.
ii®Drucker, The Pvaatioe of Management, op. oit.j
p. 37; Managing For Results^ op. ait.j p. 91.
ii^Drucker, The Praatioe of Management, op. ait..
pp. 65-68. 
op. oit.
1^°"Excerpts From the Measurements Project,"
12^Drucker, The Praatioe of Management, op. ait.,
p. 67.
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what his unsatisfied wants are. On the basis 
of this study the enterprise must analyze its 
products or services according to "lines"; 
that is, according to the wants of the custo­
mers they satisfy.
All electric condensers may look the same, 
be the same technically and come off the same 
production line. Market-wide, condensers 
for new radios may, however, be an entirely 
different line from condensers for radio 
repair and replacements and both again quite 
different from the physically indistinguish­
able condensers that go into telephones.
Measuring market position is used as a control to 
see if the product, through management decision, is in the 
right market and is satisfying the right customer wants.
Of course, the long-term objective of the use of measur­
ing market position is to see to it that management has 
chosen to serve the more rapidly growing markets.
To be able to measure market standing and to set 
market standing objectives, it is first required to deter­
mine what constitutes the market. A market must be 
defined in terms of a customer want— that is, the use to 
which a product is, or may realistically, be put by a 
customer. Competition within each market must be defined 
in terms of the substitutability of the products available 
to satisfy that want, as viewed by the customer. This 
definition of the market does not go as far as Drucker 
implies it should go. He shows how a Cadillac is mainly 
bought for prestige satisfaction and that Cadillac competes 
for the customer's money with mink coats, jewelry, vaca­
tions, and other prestige satisfiers.^^z Nonetheless, 
General Electric has recognized what many firms have missed, 
that the market must be measured from the customer's 
point of view, from the use to which the product is put.
^^^Drucker, Managing for Results y op. ait.y
95.
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Leading from the customer viewpoint. General 
Electric recognized the Total Market Concept; that is, 
taking as a starting point the customer and his wants. 
General Electric is usually credited with pioneering the 
modern marketing concept on which many marketing instruc­
tors have centered their courses (and many have misrepre­
sented this simple c o n c e p t ) . A l l  companies give at 
least lip service to the Total Market Concept, but 
Drucker notes that,
a good deal of what is called "marketing" 
today is at best organized, systematic selling 
in which the major jobs--from sales forecast­
ing to warehousing and advertising--are brought 
together and coordinated. . . .But, its start­
ing point is still our products, our customers, 
our technology. The starting point is still 
the inside.^
General Electric is organized by product depart­
ments; therefore, in that company's case, the
Total Market consists of those customers 
wants that can be satisfied by products 
within the assigned scope of the depart- 
menty whether or not the department is pre­
sently marketing products designed to answer 
those wants.  ̂̂  ®
Further breakdown of Total Market is made by use of Served
Markets and Unserved Markets. Served Markets represent
customer wants which a department is striving to serve and
Unserved Markets are "those the department can serve under
its assigned product scope but does not. . .
Jerome McCarthy, Basic Marketing: A Mana­
gerial Approachy Revised Edition (Homewood, 111.:
Richard D. Irwin, 1964), pp. 35-36.
^^^Drucker, Managing for ResultSy op. cit. y 
pp. 93-94.
^Measurements Project Operational Measurement y 
Key Area Mo. 2: Market Position (Schenectady, N . Y .:
General Electric Company, April, 1956), p. 5.
^^^Ihid.y pp. 5-6.
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An illustration of served and unserved markets 
appropriate to General Electric can be found in the 
lighting equipment business, or "lamp business," in com­
pany jargon. Here, for example, the department scope is 
such that it is permitted to sell both street lighting 
fixtures and searchlight fixtures. It is obvious that 
the customers wants of the two are different and repre­
sent at least two distinct markets, although the produc­
tion skill may be exactly the same. If the department 
decides to sell only street lighting fixtures, that Js 
its Served Market then its potential searchlight fixtures 
customers constitute its Unserved Market.
Extending the example, the department may elect 
to sell only one size of street lighting fixtures while 
other manufacturers are marketing models in several 
sizes. The Unserved Market would include sales not made 
to customers who buy sizes not produced by the firm.
There is a strong reason why a firm must measure 
its Unserved Markets for it is another measure of 
management decisions. Management made the decision to 
cater to certain wants and not to others. Sometimes it 
was not an explicit decision by management to avoid a 
market but rather management never considered entering. 
Whatever the case, whether a market was missed through 
management decision or through lack of insight, the effect 
of (or lack of) the decision must be ascertained. For 
this reason, both Served and Unserved Markets— that is, 
retained markets and foregone markets— must be measured.
A third measure of marketing is used by General 
Electric. This is the Industry Market, which is really a 
sub-classification of Served Markets and Unserved Markets. 
This particular measurement is weak, and if it gains 
dominant position as a measurement stick it will hide the 
true customers from the firm. Industry Market is oriented
169
to a specific type or family of products, rather than 
to a customer wants, and it includes, as competitive 
products, only those which are essentially the same as 
General Electric's. The company saysi^^?
In many of the markets in which our depart­
ments may participate, the products of more 
than one industry compete to satisfy the custo­
mer wants which that market represents.
Because of the fact that in some of these 
instances it is unlikely that we would engage 
in the marketing of non-electrical products, 
it is imperative that we be constantly alert 
to the relative status of electrical and non­
electrical products in the market place (i.e., 
stoves and refrigerators both are sold in 
electric and gas models).
This measurement is most irrelevant as a device 
to measure the effectiveness of managerial decisions. 
Industry Market is measuring the answer to the wrong 
questions. It is worried about the question, "Where is 
our market?" The proper question is, "Where is the market?" 
Once a firm allows itself to believe that its products 
are fulfilling customer wants by thinking that its parti­
cular industry has tied up the wants, then it may be 
rudely awakened some day to find another industry has 
"stolen" the market. This is reminiscent of the waxed 
paper industry, which found that the aluminum and plastic 
industries had found a way to satisfy the same customer 
wants.
From the above understanding of market position, 
the measurement team recommended two measurements for 
this key area: (1) measurements of the department's
position, and (2) measurements of respective positions of 





It should also be noted that the primary yardstick 
is Ratio of Department's Sales to Served Market Sales.
This particular measure is an attempt to measure market 
position. Thus, products sold by manufacturers in other 
industries are often found to be competitors. Because of 
this somewhat broader concept of market for General Elec­
tric "businesses," most product lines found that their 
percent of share of market was lower than it was under 
the older, narrower, and more traditional concept of the 
market. When General Electric first thought of changing 
to a wider base definition of "market" in 1956, it said:*^^
. . .a business (department) now showing a
market share of 50 percent, based on its 
present definition of market; they, using our 
definition, end up showing only 10 percent. . .
we have to re-educate ourselves as to what is 
good standard within the framework of the 
measurement index.
Figure 17 gives the recommended market position 
measurements. It should also be noticed that in addition 
to the above mentioned measurements, the measurements 
study team also suggested the use of: (1) the estimated
competitive rank within the Served Markets and Industry 
Market, and (2) the estimated share of these markets 
secured by leading competitors. Naturally, such measure­
ments can only be educated guesses.
The measurements of market position only measure 
market position; they are not measures of the total 
marketing function. They, taken singularly or totally, 
are not measures of'!marketivitÿ'̂  ̂ “— which must include 
marketing costs, or at least some estimate of marketing 
inputs, such as storage, moving, administrative costs, and
pp. 20-21.
^^°Marketivity is a term coined by Saul Silver- 





Measurements of the department's position
Primary Measure:
Ratio of Department's Sales to Served Market 
Sales
Secondary Measure:
Ratio of Department's Sales to Served Industry 
Market Sales
Measurements of respective positions of the Industry 
and Served Markets in which the department is 
Participating
Ratio of Served Industry Market to Served 
Markets
Ratio of Served Markets to Total Market
Supplemental Measure
Customer surveys to measure customer opinion 
of department's products and service performance
Source: Measurements Pro^eot Operational
Measurement Key Result Area No. 2: 
Market Position (Schenectady, N .Y .: 
General Electric Company, April, 
1956, p. 19.
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so forth. General Electric does not consider marketing 
costs in any of the market measurements. Marketing costs 
are only part of the cost used in the figuring of 
profitability.
To understand how the market position measurements 
are used, the study on Key Area No. 2; Market Position, 
which has heretofore not been published, offers useful 
illustration. Figure 18 is a condensation of the illus­
tration from the study and has been updated somewhat.^^^
Figure 18 allows an understanding of the measure­
ments systems developed by General Electric. This 
measurements system enables a better understanding of 
one aspect of how top management controls department 
managers through a subjective interpretation of objective 
or quantifiable market variables. You will note that 
the department's position in terms of percent of Served 
Industry Market shows an improvement from 15 percent to 
20 percent between 196 8 and 1969, and from 20 percent to 
25 percent between 1969 and 1970. Sales have also 
increased from $60,000 to $75,000 over the same period.
But, the picture is not so bright when an examination 
of the Industry Market is made. This shows a rapid 
decline from $400,000 to $300,000, or from 57 percent 
of the Served Markets in 1968 to only 38 percent in 1970. 
This indicates that, while the department's position appears 
to be fine, the industry as a whole has badly declined.
Looking at the share of Served Market, we find a 
more accurate picture of the department's position. When 
measured against all competitors, its position has improved 
very little, from 8.6 percent to 9.4 percent, despite the 
improvement in sales volume for the department. The
Area No. 2, op. oit., pp. 23-35
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FIGURE 18 
ILLUSTRATION OF MARKET POSITION
1968 lÜl 1970
Department Sales $60,000 $70,000 $75,000
Served Markets
Industry $400,000 $350,000 $300,000
All other 300. 000 400.000 500.000
Total $700. 000 $750.000 $800.000
Unserved Markets
Industry $100,000 $200,000 $300,000
All other 200. 000 250.000 300.000
Total $300.000 $450.000 $600.000
Total Markets
Industry $500,000 $550,000 $600,000
All other 500.000 650.000 800.000
Total $1.000.000 $1.200.000 $1.400.000
Department Position
% of Served Industry 15 20 25
Market 8. 6 9-3 9.4
% of Served Markets
l Uidastry-M^rlsgt
% of Served Markets 57 47 38
Served Markets
% of Total Market 70 63 57
Source: The illustration is a condensation of
the illustration from the Meaeuvemente 
Projeat O-perational Measurement Key Result 
Area Wo. 2: Market Position (Schenectady^
N. Y.: General Electric Company, April,
1956), pp. 23-25, and has been updated 
somewhat.
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"all other" portion of Served Markets indicates that while 
the Industry portion has been declining, the non-industry 
portion has increased substantially.
Completing the picture, we shall look at how the 
Served Markets of the department stand in relation to the 
Total Markets available to the department. The Served 
Markets' share of Total Markets has declined from 70 per­
cent to 57 percent, obviously showing that the Unserved 
Markets have been growing faster than Served Markets.
The Measurements team concludes :^̂ ^
We think that information of this kind is 
important to a manager not only in informing 
him on his position in the various markets 
but even more importantly in pointing up trends 
affecting the long-term interests of the depart­
ment and, through the department, the company.
A presentation of the actual sales of the vari­
ous markets, coupled with a projection of 
potential sales, will be a valuable guide to 
advance planning and establishment of objectives.
The company literature is always quick to point out 
that these measurements are used to help managers under­
stand what is happening and, equally as important, to 
help them evaluate their own managerial decisions. That 
is in line with their overall corporate philosophy of 
self-evaluation. A cornerstone of GE's decentralization 
philosophy is self-development— it allows for what General 
Electric has long preached, self-control. It also allows 
for a more quantifiable control from above.
Productivity
Productivity is the third key area of measurement 
for managers of operations. As an economic term, it is 
the relationship of output of goods and services to the
1 3 2Ibid., p. 25. This concludes the illustration.
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resources, or inputs, consumed in their production. For 
the national economy, productivity is more frequently 
measured as the amount of output per unit of labor input. 
But labor is only one of the many factors contributing to 
output. The contribution of capital, or technology, and 
of knowledge, are frequently overlooked in economic folk­
lore as to their effects on productivity. It has only 
been since the pioneering work of Simon Kuznets that the 
factors of productivity other than labor have received a 
great amount of consideration among the economists.  ̂̂ 3 
Drucker, when discussing the economic advance of the last 
hundred years, claimed, "There has been no increase in 
the 'productivity'of l a b o r . T h e r e  most likelv are 
many who would disagree, but the fact is that almost 
all productivity increases can be attributed to appli­
cation of advances in our knowledge. General Elec­
tric believes, "the bulk of the increases in productive 
efficiency comes from technological advances, creative 
innovation in products, and attendant progress in pro­
ducts, materials, facilities and methods, and in organi­
zation of the w o r k . I t  is the responsibility of a 
manager to plan, to organize, and to integrate these many 
different factors. It is the manager's responsibility to 
lead or motivate the employees to increase productivity. 
Productivity is a proper measure of a manager's success 
since he is the coordinator of all the factors affecting 
productivity.
General Electric has not finished its research on
how to measure productivity, but when the research is
complete, the conclusions should add another yardstick by
i**Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Disoontinuity
(New York; Harper and Row, 1959), p. 151.
1 * 5"Productivity," Relations News Letter (New 
York: Relations Services, General Electric Company,
August 1, 1960), p. 1.
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which managers can evaluate themselves and others. The 
preliminary investigation has brought up some worthwhile 
insights to productivity as a control device. The indexes 
of productivity for an economy as a whole are computed by 
the relation of G.N.P. to total man hours worked. In 
developing an index of productivity for the firm, the 
figure of Sales Billed may be looked upon as the counter­
part of G.N.P. (output). Therefore, for a firm, produc­
tivity is the relationship between Sales Billed and 
employee man hours. General Electric has found other 
factors which may express productivity— output against 
input— and each has merits. A listing of the factors which 
may show productivity includes the following:^^®
Output Input
Sales billed Man hours worked
Units sold Payroll dollars
Value added Equivalent man hours
Manufacturing cost Floor space
Units produced First cost of Plant and
Equipment
There are other possible indexes which have been developed. 
Sales billed as a measure of output is weak and could be 
misleading as the firm may decide to buy materials in an 
advanced stage of fabrication or subcontract the manufac­
ture of various component parts of a product. This would 
have no effect on sales billed, but man hours worked would 
be reduced and "productivity" would show a substantial 
improvement.
The measurements project team has been seeking to 
develop an index which would do two things:
Measurements Projeotj Part I, op. oit. 3 p. 12. 
Ibid. 3 p. 13.
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(1) measure improvement in the productivity 
of our operations as distinguished from improve­
ment contributed by our suppliers of materials, 
and (2) broaden the input base so as to recog­
nize that capital as well as labor contributed 
to improvement in productivity.
Hoping to recognize the value capital plays in 
conjunction with labor. General Electric began to study 
the possibility of using "value added" as a basis for 
determining productivity. "Value added" is defined by 
the firm as sales billed less the cost of goods and 
services purchased from other producers whether incor­
porated in the end product or consumed in the operation 
of the b u s i n e s s . 3̂8 value added is, in fact, what the 
company now uses as a basis for p r o d u c t i v i t y . T o  
avoid confusion, it should be mentioned that another 
possible basis is "contributed value." This is not used 
by GE. "Contributed value" is sales billed less the cost 
of goods or services actually incorporated in the end 
product only. On the input side of the ratio, GE has 
thought about using payroll dollars plus depreciation 
dollars as the input factor. Thus, productivity would 
be the ratio of value added to the sum of the two dollar 
figures. Both the input and output figures would be 
expressed in constant value to make it possible to see 
trends.
These have been the preliminary recommendations 
of the measurements project team which is now only begin­
ning a thorough investigation of the area as a sub-project.
^^®This was brought out in each of the following 
interviews; Hugh Estes, Organization Planning Consultant, 
July 30, 1969; Maurice Mayo, Manager--General Accounting, 
July 30, 1969; G. Richard Shoemaker, Manager--Marketing 
Planning--Computers, July 30, 1969.
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Product Leadership
The fourth type of measurement developed for the
firm is Product Leadership. Again, this measurement
reflects the performance of the business or product line
as a whole and should not be interpreted as a measurement
of any one function. Product Leadership is defined as
the ability of a business to lead its industry 
in originating or applying the most advanced 
scientific and technical knowledge in the 
engineering, manufacturing and marketing fields 
to the development of new products and to 
improvements in the quality or value of exist­
ing products . ̂ ®
Two of the members of the team investigating 
General Electric's first attempt at Measurement of 
Performance in this qualitative area have been promoted 
to Vice Presidents. They are Robert W. Lewis as Group 
Executive of the operational field. Power Transmission and 
Distribution; and John B. McKitterick as Vice President 
of the staff field. Planning Development. So, this 
measurements project team was extremely high powered 
in terms of corporate administration positions held by the 
team members.
Product leadership is in the minds of the con­
sumers and not, or should not be, what the manufacturer 
thinks. Drucker notes, "There is no leadership if the 
market is not willing to recognize the claim.
^‘*°Robert W. Lewis, "Measuring, Reporting and 
Appraising Results of Operations with Reference to Goals, 
Plans and Budgets," Planning^ Managing and Measuring the 
Business^ A Case Study of Management Planning and Control 
at General Eleotrio Company (New York: Controllership
Foundation, 1959), pp. 35-36.
^‘'^Drucker, Managing for Results^ op. ait. ̂ p. 44,
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This means in terms of what the customers are willing to
pay. Product leadership is an economic term and not an
aesthetic term, and is used as a measure of two or more
products, by different firms. A monopolist cannot have
product leadership because the consumer has no choice.
The customer, who by preferring one product to its
competitor's, gives product leadership.
Therefore, it holds that product leadership should
not be measured by the common test, "Share of Market."
The reason for this is that, as often found, to get the
largest share of the market, companies have to sacrifice
profitability— compared to competitors. Thus, instead of
getting paid to be the product leader, the firm is having
to pay to get leadership. Drucker has found:
Some small manufacturers, each specializ­
ing in one or two special applications of low- 
horsepower electrical motors, have been doing 
proportionately better than General Electric 
or Westinghouse, whose dominant market share 
forces them to supply all kinds of motors to 
all customers and for all end users, and who 
therefore, of necessity, must be marginal or 
lose money on some lines .
Peter Drucker has a study of product leadership in 
his Managing for Results and he proposes that the follow­
ing five questions must be asked in analyzing products 
for their leadership position. ̂ ^
1. Is the product being bought in preference 
to other products on the market, or at 
least as eagerly?
2. Do we have to give anything to get the 
customer to buy?
3. Do we get paid for what we deliver to him 
as indicated by an at-least-average profit 
contribution?
4. Are we getting paid for what we think is 
the product distinction?
5. Or do we have a product with leadership 
position and with distinction without 
discerning it?
1 h. 0
■Ibid., p. 43. ^‘*^Ihid., p. 44,
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The extent of product leadership, or lack of it, 
has a vital effect on the survival and growth of the 
firm. In a widely decentralized company such as General 
Electric, the performance of one department in product 
leadership may have considerable influence in establish­
ing customer acceptance of the products of other depart­
ments of the firm.
Because of the importance of this field and 
because of the vitalness of this area to managerial decision­
making, to properly evaluate a manager's performance, it 
is necessary to develop a method of measuring product 
leadership.
Once product leadership has been determined, then 
the reasons why this position was reached are of paramount 
importance. For instance, when a department's performance 
has been judged to be unsatisfactory, the appraisal should 
include why the department has lagged behind competitors.
Did it fail to recognize market requirements; was it 
unable to solve engineering or manufacturing problems; 
or were there other causes?
Appraisal of a department's existing products and 
the similar products of competitors will enable the 
department to determine how well its products satisfy 
customer wants as compared with competitors' products.
To continue as a leader, company products must be evaluated 
in terms of strengths— and weaknesses— which will allow 
the manager to develop offensive action rather than defen­
sive action.
The Electronics Business Development Study 
of 1955 pointed out the importance of being a leader in
^Measurements Project Operational Measurements 
Key Besult Area No. 4: Product Leadership (Schenectady,
N . Y .: General Electric Company, April, 1956), p. 2.
p. 5.
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introducing new technical principles to the market. The 
study pointed out that when General Electric made a late 
entry into the market with products which copied the 
technical principles of other firms, GE seldom achieved 
product leadership. The conclusion was that product market 
leadership resulted from leading or at least keeping pace 
in introducing new products to the market. This seems to 
emphasize that the firm cannot often afford to lag in 
introducing new products or it will lose leadership. 
Hopefully, emphasis on being first or early in marketing 
products will not encourage the premature marketing of 
new products or product improvement. Of course, the measure­
ment team did point out that delay in entering a market 
may give rise to lost prestige, reduced volume, and less 
profits resulting from the time advantage given to competi­
tors.
When evaluating the leadership of various products, 
a qualitative evaluation has to be used. But General 
Electric measures performance, which is a measure of past 
managerial decisions, by appraising the firm's existing 
products to determine:
1. How they compare with competitors' products 
and with General Electric standards.
2. The source of the research on which the 
products are based.
3. Whether the basic product and subsequent 
product improvements were first introduced 
by General Electric or by competition.
In conjunction with the second point, Ted Quinn,
long-time head of General Electric's lamp department, was
able to say in 1953,
 ̂ ® "Excerpts from the Measurements Project,
op. oit.
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I know of no original product invention, 
not even electric shavers or heating pads, 
made by any of the giant laboratories of 
corporations, with the possible exception 
of the household garbage grinders, developed 
not by the Research Laboratory but by the 
engineering department of General Electric 
. . . .The record of giants is one of moving
in, buying out, and absorbing the smaller 
creators . ̂ ^
Oddly enough, Drucker was to write a decade later, "General 
Electric seems to have had little luck with the businesses 
it acquires . " ̂ ®
In considering the factors to be evaluated in pro­
duct appraisals, the measurements project team working on 
Key Result Area No. 4 determined that it was necessary 
to establish groups of basic factors that could be used 
for any product to be evaluated, since a detailed set of 
criteria could not be developed to fit the numerous 
diverse products of the firm. With that in mind, the 
team suggested that products be subjectively appraised 
for performance, features, and attractiveness, and the 
following outline was suggested as a guide for evaluating 
each product.
1. Performanae--ho^ well the product accomplishes
its required function.
a. Teohniaal oharaoteristios--such as efficiency, 
sensitivity, accuracy, capacity, and rating.
b. G p e r a t i n ÿ  cost —  cost of operating and maintain­
ing the product during its economic life.
c. i?e Z--ia2?iZity--availability for consistent and 
dependable performance.
i^^Theodore K. Quinn, Giant Business: Threat to
Demoaraay (New York; Exposition Press, 1953), p. 117.
^‘*®Drucker, Managing for Results^ op. oit., p. 115.
'̂*̂ Key Result Area No. 4, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
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d. DurabiZ-ity--ability to withstand conditions 
of use and environment.
e. Z/i/e--length of time the product renders 
satisfactory performance.
f. Disturbanae Zeye Z---undesirable output, such
as noise, light, vibration, and heat, produced 
while operating under normal conditions.
g. Safety--freedom, from hazards of a functional 
nature under operating conditions.
h. UnifOPm-ity--consistency with which the product 
meets its performance characteristics.
Features —  aspects of the product's design that
are not necessarily essential to the performance
of its function but which increase its salability.
a. Physioat oharaateristios--such as size, weight, 
shape, and finish.
b. Special funations--a.dditional applications for 
which the product may be used which are 
secondary to its stated function.
c. Ease of installation and sevvioing--aspects 
of the product's design and use of common or 
standard parts that facilitate the installation 
or servicing of the product.
d. Range of wse--degree to which the product may 
be adapted easily to different operating 
conditions or requirements.
e. Aaaeasories— supplementary devices that may be 
incorporated in or added to the product.
f. Interohangeability--deqree to which the product 
may be replaced in whole or in part with the 
same or a similar product or part.
g. Convenienoe--ease with which the product may 
be used.
h. Safety--freedom from hazards of a non-functional 
nature.
i. Paakaging--type of crating or boxing used from 
the standpoint of facilitating the handling, 
displaying, and installing of the product.
Attractiveness--aspects of the product and its
package that appeal to the senses.
a. Sty ling--harmony and timeliness of such factors 
as shape, texture, color, and finish.
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b. Compatibilirty--degree to which the styling 
blends with its surroundings and other 
products.
c. Cons truetion--evLdence of good design and 
workmanship.
d. Uniformity--consistency with which the product 
meets specifications for such factors as 
shape, texture, color, and finish.
Each product department will have to exercise 
judgment in weighting the various factors and making them 
fit the particular market.
The point is that each product must be critically 
examined to determine its relative strengths and weaknesses 
from the standpoint of "appearance design, functional 
design, ease of manufacture, ease of maintenance, quality, 
and value per dollar as compared with accepted General 
Electric standards and with competitors' products.
Each department must determine standards from the 
standpoint of the customer, for General Electric claims 
that the customer sets the standards. This view would 
prevent a product from looking superior on paper by being 
"over-engineered" beyond the desires of the market. Stan­
dards must be set by sampling the market at regular inter­
vals to ascertain what the customer wants in way of per­
formance, features, and attractiveness in products and 
also in terms of what the customer is willing to pay. The 
results of these surveys will help develop standards 
against each product which can be appraised to determine 
the "leading product."
It is easy to see that General Electric is develop­
ing a true control structure in this area. First, it has 
set objectives— to have leading products. Second, it has 
organized the particular measurements— performance, fea­
tures, and attractiveness in the eyes of the consumers.
op. ait.
"Excerpts from the Measurements Project,"
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Third, it has set standards— although they are flexible 
and subjective, they are standards.
Separate standards must be developed for each 
market because General Electric correctly defines products, 
not from the manufacturing needs, but from the customers' 
needs. For a product doing well in one market may be 
weak in another market. General Electric says.
Based on survey results. . .and the informed 
judgment of the department management, weighted 
numerical values may be assigned to the various 
factors of performance, features and attractive­
ness (depending upon the relative importance of 
each in a particular market) to arrive at a 
product standard.
For determining the overall rating for each pro­
duct, the products should be evaluated from the stand­
point of how they compare with the standards based on market 
requirements. Some evaluation can be expressed in numeri­
cal terms and some evaluation must be expressed subjectively. 
Qualitative measurements, when used correctly, can be as 
useful as quantitative measurements. The inability to 
express some inputs in absolute numerical terms should not 
detract from their use as evaluation aids.
Appendix Exhibits 3-6, 3-7, and 3-8 show how 
General Electric recommends to each department general 
manager how he can show product leadership so that it is 
easy to understand and exceptional cases can be easily 
seen. Such a profile makes the process easier to control 
through management by exception.
Area: No. 4j op. oit.j p. 19.
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Personnel Development
Personnel development^®^. Key Result Area No. 5, 
is another part of management which is future oriented. 
Edwin Flippo said that there are two general principles 
of executive development: one, all development is self­
development; and, two, an effective organizational climate 
must be established if the program is to be successful.
He also adds, as a corollary, that it is a long-range 
process.1®® He then goes on to discuss coaching, job 
rotation, special courses, and so forth, and how they 
fit into an executive development program. That is to 
say, he demonstrates how the company organization, a 
manager's superior, and outside stimuli affect self­
development. What Flippo and most of the other "self­
development" advocates are saying is that self-development 
requires a great deal more than the "self." Ronald 
Shuman has pointed out, "that 'development' does involve 
superiors. It is not, or should not be, wholly a matter 
of individual or self-development on the part of the
^®^The most concise definition of General 
Electric's method of personnel development is found 
in Harold F. Smiddy, "General Electric's Philosophy and 
Approach for Manager Development," General Management 
Series No. 174 (New York: American Management Association
1955). Also see Gerald L. Phillippe, "Management Train­
ing at General Electric," The Controller, Vol. XXIX, No. 8 
(August, 1961). General Electric has also published, for 
internal use only, the following books: Manager Develop­
ment Basic Principles and Plan (1954), Manager Develop­
ment Guidebook I, Managerial Climate (1954), Manager 
Development Guidebook II, Self-Development Planning 
(1954), Manager Development Guidebook III, Manager Man­
power Planning (1954), Manager Development Guidebook IV, 
Manager Education{1954).
^®®Edwin B. Flippo, Principles of Personnel 
Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1960),
p. 218.
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subordinate."^^** Or, as Drucker has noted, the organiza­
tional climate, the structure, the standards, the managers, 
must be so designed that it motivates the individual to 
self-development. That is, the organization must have 
systematic, focused, and purposeful self-training.'®®
General Electric defines personnel development 
as, "the systematic training of managers and specialists 
to fill present and future needs of the company, to provide 
for further individual growth and expansion, and to per­
petuate corporate existence."^®® It, therefore, includes 
programs in the functional fields— engineering, manufac­
turing, marketing, and finance— as well as broad programs 
aimed at developing an understanding of the process of 
managing. The programs are designed to provide a continu­
ous flow of managers, enabling the filling of all the 
needs of the company.
To understand the formal training programs, a 
look at the control measurements may throw some light on 
the subject. One approach to-measuring the effectiveness 
of company-sponsored personnel development programs 
consists of inventorying managers and functional special­
ists to determine where they received their training; 
i.e., as graduates of company programs, had no organized 
training, or were hired from outside the company. Such 
inventories, taken yearly, would give some indication of 
coverage of company-sponsored programs. Other measure­
ments would be to determine what and how many weak areas 
are found in the organization, which could have been 
forecasted. That is to say from forecasting corporate
* ® **Lecture, Ronald B. Shuman, Professor of Manage­
ment, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, April 24, 1967,
^®*Peter F. Drucker, The Effective Executive 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 156-174.
Key Area: No. 4, op. ait.j p. 21.
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needs in the past, how many of these needs did the program 
properly fill. Another measurement of the effectiveness 
of personnel development programs is the degree of progress 
achieved by employees who were graduates of such programs.
The first step in the operation of an orderly and 
successful personnel development program is to determine 
the needs, present and future, of each part and at all 
levels of the company, for each management position.
Such a forecast would be a master plan of manpower require­
ments for each department and show the department's mana­
gers own needs and the needs of other departments— which 
are frequently filled by interdepartmental transfers 
and promotions. Robert Lewis notes, "Each department 
would have to receive some guidance with respect to the 
number and quality of individuals it would be called upon 
to supply to other components."^®’
Figure 19 shows a simple manpower chart developed 
in 1952 for the next decade. After a more elaborate man­
power schedule is developed, the next step involves the 
conception of plans as how to satisfy the needs— how 
each department will get the number of qualified managers 
and specialists. This entails the looking at individual 
department development programs, overall company programs 
(usually sponsored by service organizations), the avail­
ability of individuals from other departments, and the 
desirability of hiring outside talent. When this is 
finished, it is up to the departments to tell the Services 
Division what its needs are from the service-sponsored 
programs.
Control is difficult in this area, as the objec­
tives, the forecasts of required personnel, are future orien­
ted and only in ten or twenty years after the fact can a
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FIGURE 19
G E N E A A i g i  E L E C T R I C
ANALYSIS OF MANAGERIAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 
FOR SECTION MANAGER AND HIGHER POSITIONS
1952 through 1962
NUMBER O F MANAGERS
Management
E xecutives)




P O S IT IO N S -» - \
Second Level o f Management 
(Serv ices D iv. M anagers & D iv. G en. Mgrs
liKl
28 PROMOTIONS (IN T ER -L evel) 




2 6  NEW 
POSITIONS
T hird Level of Management 
(D ept. M anagers and  G eneral M anagers)
193 PROMOTIONS (IN T E R -L evel) 




Fourth Level of Management
(Section M anagers)
709 PROMOTIONS (IN T E R -L evel)
Total Soparoflotts (dooths, ro tlg n o tfo n s .
d iao b illlia s  and ra tirom ants),..........................571 (SOtlof P reso n l Incumbent*)
P iom otion t — In le t-L e v e l..................................... 930 (80% ol P re a e n t Incumbent*)
Promotion* — In tro -L evel..................................... 595 (52X of P reaen t Incumbent*)
(64X o( Inter-Level Prom otion*)
Total Prom otion*...................................................... 1525(I32tCo( P reaen t Incumbent*)
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program be properly evaluated. This train of thought 
will be explained when a discussion of control of services 
is made.
Harold Smiddy, a great advocate of self-development, 
was the designer of one of General Electric's major formal 
development programs. He has made some interesting points 
worth noting on management;  ̂® ®
First of all, we can't engraft talent 
and ambition onto the personality of someone 
who hasn't got them. But we can create a 
favorable climate and give guidance to the 
man of ability who is his own self-starter.
In the second place, the process of natural 
selection--the idea that the good man invariably 
realizes his potentialities and rises to the 
top or toward it--just doesn't pan out. In 
our case, it has produced too few managers too 
la te.
Moreover, we think that the practice of 
management is ahead of its codification. We 
are continuing research into method and moti­
vation for a ten or even twenty year pull.
Meantime, the responsibility for developing 
men using the knowledge already at hand, is 
written into the job assignment of every GE 
manager.
Perhaps the most provocative--and important-- 
idea on which we're proceeding is that managing 
should be regarded as a distinct type of work, 
with its own disciplines, its own criteria for 
achievement, something which is both learnable 
and teachable.
At General Electric it is not a major job 
requirement for a manager to train and develop those 
below him. Management development is more self-development 
than lead-development, although the company has an exten­
sive system of formal training programs. The company's 
official policy is that, "a manager has the responsibility
^'*®Herbert Harris, "3-Year Study Shows How 
Managers are Made," Nation’s Business^ Vol. 44, No. 
(March, 1956), pp. 90-91.
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for appraising the strengths and the weaknesses of each man 
who reports to him for suggesting 'on-the-job' and 'off- 
the-job' plans for self-development by each individual." 
(Emphasis added.)
Why is self-development emphasized over the more 
traditional belief that developing subordinates is an inte­
gral part of every manager's job? After a discussion with 
Ralph Cordiner on November 7, 1951, Lemuel R. Boulware 
formally asked Harold Smiddy and Management Consultation 
Services to undertake a study to determine the company's 
needs for development of managerial manpower and to formu­
late a plan to meet the needs. From 1951 through 1956 
Harold Smiddy led a research study into the factors that 
make for executive proficiency. The study was begun by 
informal talks with officers and managers of the company. 
These were followed by talks with representatives of 
leading corporations, by study of writings about manage­
ment development, and by participation in related sessions 
of the American Management Association and the Society for 
the Advancement of Management. Then, more than three 
hundred General Electric people were consulted covering 
all of the components, and finally, twenty-seven managers 
from department managers and above spent two days develop­
ing a plan of attack for the study of management develop­
ment. The study then became extremely high powered, using 
top company executives and outside personnel. McKinsey 
and Company, the Psychological Corporation, and private 
consultants were gathered for the study. Peter Drucker 
and Ewing Reilley (of McKinsey) and Moorhead M. Wright
^^'^Professional Management in General Electric 
Book Three. . op. cit., p. 89.
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(GE) headed the coordination of the s t u d y . H e r b e r t  
Harris, staff writer for Nation's Business^ commenting 
on the study, said.
The study also demonstrated that you can't 
count on a man to get ahead just because he 
has talent, that experience alone doesn't 
insure capability on the job, that management 
is a distinct skill, and that the practice of 
management is far ahead of its translation 
into rules and procedures . ̂  ^
The study also brought forth the need for self­
development. This is not truly self-development, for it 
combines self-education with management coaching and with 
organized training programs. It is the policy of the 
firm that
responsibility for manager development is 
accordingly a responsibility of each man as 
an individual and as a manager. As an indi­
dual he has the responsibility for his 
self-development; as a manager, he has the 
responsibility for the development oppor­
tunities and challenges of the men under 
him.^ ® ̂
Position guides for managers include responsibility for 
manager development as inherent in each manager's job, 
although not a major part of the job, and as an important 
consideration in evaluation of the incumbent's performance. 
The words "teach, advise, counsel" can be found in the 
position guides of all managers at General Electric, 
including the position guide for the Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer. That position guide, 
developed for Cordiner, states.
^^^Manager Development Study: Basic Report on
Manager Development Plan (New York: Management Consulta­
tion Services Division, General Electric Company, July, 
1953) , pp. V-VI.
*®^Herbert Harris, op. oit.^ p. 90.
'^Management Development Study^ op. ait., p. 2.
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The primary measures of the Chairman of 
the Board and Chief Executive Officer's per­
formance will be:. . .The quality of managerial 
leadership in teaching, advising and counseling 
officers and General Managers. . . .  ̂̂  3
Harris termed the General Electric study as 
"perhaps the most elaborate management development project 
of any in U. S. industry."^®** From the original study, 
extensive organized training programs were developed 
which are now in use at General Electric. These training 
programs have more than one objective. Besides the normal 
objective of producing competent managers and specialists 
for new positions and as replacements for posts vacated, 
the programs also seek to assist the executive to func­
tion more effectively in his present position and to correct 
any narrowness of outlook caused by overspecialization 
of function and provincialism of corporate background.
"No company, no industry, can afford to let managers just 
h a p p e n , "iG5 says Smiddy. To back up each department's 
personnel development programs. General Electric set up 
two programs under Smiddy's Management Consultation Ser­
vices; a decentralized "Professional Business Management 
Course" and a centralized "General Electric Advanced 
Management Course." The Advanced Management Course was 
given at the General Electric Management Research and 
Development Institute at Crotonville on the Hudson, some 
thirty-five miles north of New York City. The company's 
attitude is similar to that found behind the excellent 
programs of Standard Oil (N.J.), Sears Roebuck, General 
Motors, and others. The General Electric program is much
^"Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Offi­
cer Position Guide," 4/24/58, General Eteotria Organiza­
tion and Policy Guide^ pp. 6-7.
^®**Herbert Harris, op. cit.j p. 90.
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broader than other corporate programs and may be considered 
similar to the Harvard MBA program.
The Crotonville Management Research and Develop­
ment Institute, known in the press as "General Electric U." 
or "GE College," is situated on the estate of the late 
Harry Arthur Hopf, a pioneer management consultant. The 
original course was designed in 1956 by such men as 
Smiddy, Drucker, Marc A. deFerranti, Edward Kemble, Earl 
Brooks, and Frank Gilmore, currently director of Cornell's 
Executive Development Program.‘® ® Set up like an accelerated 
MBA Program, originally the course extended for thirteen 
consecutive weeks, with classes meeting five and one-half 
days a week; the eighty executives who attended were per­
mitted one weekend at home during the c o u r s e . ^̂ 7 The 
first semester had most of the course designers as lec­
turers, as well as Ralph Cordiner, Robert Paxton (GE),
Dr. Lillian Gilbreth, Lemuel Boulware, Norman Maier,
Gerard Swope, and Chris Argyris.^®® Other semesters have 
seen Lyndall Urwick, Myles Mace (Harvard), Douglas 
MacGregor (MIT), Paul Mills and Gerald Phillippe (GE) 
and William Newman (Columbia).^®* The eighty students 
were selected by their immediate superiors, came from three 
levels below the president's office down to the section 
manager level. During the time of the course the students 
were completely detached from their work, with full 
salaries. The cost for tuition, room and board was $2,500 
per man and charged against the divisional or departmental
*®®Personal letter from Frank F. Gilmore,
November 25, 1964.
^®'Joseph M. Guilfoyle, "General Electric U.,"
The Wall Street Journal^ Vol. CXLV, No. 104 (May 27, 1955).
^®®Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, November 29, 1969. Mr. Greenwood was on the 
same program with Mr. Swope.
^®®Guilfoyle , Ibid,^ and letter from L t . Col.
L. F . Urwick, June 24, 1963.
195
budget, ensuring that the division or department would 
send only those who would profit from the course.
In 1956, the Institute began a nine-week course with 
about three hundred graduates a year. By 1961, this 
course had a two-year backlog of nominated students.
Going to Crotonville became something of a status symbol; 
this was a consequence that the firm did not want to 
happen, yet it seems to have been inevitable.
The curriculum has changed greatly over the years, 
but it can be termed "multi-functional." Such specialized 
courses as finance, marketing, accounting, and so forth, 
are left to other training programs— those within depart­
ments or those run by special staffs. The Crotonville 
courses concentrate on management theory and economic, 
social, and political issues. Originally, the Institute 
stressed decentralization with such specifics as how to 
write and interpret policies, and how to administer salary 
systems. By 1960 the emphasis shifted to the business 
environment.
In 1961 the school shut down to reorganize the 
curriculum and it reopened in January of 1964 with new 
courses and with a larger number of students. Hugh Estes 
said at the time, "It is bigger than ever, and we run 
more people through it."  ̂ The new curriculum is covered 
by a thirteen-week course. The new course spends five 
weeks on "perspective and environment" and four weeks on 
"strategy and action for the total enterprise.
^^°Busineee Week^ March 4, 1961, p. 51.
 ̂̂ ̂ "GE Institute Near End of Run--Now What?" 
Business Week^ March 4, 1961, p. 50.
^^^Interview with Hugh Estes, New York, July 30, 
1969. Mr. Estes said that the school shut-down was used 
to redesign the curriculum to match the new needs of the 
employees.
^®"Management Training: An Act of Faith," Dun’s 
Review and Modern Industry^ vol. 92, No. 6 (December, 1968), 
p. 49.
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The question, for control purposes, "Is the 
Institute worthwhile?" At the outset, Smiddy said.
We wouldn’t be putting our money into 
this project if we didn't think it's going to 
pay off. But it will probably be five years 
before we know the answer for sure. One way 
of measuring its success will be to compare 
the performance of men who've attended the 
Institute and those who haven't. Studies made 
so far indicate that executives who've taken 
courses at Harvard and elsewhere advance much 
faster than those who haven't had such training.
Five years later Business Week evaluated the Institute,
saying, "Crotonville has had no measurable impact on the
quality of GE's management^^® No explanation was given
on how this conclusion was reached, yet the school is
still in existence.
During the seventy-eight years of its history. 
General Electric has tried out every form of personnel 
development— from job rotation, to having personnel attend 
graduate schools of business, to attendance in the firm's 
own staff college— the first ever created by a company for 
the advanced education of its own personnel.^̂ ® Yet, 
the real development is seIf-development, where a job is 
designed so that a manager learns from his work, and by 
proper placement which enables the manager to stretch.
"You can keep getting your feet wet around the edges of 
real managing just so long. Then you have to take the 
plunge,"^°° says Lawrence E. Walkley, General Electric 
General Manager.
The rigorous performance appraisal system is a 
major component of General Electric's development plan 
every six months. Every subordinate is assessed by his
^^^Guilfoyle, op. oit.
 ̂̂  ̂ "GE Institute Nears End of Run," op. oit.y p. 50,
1 7  9 ,Harris, op. o^t.J p. 91.
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superior in relation to his work assignment. The work 
assignment requirements are spelled out in a position 
guide, which is more specific and detailed than the usual 
job descriptions. The subordinate is rated on a sliding 
scale (i.e., outstanding, superior, satisfactory, not 
yet satisfactory, unsatisfactory) for everything from 
technical proficiency to emotional stability under pres­
sure. This evaluation will be discussed more fully in the 
section covering control mechanisms.
Roy Johnson, General Electric Vice President of 
Executive Development, points out that the Institute is 
very important to a manager's development, even though the 
company preaches self-development. Explaining how formal 
training fits with self-development at General Electric, 
it is estimated that 90 percent of a man's career develop­
ment is derived from actual work and the responsibilities 
derived therefrom; another seven percent is the result 
of coaching on the job from his superior; and the remain­
ing three percent is achieved through formal training, 
such as Crotonville, Professional Business Management 
Course, Business Training Course (Accounting, and so 
forth).'*1
Employee Attitudes
The Measurements Project issued its report on 
Key Area No. 6, Employee Attitudes, in January, 1958.^®^
p. 93.
^^"Management Training," op. ait.j p. 45.
 ̂̂ "^Measurements Project--Operational Measurements- 
Key Result Area No. 6--Employee Attitudes (Schenectady, 
N.Y.; Measurements Service, Accounting Services, General 
Electric Company, January, 1958).
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Although this report has not been published for other than 
General Electric employees to read, a good description 
of the basis of the study was published fifteen years ago 
by two of the collaborators.^®^
This key result area assumes that part of each 
manager's job is to develop a positive attitude toward 
the company, particularly from each of his subordinates. 
Since this morale or attitude leadership is inherent in 
each managerial responsibility, then the extent to which 
a manager affects the attitudes of his subordinates should 
be measured to determine the effectiveness of the manager. 
Unfortunately, attitude measurement is not easily measured 
in dollars, although employee attitudes will ultimately 
affect the balance sheet.
Robert W. Lewis and his measurements study team 
claim that men bring to their place of employment six 
specific needs which affect their attitude.^®**
1. The need for compensation and related benefits 
to obtain or maintain a desired level of living.
2. The need for recognition and appreciation of 
his accomplishments and of the efforts he 
expends.
3. The need for acceptance by his associates 
and his community.
4. The need for opportunity to progress.
5. The need for adequate and safe facilities.
6̂. The need for security for himself and his 
family.
Enlightened management, such as Taylor, Follett, 
and the Gilbreths, long before Mayo, recognized these 
needs, both material and non-material. Reflecting the
^®®Willard V. Merrihue and Raymond A. Katzell, 
"ERI--Yardstick of Employee Relations," Harvard Business 
RevieWj Vol. 33, No. 5 (November-December, 1955), pp. 91- 
99.
18 4Key Result Area No. 6̂  op. oit.y p. 53
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social responsibilities of business, managers have 
attempted to provide working conditions whereby the 
employees have an opportunity to satisfy their needs.
The extent to which a company succeeds in meeting its 
social responsibility is reflected in part by the atti­
tudes of its employees. The development of employee atti­
tudes of active and willing cooperation, and "of wanting 
to direct their efforts toward the success of the enter­
prise,"^®® is of primary concern to the business.
Brigadier General Edward L. Munson, Chief of Morale 
Branch, United States Army, as far back as 1921 said,
such negative factors as impatience, indiffer­
ence and lack of interest reveal themselves 
with mathematical accuracy in the amount of 
product created. Morale depression thus has 
the same effect on the individual's productivity 
as physical defeat.^®®
Earl Brooks, Professor of Personnel at Cornell, says.
Surveys show that at least four out of five 
employees who fail to make good on the job 
have the knowledge and skill to do the work 
required but they fail because of their unsatis­
factory attitudes, interests, and work habits.^®^
Although Brooks has introduced some additional factors, 
it can be safely stated that employee attitudes are of 
more than just a passing interest to management.
If management is to discharge its leadership func­
tion properly, it must get information concerning the types 
of attitudes which exist and take the proper action which 
will result in attitudes favorable toward the company's 
objectives. To accomplish this, the measurements team 
attempted to:*®®
'®®Zbtd., p. 4.
^®®Edward L. Munson, The Management of Men (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1921), p. 740.
*®^Earl Brooks, "Getting Results Through Others," 
unpublished mimeograph used in Organizational Behavior and 
Theory 120, Graduate school of Business and Public Adminis­
tration, Cornell University, Fall, 1964, p. 2.
^®®Ke# Result Area No. 6, op. cit., p. 5.
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1. Arrange information in a more orderly pattern 
so as to facilitate understanding;
2. Give greater assurance that all of the 
significant information about attitudes 
will be disclosed;
3. Provide a method of observing changes in 
attitude over a period of time;
4. Provide a means whereby the relative level of 
attitudes in one group or segment of an organi­
zation may be observed and compared with the 
level of attitudes of other groups.
Using direct questioning and analysis of statisti­
cal data. General Electric developed a measuring system on 
employee attitudes designed to "isolate a number of broad 
attitude areas, measure them on a relatively uniform scale 
and identify them with particular segments of the organi­
zation. "199
The statistical data to be used, in conjunction 
with direct questioning, relate to;i*°
Tardiness Benefit Plan Participation
Absence Accidents
Resignations Suggestions
In the initial (1955) interim report, grievances and work 
stoppages were also used as data.^^i These data are known, 
collectively, as the ERI, employee relations index. The 
various statistics used are termed indicators of employee 
attitudes, they reflect behavior that is optional on the 
part of the employees, such as absenteeism. It is true 
that some absenteeism is not optional on the employees' 
part; i.e., illness, court duty, family emergencies, but 
some absenteeism is optional and used with other indicators; 
it helps to point out trends. "The behavior at the root
p. 7.
isofbtd., p. 93.
i^iMerrihue and Katzell, op. oit.j pp. 94-95
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of the statistic should have implications as being either in 
accord with objectives of the business or at variance with 
such objectives,"'*2 wrote Merrihue and Katzell, two members 
of the study team.
Several years of work went into getting the statis­
tics, analysis, testing the validity and assigning relative 
weights to each factor. Using factor analysis on several 
sets of data covering forty plants and more than six hundred 
work groups, it was found that the indicators do tend to 
fluctuate.Merrihue and Katzell add,
the sensitivity of several of the indicators in 
the plant-wide analysis was improved when due 
allowance was made for the influence of certain 
background variables on some of them (e.g., 
effects of community growth on separations rate).!***
This is adding much subjectivity to the study.
Professor Thomas Gilson, in discussing the ERI 
with William C. Schwarzbek, one of the members of the 
measurements project, pointed out that the indicators used 
can be manipulated by managers. Using strong authori­
tarian threatening pressure on subordinates, absenteeism, 
turnover, and so forth, can be cut down— for short periods, 
although in the long run organizational deterioration is 
likely.1*3 This has been also pointed out by many others.i*® 
The other half of the employee attitude study is 
the attitude questionnaire. A questionnaire was developed, 
tested, and used by General Electric for hourly rated 
employees. The original study questionnaire contained fifty- 
six questions covering twelve categories.i*  ̂ Appendix
p. 95. i**Ji&id., p. 95.
i*"Z6td.
i**lnterview with Thomas Gilson, Chairman, Depart­
ment of Management, Marketing, and Industrial Relations, 
University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, December 8, 1969.
i*®See Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1961), p. 75.
i*7%g^ Rssult A.rea No. g, op. cit.^ pp. 26-28.
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Exhibit 3-9 is a copy from the original study showing the 
twelve categories. The questions related to compensation, 
working conditions, various aspects of supervision, some 
features of group relationships, work methods, incentive 
climate, and value perceptions. After the survey was 
conducted, the managers, supervisors, and foremen received 
all of the information on employee attitudes which enabled 
them to compare the relative standing of their groups to 
all other groups in the plant or department. Appendix 
Exhibits 3-10 and 3-11 show how the tabulation of employee 
attitudes looks. The company has yet to develop a 
questionnaire for salaried employees, but Lewis suggests 
the use of questionnaires found in the personnel market.
The two measures, statistical data and question­
naire, are, at best, samples of employee attitudes which 
give some indication of employee personal satisfactions, 
preferences, and evaluations, and which also indicate job- 
related behavior based on personnel statistics. Once the 
attitude survey has identified significant deviation from 
what the manager expects, then action can be taken.
Expected attitudes are determined by long-term study to 
determine what is "normal" for such a group and by subjec­
tive guesswork. Each manager is to be measured by match­
ing the results of the study against expectations, which 
are developed as are other objectives, by close work between 
the manager and his boss.
It was hoped by the measurements team that the 
attitude survey would be made each yearand that it would 
be used to evaluate the effectiveness of past courses of 
action allowing for present action to be planned with 
better predictability of its outcome. In other words, 
through long years of investigation and measuring of 
various situations and management actions, certain practices
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might emerge which fit the needs of each type of situation, 
enabling management to identify the best course of action 
to take for a given situation.
Although the measurements team explains how the 
attitude survey is going to help a foreman evaluate his 
work group, the team failed to note adequately that this 
would be an excellent top management tool to evaluate the 
effectiveness of middle managers. Each key area was 
developed for self-evaluation purposes and for top-down 
evaluation purposes. Since a manager realizes that the 
attitudes in his group are being quantitatively measured, 
there is some support to the belief that he will try to 
develop a group with favorable attitudes toward the 
company. He will not do this at the expense of profit­
ability or productivity, however, for each manager also 
realizes that profitability and productivity far outweigh 
employee attitudes as a measurement device.
Public Responsibility
The seventh Key Result Area by which all General 
Electric managers are to be measured is public respon­
sibility. Drucker says, "Management is also responsible 
for making sure that the present actions and decisions of 
the business enterprise will not create future public 
opinion, demands and policies that threaten the enterprise, 
its freedom, and its economic success."^®® General Elec­
tric claims to place great emphasis on this area: "Society's
appraisal of the conduct of the Company is dependent upon 
the impressions received as the result of actions taken by 
all levels of management, including the actions of the
^®®Drucker, The Practice of Management^ op. cit.,
385 .
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Product Department."^̂  ̂ Yet, General Electric was involved 
in thirteen antitrust cases brought by the Department of 
Justice between 1940 and 1948,^“° and in late 1960 an anti­
trust price-fixing case became front page reading involv­
ing General Electric which gave American business as a 
whole its worst public relations of this century, perhaps 
of any century.
Public Responsibility used as a partial measure­
ment of a manager's ability is probably more a measurement 
of negative responses than of positive reactions toward 
what a manager does. When public attitude is opposed to 
the firm, a product, or its managers, and this can be 
ascertained through employee and public attitude surveys, 
then corporate counteraction can be applied. Positive 
acceptance, which is expected, is not so readily noticed; 
hence, a manager can be adversely affected by measuring 
his effect on public opinion, but it is unlikely that he 
will be helped in his overall rating by having strong 
pos itive acceptance.
This area presents a major problem if it is used 
as a control device, for measuring it is difficult, even 
if it is a subjective measurement. Robert Lewis, in his 
preliminary study of this area, says:^°^
We have tentatively concluded that respon­
sibilities to share owners, educational 
institutions, and areas of government are best 
measured from an overall company viewpoint rather 
than from the viewpoint of the individual pro­
duct businesses. In addition, we believe that 
there would be little point in trying to measure 
relationships with customers under the heading
^'^'^Measurements Project y  Part I, op. oit. y  p. 29,
S. Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Price 
Fixing and Bid Rigging In the Electrical Manufacturing 
Industrijy S. Res. 52, Part 27, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1961, p. 16509.
^°^Robert W. Lewis, op. oit.y pp. 39-40.
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of "public responsibility". . .cue effectiveness 
of the way in which the produce businesses ful­
fill their responsibility to eheir customers is 
best measured by "market position". . . .
Public responsibility is the part of a manager's 
job which involves the realization that the job and the 
job holder are part of a corporate body. A corporate body, 
like General Electric, is an institution, a citizen and a 
major factor in the society in which it lives. What 
society and the nation believe also has a great impact on 
the corporation. Large corporations are in great measure 
responsible for many of the great gains in our society. 
Society and the country are its customers, owners, and 
employees.
Lewis, in his report on this key area, said,
"We may confine ourselves to the. . .obligation of the 
corporation: to conduct itself as a good citizen within
s o c i e t y . T h i s  was just six years before the price- 
fixing case broke, and a year in which price-fixing was 
occurring within General Electric according to testimony 
offered in the now-famous Philadelphia trial.
It has been suggested by a number of people, among 
them Senator Estes Kefauver, that decentralization within 
General Electric helped to foster the price-fixing s bamming 
from the loss of control. Cordiner answered under oath
Measurements Project, Part I, op. cit., p. 29.
^Richard Austin Smith, "The Incredible Electrical 
Conspiracy, Part I," Fortune, Vol. 63, No. 4 (April, 1961), 
p. 137.
^Richard Austin Smith, "The Incredible Electrical 
Conspiracy, Part II," Fortune, Vol. 63, No. 5 (May, 1961). 
Also see "General Electric and the Price Conspiracy Cases," 
Northwestern University, School of Business, 1962, Inter­
collegiate Case Clearing House, No. ICH 9 G 146 and William 
Harris, op. oit.
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that he believed, "the decentralization has nothing to do 
with antitrust violations."^"® Cordiner retained former 
President of General Electric, Charles Wilson, to investi­
gate the president's office and any other part of General 
Electric he wished in an effort to determine guilt.
From Wilson's investigation and from other reports, the 
firm made extensive efforts to prevent future violations 
and to promote good public relations by having an educa­
tional campaign for the employees and by introducing 
different or additional auditing s y s t e m s . T h e  question, 
of course, is why didn't the traditional auditing methods 
catch the violations, some of which had occurred inter­
mittently for three decades? This problem will be dis­
cussed in Chapter V in more detail.
Balance Between Short-Range and Long-Range Goals
The eighth and last Key Result Area in measuring 
a manager's managerial ability is his ability to properly 
balance short-range and long-range goals. To be consis­
tent with the listing of the various control devices used 
by General Electric, this eighth key area has been included 
in the discussion of the measurements project. The com­
pany has not, as yet, developed a research report for this 
area, although when it is developed it will necessarily 
be a highly subjective measurement. This area is, in 
fact, interwoven with the other seven measurement areas. 
Lewis says:^°®
S. Senate, Part 28, op. oit.^ p. 17723.
^General Eleotpia Company Annual Repovt 1 9 6 0 y p. 22.
General Eleotrio Company Annual Report 1961y
p. 22, and General Electric Company Annual Report 1962y
pp. 24-25.
^"®Lewis, op. cit. y p. 41.
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As a practical matter, we have decided 
that our approach will be to consider the 
"balance between short-range and long-range 
goals" as an integral part of the development 
of measurements in each of the first seven 
key result areas, rather than as an area 
separate and distinct in itself. Upon comple­
tion of the measurements program in the other 
seven areas, we plan to summarize the specific 
recommendations which relate to the proper 
balance between goals in order to assure 
ourselves that consideration has been given 
to this important factor.
From this statement it can be deducted that any 
measurement in the other seven areas must consider both 
long-range and short-range goals, however defined.
The eighth key result area is essentially differ­
ent in nature from the other seven and might be treated 
as a major element of each of them.
The reports from the eight key result areas pro­
ject represent the foundation for further operational work 
measurements, functional work measurements, and managerial 
work measurements.
Other than a cursory look at these eight key 
areas, as found in the eleven pages of a Controllership 
Foundation booklet published in 1955, no other known 
discussion can be found distributed outside the company. 
The key to the entire control function at General Elec­
tric under decentralization is found in how these key 
areas are designed and administered. Employees affiliated 
with this project do not admit that the reports have 
been issued on all of the areas. It is known that each 
area was thoroughly investigated and reported with the 
issuing of highly secret reports which have been closely 
guarded by the company as high security items of infor­
mation. When questioned as to the availability of these 
reports, more than one high-ranking executive made it 
abundantly clear that the firm was not about to let any
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outsiders peer at the contents of the reports. The pro­
fitability report is considered especially private as it 
contains penetrating analyses of the internal mechanisms 
of the company, and could be competitively damaging if 
the report were to become publicized. Reports were issued 
on the following key result areas: Profitability (report 
issued January, 1954); Market Position (April, 1956); 
Product Leadership (April, 1956); and Employee Attitudes 
(January, 1958). It was stated, off the record, that a 
key result area report has been issued within the past 
two years, so perhaps all areas have yet to be reported.
Measurements of the Work of Management
The entire statement on this subject is contained 
in the four paragraphs below which is all that the mea­
surements project team has written, to this date. It 
is the understanding of Harold Smiddy that a fifth book in 
the Professional Management in General Electric series 
was issued on this s u b j e c t . G e n e r a l  Electric did 
organize a Book V in 1960 but claims that the draft was 
discarded or destroyed; it was never published, and Hugh 
Estes, Organization Planning Consultant, now responsible 
for publications of this nature, indicates that if it 
ever were to be published it would all have to be redone.
He also indicated that probably it never would be pub­
lished.^^® Therefore, the following is taken in whole 
from the Measurements Project's overall report:^^^
Measurements in the third sub-project, the 
work of management, also seem to us to be con­
tingent upon the measurements developed in the
^°®Interview with Harold F. Smiddy, Cincinnati,
Ohio, August 25, 1969.
^^®Personal letter from June C. Starck, October 8,
1969.
 ̂̂ ̂ Maacurcmcntc Project^ Part op, oit. ̂ pp. 41-42
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operational and functional areas,. in the final 
analysis, the work of management must be measured 
in terms of actual performance in all areas in 
comparison with the standards set for those areas.
However, since managing is a distinct and pro­
fessional kind of work, we believe that a balanced 
appraisal requires in effect that we back off and 
take a separate look at the quality of the job that 
has been done on planning, organizing, integrating 
and measuring in each of the Key Result Areas.
If this kind of appraisal is performed separately, 
we feel that the chance of obtaining a balanced, 
fair, and objective evaluation is considerably 
enhanced.
At this point, it appears that the most useful 
device for measuring the work of management is of 
a qualitative nature, that is, a check list of 
questions directed at pinpointing strengths and weak­
nesses under each of the elements of management.
Such questions must be constructed within the broad 
background of actual results in the operational and 
functional areas and must be designed to evaluate 
the work of a management team in a given business 
or a given function rather than the work of an 
individual manager.
This approach to measuring the work of manage­
ment could be used effectively immediately following 
a Business Review, when the Reviewer would have 
at hand specific evidence on which to base his 
appraisal. If it is agreed that the most important 
areas of business performance are those that we 
have referred to as the Key Result Areas, presumably 
each business should be planning, organizing, inte­
grating and measuring its activities--shoi't and 
long range--in terms of these areas. The Business 
Review, in turn, should then be constructed around 
the Key Result Areas so that how well the manage­
ment work has been performed can be evaluated in 
the light of actual accomplishments.
Functional Measurements
Functional measurements comprise one of the three 
subprojects organized to formulate a workable measurement 
or control system. Functional measurements include the 
work of manufacturing, marketing, financial, and all of
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the staff functions, such as engineering, employee rela­
tions, community relations, and the legal function. It 
was expected that the eight key result areas, which con­
stituted the operational measurement subproject, would 
form the basis on which to build sound measurements of 
the functional work and the work of management. This has 
yet to be proven.
The measurements project has concentrated its 
efforts on exploring the eight key result areas under 
Operational Measurements, and therefore little has been 
done to formulate functional measurements other than those 
which come about through the day-to-day operations of 
any of the various functional components. Basically, 
General Electric has concluded that one way of getting
at the answers is to analyze each function along these
lines ; 212
1. What are the objectives of the function in
terms of the business as a whole, or what
should the General Manager expect from each 
function?
2. What are the objectives of each function in
terms of the other functions, or what should
the General Manager expect each function to 
contribute to the other functions?
What is expected by General Electric is that each
function should be analyzed to see how it relates to other
functions; this analysis of each function should be made
by functional specialists working with representatives
from the other functions.
It was anticipated by the measurements project
team^i^ that measurements of functional work will be and
are highly qualitative in nature. Subjective evaluation—
or, more bluntly, "guessed at evaluation"— is the method
''-Measurements Project^ Part J, op, cit. y  p. 37. 
pp. 37-39.
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of measuring functional effectiveness. In advancing this 
viewpoint of functional measurements, it might appear that 
the measurements project goal of better measurements has 
not progressed significantly because of the suggestion to 
rely heavily on the exercise of judgment. Robert Lewis' 
team replies,
In our opinion, measurements are designed to 
supplement judgment, not supplant it. They help 
to ask the right questions but seldom give answers 
in themselves. By thinking through the objec­
tives of the functions and establishing for our­
selves what we expect a given function to do for 
the General Manager and for the other functions, 
we will develop measurements that are just as 
valid as numerical indexes. We should continue 
our efforts to develop quantitative measurements 
but always with the recognition that even quanti­
tative measurements require the exercise of 
judgment. ̂  ̂ “*
The hand that guides the pen of objectivity is most subjec­
tive.
Budgets
The method of planning and budgeting and the means 
for measuring and controlling are considered by many as 
keys for seeing the difference between "real" decentrali­
zation and "lip service" decentralization. John Flowers, 
Manager of Business Analysis and Cost Accounting Consult­
ing, sees decentralization from the point of view of how 
industrial budgets are set and measured. He reports that 
during Swope's reign and by the early '30b, an Appropriation 
and Budget Committee was organized which consisted of 
the President and six staff and seven department heads.^^®
2  1 4 Ibid.j p. 39
^Interview with John Flowers, Manager of Business 
Analysis and Cost Accounting Consulting, General Electric 
Company, New York, New York, August 5, 1959. These figures 
may not be correct since in 1947 the firm had four staff 
vice presidents and six operating vice presidents.
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This committee reviewed the operations of all staff areas 
and operations of the firm. Flowers claims that the firm 
had little documentation of internal finances other than 
what the committee might give out from what each department, 
line and staff, would report to the committee for review 
purposes. There was no regular required reporting; reports 
came only when requested. He says there was no detailed 
breakdown by accounting— at least in the modern account­
ing sense. During the '30's and '40's, each foreman was 
given an expense budget broken down by month and by account-- 
this budget did not include items received from central 
purchasing. Flowers claims the budget was developed at 
the top of the organization in the Appropriation and Bud­
get Committee and handed to the various Vice Presidents.
They broke it down by departments, and each department 
manager could break his budget down to his subordinates, 
and so on, until it reached each foreman. This is known 
as centralized or top-down budgeting. "Foremen were handed 
a budget; they had to live within it," says Flowers, "and 
they had to explain variances. ®̂
Decentralization changed top-down budgeting. In 
1953, position guides or position descriptions began to be 
written and formulated for all managerial jobs within the 
organization. These guides stated the responsibility 
by defining the job, and therefore made the job holder 
accountable for results. It was now possible to use 
bottoms-up budgeting. The budget became a joint effort 
between the manager responsible for results and his super­
visor. Total acceptance and implementation of bottoms- 
up budgeting took about five years, according to Flowers. 
Bottoms-up budgeting was a great change and allowed decen­
tralization to become a reality, as well as a philosophy.
^^®Interview with John Flowers, New York, August 5,
1969.
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Under bottoms-up budgeting, each manager working 
with his supervisor developed his own budget, and, because 
it was his own budget, it was expected that he would try 
harder to live within it. The manager was held accountable 
for the results of his own designed budget and any variances 
would be carefully scrutinized. He was graded on the proper 
fit of his output against budgeted output, taking into 
account why a variance occurred; sometimes managers even 
had to explain why they were on the budget in instances 
where the environment had changed more than anticipated.
The department level is the corporate level 
which is evaluated on a profit-and-loss basis; a department 
is the profit center. Therefore, the manager of a department 
must budget so that he can produce the best profit or least 
possible loss. When purchasing was centralized, the Vice 
President of Purchasing was considered to be a very strong 
person. Under centralization and top-down budgeting, there 
was no profit-and-loss evaluation at the department level. 
These budgets did not include allocations for centralized 
purchases— which means that items from central purchasing 
were not budgeted for and were not charged against the 
department nor its lower level managers. Consequently, if 
two items were needed from central purchasing, three would 
be ordered. The desire to have extras ready was rationali­
zed by the fact that the extra, and often unused material, 
did not "cost" the manager or foreman, but if his workers 
ruined some of the material and were held up waiting for 
replacements, the budgeted time allowed for completion of 
that job would be higher than expected and would cause a 
variance.
In 1949 the Vice President of Purchasing retired 
and was not replaced. Purchasing then became decentralized 
with each department making its own purchases. This 
gradual takeover by departments of purchasing became
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complete by 1953.^^^ With the decentralization of purchas­
ing came the concept of "profit centers." Each department, 
being a "profit center," was evaluated on its profit or 
loss. This meant that purchasing at the department level 
could greatly affect the profit or loss of each department. 
No longer could a department manager allow his foreman to 
"over-purchase" materials just to play it safe. Now when 
two items were needed only two items were ordered. Each 
foreman now was evaluated, among other methods, by how 
effective or efficient he was with the goods with which 
he had to work— including what he ordered. Consequently, 
department managers wanted to hold down unneeded purchases 
to raise profits or lower losses and foremen could not 
over-budget because it would make them look inefficient 
with their inputs.
The concept of bottoms-up budgeting means that 
budgeting became an operating function rather than a staff 
function. When budgeting was top-down, budgets were 
developed by the Appropriation and Budget Committee, a 
staff organization. With bottoms-up budgeting, budgets 
were developed by each manager starting at the foreman 
level, and these budgets were integrated into the budget 
of the next higher level. This is budgeting being initiated 
by the operating personnel, and in each case having the 
authority commensurate with the responsibility.
For clarity, it must be added that when each depart­
ment level was considered as a profit center (in 1953), 
each department was naturally given pricing responsibility. 
It would have been irrational to consider a department as 
a profit-and-loss center without pricing responsibility.
 ̂̂ I n t e r v i e w  with John Flowers, New York, A u gust 5,
1969.
215
John Flowers notes that from 1950 to 1958 all 
budgets were proposed in constant d o l l a r s . ^ I n  1957-58, 
budgeting changed to current dollars to enable a more 
realistic figure to be presented.
The budget is the prime control mechanism for day- 
to-day operations. It allows the rapid identification of 
any variances in plans which must be explained. Thus, 
quick adjustments may be initiated.
Most department budgets are derived ultimately 
from sales forecasts. Managers in manufacturing can figure 
their production from sales forecasts, thus being able to 
budget their needs. Of course, this is not the only method 
of budgeting nor should it be implied that all budgets 
are in dollars alone. A look at the eight key result 
areas makes it obvious that managers at General Electric 
use numerous types of budgets and are measured against 
each of these budgets. Some of these budgets are less 
quantitative, and therefore require more subjective 
judgment than do some other types of budgets.
Flowers, as Manager of Business Analysis and Cost 
Accounting Consulting, made the following observations as 
to the role of the Accounting Department. The Accounting 
Department recommends formats to be used by each department. 
It makes these recommendations with the aid of each 
department and can make recommendations as to how and what 
records to keep only because of the thorough knowledge in 
the function of record keeping which the Accounting Depart­
ment possesses, compared with the accounting knowledge 
within a normal product department. These recommendations, 
however, are not requirements. How the information is 
gathered and interpreted is a function of each individual 
department. The Accounting Department might have, of course.
^^®Interview with John Flowers, N ew York, A u g u s t  5,
1969
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some broad requirements for particular information, such 
as that needed for Federal income tax and Federal securi­
ties regulation reporting. Other than these few needs for 
centralized accounting procedure, each department develops 
an accounting system designed for its particular peculiarities 
Above the department level in the division and group level, 
information is in summary form, and therefore much con­
formity may be detected as there are only about a dozen 
groups in the firm. Each group Vice President may require 
his own type of information, but for practical purposes 
they all end up asking for about the same r e c o r d s . ^ i s  
Flowers again emphasizes that budget control is in the 
line, not in staff. The Accounting Department only helps, 
it does not dictate; it gathers information which the line 
tells it to gather. Therefore, budgeting control and 
reporting is really performed by those who have line respon­
sibility for individual products. He claims that in the 
1940's the Accounting Department only kept general ledger 
information. Today, cost accounting, data processing, 
information systems, and auditing are all functions of the 
Accounting Department. These are areas by which the 
Accounting Department must lend assistance co any opera­
ting department which requests help.^^°
The budget for each department must be prepared 
by April of the previous year. For instance, the 1970 
budget is finished by April of 1969. At the same time 
that next year's budget is being prepared, a four-year 
budget is also prepared. Thus, General Electric requires 
each department to budget up to four years ahead.
Capital budgeting is centralized which is to say 
that commitments over $500,000 could not be made at the
^^^Interview with John Flowers, New York, August 5,
1969.
^ ^ “interview with John Flowers, New York, August 5,
1969.
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Operating Department level by general managers.^̂  ̂ The 
Policy (No. 20.6) for Investments in Facilities lists the 
following dollar expenditure which may be made without 
higher approval, as follows:
Lowest Sole Authority
D_o]Iar Appropriations to Grant Approval
1. $500,000 or more 1. Board of Directors
2. Below $500, 000 2. Group Executive, Chief Executive
Officers, President, Chairman of 
the Board
3. Below $250, 000 3. Division General Manager or at
equivalent level. Services Offi­
cers
4. Below $100, 000 4. One level above the delegated
approval for operations meeting 
criteria
The consensus, as stated by John Flowers, is that 
bottoms-up or true decentralized budgeting was started 
about 1953, and this was a reversal of centralized top- 
down budgeting of earlier years. It was also a change from 
staff budgeting as practiced by the Appropriation and 
Budget Committee to line budgeting as practiced by each 
department. Paul Mills, who had over thirty years' ser­
vice with General Electric (part of this time as Manager—  
Finance for the Air Conditioning Division, and twelve 
years as Manager of Organization Consulting Service), 
believes that most of the above information is more
^^^Cordiner, New Frontievs for Frofessionat 
Managers, op. oit., p. 61.
^^^"General Electric Organization and Policy Guide, 
No. 20.6, 'Investments in Facilities,'" 6/15/69, p. 2.
The area of appropriations must meet criteria set out for 
each section of the organization. For the criteria in 
level four, the six-page policy guide lists a broad outline 
for determining the criteria. A recent policy on invest­
ments is reproduced as Appendix Exhibit 3-12.
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propaganda than fact. He says, "As far back as 1930-1932, 
I had a job in General Expense in Headquarters disburse­
ments to help company budget officers put budgets together 
from all over the company. The underling work was done 
by departments— those responsible for results.
Conclusion
Large organizations can be managed not by 
a single brain, but through coordinated deci­
sions made by many. Just how decisions are 
to be thus delegated and the resulting actions 
coordinated is the central question in organi­
zation design,
says William T. Morris, in his Deaentralization in Manage­
ment Systems. So it is with the design of decentraliza­
tion in the General Electric Company. Before 1951 General 
Electric was centralized in the common meaning of the 
word with committees as the central means for coordina­
tion. After 1950 decentralization became the gospel and 
committees for decision-making were eliminated.
Cordiner did not feel, after his organization 
study, that General Electric's basic problem was in its 
huge size, but rather in the diversity of its p r o d u c t s .
He once said, "General Electric may well be the most 
diversified company in the w o r l d . Therefore, Cordiner
^^^Interview with Paul Mills, Glen Ridge, New 
Jersey, August 7, 1969.
^William T . Morris, Deaentralization in Manage­
ment Systems: An Introduotion to Design (Columbus, Ohio:
Ohio State University Press, 1968), p. 3.
22®r o c c o  Carzo, Jr., and John N. Yanouzas, Formal 
Organization (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
The Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 59.
^2®cordiner, New Frontiers for Professional 
Managers^ op. ait., p. 32.
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decentralized or fragmented the company into product 
departments. Each department has relative independence 
in decisions. Although this plan, in theory, solved many 
day-to-day operating problems, the decentralization into 
product or operating departments could have created 
a coordination and long-range planning problem. The 
development of the Executive Office with the chief execu­
tive officer, group vice presidents and services execu­
tives has filled the function of coordination and long- 
range planning. In terms of control, the executive 
management, above the operating department, has authority 
to review and appraise the performance of the Operating 
Departments.
At the time of the firm's reorganization, Cordi­
ner thought through the philosophy of the new organiza­
tion over a period of several years, and had its management 
philosophy documented in book form long before completing 
his implementation program. Few large firms, even to 
this day, have attempted to think through and record their 
corporate philosophy. Paul Mills saw that General Elec­
tric, before the philosophy became organized, was moving 
dangerously toward "an organization without sense of 
common identity, without a recognition of common objec­
tives, and without a sense of mutual responsibilities 
and p u r p o s e s . "2 2 7 General Electric, or more specifically, 
Cordiner, wanted to organize the firm to find out where 
it was going, to give it common identity, common objectives, 
and a sense of mutual responsibilities and purpose.
The corporate philosophy is not fully developed. 
General Electric claims it is still doing "pure research" 
on management theory and practice. The philosophy
22 7paui E . Mills, "Making Decentralization Work: 
One Company's Experience," The Management Review^
Vol. XLVI, No. 6 (June, 1957), p. 70.
2 2 0
thus far organized, is a foundation on which the firm 
operates. The philosophy is a structure to give direction; 
it is not final, for it is still being tested and redefined. 
It has proved to be a successful philosophy in terms of 
the fact that the company has been highly profitable 
throughout the period in which the philosophy was developed 
and practiced. The point is that the firm has been 
actively thinking of the theory, for, as one distinguished 
writer said: "The man who says he has no time for theory
is either using a theory someone else has developed, or even 
a theory someone else has discarded.^® The central 
point is that each company should study its environment 
so as to evolve a philosophy and structure that is appro­
priate for each individual company.
The decentralization philosophy was not adopted 
capriciously, but only after deep debate, long considera­
tion, and extensive research. It was the Special Planning 
Committee inside General Electric that concluded in 19 43 
that the firm was going to grow very large after the war 
and that a complete reorientation of thinking regarding 
the organization, the structure, and the philosophy of 
the company was necessary. In 1945 Cordiner, with 
President Wilson's endorsement, concluded that it was 
vital that General Electric develop and then adopt a 
philosophy of decentralization which embraced not only 
physical decentralization, but also decentralization of 
authority, responsibility, and decision making. "In 
addition," notes Smiddy, "it was necessary to develop a 
top physical structure within the Company's organization 
which would preserve the Company as a corporate entity.
^^®Quoted by Harold F. Smiddy, "Actually Doing 
'The Work of a Professional Manager,'" (Crotonville, N.Y.: 
Advanced Management Course, February 21, 1956), p. 13.
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assure its future progress and growth in established 
businesses, and enable it to move forward into new areas 
of technological, economic, and sociological advance­
m e n t . T h e  philosophy may seem somewhat obscure, but 
the result has been to put the responsibility for opera­
tional decision-making into the hands of hundreds of 
managers in the third and fourth level of management, 
instead of in the hands of a few top executives.
This chapter has attempted to discuss the three- 
part structure which distinguishes between Operating 
work. Services work, and Executive work. It has also 
tried to explain what is meant by decentralization at 
General Electric, and what is meant by claiming business 
decisions are made in the line at the product department 
level.
The last half of the chapter discussed the 
various measurements developed to control the many mana­
gers provided for under the decentralization plan.
Chapter IV will discuss problems encountered with these 
measurements as control mechanisms as they are trans­
formed from theory into practice.
^^^Harold F. Smiddy, "Basis for the Development 
of General Electric's Management Philosophy." Remarks 
to conference at Waldorf Astoria, New York, February 18, 
1956, p. 4.
CHAPTER IV
SOME PROBLEMS WITH ACTUAL 
ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL
This chapter covers General Electric's organiza­
tional evolution from a centralized functionalization to 
a decentralization by product lines, both in theory as 
well as in practice. The chapter is organized into 
three sections, but such a structuring is not intended 
to imply that each section can stand as an entity by 
itself for each is, in practice, intertwined with the 
other, forming what might be termed "the General Electric 
environment." The three sections are used to enable an 
easier understanding by dissecting the system and allow­
ing a look at some of its components. Although there 
is a chance that synergism will be lost by this method, 
it does help research and presentation and, hopefully, 
comprehension. Section I is "The Organization Structure" 
as it influenced the people in the organization. Section 
II, "Control" focuses on the use of: (A) Measurements,
(B) The One Result Area, (C) Management By Objectives. 
Section III, "Appraisal," focuses on the evaluation of 
the individual and is divided into the following subsec­
tions: (a ) Measurements, (B) Measuring Services, (C) Apprai­
sing the Individual. Under this section the work of 
Dr. Herbert Meyer will be discussed.
The theoretical foundation upon which the General 
Electric Company's management and organization philosophy
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was established was firmly laid down in documents prepared 
by its Management Consultation Services. Although the 
philosophy was thought through and painstakingly implemented, 
the course followed by the organization was not without 
problems. For it is people who man, organize, and run an 
organization. A human organization is never perfect and 
an organization the size of General Electric has to reckon 
with the considerable differences of ability, temperament, 
and integration among people. Charles E. Wilson, who was 
President of General Electric before the decentralization 
philosophy was implemented, is said to have had an out­
standing personal charisma which enabled him to run an 
$800 million company. Ralph Cordiner is said to have had 
"as much charisma as a cold fish,"^ yet he ran the firm at 
five times the size. The stated philosophy and organiza­
tion structure of the firm was of necessity styled to 
give the individual as much leeway as possible. This 
allowed the idiosyncrasies of individuals oftentimes to 
play havoc with the system. Frequently, it has been 
found that some of the philosophy itself does not seem 
to reflect the goals of the organization. For instance, 
it can be stated that General Electric goals are long- 
range— profit in the long run— yet the control mechanisms 
employed tend to force managers to emphasize the short 
run. This point will be expanded in this chapter.
Philip D. Reed, who was Chairman of the Board 
under both Wilson and Cordiner, says that the two men were 
quite different, and the type of organization structure 
required by the company during their reigns had, in con­
sequence, to be greatly dissimilar. "Charley Wilson was 
an old-time operator who had never been in a truly
^Interview with Thomas A. Gouger, retired Con­
sultant, Management Consultation Services, General Elec­
tric Company, Rye, New York, August 24, 1970.
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decentralized operation (lamps v/as the only truly decen­
tralized area before 1950). "This was all right for the 
1920's and '30's," says Reed, "we weren't so damn big 
and complex. We could work with reasonable effort that 
way (highly centralized)Cordiner, on the other hand, 
was termed "a student of organization theory"^ by Reed.
The organizational problems did not seem too serious in the 
period before World War II, but Reed remembers,
. . .as we emerged from there the fact we
were going to be a billion dollar company 
overnight struck us. We both (Wilson and 
Reed) could see a major management problem, 
not only in dollars but in products--chemical, 
aircraft, and so forth. We had to do a major 
job of breaking down an amorphous organiza­
tion. An organization whose top men were split 
between New York and Schenectady. We needed 
a major study of organization and Ralph Cordiner 
was the best man for that. He spent at least 
two years doing nothing else other than study 
the General Electric organization ." **
Cordiner brought Harold F. Smiddy to New York to 
plan the new organization. Smiddy came to be, perhaps, 
the most feared and hated man in the company, while at the 
same time considered by most who knew him as the most 
brilliant management theorist in the corporation. As 
Tom Gouger, Consultant— Management Consultation Services, 
observed, "you either liked him or hated him; there was 
no middle of the road. You had to respect his brilliance 1'®
Interview with Philip D. Reed, 
of the Board, General Electric Company, 
York, August 4, 1970.
^Interview with Philip D. Reed, 
of the Board, General Electric Company, 
York, August 4, 1970.
^Interview with Philip D. Reed, 
of the Board, General Electric Company, 
York, August 4, 1970.
^Interview with Thomas A. Gouger 
sultant. Management Consultation Service 











Smiddy formulated the basic concepts and the organization 
building blocks about 1951, but few claim that the con­
cept was really working effectively until 1958 or 1960. 
Smiddy confirms that true decentralization was only begin­
ning to take place at the time of his retirement in I960.® 
One major reason for this slow attainment of goals was the 
fact that General Electric had an enormous number of 
strong charactered managers at the Vice President level. 
These men blocked many changes and usually didn't want 
"to give up the business"— that is, they did not want to 
let go of the reins— the rights to personally direct 
those profit centers which were removed from one level to 
two levels below them in the department. These strong 
men did not willingly release power to their departments, 
and thus held up true decentralization in practice. Yet 
Drucker, sounding like the realist he is rather than 
purist, believes some managers must buck the rules of 
decentralization once in a while, although perhaps not to 
the extent found in General Electric. He says.
For decentralized management to be efficient, 
it must contain at least a sprinkling of execu­
tives who pay very little attention to the 
rules of decentralization and are inclined 
toward a rather autocratic "do-this-or-be- 
damned" attitude. . . .High-handed, arbitrary,
even dictatorial behavior may thus be not only 
no contradiction to decentralization but a pre­
requisite for its functioning, provided only 
that such behavior is seen and understood by 
everybody. . .as an exception and as a deviation 
from the norm.^
Unfortunately, in General Electric the old guard outnumbered
^Interview with Harold F. Smiddy, retired Vice 
President, Management Consultation Services, General Elec­
tric Company, Cincinnati, Ohio, August 23, 1969.
^Peter F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation 
(New York: John Day Company, 1946), p. 75.
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the disciples of the new philosophy and were more than 
just a sprinkling.
General Electric decentralization required an 
explosive increase in the size of middle management.®
In 1953, the firm predicted that by 1962 the total employ­
ment of the company would be 300,000 employees, of which 
108,000 would be salaried people, and 192,000 hourly 
employees.* In 1962, employment actually was only 258,000 
workers.^® The 1953 estimate was 20 percent over the 
actual requirements of the firm. The error in estimating 
projected employment for 1962 was caused by the under­
estimation of future productivity. It had been assumed 
that the company would produce $5 billion in sales in 1962, 
and this estimate was very close to the actual sales of 
$4.8 bill i o n . T h i s  means that the productivity per 
employee was far greater in 1962 than had been planned 
for 1962.
In the early years of decentralization, sweeping 
reorganizations of the company were accomplished, but not 
without a great deal of turnover in employment. With 
new prime responsibility pushed down on lower level mana­
gers, most of whom had not experienced such a burden, 
many were found not qualified to handle the responsibility, 
either because of inability or lack of desire to accept
*Edward M. Currie, "The Importance of Human Rela­
tions in Decentralization: A Study of GE," unpublished
Master's thesis, Iowa State University, 1965, p. 10.
^Manager Development Study^ Appendix Findings 
On Quantitative meeds (Management Consultation Services 
Division, General Electric Company, April, 1953), pp. A-8, 
A-9.




such responsibility. The first years from 1954 to 1958, 
immediately following the delegation of authorities 
demanded by the decentralization structure, were disrupted 
internally because of this high turnover rate. The turn­
over rate for managerial jobs at this or any other period 
has not been released, but Vice Chairman Jack S. Parker 
says the turnover rate was high then but asserts it leveled 
off after 1958 and is currently not a major problem.
It took quite a few years and much friction before 
General Electric evolved from a centralized functional 
organization to one structured on decentralized product 
lines. When Cordiner was asked why this was so, he 
replied;^ ̂
For one thing, I thought that a lot of the 
fellows we took from functional jobs and made 
general managers would respond to the challenge 
of being measured. I was wrong. I should 
have realized that you can't expect a fellow 
who has been running just a part of it to, all 
of a sudden, be accountable for the whole thing.
In fact, to my surprise, a lot of people 
who looked good in functional jobs actually 
asked to be passed by. They didn't want to 
stick their necks out. A lot of these people 
and some others came to me and said, "See all 
the troubles you've caused and the heartaches."
Okay, but if I hadn't the company couldn't 
have gone from $2 billion to $5 billion--and 
now it's $7.2 billion.
I. The Organization Structure
The picture usually painted by present and past 
employees of General Electric is one of outstanding
^^Interview with Jack S. Parker, Vice Chairman 
of the Board, General Electric Company, New York, New 
York, July 1, 1970.
^^"As I See It; An Interview With Retired General 
Electric Chairman Ralph Cordiner," Forbes^ Vol. 100,
No. 8 (October 15, 1967), p. 31.
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achievement in the organizational areas. Yet some dissent 
is found among practitioners when they are pressed to 
describe what changes occurred in the actual day-to-day 
operations as opposed to what was changed on paper. Paul 
Mills, who was Manager— Organization Consulting Service 
when he retired in 1962, when asked what really changed 
in terms of control, said, "I don't think a damn thing 
changed. They (General Electric) never lost centralized 
financial control; it was there before and is there today. 
Mills had an excellent vantage point to see the control 
mechanisms in the firm. At the time of his retirement, 
he was the highest paid non-vice president in the company. 
His boss, Harold F. Smiddy, was Vice President of Manage­
ment Consultation Services, and it was the Smiddy team 
which engineered the organization restructuring from 1950 
through 1961. Mills began his association with General 
Electric in the early '30's and concentrated in Finance, 
Legal, Engineering Services, and Chemical Manufacturing, 
along with Management Consultation Services.
It is Mills' opinion that Cordiner and Smiddy 
failed to make any real control changes, other than the 
reorganization of the lines on the chart. He believes 
they "failed because of the internal power struggle 
wherein about a quarter of a million workers were led by 
powerful executives in four or five of the main areas 
(both operational and functional a r e a s ) . T h e s e  strong 
leaders chose and developed their own select group of 
extremely loyal, highly intelligent managers. Their loyalty 
was not to the Company as was hoped for by Cordiner and
^‘'interview with Paul E. Mills, retired Manager, 
Management Consultation Services, General Electric 
Company, Glen Ridge, New Jersey, August 7, 1969.
1 s .Interview with Paul E. Mills, retired Manager, 
Management Consultation Services, General Electric 
Company, Glen Ridge, New Jersey, August 7, 1969.
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Smiddy. Mills did not say but others, being assured of 
anonymity, did emphasize that Cordiner feared most of 
these strong "characters" who headed up the larger opera­
tional groups and functional areas, such personalities 
as Henry Erben, head of Major Apparatus, and Robert 
Paxton, Large Transformers, and Walter Baker of Radio, 
Television and Electronics. Many claim Cordiner had hoped 
to break down the internal power structure of these men 
but he failed to do so. Cordiner, it must be remembered, 
was considered an outsider. He did not come up through 
the ranks in General Electric. Cordiner came from Edison 
General Electric Appliance Company in 1932 and left in 
1939 to become President of Schick. After war service 
he again went to work for General Electric as Assistant 
to the President, at a considerable decrease in pay,^® and 
he headed up the Wilson organization evaluation.^^ At 
570 Lexington Avenue (head office of General Electric) he 
was referred to as "the undertaker"** or "hatchetman."* * 
He was also considered by those at the top of the organi­
zation as a loner. Mills believes Cordiner used Smiddy 
to head the reorganization because Smiddy was a powerful 
figure by sheer personality and knowledge. But Mills 
comments,
Interview with Philip D. Reed, retired Chairman 
of the Board, General Electric Company, New York, New 
York, Auyust 4, 1970.
*7"Mr. Wilson at Work," Fortune, Vol. XXXV, No. 5 
(May, 1947).
p. 168.
**lnterview with Philip D. Reed, retired Chairman 
of the Board, General Electric Company, New York, New 
York, August 4, 1970.
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Cordiner failed because the reorganization 
could not break up the loyalty (to particular 
managers) within the areas. He was unable to 
redirect this loyalty which had developed over 
many years to a new managing philosophy called 
professional management.
Having managers think of themselves as "professional 
managers" was one goal of the decentralization; the firm's 
famous four books on management are called Professional 
Management in General Eleotrio. Cordiner's own book is 
called New Frontiers for Professional Managers. There 
was great effort to try to make the work of managing objec­
tive oriented and to break away from past loyalties and 
narrow viewpoints both in the operational and functional 
areas.
In a move to destroy much of the power structure 
found in the Comptroller's Office, Cordiner made Harold A. 
MacKinnon (head of the powerful Auditing component in 
Comptroller's Division) Manager of the Component Products 
Division in 1952, and in 1953 he moved the Comptroller, 
Donald Millham, to manage the Lamp Division. This allowed 
Cordiner to place a hand-picked ally, Gerald L. Phillippe, 
as head of the highly feared and powerful Comptroller's 
Department. Much later, Cordiner promoted Phillippe to 
President (1961), and at Cordiner's retirement, Phillippe 
became Chairman of the Board. It is interesting to note 
that these moves did not lessen or change the built-in 
loyalties of the Comptroller's staff, merely shifting their 
allegiance to Phillippe and not to the philosophy.^̂
To see how and why the Comptroller's office was 
so powerful and exercised such tight control, we must look
Interview with Paul E. Mills, retired Manager, 
Management Consultation Services, General Electric Company, 
Glen Ridge, New Jersey, August 7, 1969.
^^Interview with Thomas A. Gouger, retired Con­
sultant, Management Consultation Services, General Elec­
tric Company, Rye, New York, August 24, 1970.
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at its role in the firm. Traditionally in General Elec­
tric the Comptroller is head of Accounting Services and 
reports to the President. The Treasury Department is a 
totally different organization and throughout the '50's 
the Treasurer reported to the Chairman of the Board. Within 
the last five years the Accounting and Treasury Depart­
ments have been combined to form Corporate Finance report­
ing to the Corporate Executive Office. However, before the 
combination the Comptroller and his Accounting Services 
were, in company lingo, called the Financier and Finance 
Department. These titles did not refer to the Treasurer 
and were not used for official language. It was the 
Comptroller rather than the Treasurer who planned and 
determined many of the control mechanisms. The Finance 
Department, as a service component, had the right and 
obligation to audit its counterpart in each of the 
operational groups and divisions. That is to say, the 
Comptroller's office as a staff or service organization 
would audit the financial statements and financial com­
ponent of each product or line group. The Financial Depart­
ment had this right, from the early 1930's, as far as 
those interviewed could remember and most likely well 
before that. At least during the early '30's the Finan­
cial Department sent out teams of traveling auditors to 
every department, visiting once a year and more often in 
the larger areas. Therefore, it can be stated that from 
the 1930's forward General Electric had two financial 
departments, one was the Comptroller's Department with its 
traveling auditors and the other was the financial staff 
attached to each product group or line. It must be 
reported that the financial staff attached to each product 
group or division was responsible to the manager of the 
product line and not to the Comptroller and his account­
ing organization— at least this was the stated structure.
It was hoped that the two financial organizations would be
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independent of each other and serve as double checkpoints, 
each checking the product department figures and conform­
ance to accounting policies and practices. But this was 
not how it worked in practice.
In the '30's and ' 40's the audit staff from the 
finance area as well as the audit staff from the product 
groups would compare the budgeted or planned expenditure 
with the actual. More will be said on how this budget 
was developed shortly. Any variances from plans, when 
discovered by the Comptroller's staff, would be duly noted 
and filtered to top-level management through the Comptroller's 
office. Thus, the financial fraternity was respected 
for ability and feared for results stemming from their 
visits. The Comptroller had the ear of both the Presi­
dent (Swope, Wilson, or Cordiner) and the Chairman of the 
Board (Young or Reed). This is one method by which the 
Comptroller exercised control and power.
The Financial Fraternity
A second source of control and power came through 
what most call the "financial fraternity." The Comptroller 
and his associates had the right of appointment (before 
1951) or veto (after 1951) of any financial manager in 
any department to assure that the prospective financial 
manager did meet the standards of the Comptroller. 
Unfortunately, these standards were not always explicitly 
stated. One standard was that the manager be a graduate 
of the firm's Schenectady, New York, Business Training 
Course, known as BTC. The course is a three-year study 
of accounting and is considered by General Electric to 
be the toughest accounting program in the country. Mills 
says, "Ninety-nine percent of the financial managers in
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departments were BTC students (graduates).  ̂ Graduates 
of BTC had been indoctrinated with one accounting philo­
sophy, that of the Comptroller's Department. Graduates 
found kinship through this common accounting philosophy 
and BTC. They are, therefore, acting more as a second 
team of financial auditors for the Comptroller rather than 
acting for their departments. It is also Mills' opinion 
that this practice has not been altered in recent years. 
The centralization to decentralization reorganization did 
not change this type of control. According to Mills, 
"Nothing changed, the same guys with the same background, 
BTC graduates, ran the financial end of the business, no 
matter if they were found in the corporate staff or 
department s t a f f . I t  should be noted that when Cordi­
ner moved Donald MiIlham to lamps in 1953, he replaced him 
with a man considered to be in the Cordiner camp, Gerald 
Phillippe, who was also a BTC graduate. "It (the finan­
cial fraternity) was a tight little lodge," comments 
Mills, "you got into it by being recruited and got out 
by not keeping your nose c l e a n . Y o u  could also be 
forced out for incompetency as the standards set by the 
Comptroller were extremely high.^®
^^Interview with Paul E. Mills, retired Manager, 
Management Consultation Services, General Electric Company, 
Glen Ridge, New Jersey, August 7, 1969.
^^Interview with Paul E. Mills, retired Manager, 
Management Consultation Services, General Electric Company, 
Glen Ridge, New Jersey, August 7, 1969.
2^Interview with Paul E. Mills, retired Manager, 
Management Consultation Services, General Electric Company, 
Glen Ridge, New Jersey, August 7, 1969.
^^It should be noted that Mills, himself, was a 
BTC graduate and had become a key financial manager prior 
to his promotion to Smiddy's staff.
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Soon after Cordiner introduced the first moves 
toward implementing his reorganization plan in 1951, a 
conference was held in Atlantic City. It was here that 
the concept of the separation of "Service" work and 
"Operating" work was introduced to managers just below the 
executive vice president level. The managers in attendance 
were totally unprepared for any such development. It 
was explained to them that the six components, where the 
overall responsibility for profits was then found, were 
to be restructured and that profit responsibility was to 
be assigned to approximately 100 departments and a few 
sections well below the executive vice president level.
It was specifically put forth that the new organization 
required an obviously broader understanding that the 
operating unit was to be the Product Department, with its 
designed product field, its own personnel, its own shops, 
its own marketing responsibility and its own requirements 
to "finance" and control its business, facilities, payroll, 
and related programs, procedures, and activities.
Similarly it was explained, but "considerably less 
clearly in many quarters and many respects," says Smiddy, 
that
there was developing appreciation that the 
work and personnel of each Services Division 
should increasingly be organized and sub­
divided to provide specialists and skilled 
services in each of the principal subfunctional 
areas, which together comprise the fundamental 
kind of work in which a particular Services 
Division is expert.^®
It was late in 1951, after this Atlantic City 
conference, that the principles of decentralization began 
to be applied in practice. But decentralization or
2®Harold F . Smiddy, "Decentralization--Next Stage?" 
unpublished notes. New York, October 24, 1951.
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reorganization of such a huge complex organization took 
time. When Wilson abruptly left General Electric, Cordi­
ner was faced with the choice of slowly implementing decen­
tralization or quickly implementing it. He chose the 
latter approach— the quick overhaul. This means he expec­
ted that the application and acceptance of the principles 
of decentralization would take only five y e a r s . F i v e  
years, although considered the shortest possible time for 
reorganization, is a long time to keep an organization 
"hanging." It was during this period that many managers 
could and did complain that they heard one philosophy 
(namely that of "decentralization") expounded from top 
management but saw and felt a different concept (that of 
centralization and tight top control) from the same top 
level. The older managers, many of whom were found at 
upper levels of the new Services components, had grown up 
under a centralized, functionalized structure. Because 
of the backgrounds of many managers they acted contrary 
to the requirements of the corporate written policies.
Lower level managers, found in the Operating components, 
could rightfully believe that the real intent of the Ser­
vices managers was
not to let the decentralized manager act 
with discretion and judgment but really to 
recapture a piece of his delegated function 
as a "manager" and bring it back into a 
centralized Services Division area either 
for decision or for performance.^®
Because of this type of action, thousands of intelli­
gent middle supervisory and managerial men concluded that 
there was a lot of double talk going on.
^^Interview with Harold F. Smiddy, Cincinnati, 
Ohio, August 25, 1969.
^®Interview with Harold F. Smiddy, Cincinnati, 
Ohio, August 25, 1969.
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When Cordiner first tried to delegate the autho­
rity for so many acts to the Department General Managers, 
he tried to do it before written policies on the subject 
were developed. Thus, in the early stages of decentrali­
zation, there were no written rules stating when and what 
authority was delegated to whom. Smiddy was assigned the 
responsibility to see to it that such policies and badly 
needed position descriptions were written. This project 
was to take about five years before it was reasonably 
completed (it is a continuing project). Smiddy relates 
that at the outset of the project many of the executive 
vice presidents did not want to put on paper their job 
descriptions, their authorities and responsibilities. They 
were reluctant to formulate the guides and policies into 
written statements, but decentralization would have been 
impossible in General Electric without the scope of each 
position understood properly. Smiddy tells one story about 
one particular executive vice president who was extremely 
powerful because of his position and personality. This 
man, with forty-odd years' service, could and did manage 
by the "seat of his pants" and was strongly against the 
formulation of written organized policies and position 
guides. After much discussion between Smiddy and this 
man, the executive vice president became so mad at the 
whole thing that he sat down— and must have said, "I'll 
show Smiddy"— for he wrote the most detailed and most 
complete position description turned in by any manager, 
leaving nothing out and making sure that he got on paper 
all of his authorities and responsibilities. Smiddy added 
that it needed no change, while the position descriptions 
of other managers in favor of the project took many months 
and many drafts to complete in accordance with the 
requirement.^ ® The early position descriptions were
Interview with Harold F. Smiddy, Cincinnati, 
Ohio, August 25, 1969.
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intentionally "too detailed" because of the need to convey the 
philosophy while it was concurrently being formulated.
Many managers refused to believe that they had the respon­
sibilities and authorities intended and that the position 
description was one vehicle used to indoctrinate them.
One of the reasons for decentralizing the company 
was the hope to lessen costs by sharpening communications. 
Cordiner felt that the corporation was too big to allow 
communications to operate through centralized organization 
channels. Decentralization would, he felt, free up commu­
nications between those who have information and those who 
need it. Without doubt, one of the biggest obstacles to 
effective operating management was, and still is, the 
imperfect status of human communication. Cordiner believed 
that communications should not follow the lines of an 
organization chart and centralization encouraged that 
practice.
Clash of Cultures
The first decade of decentralization (1951-1960) 
produced a clash of cultures. General Electric had 
the "old school" managers whose automatic reactions to 
situations were developed into habit patterns long be­
fore decentralization started. These people were on one 
side of the cultural clash and usually found in the "power" 
positions of upper level management. The other side of 
the clash was comprised of the younger middle management 
people who were schooled in the human relation movement 
which was very much a fad during the decade of the '50's.
This latter group was more dedicated to the new philo­
sophy of General Electric as pronounced from the office 
of Cordiner. Many of these people devoted hours of deep 
thinking and posed many penetrating questions on the real 
meaning of the "new philosophy." It became increasingly
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difficult for these young crusaders in the new philosophy 
to communicate effectively with the "old school" managers 
whose habits were generated prior to decentralization. 
Smiddy, recently reflecting on those years, said that 
Cordiner had expected that decentralization could be 
complete on paper within five years after he initiated 
moves to reorganize, but Cordiner did not expect the incum­
bent top managers ever to really accept it in practice and 
believed that a thorough education program directed at 
middle management was needed to lay the groundwork by 
which the philosophy would slowly become accepted. Cordi­
ner believed that only when the then middle managers 
accepted a true decentralized philosophy and they in 
turn filtered to the top would real decentralization of 
decision-making become a reality within the company.
Smiddy adds that this was beginning to take place at the 
time of his retirement in 1960, nine years after the 
Atlantic City conference.^®
This clash of cultures during the 1950*s often 
"split right across an Operating Department, separating 
one layer of management from another or one part of a 
management team from the rest of the management team,"®^ 
says Don Webb, a member of Mills' staff and one who could 
be termed a member of the younger pro-Cordiner side of the 
clash. In those departments so torn, a period of ineffi­
ciency and high overhead costs must have resulted, caused 
in part by the fact that communication costs must have 
risen.
John Flowers, looking back on company history, 
believes it took five years to implement (1951-1956)
interview with Harold F. Smiddy, Cincinnati,
Ohio, August 23, 1969.
®^Donald R. Webb, Management Consultation Services, 
unpublished notes written in 1957 (from a carbon copy), p. 5
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decentralization into the c o m p a n y . Ralph Cordiner, in
1956, said, "I personally felt in 1951 that five years
would be required to evolve the new structure and have it
implemented with understanding and enthusiasm. The program
appears to be just about on s c h e d u l e . Therefore, 1 9 5 7 -
58 should have been a period by which decentralization was
firmly established. Donald R. Webb, who began his General
Electric career in 1951 and spent many years as a manager
reporting to a Department General Manager, was able to
comment in 1957,
If, in keeping with the new philosophy, we 
are to establish high standards of performance 
against which we can measure our progress, 
it is evident that we still have a very long 
way to go before we can say that decentraliza­
tion is working in a truly satisfactory manner.
The control function, as Paul Mills understands 
the term, is a regenerative cycle of planning, organizing, 
interpreting, measuring, and leading. Each manager does 
this and summarizes the work performed below him, and in 
turn this is repeated on up the hierarchy. "In some 
areas," he says, "it worked, they believed in it (decen­
tralization of work), others paid lip service to it."^® 
Unfortunately, there is no non-authoritarian way to force 
a manager to modify or avoid authoritarian practices, and 
authoritarian management has no place in General Electric's 
decentralized management philosophy. "(Only) through 
training over time will a boss see that the authoritarian
^^Interview with John Flowers, Manager of Business 
Analysis and Cost Accounting Consulting, General Electric 
Company, New York, August 5, 1969.
^^Ralph J. Cordiner, New Fvontieps for Professional 
Managers (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1956),
p . 54.
^^Webb, op. ait. 3 p. 2.
^^Interview with Paul E. Mills, retired Manager, 
Management Consultation Services, General Electric Company, 
Glen Ridge, New Jersey, August 7, 1969.
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way is wrong," says Mills. "(Only then will) they learn 
to lead with authority of knowledge rather than lead with 
authority of position— it is a new way of life."^®
The conflicts generated by the many pressures on 
managers, especially those in operating departments which 
were the profit centers, and also generated by the fact 
that authoritarian managers existed side by side with 
those dedicated to the new philosophy caused a practice 
by some of giving lip service to the new philosophy with­
out, in fact, adopting it. Acceptance of the new philosophy 
had the backing of most of the corporate leaders— being the 
main thrust of the Advanced Management Course at Croton- 
ville— and was coupled with a vigorous campaign in the 
Professional Business Management Course within all the 
departments of the firm. The new philosophy had to be 
either adopted in fact or the manager must give lip ser­
vice to it. Giving lip service to decentralization of 
control, of authority, of decision-making, without actually 
practicing the philosophy was used by many of the "old 
school" managers who did not believe in giving up authority, 
did not understand how it worked, or could not believe that 
they acted differently from what they preached.
As late as 1957, Donald Webb, then a manager in an 
operating department, made the following notes on this 
problem;^’
A manager is confronted with the conflict 
between Operating business pressures and the 
requirement for low overhead costs on the 
one hand and he must demonstrate that his depart­
ment is appropriately equipped with position 
guides, functional charts, structural charts, 
and other similar paper work symbolic of the 
new philosophy. An enormous amount of paper 
work is then generated by lifting verbatim
*®Interview with Paul E. Mills, retired Manager, 
Management Consultation Services, General Electric Company, 
Glen Ridge, New Jersey, August 7, 1969.
3?webb, op. cit., p. 7.
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phrases and paragraphs from the Services 
functional charts, generic position guides 
for Operating Division General Manager,
Operating Department General Manager and 
even the position guide for the President.
The phrases and paragraphs which are lifted 
are applied in wholesale fashion to or­
ganization components and positions through 
the departments regardless of the real mean­
ing or intent of these phrases. Since the 
phrases are lifted from sources of unques­
tioned authority their very application to 
the lower level components and positions is 
presumed to bring a form of sanctity like 
sprinkling with holy water. It is hoped 
that by this magic the organization will 
"meet the criteria," appropriate delegations 
will be given for making all future deci­
sions not more than two layers above the 
place affected and from that time on the 
department will live in a new utopia of 
complete freedom.
The writing of position guides for every position 
in General Electric was under the direction and coordi­
nation of Harold Smiddy and the Management Consultation 
Services. Position guides or the narrower written job 
descriptions were not found in written form before this 
1951 project was started. The basic underlying principle 
of a position guide is to have a complete and thorough 
understanding between man and manager of the requirements 
of his position and how its performance is to be measured. 
It is imperative that every work and phrase in the posi­
tion guide have a meaning significant to that man and 
his manager, a meaning that is fully understood by them 
and one which they believe most precisely describes the 
responsibilities of the position. The position guide 
was designed to be a working document between man and 
manager. But,
many of the position guides existing in opera­
ting departments today, however, are not work­
ing documents,^®
3 8Ibid. y p. 8.
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says one manager reporting to a department general manager 
after about a decade following the reorganization. He went 
on to say,
They (the position guides) are supposed by 
both man and manager to be full of some kind 
of magic gobbledygook. When it becomes neces­
sary for them to sit down and agree on what 
the man is supposed to be doing, they both find 
it necessary to discard the position guides 
and start afresh in an entirely different 
language.  ̂*
Donald Webb claimed that the same problem which 
occurred with position guides plagued the functional 
organization charts. Webb made his claim in 1957, but it 
has been repeated by managers to this day."*® Webb said,
Many of the functional organization charts 
(were). . .prepared to "meet the criteria" 
and it is pathetic to observe that much of 
this paper work has been generated solely 
for the principles of meeting criteria and 
has never become the working document in the 
actual organizing process that it is intended 
to be . "* ̂
The principal purpose of a functional organization chart 
is to show the functions and subfunctions necessary to 
accomplish the objectives of the overall function or 
business of the organization. Thus, the functional organi­
zation chart brings together the functions of all posi­
tions in the organization, and as such may be considered 
as a condensed, topical summary of the position guides 
for all of the positions in the organization, thus produc­
ing an overall "picture" of the functions and work of 
the organization. Hence, any complaints issued against 
the position guides would naturally be applicable to the 
functional organization chart.
‘*®Reported from recent talks with various General 
Electric Managers in interview by William J. Greenwood,
Vice President, Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., Darien, Connecti­
cut, September, 1970.
‘*^Webb, op. oit.. p. 8.
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In general, while the chart shows enough infor­
mation to increase the understanding of all people within 
the component as to the relationship of this work to the 
whole organization structure, it also is useful to a 
manager external to the business, in enabling him to 
understand the work of each principal component and posi­
tion in the organization depicted by such a chart. The 
functional organization chart summarizes the position 
guides to determine what the objectives and the work or 
contribution expected from a component, activity or posi­
tion really are. From the functional organization chart. 
General Electric believes one can determine if there are 
any major gaps in the structure and to the extent if there 
are any overlaps. “* ̂
The work of human relations researchers has for 
years demonstrated the power of the informal organization 
to effect the formal operation. The "financial fraternity," 
the "strong characters," and the "cultural clash" were 
strong influences on the practice, structure, and operations 
of General Electric. Also influencing the operating prac­
tices is how people interpret written policy. The next 
section will concentrate on one of the major problems 
found in General Electric in this area.
II. Control
A. Measurements
Judging from the memories of those men interviewed 
and from attempts to read between the lines of various 
company publications, there seemed to be, prior to 1960,
'‘^william J. Greenwood, "Organization Tools," 
unpublished talk to Advanced Management Course, Croton- 
ville, N. Y ., January 30, 1956.
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in General Electric the widespread belief that the only 
real measurement of performance of the operating depart­
ment manager was in short-term profit dollars. If this 
were true, then there was need for some strong motivation 
of managers to have them make any decisions which would 
decrease their short-run profits and yet might be neces­
sary to meet the long-range goals of the company.
By 1970 enough material had been circulated on 
the eight key result areas of measurements, as covered 
in Chapter III, dating back as early as January, 1954, 
and enough discussion about these key result areas, so 
that all managers were fully knowledgeable of each of 
the other seven areas. Despite this knowledge of the 
other seven areas of measurement, many managers were skepti­
cal about the practicability of their application to the 
daily work. Donald Webb described it this way.
The general feeling is that it is all good 
theory (eight key result areas) but when the 
chips are down and their bosses are actually 
making a determination affecting their compen­
sation or their survival, there will be only 
one measurement that counts and it will be the 
figure at the bottom of their profit-and-loss 
s tatement. '*
As a result of this feeling that short-run profit­
ability was the only real measurement, many department 
general managers took "selfish action," in terms of the 
component or department, in order to add profitability to 
their particular departments at the expense of the overall 
interest of the General Electric Company. All members of 
management were acquainted with the corporate policy on 
this subject as laid down by Cordiner, Harold Smiddy, Robert 
Lewis, and others, as to the unprofessionalism of department
'* ̂ Measurements Projeot^ Part The Overall ProQeet 
(Schenectady, N. Y .: Budgets and Measurements Services
Department, General Electric Company, January, 1954).
‘*‘*Webb, op. ait.j p. 24.
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selfishness. Yet when challenged by people (colleagues 
and other managers) as to the correctness of pushing for 
profits at the expense of other are.s, a typical comeback 
might have been : * ®
when I see some actual signs of somebody 
measuring my performance or my department 
by my contribution to the Company as a whole,
I may act differently; but as long as I am 
being judged by the figure on the bottom of 
that profit and loss sheet, I am going to make 
it just as big as I can and to hell with the 
rest of the Company.
Component selfishness caused by the short run one 
key area measurement caused rifts between different com­
ponents of the company. If one department can take 
action increasing its profitability at the expense of 
another department, then a rift between the top depart­
ments naturally will result. This happened on more than 
one o c c a s i o n . Once the rift took place, the two com­
ponents could not get together objectively since discussions 
were now subjective in nature. Two rival camps thus 
developed, two rival teams with the objective of "beating 
out the other unit." Much of the effort devoted to team­
work for the purposes of furthering the interests of these 
new opposing camps turned out to be non-productive effort 
with respect to the over-all company objectives. This 
then injured the competitive position of the company with 
respect to efficiency, costs and often found its negative 
way into customer and public relations.
Since product departments are the profit centers 
and the focal point at which product decisions are to be 
made, there developed a problem on how to resolve
'*^Ihid.a p. 25.
^^Webb, op. oit.i Interviews with William J. 
Greenwood, Darien Connecticut, September, 1970; Paul E. 
Mills, Glen Ridge, New Jersey, August 7, 1969; and 
others.
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interdepartmental product scope conflicts. A product 
scope conflict is the problem of determining what products 
belong to which dep&rtment. A newxy developed product 
might easily fit the product areas of more than one depart­
ment. Such overlapping products may look extremely 
promising,as potentially highly profitable, and therefore 
department managers vie for the right to produce and sell 
these products. It would seem that such conflicts are 
properly the jurisdiction of Division General Managers 
and/or Group Executives. Such is usually the case, but 
frequently such conflicts are left to be fought out at 
the department level. There is a widespread feeling that 
product responsibility will be assigned to the depart­
ment which already has the product activity well in hand. 
This works well for products developed within a particular 
department, but fosters open warfare when a product is 
developed in the corporate research division. Thus, 
"product grabbing" has occurred from time to time.
There appears to have been a distinct reluctance on the 
part of Division General Managers to take action in the 
direction of settling product disputes within their own 
divisions."*^ There also has been even greater reluctance 
to bring product disputes to the attention of Group Execu­
tives when the disputes involve a department outside of 
their divisions. Although this reluctance is not fully 
understood, it is believed that some of it stems from a 
sincere desire to use "Management by Persuasion." When 
persuasiveness does not work, the problem is allowed to 
remain unsolved rather than to resort to stronger methods 
or to refer the matter to higher authority.**®
^^Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, September, 1970.
**®Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien,
Connecticut, September, 1970.
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The practice of product "grabbing" stems from 
the philosophy of decentralization taken to an extreme 
which is the underl'ing belief tnat a department has 
responsibility for products which it successfully makes 
and sells; that if two departments are involved in an 
overlapping product responsibility, favor will ultimately 
accrue to the department most successful in that product 
area. Therefore, it is better to present top management 
with an accomplished fact, a well developed product, with 
an on-going profitable new product line rather than 
bringing up questions prematurely by letting management in 
on the early stages of a development. It has been observed*® 
that some departments in which the practice of product 
grabbing was the most common went to all kinds of extremes 
to protect the secrecy of their activities from other 
departments with product claims when beginning to exploit 
a new product possibility. This was often the case 
between the Hotpoint Division and the General Electric 
branded division producing the same types of products 
before the two were combined under one division in late 
1965. "Such protections have on occasion gone to the 
extreme of establishing a conspiracy with a customer 
for the purpose of maneuvering into a position of accom­
plished fact and thus get the jump on another competing 
department,"®® says Webb. It would seem that such maneu­
vering of sales organizations of competing departments 
must have had an adverse effect on the company image and 
prestige with the particular customer who was the focal 
point of the competition.
The belief that product grabbing may encourage 
healthy internal competition has not been accepted as 
valid by most of General Electric top management and it is
**®Webb, op. ait.
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not the purpose here to evaluate the company's feelings 
on this matter, but the discussion is offered only to 
present how this practice affected the measurements used 
by the firm. Webb went on to condemn corporate practices
in a paper which did not receive wide circulation. He
said:5 1
It is believed that product grabbing prac­
tices have seriously impeded the clear defini­
tion of product scope for departments, that 
the persistent belief in the practice of 
product grabbing on the part of some Department 
and Division General Managers has given them 
reason to oppose and delay the clarification 
of product scopes; and that product grabbing 
stems from component selfish actions, very 
largely, resulting from the "one measurement"
concept. The real solution lies in making very
clear the relationship between over-all company 
interests and measurement of a department and a 
department manager and making this clear with 
respect to determinations of salaries and Incen­
tive Compensation.
From the Webb report and from other sources it 
can be assumed that product grabbing was a serious and 
widespread problem resulting from a more widely accepted 
view that profitability was the measurement and that the 
other seven were only secondary measurements, if in fact 
these seven were of any importance at all.
A second problem noted as far back as 1957, 
caused by this one measurement outlook by some managers, 
and also caused by older managers who gave only lip ser­
vice to the new philosophy, was that dedicated managers 
could see a discontinuity between what the company was 
preaching and what was being done. The management educa-. 
tion program was well developed: extensive courses at
Crotonville; departmental education programs; three of 
the four PTofesaional Management books were published and 
well circulated communicating the overall objectives of the
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company; the eight key result areas of measurement 
were well publicized; and the high integrity and character 
of the company (this is before the price-fixing scandal 
broke) was much discussed. Yet the younger, lower-level 
manager who had been weaned on this new philosophy began 
to see through the one measurement concept, which developed 
into division or department selfishness. They wondered 
whether the new philosophy was hollow or whether the 
company (top management) really believed in it.
If it were just a question of a particular manager, 
such as a Department General Manager, who took these 
"component selfish" actions contrary to the philosophy of 
his own manager and group executive, it could have been 
written off as a failure of a particular department manager 
which could have been corrected by measurement and counsel­
ing and, if necessary, by replacement. Unfortunately, 
this component selfishness in many instances seemed to 
be acting in complete harmony with the philosophy of his 
division manager and in harmony with the philosophy of 
his group executive. At least this was the picture as 
seen by a number of present managers who have asked to 
be anonymous.® ̂
B. The "One Result Area" Concept
The incumbent Vice Chairman of the Board, Jack S. 
Parker, admits that during most of the decade of the *60's. 
General Electric's top management through the Group and 
Division levels placed a disproportioned emphasis on pro­
fitability. Deemphasizing the importance of the other
fairness to those executives who expressed 
this opinion in confidence, these judgments can be easily 
concluded as truthful and obvious from the speeches made 
inside the company which were attacking this problem.
’^Interview with Jack S. Parker, New York,
July 1, 1970.
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seven key result areas was caused by errors in forecast­
ing and legal problems which taxed the company for working 
capital and hence t'.e need for current results dominated 
the situation. Although 1971 is again a year of tight 
financial needs, Parker expects an upgrading of the other 
seven areas so that shortly there will be eight equally 
balanced key result areas on which every operating depart­
ment manager will be measured.
Parker said, "From '61 to '64 we paid out about 
two hundred million in the anti-trust mess and we were 
looking for money to pay this and the shareholders."®**
At about the same time the computer business began to 
drain cash at a much faster rate than anticipated.
"Here is where we made a major mistake," said Parker. "We 
planned too low on the computer business; we were low 
key and we fell behind. To make money in this area you 
have to be number one, two, or three. IBM is one, and 
we should have aimed for two, but we didn't. In retro­
spect, we should have developed a specialty, computers 
for banks, and we would have been very successful. We 
put a lot of money into this area. We will be successful, 
not as planned and a lot longer into the future than 
previously anticipated. This Honeywell deal will save 
us a lot of money, keep us in the field, it's what we 
needed all along."®® The computer area did cost a great
®‘interview with Jack S„, P a r k e r N e w  York, July 1,
1970.
®®Interview with Jack S. Parker, New York, July i, 
1970. The Honeywell deal to which Parker was referring was 
the May, 1970, agreement between General Electric and Honey­
well to form a new computer company in which General Elec­
tric would own 18-1/2%. Dun's reported incorrectly that 
all the computer operations of General Electric were sold 
to Honeywell (See Alvin A. Butkas', "The GE Puzzle,"
Dun's Review and Modern Industry^ Vol. 96, No. 1 (July, 
1970), pp. 34-37 and p. 3). Actually, General Electric's 
time-sharing services, computer communication equipment 
and process computer business were not included in the 
negotiations with Honeywell (see "GE, Honeywell Announce
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deal of money and was never out of the red, admits Richard 
Shoemaker®® of the Computer Division (General Electric 
does not issue finanzjal statements by division). Dun’s 
Review estimates that the computer business "has bled 
conservatively $400 million from profits (equal to $4.44 
a share before taxes per year) over the past fourteen 
years."®’ Philip Reed said, "This is the first one 
(business) I know of, of any magnitude, that we pulled 
out. "® ®
Another capital drain mentioned by Parker was the 
nuclear power business. He said, "In the nuclear thing 
we got in deeper than we thought."®® Currently, General 
Electric has about 45 percent of the nuclear power market 
and has invested between $150 and $250 million and has 
yet to turn a profit.®® Phil Reed said that, "Chuck 
Rieger (currently president.of Ebasco and at one time 
head of General Electric's Nuclear Energy Division) took 
on many jobs under "guessed costs" and he guessed low.*61 
Alvin Dutkas of Dun’s Review says, "Losses are clearly
Computer Agreement," Monogram^ General Electric Company, 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (May-June, 1970), p. 17, and W. David 
Gardner, "Anatomy of a Merger," Datamation^ Vol. 16,
No. 15 (November 15, 1970), pp. 22-31).
®®Interview with G. Richard Shoemaker, Manager 
of Marketing Planning, Computer Division, General Elec­
tric Company, New York, New York, July 30, 1969.
®’Butkas, op. oit.y p. 34.
®®Interview with Philip D. Reed, retired Chair­
man of the Board, General Electric Company, New York,
New York, August 4, 1970.
®®Interview with Jack S. Parker, New York,
July 1, 1970.
®®Butkas, op, oit.j p. 38.
®^Interview with Philip D. Reed, retired Chairman 
of the Board, General Electric Company, New York, New 
York, August 4, 1970.
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narrowing, and analysts believe the venture will 
contribute to profits in 1972, . .but it is still question­
able whether General Electric will make any big money in 
nuclear generation before 1 9 8 0 . General Electric 
scientists had advised management as early as 1945 that 
it would be at least forty years before nuclear energy 
could be used to produce electric power commercially.®^ 
Nevertheless, General Electric decided to enter the field 
to avoid the risk of being left out should atomic genera­
tion of electricity become feasible. As Drucker notes. 
General Electric entered the nuclear reactor market as 
a defensive measure rather than as an innovation. ® *
The last major capital drain mentioned by Jack 
Parker was the jet engine business. He said, "This 
venture was not so much a capital drain as the others, 
but some income was needed."®® General Electric, Rolls- 
Royce, and Germany all independently developed the jet 
engine during World War II but General Electric has had 
a great deal of trouble competing in the field. Some 
feel this has been caused by neglecting to develop new 
models as Rolls, Pratt & Whitney and the others have 
done.®® General Electric did invest a great deal of 
money in the engine for Lockheed's C-5A, the Air Force's 
super cargo, hoping it would be converted into a commer­
cial airliner. Lockheed has yet to start the commercial
®^Butkas, op. ait.
®*Peter F. Drucker, Technology^ Management and 
Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 144. Philip
Reed disputed this statement in an interview August 4, 
1970. He said, "If all had gone well we would have had 
profits by 1963-64."
®‘'Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 62.
®®Interview with Jack S. Parker, New York,
July 1, 1970.
®®Butkas, op. cit.a p. 36.
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plane. Butkas claims.
The real irony of the C-5A debacle is that 
General Electric's financial muscle was strained 
to the point to v here it had to bow out of the 
bidding for the engines on Boeing's 747, of 
which 197 are already either delivered or on 
order.® ̂
Thus, through most of the 1960's General Electric 
had a cash problem which forced concentrating on current 
returns at the expense of the long term. During the 1950's 
when the plans were being formulated for the '60's, Parker 
recalls that they expected these various areas to be 
losing money before profits were received. "But, we 
thought they (each cash drain area) would be staggered; 
they weren't and it put pressure on current results. Sure 
we had long-range planning going on, both at the top and 
in the department," he went on, "but we had to put body 
English on it, because we needed quick results. The bottoms- 
up plans got cut at the division level, to get current 
earnings."® ® The implication seems to be that there is 
much more freedom of decision and truer decentralization 
during prosperous years for prosperous departments than 
would be the case during lean periods and less profitable 
departments.
C. Management by Objectives
In the early 1950's the eight key result areas 
were agreed upon and feedback mechanisms were designed 
to be used to control the system. "In theory," says 
Paul Mills, "the more that can be quantified, the sharper 
the measurements."®^ Thus, results became an important
p. 37.
®®Interview with Jack S. Parker, New York,
July 1, 1970.
Interview with Paul E. Mills, Glen Ridge,
New Jersey, August 7, 1969.
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word. "This, I assure you," says Mills, "produced a lot 
of bitching." Smiddy led the drive to think through and 
to organize a systematic method for evaluating the appro­
priateness of goals and the effectiveness of each compon­
ent toward its goals. It was Smiddy who felt that one of 
the major education jobs of his Management Consultation 
Services was to teach objective setting or goal setting 
to the Operating Departments. Sectional and Departmental 
objectives were derived from the overall divisions. 
Divisional objectives were derived from the overall Group 
and Company objectives. Smiddy expected that managerial 
effectiveness should be measured by quantitative and quali­
tative comparisons of actions and results against the 
predetermined goals.
Management by objectives which Smiddy was advoca­
ting before Drucker popularized the philosophy in his 
1954 Pvactioe of Management3 can be found in the literature 
much before 1950. Yet, students of business policy formu­
lation of today are quick to point out that "management 
by objectives" as practiced in the 1920's and 1930's is 
not the same as "management by objectives" as practiced 
today and that which was advocated by Smiddy and Drucker, 
as a consultant to Smiddy, as early as 1951.^° Business 
policy formulation between the two world wars was basically 
short-term planning, with the major task of managers, 
including the chief executive, to plan the adaptation of 
the organization to the changing conditions. Henri Fayol 
attributed much of his success as a manager to this type 
of planning which was based on the "General Survey."  ̂̂
^°Frank F. Gilmore, Formulation and Advooaoy of 
Bueineaa Polioy (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University 
Press, 1968), Chapter I, pp. 6-34.
^^Henri Fayol, "Administration Theory in the State," 
Papers on the Soienae of Administration3 eds., Luther 
Gulick and L. Urwick (New York: Institute of Public Adminis­
tration, Columbia university, 1937), p. 105.
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The "General Survey" consisted of sizing up the situation 
in the economy and industry with respect to; the competi­
tive situation; the financial and operating picLure; 
analyses of sales, production, costs, executive organi­
zation, etc. The size-up was followed by recommendations 
for action. Such General Surveys were conducted when 
management was faced with major problems. A pioneer 
consultant, James 0. McKinsey^^ followed this method of 
"management by objectives," although he didn't use the 
term. Adaptation to changing conditions was the method 
of teaching business policy formulation at such leading 
institutions as Harvard. Melvin T. Copeland's landmark 
article on the subject published in 1940 stresses this 
c o n c e p t . T h u s ,  this short-term method of planning was, 
in fact, practiced by big business, including General 
Electric. The method of setting objectives was then to 
decide on a course of action in the light of the situation 
facing the company at a particular time. Immediate 
profits and adaptability to meet changing current condi­
tions were of prime importance and were therefore the 
measurements used to evaluate the past managerial deci­
sions. Cornell's Professor of Business Policy, Frank 
Gilmore, says, "There was seldom a clear concept of objec­
tives or long-range plans to which management was committed 
. . .major planning was initiated only when management 
sensed that a serious policy problem existed. . . .
James 0. McKinsey, "Adjusting Policies to Meet 
Changing Conditions," General Management Series  ̂ No. 116 
(New York: American Management Association, 1932).
^^Melvin T. Copeland, "The Job of an Executive," 
Harvard Business Review^ vol. xvili. No. 4 (Winter, 1940), 
pp. 148-1960.
^‘Gilmore, op. oit.^ p. 7.
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At General Electric in the early 1950's it was 
felt that this type of business planning was unacceptable. 
Sporadic diagnosis was replaced by constant surveillance. 
Continuous planning was part of each component and 
Harold Smiddy informally saw that it was performed.
Two years after Smiddy retired, John B. McKitterick was 
made Manager of Corporate Planning Operation which was 
a special corporate section. In 1965 McKitterick was 
elevated to Vice President and his corporate planning 
was given full-fledged status as a Services component.
The change from sporadic diagnosis to continuous reapprai­
sal of corporate policy has been in keeping with Peter 
Drucker's advice of the early 1950's. General Electric's 
attention had been focused more on the seizing of oppor­
tunities than on the solution of problems.
Mills explains that management by objectives best 
describes the General Electric system, and one aspect of 
this system is the measuring stage. If the measuring stage 
is properly "implemented," he says, "it can go a long 
way in allowing managers to keep their ' mitts' on the 
organization."?* But Mills sadly reflects, "A lot of 
measurement work was given to clerk types who mechanically 
grind out comparison of planned versus output, without 
explanations of why."?? What he means by "without explana­
tions" is that the "clerk types," who work up comparisons 
of the planned work against what actually happened, do not
?*Drucker, The Fvaotioe of Management (New York; 
Harper and Row, 1954). For an in-depth analysis of this 
closed loop or modern objective setting, see Frank F. 
Gilmore and Richard G. Brandenburg, "Anatomy of Corporate 
Planning," Harvard Buaineaa Review^ Vol. 40, No. 6 (Nov- 
ember-December, 1962), pp. 61-69.
?®Interview with Paul E. Mills, Glen Ridge, New 
Jersey, August 7, 1969.
??Interview with Paul E. Mills, Glen Ridge, New
Jersey, August 7, 1969.
257
explain the variances, when found, nor do they explain 
why the planned and actual results did match when the 
environment changed to make this result unnatural. Without 
the explanations, he says, "Variances are meaningless."^® 
When you have management by objectives, you expect control 
by exception. But Mills notes, "Control by exception is 
spoken about, but what the financial people are doing at 
General Electric, are managing by patterns. If something 
doesn't fit a pattern, it pops out."^® As a long-time 
manager in the financial area, Paul Mills adds, that even 
when patterns look good to the financial analysts you "may 
have a pattern which could run you to bankruptcy."® °
This may happen when patterns become so dominant for 
decision purposes, that management may become blind to the 
objectives it has set for itself.
Mills spent his last three years as a manager in
the highly dynamic chemical industry. He had the right
to spend up to a quarter of a million dollars if he
w a n t e d . H e  says,
I couldn't get figures which estimated the
percent of project completion versus real
completion. I couldn't get what was done
ahead of schedule. When you don't know what
work is completed ahead of schedule, you may





















Paul E. Mills, Glen Ridge, New
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Most budgets aren't worth a damn as control 
documents. Budgets are made five, six, eighteen 
months ahead of the period to be controlled.
In the chemical industry (of which General Elec­
tric is no small part) the dynamic prices can 
change overnight, so a budget is not worth much 
as control.® ̂
Turning to the power construction field, where Mills worked 
at one time in General Electric and also when he was Vice 
President of Ebasco Services, Inc., he said that he tried 
to use an eighteen-month rolling forward total—
So that I was looking ahead of the average 
time (18 months) it took from receipt of orders 
to the time we could put the plant on stream; 
here budgets for control are for the birds.
I tried min-max budgets; I've tried them all.
One thing for sure, a fixed budget is almost 
worthless in many industries.®**
He included in the meaning of that last sentence much of
the electrical and chemical industries.
The belief that profitability was the most impor­
tant measurement of a man's ability, and the desire to 
protect oneself, as evidenced by "product grabbing," 
created a need to find measurements which would encourage 
managers to concentrate on the goals and objectives of 




One of the major problems found in management, 
whether it is centralized or decentralized, is how to
®®Interview with Paul E. Mills, Glen Ridge, New 
Jersey, August 7, 1969.
®'*Interview with Paul E. Mills, Glen Ridge, New
Jersey, August 7, 1969.
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appraise the collective performance of a group, division, 
or a department; or the performance of the individual 
who heads the unit. I-*, is conceivable that the executive'r 
performance might be good even though his department has 
results which are considered to be poor, or vice versa.
The overall determinant of departmental performance on 
occasion is established based on one criterion; e.g., return 
on investment, and both the departmental performance and 
its top executive are judged in terms of this criterion.
At the Columbua University Roundtables on Management 
(1954)®® an alternate approach was discussed. Instead 
of judging the executive by the results of his department 
alone, emphasis would be on how he does his work. His 
ability to size up competition, to think, to spot and 
correct weak areas, to work with his people, and so forth, 
could be used to evaluate a manager. In this approach, 
attention is clearly shifted from the department to the 
individual. However, this type of measurement is difficult 
to apply, yet it is pertinent for measuring managers.®®
At the Columbia University Roundtables, a com­
prehensive list of criteria for measuring managers was 
presented by one member. The list was the eight key 
result areas used by General Electric as presented in 
Chapter III.®’ It can be assumed Harold Smiddy presented 
this list to the conference since he was one of the many 
distinguished participants which also included Peter Drucker, 
who helped form the measurement concept, Wallace Sayre
®®Columbia University Graduate School of Business, 
Round Tables on Management of Expanding Organizations^ 
November, 1953-March, 1954, Minutes of 4th Meeting.
®®Z6td., p. 2.
®’lhe eight key result areas, it will be remembered 
(page 148), are; Profitability, Market Position, Product­
ivity, Product Leadership, Personnel Development, Employee 
Attitudes, Public Responsibility, and Balance Between Short- 
Range and Long-Range Goals.
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(C.C.N.Y.) and William Newman (Columbia) the only academic 
participants among the twenty conference attendants, most 
of whom were top business executives and business consul­
tants. After the General Electric list of eight key result 
areas was presented, William Newman reported.
The list was recognized as needing further 
definition of sub-factors, adaption to speci­
fied operations, and other refinements. Never­
theless, it does provide comprehensive coverage 
within a manageable number of factors.®®
Further discussion brought out a number of areas needing
refinement or réévaluation, the same problems with which
General Electric managers have wrestled over the past
seventeen years. It was noted that along with this
multiple factor approach to management appraisal for
control purposes was the need to vary the weights of the
various areas according to a particular situation. The
product research which effects profitability and product
leadership must be given much more weight in a department
producing computers than one producing electric tape where
the growth prospects are much more modest. This problem
falls under the eighth key result area— balance of long-
and short-range goals— and it still is a most difficult
problem to solve in practice.
In planning the eighth key result area a most 
subjective factor is how to assign weights to the factors 
considered important by top management. Since each 
operating department produces different products, each 
at different stages of product life and each somewhat 
unique, then it holds that each product will require 
emphasis to be placed on different factors with different 
weights. "Tomorrow's breadwinners," to use a Drucker 
expression,®* would require planning emphasis looking
®®Columbia University, Round Tables^ op. oit.^ p. 5
®*Peter F. Drucker, Managing for Results (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1964), Chapter IV.
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toward the long run, while "today's or yesterday's bread­
winners" require a control measurement to reflect today's 
cost and contribution to profit. Thus, while it is most 
difficult to compose the quantitative and qualitative 
measurements in the first seven key result areas, the 
subjectivity of the eighth area almost negates any compari­
son of products. What the key result areas can help do 
is to measure past performance against expected results.
This type of organized measurement allows better use of 
management by objectives, but it does not make management 
by objectives any less subjective. There is a danger that 
if the subjectivity of the eighth key result area is not 
appreciated and managers improperly read more objectivity 
into the measurements than exists, this approach will be 
reduced to a formula. It is doubtful with the state of 
the art that any formula could be flexible enough to 
reflect what has happened, to properly measure the manage­
ment, and to fit all situations and products. Subjective 
judgments involved in such measurements used for control 
purposes open the way for clashes of opinion between top 
management and operating executives.
A cursory look at the eight key result areas in 
GE gives the impression that a series of detailed operating 
standards are used to appraise departmental performance 
and also executive achievement. But once the subjectivity 
of the standards is understood then it can be readily 
seen that the eight key result areas when used to evaluate 
the departmental executive actually emphasize "how he does 
his work," e.g., how does he size up his product and competi­
tion; how does he think; how energetic is he in correcting 
weak spots; how does he treat his men; how does he plan; 
and so forth. Since the measurements are subjective and 
there is no "one best way" of managing, these measures 
used as a control device are most difficult to apply. The 
more objective the evaluation superiors believe the
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measurement criteria to be, the more these measurements 
become a method of domination by the superior. That is, 
they become strict standards needing little interpretation 
and thereby become control devices in a negative sense.
Control can have two meanings in management. The 
positive meaning for "control" is the ability to direct 
oneself and one's work. The negative meaning is domina­
tion of one person by another. With management by objec­
tives being the central theme in General Electric's 
philosophy of control, the negative meaning of the word 
has no place, i.e., where the control becomes domination 
of one by another, there is a breakdown between corporate 
philosophy and corporate reality. Drucker notes, "One 
of the major contributions of management by objectives is 
that it enables us to substitute management by self- 
control for management by domination."** Because of the 
possible negative connotation of the word "control,"
Smiddy dropped its use to describe a function of manage­
ment in favor of "measuring" at the time he introduced 
Hopf's elements of the leadership function into the 
corporate professional management blue books.
The concept of self-control is certainly not new 
with General Electric; it is plainly found in the writings 
of Follett, L. Gilbreth, Hopf, and others. It underlies 
the managing philosophy of "pushing decisions down to the 
lowest possible level." Self-control requires a manager 
to know what his goals are and to be able to measure his 
performance against the goals. It does not require exact 
quantitative measurements but it does require relevant 
and simple measurements. Relevant in that the efforts 
are directed toward the correct goals or objectives; 
simple so that they are understandable to the manager 
in question.
*®Drucker, The Pvaotioe of Management^ op, oit.,
p. 131.
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Drucker adds : * ̂
Each manager should have the information 
he needs to measire his own performance and 
should receive iu soon enough to make any 
changes necessary for the desired results. And 
this information should go to the manager himself, 
and not to his superior. It should be a means 
of self-control, not a tool of control from 
above. . . .
General Electric has a special service-- 
the traveling auditors. The auditors study 
every one of the managerial units of the company 
thoroughly at least once a year. But their report 
goes to the manager of the unit studied. There 
can be little doubt that the feeling of confidence 
and trust in the company that even casual contact 
with General Electric managers reveals, is directly 
traceable to this practice of using information 
for self-control rather than for control from 
above.
Drucker's statement does seem to conflict with the 
previously reported "financial fraternity" concept. The 
fact that the traveling auditors send the report to the 
manager of the unit studied does not prevent informal 
information passing to other members of the so-called 
"fraternity." The real conflict between Drucker and the 
"fraternity" concept lies in "the feeling of confidence 
and trust" found by Drucker. Evidently, various people 
have perceived the situation differently. It should be 
noted that Paul Mills, who was cited earlier in the dis­
cussion of the concept,92 spent about thirty years as a 
GE employee and some of that time was spent in finance. 
Drucker, as an outside consultant, was very involved 
with GE for about five years when he was assisting Smiddy 
in the reorganization in the early 1950's.
The foregoing discussion does not imply that 
reports are not sent to top management, those above the
^^Ibid.y pp. 131-132.
9^See subsection "The Financial Fraternity" in 
this chapter.
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manager being measured, for they are and should be. 
Successful managers, those who have made it to the top 
levels of organization have normally received their pro­
motions because they initiated work, they got things done 
and done right. Although they talk delegation and perhaps 
even believe they practice it, truly letting go of the 
reins is a most difficult thing to do on the part of 
those who have been so successful by being action-oriented 
production managers of operations close to the movement 
of products. Creating the proper climate for decentrali­
zation to work is extremely difficult. The need to know 
what is being done below is strong. The urge to meddle 
in the affairs of subordinates once a manager receives 
information about his subordinates is sometimes over­
whelming and all the philosophy to the contrary will not 
alter what may occur in practice. But with properly 
trained leaders, a greater percent will overcome the 
strong desire to "take charge" and entrust subordinates 
with full responsibility for certain assignments if they 
know what is happening and that the risk entailed by 
failure on the part of the subordinate is not of excessive 
magnitude. Raymond Villers, in Harvard Buaineaa Review^ 
concluded that:® ̂
The high-ranking executive who is respon­
sible for the operations of large sections of 
an industrial organization and who is not in 
a position to make use of effective controls, 
tends to be tyrannical because he is worried.
He will give much greater independence to his 
subordinates if he knows that their mistakes 
will be detected before any irreparable damage 
results.
The evaluation of workers is closely tied to the 
controls used to assure that the organization is continuing
**Raymond villers, "Control and Freedom in A 
Decentralized Company," Harvard Buaineaa Review^ Vol. 32, 
No. 2 (April-May, 1954), p. 96.
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along a proper path. The eight key result areas are cate­
gories of measurements used to ascertain the relative posi­
tion of a product depertment. Some of the measurements 
quantify particular aspects of the job performed by a 
product department; most compare one aspect of the depart­
ment against predetermined standards. Some measurements 
are quantifiable and objective; others are less easily 
visualized and are very subjective. Measuring non-product 
department managers is very difficult and presents a prob­
lem which the company philosophy has yet to solve. Even 
evaluating or measuring a whole division is difficult, 
especially if it is a Services division. Before you can 
really control an organization, you must be able to evaluate 
and measure it by objective and/or subjective means. Some 
of the objectives and goals for service organizations and 
managers have fruition periods of fifteen to twenty years. 
Measures made of the effectiveness of an initial decision 
might be easily designed but the manager initiating the 
course of action usually is no longer around, having either 
been promoted or retired. Lemuel Boulware, retired vice 
President of Employee Relations at General Electric, believes 
that evaluation and the measuring of managers is "the 
toughest problem in business management— at every level 
and whether in operations or services. " ® * Even when figures 
are available for evaluation of product department mana­
gers, the subjective evaluation still commands the central 
position in the evaluation. Remember, it is only the pro­
duct department manager who heads a profit center; all 
other managers are either above, below, or outside (such 
as in Services divisions) the company's profit centers.
So it is only the product department managers who can be
®‘Letter from Lemuel R. Boulware, Retired Vice 
President— Employee and Community Relations, General 
Electric Company, dated March 10, 1970.
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measured by the eight key result areas, and there are 
less than two hundred of these managers in the company.
But, even if much quantitative information is available 
on a manager's work, the subjective evaluation still deter­
mines the overall appraisal of the manager. Boulware, 
in a recent letter, says:®®
When sitting in judgment on a manager for 
bonus or promotion purposes. . .the quantita­
tive information available does not show the 
causes behind the figures. The qualitative 
enters as the finally determining factor most 
every time. How much of the manager's 
"results," as shown In the figures, was due 
to the way he drew on his own inner resources, 
and how much was due to factors beyond his 
control such as a surge in the industry market 
or a mistake or strike suffered by a competitor?
Was an advantage in volume temporary, and could 
competitors be expected to. . .get back their 
share?
B. Measuring Services
The task of measuring the performance of Services 
components and their managers is even more difficult than 
judging decentralized operating managers and their compon­
ents. The output of Services is largely intangible and 
this leads to difficulties in comparing costs with results.
General Electric's philosophy is based on manage­
ment by objectives. Thus, Services are measured and 
controlled by the setting of an evaluation of progress 
toward objectives. These objectives are set once a 
year at the time the budget is established. The objectives 
are reviewed by members of the Executive Office— that is, 
by all the Services Officers together with the Operating 
Group Executives. One past executive called it "our day
®®Letter from Lemuel R. Boulware, March 10, 1970.
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in court" when the budget and objectives were presented.
He said.
We would go dofn through the objectives 
specifically and explain what Management Con­
sultation Services, let's say, was going to do 
for each one of the other components, and in 
this meeting agreement was made on how much 
money would be budgeted for each objective.
Such things as writing the philosophy books, 
what we were going to do to management develop­
ment, plans for the Crotonville school, 
what organizations we were going to look at, 
why and how, and so forth, were discussed 
in specific detail.**
Measuring Services is very subjective. The Chief 
Executive Officer, whether it was Cordiner, or today 
Borch, meets with the executive office once a year for 
the executive review of budgets and objectives. This 
executive review should not be confused with the business 
review which is a review of each operating department made 
twice a year.*^ Although this formal executive review 
occurs once a year, there are numerous monthly progress 
reports from each Services and Group to the Executive 
Office. These monthly reports state what each component 
is doing against what was planned at the beginning of 
the budgeting period. Objectives can change during the 
year based upon the need, but always with prior agreement. 
The Chief Executive Officer, sitting above the Services 
Vice President is able to judge from the reaction of 
the other corporate executives as to what and how each 
Services is doing and if any changes are warranted.
*®Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, November 23, 1969.
*^Business Reviews are conducted by the Group and 
Division Managers over a department, along with the Ser­
vices heads to evaluate operating departments along the 
lines laid down by the eight key result areas. They are 
frequently called with less than a week's notice. See 
Buaineaa Week^ April 19, 1952, p. 1 2 3.
268
A difficulty in measuring Services is that fre­
quently Services projects would not have results forth­
coming for about twenty years. It must be remembered 
that at General Electric the word "Services" covers a 
wide range of activities, some are short termed, some 
long termed, and some activities are more closely associa­
ted with operating work than the traditional concept of 
staff work. For example, one Services activity at 
General Electric which is closely associated with opera­
ting work is union negotiations. This type of work is 
not looking twenty years ahead; it's taking care of today's 
needs. In this case, the New York office directs all 
the bargaining. The General Engineering Laboratory, 
where General Electric has designated capital for research, 
is in a sense doing operating work. When Engineering 
Services is "training" engineering people for operating 
work, then that really is not Services work as much as 
it is operating work on a pooled basis. This would be 
easier to measure than when one is dealing with the pure 
Services function, such as what is going to happen 
sixteen to twenty years in the future. In that case, the 
measurement must be subjective and it must be on "how is 
a manager doing today in getting operating people ready 
for tomorrow."®® Measuring Services is not unlike the 
evaluation of skating, diving and gymnastics in that all 
judgments, even for the "expert," are subjective. But 
in athletics the event is evaluated as it occurs; in 
Services the evaluation takes place long before results 
from actions are expected.
Most of the personnel found in Services have been 
promoted out of Operations. It should be understood that
®®Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien,
Connecticut, November 23, 1969.
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the establishment of the Services organization came as 
part of the 1951 reorganization and it was at this time 
that Cordiner and Smiddy decided that Services people 
would get their reputation and strength based on an 
"authority of knowledge." Therefore, Smiddy scoured the 
various line departments for highly authoritative people 
to be put into Services. In order to attract them the
Company had to give them a higher salary than they were
earning and many of these people were the highest-paid 
men within the Operating Departments. It was felt by
Smiddy that the line people would come to Services for
guidance because of their tremendous reputations as 
successful operating people and these were the types 
that were attracted to Services work and were highly 
successful. One problem was evident, even at the early 
stages— that the Services expert often felt the time spent 
on long-range planning less tangible and more frustrating 
because, as Arthur Vinson, retired Executive Vice Presi­
dent, noted.
There are no quickly obtainable evaluations 
of progress. . .he feels at first as though 
he is not earning his pay; that he is unable 
to get his teeth into the problem; that the 
work that others (line people) are doing is 
more important.**
Another problem somewhat related to control of 
Services personnel, which was not handled by the philoso­
phy or the practice of the Company is how to handle Ser­
vices personnel after they lose some of their "authority 
of knowledge." While the managers who had been promoted 
into Services were searching and teaching better methods 
of work, some of the line people began to have even greater 
knowledge than their Services advisors through their own
**Arthur Vinson, "General Electric's Services 
Division," Planning^ Managing^ and Measuring the Business 
(New York: Controllership Foundation, Inc., January, 1955),
P . 10.
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advancements within Operations and being right on the firing 
line. It was in the mid-1950's when Smiddy and Cordiner 
discovered a tremendous problem, because Services work 
had always been considered of higher status and higher com­
pensation than Operating work.^°° It became necessary to 
send Services people back into Operations. Through time 
some Services people lost some "authority of knowledge" 
to Operating people and it was concluded by Smiddy that 
these men must go back into Operations, but to go back to 
Operations meant that they had to keep their higher Ser­
vices salary because these men were not being reprimanded 
for poor work; they were going back for a "refresher 
course" in Operations with the expectation that they would 
soon return to Services. Unfortunately, the higher salary 
commanded by the shifted Services people wasn't in the 
structure— the pay scale of Operations would not accept 
such high salaries and the fairness of these high salaries 
compared to the salaries of Operating men who did not have 
a Services background doing the same work was questionable. 
This posed a tremendous problem for Cordiner and for the 
salary evaluation group in the Compensation Service, which 
was under Lemuel Boulware for the decade of the 1950's. 
William Greenwood remembers :  ̂° ̂
To my knowledge, I dont remember any who 
made the complete switch from line to Services 
to line and back to Services. Several were 
sent back for the so-called "refresher courses" 
but they became so ingrained with their first 
love. Operations, that they themselves didn't 
want to come back into the very difficult kind 
of Services work where measurements were so 
subjective and so difficult to understand.
10 0As previously noted in Chapter III.
^°^Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien,
Connecticut, November 23, 1969.
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They obtained greater pleasure in seeing 
things go out the door than they did in 
looking at research studies and thinking 
through corporate philosophy.
As a result of all this, I feel that 
Services today possibly are weaker than they 
were in the 1950's and that something will 
have to be done to get people to come into 
Services out of the line and to stay in Ser­
vices using "refresher courses" on the basis 
of a loan or something like that to various 
Operating Divisions. I don't think this has 
been done since the new structure was inau­
gurated in 1951. One opinion, reinforced
many times, still remains, the best Services
people are those who have had on the line 
experience in rough managerial situations.
Lemuel Boulware, however, known for his "hard" 
approach to labor relations and the 1958 recipient of the 
SAM human relations award, does not think the qualita­
tive measurements used for Services organizations make
for any more formidable a problem than measurements for 
Operations. He said;^®^
In operations there is a presumed luxury 
of positive figures on volume, profit, percen­
tage of profit to sales, return on investment, 
inventory turnover, market performance, and 
percentage of the industry's actual sales.
But this quantitative information frequently 
is as inaccurate as (subjective) judgments.
When profits are substantially overstated 
because of inflation and when allowable 
depreciation is far too little for replace­
ment in kind, this quantitative information 
without careful restructuring can be and often 
is basically inadequate. Even if accurate, 
it is very misleading if taken by itself.
In his book. The Truth About Boutwarianit^^ ̂ he
V®^Letter from Lemuel R. Boulware, March 10, 1970.
^Lemuel R. Boulware, The Truth About Boulwar'ismi 
Trying To Do Right Votuntarily (Washington; Bureau of 
National Affairs, Inc., 1969), especially see pp. 92-96.
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spells out very plainly the requirements of his Employee 
and Plant Community Relations Services Division. All 
nine departments undei Boulware were engaged in persuading 
operating personnel in some aspect of work. Boulware, in 
a letter, recently said;^®**
The big problem was to get operating people 
at each level to recognize the need to make 
room for new work added besides the old 
"metal cutting and paper shuffling," and to 
become both sufficiently competent and suffi­
ciently active in that work. This work did 
not come to them automatically as in the 
case of operating duties. Rather it was an 
•investment ahead of time in "prior homework" 
that would yield increased cooperation and 
productivity constantly as well as providing 
insurance against periodic disasters.
Because of our being constantly in the 
field, it was not hard to observe who was 
going at which parts of our program in 
earnest. This was a sure clue both for our 
discussions with superior operating authority 
as to further pressure by them on which of 
their subordinates, and for my own judgments 
as to which of my specialized departments 
were being acceptable persuasive.
Boulware admits that the control function is 
complicated in Services by the fact that the Services have 
to engage in a very sizeable and unpredictable amount of 
"fire fighting work in addition to meeting. . .(the) main 
responsibility for fire prevention‘°®
The eight key result areas are used to measure 
the approximately two hundred departments in General 
Electric. But Services and, on the Operating side, the 
levels of Division and Group are not measured or controlled 
by the eight key result areas. These top level managers 
are measured very differently. The philosophy of the 
conpany concentrates on the profit centers— the departments.
^®**Letter from Lemuel R. Boulware, March 10, 1970.
^°®Letter from Lemuel R. Boulware, March 10, 1970.
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The measurements project, which has yet to complete its 
almost twenty-year search for operational measurements 
at the department level, has done almost nothing to 
develop organized thinking on measurements in other areas. 
The measurements study team has stated that they can con­
sider how to approach the problem of formulating functional 
measurements only after the operational measurements have 
been substantially completed and tTiat further development 
on the measurement of the work of a manager (at all levels) 
is contingent upon the measurements developed in the opera­
tional and functional a r e a s . T h u s ,  the philosophy of 
the firm in this most important control area has yet to 
be organized and unified. When asked, "How do you evaluate 
the Group Vice Presidents reporting to you?" Vice Chairman 
Jack S. Parker began by saying, "We (the Corporate Execu­
tive Office) all have our own method and we each are 
looking for different t h i n g s . T h u s ,  emphasizing that 
the firm has not researched this area well enough to 
develop guidelines for evaluating managers such as it has 
done for the operation departments.
The measuring of the work of a manager is most 
difficult. The type of measurement used, that is, what is 
looked at or considered to be important, may vary with 
each level of the hierarchy. This is not to imply, which 
may or may not be the case, that leadership and manage­
ment are not fundamentally the same at all levels. It 
is saying that the information received and methods of 
measuring the effectiveness of a particular manager may 
be altered with the level of the hierarchy and with the 
particular job performed. At lower levels more quantifiable
^'^^Meaauvementa Project. . op. ait.
^Interview with Jack S. Parker, New York,
July 1, 1970.
274
measurements may be found. A marketing manager, for 
example, responsible for sales could be evaluated using 
such yardsticks as: actual sales to quotas; accounts
received over sixty days, over ninety days; expenses 
versus budget, etc.^®® As we ascend the hierarchy other 
measures must be considered. Professor Ronald B. Shuman 
notes, "Broadly speaking, the higher the hierarchy of 
command, the less factually measurable the accomplish­
ments of the manager."!®® In his book. The Management 
of Men^ Shuman notes.
The quality of top-level management varies 
over a wide range and is not easily measurable 
by objective standards. . . .Proper selection 
of executives. . .is severely hampered by 
lack of quantitative measurements for the 
more important but intangible of human quali­
ties . ! ! °
Drucker seconds this thought by saying that managing is a 
process and
No matter how much we can quantify, the 
basic phenomena are qualitative ones: change
and innovation, risk and judgment, growth and 
decay, dedication, vision, rewards, and moti­
vation . ! ! !
It seems that management is searching for a method 
to measure and control other managers and, particularly, 
at what may be termed the "command level." The measuring 
of Services Managers and of managers above the department
!®®Frank Greenwood, Casebook For Management and 
Business Policy: A Systems Approach (Scranton, Pennsyl­
vania: International Textbook Company, 1968), p. 144.
!P®Lecture by Ronald B. Shuman, in "Principles of 
Management" course. University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla­
homa, April 24, 1967.
!!®Ronald B. Shuman, The Management of Men (Nor­
man, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1948),
pp. 182, 184.
!!!peter F. Drucker, Landmarks of Tomorrow (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1959), pp. 90-91.
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level in the line, i.e.. Division and Group, is most 
difficult and highly subjective. The hope by some is for 
a method of measuring these managers the same way, with 
the same validity used to quantitatively measure the 
manual worker. This is, in the state of the art, a vain 
hope indeed. Those raised in the scientific management 
school can plainly see and measure what constitutes 
"productivity" for the manual worker. But Services people 
are not manual workers; they are knowledge workers and 
Drucker has correctly noted, "Knowledge work is not easily 
defined in quantitative terms, and may indeed be incapable 
of quantification altogether^^^ Frederick W. Taylor 
asked what constitutes "productivity" for the manual 
worker. He never asked the same question for the indus­
trial engineer, the man who was applying his "Scientific 
Management.3 Productivity for the knowledge worker is 
not as yet definable and therefore must be measured pri­
marily on subjective qualities.
Measuring Services seems to be a most difficult 
process and much more thought is needed in order to 
develop measurements which will be effective in estab­
lishing the achievements made in working on the right 
problem of the organization. Because measuring Services 
is difficult, it should not be implied that measuring the 
individual manager or individual contributor in the line 
is any less difficult. The next area of this chapter 
discusses this aspect of the appraising problem at General 
Electric.
ii^Drucker, The Age of Dieoontinuityj op. oit.y
p. 288.
ii^Drucker, Technology. . ., op. ait.y p. 37.
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C. Appraising the Individual
Appraising the individual manager or individual 
contributor is an integral part of the measuring or control 
function. Appraisal of employees has different goals in 
different organizations. In General Electric the purpose 
of appraisals is to aid the individual to become better 
in his position, to develop and aid in his self-development 
and not to determine whether or not he should get a raise 
in pay. This is a very significant part of how General 
Electric proposes that managers be measured effectively.
The appraisal plan in General Electric, which was initiated 
about 1953, required that at least once a year a man write 
down what is required in his position in a self-development 
book. His boss would also in a separate duplicate book 
write down what he thought was required in the same posi­
tion. The reason that the "job duties," "job requirements," 
or "job scope" was written down each year by both the 
incumbent and his supervisor is that, as Norman F. Maier 
has pointed out.
Until the two agree on the. . .job areas 
there is bound to be disagreement in appraising 
or rating performance. The use of job descrip­
tions and previous experience of the superior 
on the subordinate's job does not remove the 
discrepancy. ̂ ̂
Each incumbent then would rate himself against what was 
required, that is on each one of the so-called functions 
of the position. The superior would do the same thing.
Later they would exchange books, discuss each one of the 
differences and come to an agreement. The differences may 
be that the incumbent of a position failed to work on one 
of the "functions" but that did not mean he was a failure.
ii^Norman F . Maier, Peyohology In Industry^ Third 
Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 256.
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but rather, it may have been with the full knowledge of the 
boss because of the urgency of some of the other factors 
of the position. Thi, xs a justifiable reason why a parti­
cular part of a function had not been fulfilled. A new 
incumbent in a position might be at a variance with his 
manager in what is required of a position after the first 
year— it must be remembered that position guides are fairly 
comprehensive but even a six to thirteen page position 
guide cannot and should not detail the job into a straight 
jacket. However, it should define the scope and purpose of 
the position adequately. The second, third, and fourth 
years should find the incumbent and boss quite close in 
their evaluation of the factors of the position, unless the 
position has changed. In terms of recording the require­
ments of the position, the first part of the appraisal could 
have been quite repetitious since each year the process 
is repeated and both the manager and the man retain their 
books.
The appraisal continues with recording how the 
incumbent performed with respect to other factors other 
than his specific function targets. In other words, if he 
were a manager, how did he do with planning for his compon­
ent, how did he do with the organization of it, how did 
he do with the measurement of it, how did he do with pro­
moting teamwork or integration. Each one of these aspects 
is sub-divided down into sub-groups. Then there was a 
summary with respect to each of these categories. Both 
the incumbent and his superior had to determine and record 
the strengths and weaknesses of the incumbent. The for­
mal writing of the report in terms of strengths and weak­
nesses was important so that a person was able to capitalize 
on his strengths and could either aid himself by concen­
trating in the future on his weaknesses or seek to avoid his 
areas of weakness.
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Another part of the appraisal dealt with whether 
the individual feels that his present line of work is the 
kind of work he shoul ue in permanently or for how long 
in the future. If he decided that this is not to be his 
permanent kind of work, then what steps should he as an 
individual take in order to get himself out of this 
particular position into the kind of position where he 
thinks he would be better qualified or which he would like 
better. The superior had to record for future reference 
what he as a manager would do to aid that individual get 
out of that position, for, if the individual were still 
in the same position a year or two later, these statements 
might not only become very embarrassing to the supervisor 
but also they might be spotlighting a problem.
Another important part of this appraisal system 
was that each one of the books written by the incumbent 
and his superior was not only a performance and develop­
ment review, but the comments pertinent to each were 
signed and sent to the common boss or the second level 
boss above so that he would sign cind take note of the 
appraisal. This, then, became a permanent record, not in 
the company files, but rather between the three people—  
the incumbent of the position, his manager and his mana­
ger's manager. These books are returned to the employee 
when he leaves the company because the sole purpose of 
these appraisals is to make a person a better manager or 
individual contributor.  ̂̂ ®
William Greenwood remembers ;  ̂̂ ®
^^®A more detailed explanation can be found in 
General Electric's Manager Development Study booklets, 
especially Appendix J, "Appraisal Plan for Manager Develop­
ment" (1953) and Appendix II, "Manager's Appraisal Guide" 
(1953).
^^®lnterview with William J. Greenwood, Darien,
Connecticut, November 23, 1969.
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The appraisal was done quite religiously 
from 1954 to 1958, after that I really don't 
know (he left General Electric). I don't know 
how widespread t.' a^ procedure was except that 
I do know that Cordiner reviewed each one of 
the people reporting to him in this way. And 
I do know that he demanded that they in turn do 
the same thing with their incumbents because he, 
Cordiner, had to sign those books. As to how 
far down the line it really went— it was supposed 
to go down to the lowest level of managing-- 
I don't know.
Jack S. Parker implied that he did not adhere 
strictly to the above appraisal plan. He spends much 
effort in evaluating the group executives reporting to 
him. This does not mean he does not also appraise them.
In evaluating these Group Vice Presidents, Parker says 
he first looks at the executive himself in terms of "what 
is this fellow worth to the General Electric Company and 
how do we feel about him as an officer of the Company."
He says, "If I have any doubts here, I ask what strengths 
would I look for in a replacement."^̂ ^ The second area 
Parker evaluates is the contribution of the incumbent to 
his operations. There he claims to look toward the 
future contributions and the present trade-offs between 
long-range and short-range contributions which the 
incumbent has programmed. Thirdly, he looks to see how 
does the customer like the way this man is managing. He 
says, "I check that independently, myself."*^® And, lastly, 
Parker evaluates the personnel under the executive "to 
see to it that better men are coming along— that is a 
matter of personnel and it means the future of the organi­
zation. What Parker is subjectively doing is evaluating
^Interview with Jack S. Parker, New York, 
July 1, 1970.
ii®Interview with Jack S. Parker, New York, 
July 1, 1970.
ii®lnterview with Jack S. Parker, New York,
July 1, 1970.
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the executive in terms of what he thinks the man is worth 
and will be worth to the organization in four areas—  
Company, component, cisromer, and personnel development.
This evaluation is formalized in a report once a year to 
the executive office as a whole, of which Parker is 
a part. The above is a subjective evaluation or appraisal; 
it should not be confused with the reports issued measur­
ing progress against budgetswhich are issued monthly.
Lemuel Boulware explains why it is so difficult to
appraise managers and knowledge workers. He believes
luck and intangible factors play such important roles.
He says years of experience
. . .would indicate some intangible is the deter­
mining factor in one manager having a high 
percentage of decisions that prove to have been 
good ones, while another manager of apparently 
equal ability and access to information would 
have a lower percentage  ̂°
It was Boulware who originally asked to have 
Smiddy organize the Measurements Study project in which 
Borch and Robert Lewis were to play such important roles.
Yet, Boulware has stated:
My opinion has always been that the extra 
performance (of one individual over another) 
was not due to any superior instinct or intui­
tion but rather to some unsensed combination 
of such factors as greater diligence, extra 
concentration, keener observation, a longer or 
more pertinent experience on which to draw 
even unknowingly, paying special attention 
to those facts and recommendations have proved 
more likely to be trustworthy, a disciplined 
tough-mindedness about one's own wishful think­
ing, and/or some other such positive ingredient 
whether consciously or subconsciously injected.
Smiddy insisted that "management by objectives," 
which centered on the assessment of performance by comparison
^^°Letter from Lemuel Boulware, March 10, 1970.
^Letter from Lemuel Boulware, March 10, 1970.
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against predetermined goals must be practiced. The often 
negative attitude which Douglas McGregor developed toward 
many managerial pract:ccs was not aimed at this type of 
management. He wrote that "management by objectives" 
offered "an unusually promising framework within which we 
seek a solution (to human problems of industry).  ̂̂
McGregor cited General Electric as one company exploring 
different methods of appraisal based on the assumptions 
of Drucker's philosophy.
At the time McGregor was complimenting General 
Electric on its methods of appraisal, and about eight 
years after Cordiner had begun decentralization, Donald 
Webb wrote of General Electric's performance appraisals, 
"There is strong evidence that many Division General 
Managers have never carried out effective discussions 
with their Department General Managers in this area and 
it is believed that this resistance exists at all l a y e r s . a  
Webb went on to claim that in his seventeen years' 
experience with the company he had never had a discussion 
with any of his superiors which carried out "the spirit 
of the new management phi l o s o p h y ^ ^ D r .  Herbert Meyer, 
Consultant in Behavioral Research Service, who has studied 
performance appraisals for the company and has been 
eighteen years in a department which requires performance 
appraisals, claims to have had only two in all that time.  ̂% s
^^^Douglas McGregor, "An Uneasy Look at Performance 
Appraisal," Harvard Bueiness Review^ vol. 35, No. 3 (May- 
June, 1957), p. 91. Also see McGregor, The Professional 
Manager (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1967),
Chapter 8, especially p. 131.
^^^Webb, op, ait.j p. 9.
, p. 10.
^^®Interview with Dr. Herbert H. Meyer, Consultant, 
Behavioral Research Service, General Electric Company, 
Darien, Connecticut, August 25, 1970.
282
The philosophy referred to by both Donald Webb and Herbert 
Meyer is found in the Fpofesaional Management series 
dating back to 1954;* ®
An individual who is not performing 
up to expectations in a particular position 
should be told so frankly and kindly by his 
manager. The individual himself should know 
sooner than anyone else if he is not perform­
ing up to the standards he has set for himself, 
or up to the requirements of the job which 
he has undertaken. He should be given all 
possible encouragement and guidance if he is 
trying realistically to improve his own abili­
ties and to stretch himself toward adequate 
performance. He should be removed from the 
position if, after a fair trial and after 
receiving help and encouragement, he continues 
to fall short of expected accomplishment.
McGregor describes the possibility that there may 
be a sound foundation behind the widespread reluctance 
of managers to conduct such discussions with their employees 
and that this might be tied in with the manager's reluc­
tance to "play God." McGregor argues that the "management 
by objectives" approach lessens the burdens of "playing 
G o d . T h e  question is not so much "playing God," but 
one of leading and managing. A good manager must of 
necessity "play God" in choosing people for promotion, in 
giving assignments to people and in making many of the 
other choices that must be made by a manager. The problem 
is, can the manager do this face to face with the employee 
or only behind the employee's back. In terms of management 
by objectives, it must be done face to face with the 
employee.
The main thrust of the General Electric philosophy 
is contained in this tenet, "Individuals. . .are motivated
}^^Pvofeaaional Management in General Eleotrio Book 
Three, The Work of a Profeaaional Manager (New York:
General Electric Company, 1954), pp. 59-60.
^McGregor, "An Uneasy Look. . op. cit., p. 90.
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principally by. . .inner drives rather than by someone 
else's d i r e c t i o n s . "^28 is based on the contention
that the company and he supervisor must set up a work 
situation which enables an individual to motivate himself. 
It is not anew philosophy, nor is it claimed to be, for 
it is shared by McGregor, Mayo, Hopf, Follett, and all of 
the human relations philosophers. As Robert Townsend 
points out, "You can't motivate people. The door is locked 
from the inside. You can create a climate in which most 
of your people will motivate themselves to help the com­
pany reach its o b j e c t i v e s . T h e  foundation for this 
belief is the premise that employees do not need to be 
controlled or commanded if they clearly know what is to 
be done, why it is to be done, how they are to be measured 
and paid, and what their advancement opportunities may 
be. The General Electric philosophy says.
This is the way in which strong inner 
urges and individual self-motivation, self- 
direction, self-adjustment, self-education, 
self-development, self-discipline, self- 
control, and the desire for self-realization 
are geared to the business enterprise.
It is the company's philosophy that a healthy managerial 
attitude encompasses a willingness to submit to unifying 
direction and to work in a spirit of cooperative concern 
for the work of others, while at the same time seeking 
personal achievement and recognition. A decentralized 
manager must be free to cope with such problems as main­
taining or improving the competitive position of the product 
line by improving profits without unbalancing pressures
^Pvofeasional Management in Geneval Eteotrio 
Book Three. . ., op. ait.^ p. 73.
i^*Robert Townsend, Up the Organization (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 142.
^Profeaeionat Management in General Eleotrio 
Book Three. . op. oit.
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from above. The desired atmosphere was suggested by 
Dr. Harry Hopf:  ̂̂ ̂
Practically e%ery act of management requires 
for its consummation that cooperative relation­
ships be maintained between two or more persons 
. . . .The problem is to determine the best 
method of bringing about these relationships 
. . . .The existence of cooperation depends 
primarily upon the setting by top executives 
of an example which may be found worthy of 
emulation by other members of the organization.
The acid test of the existence of true coopera­
tion is the presence of a two-fold relationship 
of loyalty— loyalty to his superior on the part 
of the subordinate and loyalty to his subordinate 
on the part of the superior. If this relation 
of mutual confidence exists, the result, in 
practical terms, spells the finest type of 
cooperation.
According to Mary Parker Follett, this desired 
managerial attitude involves "participation” which is obtained 
in three ways
By an organization which provides for it, by 
a daily management which recognizes and acts 
on the principle of participation, and by a 
method of settling differences, or a method of 
dealing with the diverse contributions of 
men very different in temperament, training, 
and attainments.
One way of evaluating the Company's philosophy of 
decentralization is to analyze the separate contentions 
by one of the CDmpany's critics. Professor Edward M. Currie, 
University of Hawaii, who held a responsible position in 
the company during the Cordiner years. Currie says.
i^^Harry Arthur Hopf, "Business Management and the 
Scientific Point of View," The Engineering Journal (Canada), 
Vol. XX, (December, 1937) .
D. Metcalf and L. Urwick (eds.), Dynamia 
Administration: The Colleoted Papers of Mary Parker
Follett (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 213.
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GE's weakness lies not so much in the lack of 
insight as in its inability to implement. Its 
use of the integration concept encourages self- 
knowledge and te, m efforts. It clearly 
exposes the managerial attitude of participa­
tion in decision-making.^*^
He goes on to say, tliough, "The emphasis is clearly on 
the encouragement of self-development, but there is also 
an implied equating of judgment with appraisal, and a de­
emphasis on the manager's responsibility to develop 
subordinates."^*** Currie believes that when appraising 
a man you should not use judgment as it will hurt self­
development. Should not judgment be one of the methods 
for appraisal? To answer in the negative, as Currie 
does throughout his article on General Electric, assumes 
appraisal to be made solely on facts. But Drucker has 
noted only opinions give facts value.” * Currie's attack 
on General Electric's self-development program stems from 
his belief that judgment should not be used as part of 
the total appraisal of employees. For a man to self- 
develop he must be able to measure himself— which is part 
of the corporate philosophy. Most individuals want to 
know how his self-evaluation compares against the evalua­
tions of others, especially against those in power posi­
tions in relation to his own position. As part of the 
esteem need, people want to know that others respect them 
and appreciate them. Appraisal by a superior may fulfill 
this need. Appraisal by superiors will also help direct 
the activities of subordinates so that they fit the needs 
of the superior and team and thus allow the subordinate 
to work in areas which will enable him to be more productive
^**Currie, op. oit.j p. 16.
 ̂I'*.Ibid.
” *Drucker, The Effective Executive, op. cit.. 
Chapter 7.
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to the organization, and receive higher appraisals. Ray E.
Brown points out.
Criticism is hacd to take, but people do want 
to know where they stand. Nobody likes to 
play a game and not know the score. . . .If 
the administrator is to get improvement rather 
than antagonism, he must be able to demonstrate 
disapproval without demonstrating hostility, 
and to do this he must be able to reserve a 
sufficient margin of personal detachment to 
permit him to be emotionally casual in express­
ing disapproval.1**
People want to know how well they are doing as per­
ceived by others. Currie goes on to explain that General 
Electric did not have effective human relations when he 
was in the company because the company philosophy and the 
practice suggests that the following be common to corporate 
managerial actionz^^?
1. Achieve understanding, including using the 
"tell and sell" approach.
2. Lead by "suggestion and persuasion" rather 
than by participation.
3. Listen, rather than understand and accept.
4. Fit the man to the job rather than tailor 
jobs to fit man's needs.
5. Hamper the delegation of responsibility and 
accountability with a mandatory pattern of 
obedience "at all costs," requiring the 
manager to "accept the decision as though 
it were his own."
6. The insistence upon standards being set by 
higher echelons.
7. The reservation by upper management of the 
right to reject the planning results (e.g.,
a budget) of a decentralized component on the 
grounds that it is too low, or any other 
grounds.
^**Ray E . Brown, Judgment in Administration (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 65-66.
^Currie, op. oit.
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The second point made by Currie, leading by suggestion 
and persuasion rather than by participation, is contrary to 
the philosophy of the company. If managers did not practice 
participation, these managers would be acting counter to 
the philosophy. Participation and persuasion are both often 
mentioned as requirements for good leadership in General 
Electric teachings. Philosophy Book III in the company's 
Pvofeasional Management series plainly states, "LEADERSHIP 
by suggestion, persuasion and participation on the part 
of managers and supervisors and other professional employees, 
at all levels, (in General Electric) has truly supplanted 
command, domination, or coercion. The professional manager 
thus leads by the authority of knowledge, and not by the 
authority of rank or position."^^“
The degree to which this concept is increasingly 
being clarified is perhaps best emphasized by quoting a little 
footnote from the firm's chart, "The Work of a Professional 
Manager," which is used in General Electric to explain the 
thesis where the philosophy is not fully understood. The 
footnote says :  ̂̂ ®
It is recognized that there may be emer­
gency conditions where Persuasion has failed, 
and results of continued effort at Persuasion-- 
in the judgment of the Manager--would be worse 
than temporary use of "Command" to get on with 
the job. In so doing the Manager is acknow­
ledging temporary failure as a "Professional 
Manager“î and hence resorts to such course as 
an expedient only and takes requisite steps 
to identify and correct the root causes of 
the failure in order to prevent subsequent 
similar failures.
The fourth Currie point, fitting the man to the 
job, rather than tailoring jobs to fit man's needs, is
^^^Profeeaional Management in General Eleotrio 
Book Three. . ., op. oit.^ pp. 199-200.
i39"jhe Work of a Professional Manager" repro­
duced in numerous places such as in Profeaaional Management 
in General Eleotrio Book Three. . ., op. oit.
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absolutely a company belief, currie says, "If the candi­
date is not prepared to accept these conditions willingly 
and even enthusiastically, then he should seek another 
position more to his liking."^**® He sees this as a nega­
tive point, for he sees the issue as an either/or approach. 
General Electric sees the job, although dynamic, as more 
permanent than the incumbent.
Currie's fifth point is that there is a mandatory 
pattern of obedience requiring the manager to accept the 
decision as though it were his own end. The sixth point 
is the insistence upon standards being set by higher eche­
lons. These are parts of the philosophy of the organiza­
tion and are used to help goal setting by individuals.
Goals are set by mutual discussion between the subordinate 
and the superior, so that the individual goals will fit 
the organization objectives. Upper management does have 
veto power on budgets if these goals do not fit with the 
organization needs. It's not that the standards and 
goals are set by higher echelons, but that they are 
accepted or rejected at higher echelons. General Elec­
tric says:
If, after consideration, the manager decides 
to pursue a course different from that which 
was recommended and adequately explained, then 
the man should act in good spirit in accordance 
with his manager's decision. This attitude is 
necessary because, by making the decision, the 
manager has assumed the responsibility and the 
accountability for unity of action in his com­
ponent. Making the final decision is his obli­
gation and prerogative in accordance with his 
over-all accountability. In such cases the 
manager has an obligation to the man to explain 
the reasons for his decision, if at all feasi­
ble, and the man should accept the decision as
i*®Currie, op. oit.
^Profeaaional Management in General Electric 
Book Three.,. ., op. ait. ̂ p. 83.
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though it were his own. This last point is 
particularly true in subsequent work with those 
who report to him. Morale and working climate 
are damaged if a man passes "down the line" 
such a decision as an edict of his boss which 
he is required to promote against his own best 
judgment.
Currie interprets the above quotation as forcing 
a decision upon a subordinate, and he implies this is 
common practice. He notes, "Forcing a decision upon a 
subordinate is never productive of optimal results, except 
in the most extreme emergency circumstances. " ̂  ̂ Although 
his use of "never" is overdramatic, the basic statement 
is largely true, but the general practice of forcing 
decisions on lower personnel is not a proper interpreta­
tion of the above paragraph or any other part of the 
philosophy of General Electric. It is true that the 
philosophy is not advocating a "country club" atmosphere 
or fostering a popularity contest, but it is also true 
that the philosophy does not subscribe to the practice 
of having the employees "run off in all directions" at 
once.
Currie adds, "To further subject a man who has 
been so treated to the ritual of a performance appraisal 
by his manager, is to augment arbitrariness with abuse, 
and is contrary to good human r e l a t i o n s . I s  Currie 
advocating that a superior should not question, or 
appraise, nor remove from office any subordinate? Such 
a conclusion seems to be a misinterpretation of the con­
cepts of human relations. The appraisal system helps to 
develop the proper environment needed to foster good human 
relations. Part of the General Electric philosophy as 
previously quoted is "An individual who is not performing
^^^Currie, op. oit., p. 17, 
^'*^Ibid.
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up to expectations in a particular position should be told 
so frankly and kindly by his manager."̂ '*'* Currie condemns 
the corporation on this point, because he says, "A more 
effective method of dealing with incompetence is to dis­
cover it from the employee himself in the process of 
non-directive counselling."^'*^ It is the belief of Currie 
and a number of other human relations writers that employees 
will "face up" to their weak areas. There are others who 
believe that people may misinterpret their weak areas as 
"strengths"; such as when a person is considered stubborn 
by others, he may see himself as having a strong will.
Currie says that the General Electric philosophy either 
builds an organization of "yes men" or produces an environ­
ment where disagreement is stymied.^**® It should be 
remembered that Currie worked in the financial area for 
about a decade at General Electric. William Greenwood 
says this biased picture of General Electric could be 
expected of financial people, for he claims that the fin­
ancial organisation fought the philosophy and tried to 
operate as a highly independent, non-GE type function.
The financial organization was so tightly organized that 
"if you didn't fit their mold you were out of luck:", adds 
William J. Greenwood.
Up to the time of any decision, the philosophy 
encourages disagreement. After the decision is made by 
the manager, the corporate philosophy states, "The man 
should act in accordance with the decision, whether or not
^'*'*Profeasional Management in General Eleotrio 
Book Three. . op. oit., p. 59.
^‘^Currie, op. oit., p. 17.
^'*^Ibid., p. 18.
 ̂ ’interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien,
Connecticut, November 23, 1969.
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it agrees with his prior recommendation; because by making 
the decision, the manager has assumed the responsibility 
for establishing unity of action to achieve desired results 
— which is the prerogative and obligation of his p o s i t i o n / *  
Disagreements of men close to the situation at hand should 
be given a careful hearing and will often suggest higher 
quality decisions than those arrived at by the boss alone. 
Former Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, is 
quoted as saying, "There are no hard decisions, just 
insufficient facts. When you have the facts, the decisions 
come easy."^*** Currie says that with this type of philo­
sophy— that when you have the facts decisions come easy—  
"overlooks the importance of acceptance, which is required 
for elegance in decisions as much as qualitative analysis."^®" 
Here Currie is pointing out the need that once a decision 
is made the subordinates must act in accordance with the 
decision. General Electric says, "We are committed to 
competition as a way of life, and to the doctrine that 
one should be compensated in accordance with his accomplish­
m e n t s . C u r r i e  condemns General Electric here as he 
says, "Emphasis on competition often leads to absurd 
artificialities in the development of motivation. Competi­
tion can be both superfluous and destructive if the rules 
are not scrupulously just and the task to be done clearly 
d e f i n e d . I t  is difficult to agree with Currie as
^'^^Profeaeional Management in General Eleotrio 
Book Three, . op. oit.^ p. 180.
'̂*̂ The New York Times, January 31, 1954, as quoted 
in Profeaaional Management in General Eleotrio Book Three 
. . op. oit., p. 142.
^®°Currie, op. oit,, p. 18.
^^^Profeaaional Management in General Eleotrio 
Book Three, . ,, op. oit,, p. 84.
i/^Currie, op. oit.
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numerous authors have pointed out that competition is 
one of the strongest motivators.
Part of General Electric's managerial philosophy 
is that "the work of managing inherently involves exer­
cising judgment as a basis for making decisions. Judg­
ment, which is in essence appraisal, is in turn a function 
of the facts and information on which it is b a s e d . 3 
Currie says, "The General Electric approach overlooks 
the weaknesses of decisions by the managers which are 
based on fact, intuition, or judgment, and fails to 
emphasize the more important aspect of the desirability 
of obtaining group participation and workable decisions 
which result from such participation."^®'* Participation 
is the basis of the philosophy as has been previously 
noted. Currie ends his discourse on GE by stating that it 
is his "conviction that ineffective human relations repre­
sent a major weakness of the General Electric Company."^
It is interesting to note that while attacking the philo­
sophy of decentralization as opposed to centralization, 
Currie uses arguments which have no relationship to 
organization structuring.
In spite of the vigorous implementation of General 
Electric's procedures for the appraisal of performance 
during the early 1950's, Currie feels the program has 
"been notably ineffective" because it involved a "judg­
ment by superior."*®® He goes on to claim that"the use 
of judgment and the unavailability of standards in apprais­
ing renders the process virtually useless."*®? The company
^Profeaaional Management in General Eleotrio 
Book Three. . ., op. ait.j p. 110.
*®‘*Currie, op. oit.^ p. 19.
* ® ® T & t d .
p. 36.
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philosophy has been and is as taken directly from Peter 
Drucker:  ̂® ®
Appraisals must be based on performance.
Appraisal is judgment and judgment always 
requires a definite standard. To judge means to 
apply a set of values; and value judgments with­
out clear, sharp and public standards are 
irrational and arbitrary. They corrupt alike 
the judge and judged. No matter how "scientific," 
no matter even how many insights it produces, 
an appraisal that focuses on "potential," on 
"personality," on "promise"--on anything that 
is not proven and provable performance--is an 
abuse.
Currie continues to shed light on the reason for 
his negative attitude toward General Electric's appraisal 
program for he adds, "There is serious question as to the 
validity of appraisal techniques, per se (in any corpora­
t i o n ) . "*^9 He also claims the system is without standards. 
Being an accountant, Currie may be unaccustomed to 
handling "non-objective" standards or objectives. A 
standard can be and often is quite subjective. At General 
Electric the setting of objectives is the first step, then 
a budget is built to fit the objectives and lastly the 
budget is costed. So, at General Electric the accounting 
objectivity of costing is built on the subjective budget 
and the even more subjective objectives.
Currie has offered some criticism which may have 
some substance. Ke believes that a fear of being criti­
cized wells up in many individuals because of appraisal.^®®
^^^'Bvofeeeional Management in General Eleotrio 
Book Four^ The Work of a Functional Individual Contribua 
tor (New York; General Electric Company, 1959), pp. 189- 
190. This is taken from Drucker's The Fraotiae of 
Management^ op. ait., p. 150.
i®*Currie, op. oit., p. 37.
^^^Ibid., p. 39.
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Naturally, fear of criticism, and the resulting effort to 
conceal behavior which would elicit criticism, will usually 
frustrate the most well intentioned approach to performance 
appraisals. Fear, the traditional tool used in the moti­
vation of industrial workers has "largely disappeared in 
the modern West,"^®^ notes Drucker. People usually fear 
appraisal; if they have not done well they fear being 
found out; if they have done well, they fear misappraisal. 
However, Currie believes that, "It is not clear. . .that 
fear has disappeared from General Electric's motivation of 
management— for a system which emphasizes judgment of per­
formance in intangible areas introduces a very real element 
of f e a r . "1^2 People demand that a manager be competent 
in his assigned area, be it long-range planning, or handing 
out work to the secretarial pool. Currie, as many other 
accountants, would like to develop a number of accounting 
measures such as rate of return on investment, sales, and 
so forth, or sales against budget or production against 
budget, to be used to evaluate a manager. Most managers 
have jobs larger than can be quantitatively measured.
The desire to measure a manager against only the measure­
ments which can be quantitatively or tangibly set will 
reduce the manager to concentrate on only part of his job. 
The manager will concentrate on only the measured part of 
his job and thus the unmeasured will be left to catch as 
catch can. In order to see to it that the total job is 
performed, the manager must be measured on a number of 
intangible items, that is on the total job. As Drucker 
points out, "how we measure (and what we measure) deter­
mines what will be considered relevant, and determines 
thereby not just what we see, but what we. . .do. . .
^Drucker, The Praatiae of Management^ op. oit.^
264.
*®^Currie, op. cit., p. 39.
'̂’^Drucker, Technology, Management and Society,
op. ctt., p. 145
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On balance, Currie does not, himself, seem to have 
established a sufficient case for his assertion that GE 
did not have effective human relations. But, Norman Maier 
has conducted some pertinent research which offers evidence 
that appraisal interviewing (which General Electric did 
before the new philosophy and is now only one part of the 
new program) and motivating behavior are in conflict.
Maier found that an appraiser is almost certain to be led 
into a behavior pattern which leads to some deteriorating 
of human relations. His studies indicate that objectives, 
methods, and skills are interrelated to an extent which 
precludes analysis of any one aspect separately. Maier 
suggests that the appraisal interview be replaced by 
an interview concerned with employee development. If 
ratings are required for other purposes, he contends that 
they should be delayed until after the interview and that 
less emphasis be placed on the fault-finding technique.^®**
During the 1960's General Electric made extensive 
progress in this area as suggested by Maier. A small 
group known as Behavioral Research Service became respon­
sible for company leadership in this area. Experiments 
conducted within the company by Dr. Herbert H. Meyer^®® 
helped to formulate a new method of appraisal reviews.
Meyer studied the traditional annual performance apprai­
sal method by testing it against a new method referred 
to as Work Planning and Review (W P and R). Studies had 
been made and are currently being conducted on how much 
and what kinds of employee participation would be most 
useful, and under what conditions. That is, what type 
and how much "participative" management is needed.
*®‘*As reported in Currie, op. ait. j pp. 41-42.
^®®Dr. Meyer is a Consultant in Behavioral 
Research Service, General Electric Company.
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Meyer worked with Dr. Emanuel Kay, a Research Specialist in 
General Electric's Behavioral Research Service, and Dr. John 
R. P. French, Jr., Program Director at the Research Center 
for Group Dynamics Institute for Social Research (Univer­
sity of Michigan). They were able to develop the following 
conclusions :  ̂® ®
1. Criticism has a negative effect on achieve­
ment ("The subordinate reacted defensively 
about 54% of the time when criticized.").
2. Praise has little effect one way or the other 
("Evidence we gathered indicated clearly 
that praise tended to have no effect, per­
haps because it was regarded as the sandwich 
which surrounded the raw meat of criticism.").
3. A tendency for a subordinate to over-rate 
his own performance ("only two of the ninety- 
two participants estimated their performance 
to be below the average point on the scale.") 
was reduced by the appraisal process (over 
80% of the participants saw their manager's 
evaluation as being less favorable than self 
estimates.").
4. Performance improves most when specific 
goals are established ("the average percent 
accomplishment estimate for those perform­
ance items that did get translated into 
goals was 65, while the percent accomplish­
ment goals estimate for those items that 
did not get translated into goals was about 
27 J ") .
5. Critical appraisal produces inferior per­
formance ("improvement in the most-criticized 
aspects of performance was considerably less 
than improvements realized in other areas.") .
6. Participation by the employee in the goal- 
setting procedure helps produce favorable 
results, providing the employee normally 
worked under high participative levels.
^®®Herbert H. Meyer, Emanuel Kay, and John R. p. 
French, Jr., "Split Roles in Performance Appraisal," 
Harvard Busineea Review^ Vol. 43, No. 1 (January-February, 
1965), pp. 123-29.
297
7. Separate appraisals should be held for 
different purposes ("it is unrealistic 
to expect a single performance appraisal 
program to achieve every conceivable need.
It seems foolish to have a manager serving 
in the self-conflicting role as a counselor 
helping a man to improve his performance 
when at the same time, he is presiding as 
a judge over the same employee's salary 
action case.").
The company's experience with the "W P and R"
approach suggests that Work Planning and Review:^̂ 7
. . .are strictly man-to-man in character, 
rather than having a father-and-son flavor, as 
did so many of the traditional performance 
appraisals. This seems to be due to the fact 
that it is much more natural under the W P & R 
program for the subordinate to take the initia­
tive when performance on past goals is being 
reviewed. Thus, in listening to the subordi­
nate's review of performance, problems, and 
failings, the manager is automatically cast in 
the role of oounsetor. This role for the mana­
ger, in turn, results naturally in a problem­
solving discussion.
In the traditional performance appraisal 
interview, on the other hand, the manager is auto­
matically cast in the role of Qudge. The sub­
ordinate's natural reaction is to assume a 
defensive posture, and thus all the necessary 
ingredients for an argument are present. . . .
In general, the W P & R approach appears to 
be a better way of defining what is expected 
of an individual and how he is doing on the 
job. Whereas the traditional performance 
appraisal often results in resistance to the 
manager's attempts to help the subordinate, the 
W P s R approach brings about acceptance of 
such attempts.
Because of the research by Meyer, Kay and French 
in 1960-1966, General Electric has changed the method of 
performance appraisal. The twin objectives of the per­
formance appraisal program— (1) letting a man know where
1 6 7Ibid.
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he stands via ratings and salary action, and (2) motivating 
him to improve— were not being achieved by the methods 
used in General Electric. The results of the research 
"showed that attempts to achieve the first objective 
frequently produce threat and defensiveness and these 
reactions, in turn, interfere with the achievement of the 
second objective," notes the company report.^®® In the 
study it was found by accident that, contrary to corporate 
policy, managers generally did not hold performance 
appraisals unless pressured into having them. In the 
traditional company method of appraisal, the performance 
was evaluated and goals were set. Meyer notes, "Perform­
ance appraisal is authoritarian. There is no doubt who 
is boss and who is s u b o r d i n a t e . H e  also noted that 
the appraisal is highly emotional and managers find it 
hard to discuss negative performance. It was found that 
frequently a manager would admit to a third party that 
he considered a particular employee as poor and desired to 
eliminate him, yet this would not be transmitted to the 
particular employee. The manager’s appraisal interview 
often communicated just the opposite of those feelings.
Two years of research showed that employees were more sure 
of where they stood before having the appraisal interview 
than they were after the interview. In other words, the 
interview tended to confuse rather than clarify. Research 
also found that employees not having the interview, which 
was contrary to company policy but nonetheless common, 
desired to have an appraisal interview. Also found was
E. Kay, J. R. P. French, Jr., and H. H. Meyer, 
"A Study of the Performance Appraisal Interview," (New 
York; Management Development and Employee Relations 
Services, General Electric Company, March, 1962), p. 3 5 .
i®*Interview with Herbert H. Meyer, Darien,Connecticut, August 25, 1970.
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the fact that rarely was specific improvement discernable 
as a result of the interview.^Thus, the research 
concludes
A merit-pay type of salary plan makes some 
variety of summary judgment or rating of per­
formance necessary, or at least desirable;
but this rating should not be expected to
serve also as a primary medium for changing 
performance. Quite separate from this rating 
activity, the manager can use goal planning 
discussions, special assignments, and other 
techniques to achieve improved performance on 
the part of subordinates.
Since 1966 the company has tried to use two or 
more interviews for performance appraisal. The first 
would be the discussion of past performance and the results 
of this interview were used mainly for salary and rating
needs. According to Meyer, this interview must be kept
to a very short and not very comprehensive discussion.
The other interviews are to deal with the future rather 
than the past. The function of the future-oriented inter­
views is to motivate the employee by mutually setting 
short-term measurable targets or objectives. Meyer, French, 
and Kay believe that three months usually is a long enough 
time span for such targets. The study found, says Dr.
Meyer, "only in those areas with specific targets were 
changes in performance observable and the more specific 
an objective the b e t t e r , T h e y  also believe that 
projects form better goals than day-to-day work. For 
instance, in a performance interview with a secretary it
1'"interview with Herbert H. Meyer, Darien,
Connecticut, August 25, 1970.
*'^Kay, French, Meyer 
Appraisal Interview," op. oit. ̂ p. 35.
^'^Interview with Her
Connecticut, August 25, 1970.
, "A Study of the Performance 
1
* bert H. Meyer, Darien,
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would be better to place a three-month goal to reorganize 
the files than to plan to have better daily typing.
The most constructive finding of the study was 
the fact that work planning and goal setting and sub­
sequent review of progress discussions between managers 
and their subordinates, which focused on specific short­
term plans and goals, yielded much greater returns in 
improved job performance than did appraisal discussions.^̂  ̂
Since 1966, the company has tried to implement the goal 
setting interview separate from the salary appraisal review 
discussions. Periodic reviews of progress in achieving 
goals are used to provide a natural opportunity for mutual 
problem solving and hopefully a less threatening atmosphere 
than was characteristic of the salary review.
Because of the work by Meyer and his team, and 
by other behavioral scientists during the 1950's and 
'60's. General Electric made changes in the way work 
was assigned, accepted, and measured. The work planning 
and review process consists of periodic, informal meet­
ings between a man and his manager. There still are 
a few formal ratings, but the emphasis is placed on an 
attempt to get together informally to match evaluations 
and expectations in less quantitative terms. The process 
centers on helping a man observe and measure himself in 
terms of how well he is meeting his goals and deadlines.
The review with the manager is then just confirmation of 
his own evaluation of his own performance.
Three basic assumptions underlie the review 
process in General Electric: (1) an employee needs to
know what is expected of him; (2) an employee needs to
Comparison of a Work Planning Program 
with the Annual Performance Appraisal Interview Approach," 
(Crotonville, N.Y.: Management Development and Employee
Relations Services, General Electric Company), p. 2.
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know how he is doing? (3) an employee needs to be 
able to obtain assistance when it is necessary.
The third assumption requires a climate which will encour­
age the individual to ask for assistance when necessary.
One General Electric study brought out that 
failures in any one of these assumptions were the causes 
for unfavorable attitudes held by highly valued engineers 
who later quit their jobs.̂ ''®
Although the work of Meyer and his associates 
shows great promise, it has not convinced all authorita­
tive behaviorists. Rensis Likért claimed, as recently 
as 1970, that General Electric departmental level prac­
tices his System I Management.*^® This generalization 
was made without qualification. He said that the stated 
philosophy of the firm is his System IV. In summary, 
from Likert's well-known book. New Patterns of Management^ 
System I is a task-oriented, highly structured exploitive 
authoritarian management style, while System IV is a 
relationships-oriented or participative management style 
based on teamwork, mutual trust, and confidence.
Systems II and III, benevolent authoritarian and consulta­
tive, are intermediate stages. The two extremes. Systems 
I and IV, approximate closely the managerial styles 
described by McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y assumptions, 
according to Hersey and Blanchard.*’®
*'^Hugh Estes, "The Ethics of Applied Behavioral 
Science," Speech, Cornell University Conference, New 
York City,, April 8, 1964.
*’®Interview with Dr. Rensis Likert, Director, 
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 9, 1970.
*’’Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management 
(New York; McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1961), Chapter 14.
*’®Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, 
Management of Organizational Behavior (Englewood cliffs, 
N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 54.
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Upon further probing, Likert was unable to present 
adequate research to substantiate his claim. He was 
able to note only two points in support of his statement. 
First, he said that General Electric in 1958 fired sixty 
managers for not making six percent return on investment. 
Second, he noted a study, undated, he had heard about 
covering three hundred or four hundred General Electric 
engineers who were divided into four quartiles. The 
quartiles were arranged by subjective evaluation of their 
potential in the company's future. Likert said that half 
of all the engineers left the firm, and almost all of 
these engineers came from the quartile having the highest 
potential in the company's future. Again, no source, 
other than rumor, substantiates the evidence. Thus,
Likert concluded that General Electric was not practic­
ing System IV Management, but was practicing System I 
below the departmental level.
The department level is the profit center. As 
to it being autocratic in management practice, this could 
be the case at any point in time. If so, it would be 
contrary to the basic philosophy of the company, but it 
would not be impossible to conceive this to be the case. 
Leadership style is an individual attribute. Frequently, 
those who are autocratic don't even know they are 
since at the same time they are teaching democratic leader­
ship or leadership by persuasion. With about two hundred 
department general managers it is conceivable that a 
number of them could be autocratic, just as it is 
possible to assume some are democratic. But to make a 
generalisation that the department managers in General 
Electric were practicing System I Management based on 
only the two cited studies may be overgeneralizing.
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The belief that the departments are headed by 
autocratic managers is not substantiated by other managers 
who have worked for General Electric. Realistically, 
they do admit that some managers were and are autocratic, 
but these are in the minority and frequently do not last 
long.^Investigating the point that sixty managers 
were fired for not getting six percent return on invest­
ment, this point was denied by Greenwood.^®® He says,
"I don't believe it. That many might have been fired, 
but certainly not for that r e a s o n . G r e e n w o o d  does 
not deny the point made about three hundred engineers.
He says he has never heard of the study. "Of those 
employees in high level positions, the firm usually lost 
many whom it wanted to keep because they were the more 
aggressive ones,"^®^ he says. Thus, it is admitted that 
those lost to the firm frequently are those most wanted 
by the company. Greenwood, who has spent about eight 
years in personnel with the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 
says that most employees who quit on their own volition 
are usually persons of high quality, while employees of 
low or marginal quality are forced to resign or are 
fired. Greenwood goes on to assert that General Electric 
has a vast pool of capable people,that the quality of 
professional people remains very high since the weaker 
ones are continuously removed from employment and the
^^®Interviews with Harold F. Smiddy, Honolulu, 
October 1, 1970; Paul E. Mills, Glen Ridge, N.J., August 7, 
1969; William J. Greenwood, Darien, Connecticut, January 5, 
1970; Hugh Estes, Manager, Organization Planning, General 
Electric Company, New York, July 30, 1969.
^““interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, April 10, 1970.
^Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, April 10, 1970.
i*^Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien,
Connecticut, April 10, 1970.
304
strong ones compete against each other for the top posi­
tions .193
Donald R. Webb agrees with the sentiments of a 
number of other people in claiming that General Electric 
before reorganization was a company practicing good human 
relations. He said: ̂ 9*̂
There used to be a widespread belief that 
General Electric was a Company with a con­
science. There seemed to be a spirit pervading 
the Company--never expressly stated--which above 
all respected the dignity of human beings and 
which derived its basic policies, written or 
not written, from a higher order of principles.
It is difficult to say where this spirit ori­
ginated, but unquestionably it was a reflection 
of the high moral standards of its leaders.
Undoubtedly, it was cemented together and 
communicated throughout the Company by the 
pep talks of the Company leaders at Associa­
tion Island camps.
As some people have classified the business climates 
in various companies and in various industries. General 
Electric was characterized by a general climate of "human 
warmth"— by a "soft" management. It is recognized that 
the climate varied in different parts of the company.
For example, if the old Apparatus Departments were charac­
terized by a "soft" management. Electronics was, by 
contrast, "hard." These variations were a reflection both 
of the differences in competition and maturity of the 
industries in which the various parts of the company com­
peted, as well as a reflection of the personalities of 
the leaders in the different parts of the c o m p a n y . 9̂5
9̂ 3interview with william J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, April 10, 1970.
9̂**webb, op. oit. i p. 10.
'95These claims are documented from Webb, Ibid. ̂ 
and interviews with Paul Mills, Glen Ridge, New Jersey, 
August 7, 1969; and William J. Greenwood, Darien, Connecti­
cut, April 10, 1970; and George Chamberlin, Vice President 
and Controller, Scott Paper Company, Philadelphia,
June 30, 1970, all former employees of the General Elec­
tric Company.
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The new organization and management philosophy 
that accompanied decentralization gave "scientific" 
legitimacy to much of this character. "Man-to-man 
discussions" were begun and were a part of the philosophy 
of the new salary plan. This is one excellent example 
of the action required by the new philosophy working in 
the direction of full recognition of the dignity of the 
human being and the desire to practice good human relations 
as understood in 1951 and the years following. Even some 
of the practices which appear on the surface to be "cold" 
are upon careful analysis practices which would further 
the "human warmth" of the managerial climate. For example, 
the philosophy made obsolete the practice of "kicking a 
man upstairs" which was actually much more harmful to him 
and to those around him than the frankness required by 
the new philosophy.
Conclusion
Although this chapter has not covered a wide 
variety of subjects, it is hoped that some light has 
been shed upon the type of organization which is General 
Electric. The sweeping organization changes of the early 
1950's produced shocks felt strongly until about 1960, 
then the firm experienced new shocks caused by managerial 
errors in forecasting. General Electric management thought 
of decentralizing as far back as the 1930's. Former 
President Charles E. Wilson relates, "My own design and 
desire, as early as 1930, was decentralization but by the 
time I became President in 1940 we were on the verge of a 
world war. . . .When I returned from my duties with the 
War Production Board in late 1944 I had full realization 
of the tremendous changes the war had brought about and 
spent my remaining years as President capitalizing on my
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belief in the potentials. . . .By 1949 I knew we finally 
had to decentralize, and hence, the efforts of Mr. 
Cordiner. . . These past two chapters have offered
a history of the organization changes, the philosophy 
behind the moves, and, hopefully, some flavor of the 
organization.
i**Letter from Charles E. Wilson, retired 
President, General Electric Company, dated April 14, 1970.
CHAPTER V
PRICE FIXING
One of the most frequently heard criticisms of 
decentralization in General Electric is based on the 
price fixing scandal. Therefore, it is important to 
deal with this widely publicized subject. A number of 
articles and books have been written on the price 
fixing scandal of 1960. Implied by some and stated by 
others is that decentralization was to blame for much of 
the loss of control by management leading to the company's 
price fixing mess.^ Cordiner denied under oath any con­
nection between price fixing and decentralization.^ It 
should be noted that the government investigation seemed 
to bring out the point that General Electric was involved 
in more anti-trust action before 1950 than after, that 
is, before decentralization. In 1946, General Electric's 
President, Charles E. Wilson, issued instructions in 
compliance with anti-trust laws. The directive was known 
as Company Policy 2.35, and these instructions were 
reissued in 1948 and 1950. The instructions stated that
^"Electric's New General," Time^ Vol. 82, No. 16 
(October 18, 1963), p. 106. Also, John Herling, The Great 
Price Conspiracy (Washington: Robert B. Luce, Inc.,
1962), p. 278.
Û. S. Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Price Fix­
ing and Bid Rigging in the Electrical Manufacturing Industry^ 




It has been and is the policy of this 
Company to conform strictly to the anti­
trust laws. . .special care should be taken 
that any proposed action.is in conformity 
with the law as presently interpreted. If 
there is any doubt as to the legality of any 
proposed action. . the advice of the Law 
Department must be obtained.^
In 1950, Ralph Cordiner's "new philosophy of decentralized 
management specifically prohibited meeting with competitors 
on prices, bids, or market shares,"** says one critic, Richard 
Austin Smith. Under Cordiner, Wilson's instructions on 
compliance with anti-trust laws remained very much in force 
and were known as General Company Policy 20.5 which is 
reprinted in full in Appendix Exhibit 4-1. Cordiner reis­
sued his 1950 Policy 20.5 in 1954, 1958, 1959, and a number 
of times after the 1960 price fixing cases broke.
Many people point to the fact that if Cordiner had 
to keep reissuing the 20.5 directive, then it follows that 
Cordiner must have known of violations. Senator Kefauver, 
as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Anti-trust and 
Monopoly in 1961, asked, "Why was it necessary for GE to 
keep reissuing '20.5'? Once issued, why was it not con­
sidered binding Company policy until revoked?"® Kefauver 
did not direct these questions to any individual but used 
them as a method of pointing suspicion toward top manage­
ment at General Electric, especially Cordiner. In answer 
to these questions, which General Electric did not attempt 
to do, it can be noted that all company policy is issued 
with an issuing date and must be reviewed and reissued after 
a predetermined length of time. Some policies run for
^Richard Austin Smith, "The Incredible Electrical 
Conspiracy, Part I," Fortune^ Vol. 63, No. 4 (April, 1961), 
p. 135.
®U. s. Senate, Committee on Judiciary, op. ait.j 
p. 16510.
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three or four years before review; others must be reviewed 
earlier, depending on their nature, but the next review 
date is always listed on the policy at the time of issuance.® 
It should also be noted that this particular policy required 
that the signature of managers be placed on the policy as 
evidence of having read and understood it.^
Collusion did occur under the Wilson directive, 
and again under the Cordiner 20.5 policy. Fortune maga­
zine quoted one General Electric employee, but refused to 
name him, as saying, "Sure, collusion was illegal. . .but 
it wasn't unethical. It wasn't any more unethical than 
if the companies had summit conferences the way Russia 
and the West meet. Those competitors' meetings were 
just attended by a group of distressed individuals who 
wanted to know where they were going."® General Electric 
was convicted of anti-trust violation in 1944 and, because 
of this. General Electric lawyers put everyone on notice 
that it was certainly illegal to discuss prices with com­
petitors. After Wilson's anti-trust admonition, the 
General Electric representatives kept out of formal meet­
ings with competitors, but Fortune magazine says that 
Clarence Burke, a manager in the Pittsfield, Massachusetts 
plant, admitted that competitors kept the Pittsfield 
group informed by telephone of their own price agreements. 
Then, "Word came down to start contacting competitors 
again," Burke remembers. "It came to me from my superior.
®It may be noted that the version of Directive 
Policy 20.5, reproduced in the Appendix, was issued 
June 8, 1954, superseding the issue dated January 4, 1963 
(eighteen months earlier); the Procedure issued on 
September 29, 1965, supersedes previous communications 
dated May 13, 1964, April 23, 1964, and January 4, 1963, 
and is itself to be reviewed by August 1, 1966 (thirteen 
months hence) .
^Interview with Philip D. Reed, New York, August 4,
1970.
®Smith, ov. ait., o. 135.
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'Buster' Brown, but my impression was that it came to him 
from higher up. I think the competitive situation was 
forcing them to do something, and there were lots of old- 
timers who thought collusion was the best way to solve the 
problem."* Men like Burke ran the conspiracy. Some 650 
million dollars in sales was involved, according to Justice 
Department estimates, from 1951 through 1958. The object 
of the conspiracy was to rotate business on a fixed per­
centage among four companies with General Electric getting 
45 percent of the market, Westinghouse 35 percent, Allis 
Chalmers 10 percent, and Federal Pacific 10 percent.
Meetings were held every few weeks to determine new moves.  ̂°
Robert Paxton, who became President of General 
Electric just before the case broke, quickly resigned 
because of "health reasons." Cordiner was recalled to the 
Presidency and to ride out the storm. Paxton was a very 
close friend of Ray Smith, a Vice President who was later 
convicted of conspiracy. Judge Ganey, who tried the cases 
in Philadelphia Federal Court, said that, "I am not naive 
enough to believe General Electric didn't know about it 
and it didn't meet with their hearty approbation.
Without doubt, there was a serious management failure at 
General Electric.
It seems that the executive office had not detected 
the cartels for over a decade, while it was an open secret 
to the rest of the industry, claims Richard Austin Smith.
It turned out that General Electric was involved in nine­




 ̂̂ Ibid, j p. 180.
^^Richard Austin Smith, "The Incredible Electrical 
Company, Part II," Fortune, Vol. 63, No. 5 (May, 1961), 
p. 164.
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On February 16 and 11, 1961, the Federal Court 
in Philadelphia handed down seven indictments. Forty 
companies and eighteen individuals were charged with price 
fixing or dividing the market. General Electric pleaded 
"guilty" to all the major indictments against it and the 
other major companies did likewise.
It is plausible to think that Cordiner, as Chief 
Executive, a man of great experience served by large staffs 
and service organizations, could actually believe that major 
divisions within the General Electric Company were waging 
aggressive campaigns in a competitive market, while, in 
fact, they were meeting with competition to fix prices 
as members of a cartel. The United States Anti-trust 
Division spent over four years seeking to disprove this 
concept without success.Cordiner twice, in the Fall of 
1960, and in the Spring of 1961, asked both internal 
counsel and an outside counsel to examine Ralph Cordiner, 
himself, and report to the Board of Directors. It has 
been implied that the reports cleared Cordiner, although 
these reports have not been released.Clarence Burke, 
General Manager of Switchgear, and one of the few managers 
who pleaded guilty to price fixing, claimed, "Cordiner was 
sincere but undersold by people beneath him who rescinded 
his orders."  ̂® Not only did Cordiner deny the charge that 
he knew of and condoned the price fixing, but he denied, 
claims John Herling, "that his lack of knowledge proved 
him derelict in his duties."^® John Fuller writes in his
^^Peter F. Drucker, "Big Business and the National 
Purpose," Harvard Bueineae Review^ Vol. 40, No. 2 (March- 
April, 1962) , p. 55.
^‘Herling, op. oit., p. 273.
^®Richard Austin Smith, "The Incredible Electrical 
Conspiracy, Part I," op. oit,̂  p. 176.
, p. 266.
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book. The Gentlemen Conapiratovej that
If Cordiner's position is sincere, it stands 
as a gargantuan monument to flagrant derelic­
tion of duty during the years 1951 to 1959 
when all the hidden ball plays were being quarter- 
backed by the highest echelons immediately 
under his jurisdiction. Direct, probative 
evidence is practically non-existent as far 
as Cordiner is concerned.
Fuller did not explain why he chose to use the word "practi­
cally" in the above quote. It implies that some evidence 
has been found against Cordiner. Neither Fuller nor any 
other author has brought such evidence to light. The 
1960 Annual Report issued in February of 1961 says:^®
The Company's management strongly believes 
it was diligent and under the circumstances 
would not reasonably have discovered sooner 
than it did the deliberately secretive activi­
ties in question.
Theodore K. Quinn said, "They would have us believe 
that a man can be in a top executive position for twenty 
years, working in an atmosphere of continuing illegality 
and never know of it. This may sound absurd, but it's 
exactly what they t e s t i f i e d . I t  has been charged that 
even if Cordiner did not know of the situation, he should 
have known. Yet, there is a vast difference between "should 
have known" and "having the ability to know." "People 
familiar with large organizations— executives, administra­
tors, consultants— have known all along," says Drucker,
"that keeping top management informed is the most elusive 
administrative problem of the big organization (and not of
i^john G. Fuller, The Gentlemen Conapiratora (New 
York: Grove Press, 1962), p. 52.
^^General Eleotvio Company 1960 Annual Report,
p. 22.
i*Theodore K. Quinn, Unoonaoioua Publia Enemiea 
(New York: The Citadel Press, 1962), pp. 24-25.
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the business enterprise alone) Perhaps because of this
reason it was implied by Cordiner and Cresap (President 
of Westinghouse) that the higher one goes in a company, the 
less they know about what is going wrong.
For information to be usable by top management, 
it is abstracted and formalized, much of the substantive 
meaning is lost. Often what is reported are the exceptions 
from what is expected. Paul Mills, retired Manager at 
General Electric, calls this "managing by patterns"; 
others have called it "managing by exception." Mills 
says, "you may have a pattern which could run you to 
bankruptcy."2 1 Drucker says.
The GE-Westinghouse debacle supports a hunch 
of many experienced executives: formal methods
of information, such as reports, audits, studies, 
and business reviews, are not enough. They have 
to be supplemented by systematic, though informed 
face-to-face contacts. Top management needs to 
get the "feel," as well as the "facts. ^
It should be remembered that Cordiner was called 
the "undertaker" by those below him. This was in refer­
ence to both his personality and his reorganization of 
the company which shortened many careers. Richard Austin 
Smith, author of Fortune 'a two articles on the Electrical 
conspiracy, claims ;  ̂̂
Cordiner has been criticized within the 
company, and rightly so, for sitting aloofly 
in New York and sending out "pieces of paper"
--his 20.5 anti-trust directive--rather than 
having 20.5 personally handed to the local 
staff by the local boss. But this was also 
a failure in human relations. A warmer man
2°Drucker, "Big Business. . .," op. oit.j p. 55.
2^Interview with Paul E. Mills, Glen Ridge, N.J., 
August 7, 1969.
22ürucker, "Big Business. . .," op. oit.^ p. 56.
2 3smith, "The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, 
Part I," op. oit. i p. 176.
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might have been close enough to his people to 
define what was going on. According to T. K.
Quinn. . .Ralph Cordiner was "First class in 
every aspect of management except human 
relations."
After the scandal broke, but before the General 
Electric stockholders meeting in April of 1961, Henry 
Ford II, a Director of General Electric, made the follow­
ing statement which seems to be directed toward the com­
pany's top management, and is evidence of unhappiness 
with Cordiner and his "I did not know, I am innocent of 
any wrong doing or mismanagement" attitude. Ford said:̂ **
At the very least, top operating executives 
are responsible for establishing strong and 
explicit policies concerning the conduct 
of employees under the law and in conformance 
with high ethical standards. These executives 
are also responsible for communicating these 
policies to their employees and making sure 
they are understood. . . .This is not a simple
or routine matter. It must be carried out with 
the utmost thoroughness and intensity. Employees 
at all levels must be made to feel in their bones 
that their company's codes and policies mean 
exactly what they purport to mean.
Ford went on to lay partial blame on the Directors 
of the anti-trust violating company, especially the out­
side Directors (at this time Cordiner was the only inside 
Director). Ford, noting the trustee function of Direc­
tors, said:^s
I believe these recent happening should alert 
outside Directors to the need to be aware of 
the pertinent codes and policies of the com­
panies on whose board they sit. Normally, the 
outside Director has only a broad picture of the 
business and cannot be completely familiar with 
the day-to-day operating details. But, when 
serious improprieties occur, all companies, 
whole industries and individuals, whether legally
^‘'Herling, op. ait.y p. 203.
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responsible or not, suffer the consequences 
of an inflamed and properly outraged public 
opinion.
General Electric has traveling auditors who have 
a number of functions, one of which is to discover fraud.
It can be asked why these auditors didn't detect the anti­
trust violations, and/or catch the violators, In answer 
to this question, one General Electric manager said.
It would be very difficult for the auditors 
to catch it. They are charged with the dis­
covery of fraud; there is no question about 
that. Evidently, it was kept so secret and 
so close to the vest by such few people, I 
really believe it was held by a very few 
people in GE for it seemed to be only prac­
ticed by the holder of a certain position 
and his replacements, that the auditing staff 
couldn't have any way of catching that secret.
I don't see how they could have caught it.^®
Edward Currie, who was an auditor in the Switchgear Division
at the time of the conspiracies, wrote, "Because of the
method used to meet with competitors, there was and is no
way to catch such violations by looking at the records.
William Ginn, Vice President of General Electric, 
was the highest level executive in the firm to admit to 
the knowledge of price fixing. Ginn, as a leader in price 
fixing, called the few who knew about it "The Club."
He said he didn't talk freely about it, "only to the people 
in the club."^* Ginn went on to add that the "club" was 
fairly large, and as he said, "The club grew to beat hell 
after decentralization.He claimed that "the club 
was confined only to three d i v i s i o n s . H o w  far back was 
price fixing a common practice? Ginn knew of it in the 
mid-thirties.Ray Smith, GE Vice President and one-time
^®lnterview with William J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, April 10, 1970.
^^Interview with Edward M. Currie, Assistant Pro­
fessor of Accounting, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, May 5, 1970.
^®Herling, op. oit., p. 246. p. 247.
sOfbtd. 'iJbtd., p. 246.
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traveling auditor, said.
To my knowledge, during the entire period 
from 1940 through 1956, it was common practice 
in both of these areas (transformers and switch- 
gears) to discuss prices and other competitive 
matters with competitors.^^
Another General Electric manager convicted of 
price fixing was Marc deFerranti who worked for much of 
his General Electric tenure in the Services side of the 
business, and at one time in charge of the Crotonville 
School. He was transferred into operations only about 
four months before the conspiracy broke. deFerranti had 
never gone to a price fixing meeting. He said that he 
was invited to such a meeting after being there a couple 
of months, but declined because it was contrary to the 
corporate policy. deFerranti says, "I was told that this 
is the way things have been done. It goes back to the 
time of 'Buster' Brown in the twenties. I again pleaded 
that it was still wrong, but my division head (William 
Ginn, Vice President) to whom I reported, said, 'Well, 
you have to make up your mind— do you want this job or 
don't y o u ? ' 3 Having knowledge of the illegal practice, 
deFerranti sat for about two months wondering what to do. 
He was debating as to whether he should go to Cordiner 
or not, because that meant he'd have to go over two levels 
(Ginn and Arthur Vinson, Group Vice President). Not 
knowing the attitude of the Chairman of the Board, it was 
a most difficult position in which to find oneself.
Shortly after the conspiracy became public, 
deFerranti and the others were offered the right to 
resign. In fact, if resignation was not given, they would 
have been fired. So it was tantamount to being fired.
®^Smith, "The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, 
Part I," op. oit.y p. 178.
**As reported by William Greenwood, interview, 
April 10, 1970, who spoke with deFerranti just after 
deFerranti met with Cordiner in September, 1959.
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Most of these men who were let go had spent many years 
with the firm and were of high caliber executive material. 
Cordiner felt that they must be removed as they had broken 
the law and corporate policy. The other companies in the 
case did not fire their men. Cordiner delegated the res­
ponsibility of finding these executives new job— for they 
were top executives with talent, they had given many years 
to the firm, and they were broken men, but they wanted to 
have a chance elsewhere. William Greenwood was given the 
responsibility to help place these men. William Ginn 
became President of the Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation 
which had $120 million sales in 1960.̂ ** Lewis Burger was 
placed with LeTourneau Westinghouse, a subsidiary of 
Westinghouse Air Brake Company (not related to Westing­
house Electric), and he is now President of that company. 
Clarence Burke and Frank Stehlik became executives at 
Philco; one conspirator became the Executive Vice President 
of Stanley Works, another the Executive Vice President 
of Yale and Towne, while deFerranti beccime President of 
the European subsidiary of the International Telephone 
and Telegraph Company.
The legal function of General Electric came under 
much criticism after the electrical industry price conspir­
acy broke in late 1960. Legal Services had been set up 
very much like the financial system. Paul Mills, who worked 
with or for the financial, legal, and engineering functions 
for much of his thirty-odd years with the firm, says 
that with respect to operating department legal appoint­
ments, the general counsel had veto right and, in reality, 
made appointments.®® The legal organization was not as
®^Interview with Lemuel R. Boulware, New York,
September 9, 1970.
® ®Intervie
Jersey, August 7, 1969.
w with Paul E. Mills, Glen Ridge, New
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closely united and not as strong as the financial side, 
but nevertheless the fraternalism inherent in profes­
sional fields gave General Services Counsel unusual strength 
in setting policy for legal managers found in the opera­
ting departments. Thus, it was a matter of persuading 
people, who most likely were already thinking along the 
same lines. The decentralized philosophy, where Services 
have only the authority of knowledge and may only try to 
persuade, was therefore not working well within the legal 
function. But, until the price fixing case, nobody 
seemed to mind.^® By 1961, the question, yet unanswered, 
was if the operating men were so closely controlled by 
Services, and if Services was auditing work of its line 
counterparts, how could the lawyers be ignorant of the 
conspiracy? It is generally felt, by one high ranking 
General Electric executive, that the General Counsel did 
not know of the price conspiracy until the case broke.
Legal Counsel was totally unprepared for that eventful 
September shock in 1960.^' The price fixing scandal 
represented a general breakdown of the corporate control 
function.
The price fixing conspiracy is evidence of impro­
per business ethics and, if Company Policy 20.5 at 
General Electric was intended to be enforced, loss of 
managerial control at one or more of the corporate levels. 
General Electric and the Philadelphia court were not 
able to fully determine where control was lost and by 
whom, although a number of managers were fined and "asked" 
to resign.*® Blaming decentralization for this loss of
*’’interview with George L. Chamberlin, former Organi­
zation Consultant, General Electric Company; presently 
Vice President and Controller, Scott Paper Company, Phila­
delphia, June 30, 1970.
*®Fuller, op. oit.j p. 203.
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managerial control does not seem warranted in light of 
the fact that government evidence indicates that price 
fixing was practiced more before 1950 than after that 
date.
The importance of the price fixing scandal, in 
terms of General Electric's organizational scheme is 
that the new philosophy of decentralization did not prevent 
the illegal practice from continuing. According to reporter 
Julian Granger, Cordiner claimed that the breakdown in 
enforcement of Policy 20.5 was caused by "the company's 
teaching, the failure to emphasize the 'personal moral 
issues' involved.9 Cordiner was pointing to a weakness 
in the philosophy.
The setting up of controls strong enough to quickly 
spot or prevent collusion and price fixing would, of 
necessity, reduce the amount of decentralization within 
the company. Whether this would be desirable is not under 
study in this paper. To increase controls might be admit­
ting that decentralization in General Electric went too 
far, gave too much freedom, and enabled men to break the 
law and ethical codes easily, without detection. To 
increase controls, that is, to change the organization, 
would be an admission that the Cordiner-Smiddy system had 
weak spots. Since no appreciable change took place, 
in terms of control, after the scandal became public, it 
may be assumed that Cordiner was not about to blame the 
philosophy or structure. Perhaps Ralph Waldo Emerson 
has some relevance in his statement, "The presence of the 
ideal of right and of truth in all action makes the 
yawning delinquencies of practice remorseful to the con­
science, tragic to the interest, but droll to the intellect.
quoted in Fuller, op. ait.^ p. 172. 
'*°Ibid.
CHAPTER VI 
GENERAL ELECTRIC RECOGNIZES WEAKNESS IN 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP PLANNING
General Electric and all business organizations 
live within a changing economy and a changing technology. 
In the group of essays titled Technology^ Management 
and Society^ Drucker argues convincingly that "up to the 
seventeenth century it was the purpose of all human insti­
tutions to prevent change."  ̂ Change was a threat to 
human security. But, he says, "In the business enter­
prise we have the first institution which is designed to 
produce change."  ̂ It is not the purpose here to agree 
or disagree with Drucker; it is only important to note 
the dynamics of the environment in which business lives. 
Because of a dynamic environment a business, in order to 
survive, must be itself dynamic. It must innovate; it 
must change to meet the changing requirements of survival. 
Drucker believes, "An organization structure must be 
temporary."^ He says that our environment is in such a 
state of flux that, "one is committed to changing an 
organization continuously. It is that dynamic."**
After the organization structure was well
^Peter F. Drucker, Technology^ Management and 
Society (New York; Harper and Row, 1970), p. 133.
^Ibid.
^Interview with Peter F. Drucker, New York, 
September 29, 1970.




developed on paper around 1953, Ralph Cordiner asked Paul 
Mills if he thought the General Electric organization 
structure needed any major revisions. Mills answered,
I think we ought to continue the study of 
the impact of "happening" (happening meaning 
the dynamics of the environment). That so far 
as major revisions, I can't foresee any for 
another doubling in size of this company. And 
when this company doubles. I'm not so sure 
that this is the organization we should have.®
General Electric has more than doubled since Mills' state­
ment, yet there has been almost no major change in the 
structure or philosophy. Growth has added a number of 
departments, from approximately 80 to about 200, and the 
groups have increased from five to eleven.
A student of organization might focus on the 
fact that today, save for size, GE looks substantially 
like the same organization structure of Cordiner.
Recently, however, the firm restructured the Executive 
Office. Cordiner in 1951 set up an advisory organiza­
tion made up of all Group Vice Presidents and Services 
Vice Presidents. That structure was not altered until 
1967 when Borch believed he could not handle this 
organization alone, so he structured a smaller organi­
zation to oversee the Executive Office, made up of four 
other men, and called it the President's Office (later, 
with the death of Phillippe in 1968, the title changed 
to the Corporate Executive Office).® In 1970 Borch 
added more advisory committees, all sub-divisions of the 
Executive Office. He has the Corporate Administrative 
Staff which coordinates functions ranging from account­
ing and legal operations to employee relations. He 
also has the Corporate Executive Staff charged with
^Interview with William J. Greenwood, Darien, 
Connecticut, November 23, 1969.
®This has been detailed in Chapter III.
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investigating the effective use of resources and long- 
range plans with operating groups. These committees 
represent a break from company philosophy which rejects 
the use of decision-making committees. Officially these 
committees are only advisory, but it is felt that realis­
tically they are policy-making.?
General Electric has long been aware that it 
cannot afford the luxury of the romantics who live by the 
poetic philosophy "I don't know where I am going, but 
I'll get there one day soon."® Until recently, however, 
entrepreneurial planning seemed lacking, and in the 
opinion of many experts,® it seemed that the emphasis was 
on short-range profitability. The natural tendency to 
try to avoid as much risk as possible has caused the 
management of the company to look to new methods of for­
cing the implementation of venture management. The com­
pany understands that it cannot be more concerned with 
avoiding mistakes than it can with taking the right risks. 
Since "structure follows strategy and not the other way 
around,"1® as Drucker notes, the company must find the 
philosophy and organization to force emphasis on the long 
reuige. The research by Alfred Chandler showed that 
structure is forced on the company by strategy made to fit
^Interview with various General Electric employees 
who wish to remain anonymous.
^Copyright (C) 1965 by Stanyan Music Company.
®See Alvin A. Butkas, "The G . E . Puzzle," Dun'e 
RevieWy Vol. 96, No. 1 (July, 1970); Allan T. Demaree, "G. 
E.'s Costly Ventures Into the Future," Fortune, Vol. LXXXII, 
No. 4 (October, 1970); Interview with Peter P. Drucker, 
Montclair, New Jersey, December 19, 1970. Also see 
Chapter IV of this paper.
^“interview with Peter P. Drucker, Montclair, New
Jersey, November 9, 1970.
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the outside.Yet, too, it should be emphasized that 
organization is not a panacea; it is not a solution to 
General Electric's venture management problem. "The 
purpose of organization," as Drucker told this writer,
"is not to solve problems, but to put the attention of 
the people in the organization in the right places, 
instead of the wrong p l a c e s . Chandler found, "that 
the company's strategy in time determined its structure 
and that the common denominator of structure and strategy 
has been the application of the enterprisers resources 
to market demand."i^ He was also able to conclude, 
"structure has been the design for integrating the enter­
prise's existing resources to current demand; strategy 
has been the plan for the allocation of resources to 
anticipated demand. " i *
Where is General Electric heading? Peter Drucker 
believes we are entering an era where the emphasis in 
industry will be on entrepreneurship. He says, "It will 
not be the entrepreneurship of a century ago, that is, the 
ability of a single man to organize a business he himself 
could run, control, embrace. It will be rather the ability 
to create and direct an organization for the new."^® The 
belief is that the new entrepreneurship will be built on 
top of the present managerial foundation.
^^Alfred Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: 
Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962), p. 366,
^^Interview with Peter F. Drucker, New York,
October 19, 1970.
^^Chandler, Jr., op. ait.j p. 383.
^‘*Ibid.
^®Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 43.
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Recent articles on General Electric have concen­
trated on failures of the company in the area of entre­
preneurship or venture management.^® John B. McKitterick, 
General Electric Vice President— Corporate Planning, believes 
these failures have pointed up the major problem the 
company faces and this problem has been caused in part by 
inadequate development of the requirements needed to 
encourage venture management in the philosophy of the 
firm. Equally to blame for the lack of new ventures, 
claims McKitterick, is that few people truly recognize 
what real "venture management" means.  ̂̂ He realizes 
that the philosophy which stressed the importance of 
balancing short-range and long-range goals was not empha­
sizing anything like "venture management." What happened 
in the philosophy and what management today sees as long- 
range planning is really just extending the present 
into the future. That is to say, the company takes its 
present products and departments and tries to estimate 
how they will grow. But venture management is the job of 
directing resources from today into tomorrow. More impor­
tantly, unlike the traditional concept of long-range 
planning, venture management emphasis is not minimizing 
risks, but rather maximizing opportunities.
Management literature has concentrated on what 
might be called the "administrative" part of the job. The 
emphasis since Taylor and Fayol has been on how humans 
and materials could be organized and how managers could 
lead more effectively. Little attention has been spent on
^®Butkas, op. oit.i Demaree, op. oit. Also see 
Chapter IV of this paper.
^^Interview with John B. McKitterick, Vice President 
--Corporate Planning, General Electric Company, New York, 
October 20, 1970.
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the entrepreneurial side of the managerial function. 
Unfortunately, "the old folklore which says that exist­
ing businesses are incapable of doing the really new 
things has so far been proved," says Drucker.^® The 
important point is that if the entrepreneurial function 
is to play such an important role in the future, as 
Drucker, among others, believes must be the case, then 
management must know how to handle this function. 
McKitterick believes that the management of the entre­
preneurial function requires a different kind of organi­
zation structure than is presently found in the company. 
Drucker concurs: "The managerial and the entrepreneurial
(functions) are not organized in the same way. They 
require that, in our minds, we keep them not separate 
but, at least, distinct."^® Managerial organizations are 
responsible for exploiting what is already in existence. 
That is not to say that they can't extend or improve.
Yet, organizations must learn to be entrepreneurial.
McKitterick explains that General Electric has a 
research staff in each area, but the firm is only begin­
ning to see the need for a methodology for true venture 
ma n a gement.He says that to have a truly venture manage­
ment organization, top management must think totally in 
terms of innovation and the future. It cannot be tied 
to any function or group, as it currently is. Venture 
management is first a state of mind, and managers who are
^®Peter F. Drucker, Teohnotogy, Management and 
Soaietyj op. ait.j p. 109.
^®Interview with John B. McKitterick, New York, 
October 20, 1970.
2®Peter F . Drucker, Technology, Management and 
Sooiety^ op. oit.^ p. 110.
^^Interview with John B. McKitterick, New York,
October 20, 1970.
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tied to functional areas or groups have to successfully 
develop the venture management viewpoint. Secondly, he 
says, the firm must develop different measuring devices 
for this side of the organization. The present eight 
key result areas do not work as measurements for innova­
tion— they perpetuate the existing structure of products. 
McKitterick might be interpreted as saying that the eight 
key result areas of measurement are aimed at the managerial 
organizations as opposed to the entrepreneurial side. 
Drucker was speaking to this point as early as 1950 when 
he said:23
So far we have practically no measurements 
and controls in the enterprise. . . .We do not 
even have a reasonable gauge of productivity; 
for accounting. . .is by definition focused 
in the past rather than on the future.
Later, he said, "In the enterprise the management job
consists very largely of the management of change, if not
of taking the lead in changes. Neither seniority nor
the yardstick of a traditional pattern can be applied."*^
Ray A. Killian says one President of General Electric
claimed that the executive of the future will be judged
largely by his skill in managing c h a n g e . Yet, this is
at present unmeasurable and because other measurements
are used to evaluate top executives, they concentrate on
other duties. Managers tend to emphasize the part of
their job on which they are measured. If General Electric
wants to have a select group concentrate on venture
management, they cannot be measured by the company's
traditional eight key result areas.
22interview with John B. McKitterick, New York, 
October 20, 1970.
2 3peter F. Drucker, The New.Society (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 208.
2 '*Ibid,
2®Ray A. Killian, Managing By Design (New York: 
American Management Association, 1968), p. 55.
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On May 22, 1970, General Electric organized a 
committee known as the Corporate Executive Staffwhich 
was charged with the responsibility to advise the Execu­
tive Office on effective use of resources and to review 
long-range plans. Its basic responsibility is to promote 
venture management.^^ The actual functioning of this 
body is still unclear since the membership is comprised 
of vice presidents and managers of the staff components, 
and these men will retain their responsibility in each 
of their respective components. It would appear that 
this committee is made up of members who have only a 
secondary responsibility to entrepreneurship and a pri­
mary responsibility to a particular component. As yet, 
no method of evaluating the work of the Corporate Execu­
tive Staff has been developed. McKitterick says, "Our 
structure is ahead of our ability to think through the 
use of this new organization structure (the Corporate 
Executive Staff)."^® He says that this staff "will think 
for the future, but top management is not sure what to 
expect from them."^* Very little is known about the work­
ings of this Corporate Executive Staff as it has been 
formed only recently and no literature, save for a few 
press releases, is available. McKitterick helped to show 
the need and then organize this venture management planning
^®See above.
^^Interviews with Jack S. Parker, Vice Chairman, 
General Electric Company, New York, July 1, 1970; John B. 
McKitterick, New York, October 20, 1970; Melvin Weber, 
Manager, General Electric Company, Bridgeport, Connecti­
cut, September 30, 1970; also Fred J. Borch, General 
Announcements, No. 499, General Electric Company, May 25, 
1970.
2*lnterview with John B. McKitterick, New York, 
October 20, 1970.
**Interview with John B. McKitterick, New York,
October 20, 1970.
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staff. He says he is glad the corporation understands 
the vital need for such an organization; now the require­
ment is to learn how such a structure should function. 
McKitterick sees the new staff committee as the best 
method for keeping GE as dynamic as its environment.^®
To determine whether or not the new Corporate 
Executive Staff is a revolutionary change in the corporate 
structure will take a few years. The staff may end up 
functioning as another long-range planning organization 
based on traditional long-range planning methods, or it 
may truly be a corporate innovation, planning and foster­
ing venture management. Only time will tell.




Decentralization was defined, in the first chap­
ter, as a word without precise or absolute definition.
As it is defined for this paper, decentralization to some 
extent characterizes all organizations. With such a broad 
scoped definition for decentralization, most major firms 
could be termed decentralized as Chandler, Dale, and 
Koontz and O'Donnell have pointed out. This definition was 
narrowed when managerial decentralization was introduced 
as being the development of a number of independent profit- 
and-loss centers within a larger organization, and further 
defined as being the process of how authority is dele­
gated rather than how activities are grouped.
Decentralization as a philosophy dates back many 
years. It became well publicized with the reorganizing 
of the highly centralized duPont Company into a decen­
tralized unit, and later by the recentralizing of the 
extremely decentralized General Motors Corporation in 
the 1920's. The definition of decentralization differs 
from firm to firm. In Chapters I through IV this author 
presented decentralization as it is practiced in only one 
company— General Electric. In Chapter II is found a short 
history of GE, developing background material to help in 
the understanding of what was happening inside General 
Electric which produced a new philosophy and structure.
GE is currently the largest firm in the electrical industry.
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fourth largest firm in the United States as ranked by 
sales, and third largest United States private employer. 
In 1963, General Electric was selected by Dun's Review 
as one of the ten best managed companies, receiving this 
distinction for its quality in general management.
The General Electric decentralization has been 
discussed in the literature for a number of years and 
perhaps only the General Motors organization is discussed 
more frequently. General Electric decentralized in 1951, 
at the beginning of the decentralization fad which spread 
throughout industry after World War II and lasted to the 
beginning of the I960's. This was three decades after 
the General Motors' experiment. Therefore, General 
Electric had the advantage of studying General Motors, 
which it did, in depth. General Electric also made a 
formal investigation of the organization needs of the 
corporation to develop a plan by which the company could 
institute decentralization. This formal study lasted 
from 1943 through 1950 and was headed by Ralph J. Cordi­
ner, then Assistant to the President, and this study was 
his only job. In 1951, he became President of General 
Electric Company and put into effect the results of this 
eight-year study.
In the third chapter is found a presentation of 
the managerial theory and the overall organizational 
structure. Here the concept of operations, services, and 
executive office was explained, as was the point that 
services do not make decisions for the line, but should 
only advise. It was also shown how GE does not use 
decision-making committees, and does not consider the 
Executive Office as a decision-making committee. Here, 
too, was explained the organization structure which is 
built on profit centers (departments) and which are 
combined into divisions, and later into groups. The 
second half of this chapter detailed how the company
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proposes to measure the effectiveness of each area.
Almost all of this measurement work is concentrated on 
the operating departments, and very little has been thought 
through for anyone other than an operating department gen­
eral manager.
In the fourth chapter, this author tried to show 
factual problems as encountered when the theory, knowledge, 
and concepts of the philosophy were exposed to the day-to- 
day operation of the organization. During the first 
decade of decentralization (1950-1960) a conflict occurred 
between the "old guard" and the "new breed." The "old 
guard" had developed its managerial habits before decen­
tralization, while the "new breed" became disciples of 
the new philosophy. A "cultural" clash developed and was 
only resolved as the "old guard" retired and the "new 
breed" rose in the ranks of the company. The actual 
organization structure was implemented by the mid-1950's, 
but it was only about 1960 before the decentralization 
philosophy was truly practiced on a wide basis. Also 
developed in the early 1950's was the belief by many 
managers that profitability was the only really important 
measurement. This belief that profitability is a more 
important measurement area than the other seven key 
result areas lingers to this day, even though the official 
voice of the company has for almost twenty years emphati­
cally claimed that all eight key result areas have equal 
importance. This belief has in recent years been given 
some impetus by top management's desire to get current 
profits to cover unplanned financial needs.
Chapter V was a short discussion of the price- 
fixing scandal which became public in the early 1960's.
Many people have blamed decentralization for price fixing. 
There is only arguable evidence to substantiate their 
opinion. However, decentralization and all of the philosophy
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amassed to back it did not prevent price collusion from 
occurring, nor was the organization able to detect it.
In Chapter VI a discussion of a recent organiza­
tional change, which hopes to insure that entrepreneurship 
will be encouraged on the executive level, was offered.
In 1970 Borch set up a committee with the responsibility 
to administer the needs GE has in the area of venture 
management. It is too early to determine whether or not 
it represents any fundamental change in the philosophy or 
structure of the firm.
The plan, philosophy, and subsequent organization 
developed by General Electric for decentralization was the 
focal point of this dissertation. The thinking that led 
the company to decide to decentralize is not of major 
importance, for it had little other choice if we are to 
believe the writings of Cordiner, Smiddy, and Wilson, 
as quoted in other parts of this paper. The bureaucracy 
of centralization had become an overbearing burden for one 
man to handle, a point which Wilson and Cordiner under­
stood in the 1940's. The significant contribution to 
management theory was not the decision to decentralize, 
but what they did after the decision. The massive plan 
and philosophy, the thinking through of the general scope 
of management, and the organization theory itself, com­
prise the contribution which the company has given to the 
general knowledge of formal organization.
There are a number of points which this study has 
attempted to communicate. First, decentralization at GE 
was shown to be the building up of about 200 individual 
profit centers, each having almost complete authority 
over production and merchandising of its products. Decen­
tralization at General Electric was shown to revolve 
around these profit centers.
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Emphasis in this paper was placed on the Cordi­
ner years because it was in those years that the founda­
tion was laid, the organization was formed, the theory 
developed. Speaking of these years and the reorganiza­
tion, Philip Reed said:^
In 1950, when Ralph Cordiner first did it 
(decentralized), there was great resistance.
But General Electric would never have grown 
as it has--lacking decentralization. It is 
just physically impossible, in my judgment, 
for any man or small group of men. . .smart 
enough to know intimately all the things 
you should to make intelligent decisions 
in the marketplace, in your procurement, in 
your labor relations, in all the varied indus­
tries in which we participate.
The second thing is the decision-making 
opportunity such a system provides for people.
It provides us with a mechanism by which 
authority can be given and measured. The 
individual will know whether he has succeeded 
or has failed.
A second point developed by this paper was that the 
decentralization philosophy was adopted only after deep 
debate, long consideration, and after extremely full visi­
ble experience with a highly centralized business bureau­
cracy with which General Electric had to struggle through 
the decade of the 1940's. General Electric's organization 
structure and philosophy was thought through, unlike the 
Westinghouse style which was, according to Chandler, con­
ceived in the 1930's and developed through a certain amount 
of trial and error.^ It is important that the company
1"Lessons of Leadership: Part XXXIV: Inspiring
Teamwork," Nation's BusinesSf Vol. 56, No. 3 (March, 1968), 
p. 42.
^Chandler, op. oit.t P* 366.
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spent so much time thinking through the theory for, as 
one distinguished expert said;^
The man who says he has no time for theory 
is either using a theory someone else had 
developed, or even a theory someone else has 
discarded.
The important point to realize about theory, as 
the company understands it, is that it is not separate 
from, but really a basic part of, good business practice. 
In the "Introduction to the Policy Volume" of the 
General Eleotria Organization & Policy Guide, the follow­
ing statement is made;**
As will be made clear, what are usually 
termed policies are in reality definitions of 
common purposes, which have been mutually agreed 
upon and accepted for the protection and pre­
servation of the common interests of individuals, 
components, departments, the company and society 
in general.
The realization of common interests in free 
society, under the accepted principle of 
government by the consent of the governed, has 
involved the voluntary surrender of certain 
freedoms by individuals, in return for which 
they have received guarantees under laws pro­
tecting their individual rights. The right to 
make changes in these laws is assured under 
constitutional processes. The realization of 
common interests within the General Electric 
Company involves similar voluntary surrender 
by individuals engaged in working in, or respon­
sible for managing, decentralized components.
A similar right and responsibility to suggest 
changes, or make recommendations regarding the 
nature or impact of common interests, exists 
within the Company.
The common purposes of the General Electric Company
^Quoted in Harold F. Smiddy's speech, "Actually 
Doing The 'Work of a Professional Manager,'" February 21, 
1956.
^General Electric Company, Organization & Policy 
Guide, Tab, "introduction and Contents," %>ril 8, 1959 
(also found in Guides issued July 16, 1954, and April 8, 
1961), p. 2.
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are very clearly defined in the written statement of company 
objectives (see Appendix 3-12) and in Volume I, II, III, 
and IV of General Electric's Professional Management 
series of books, in Cordiner's and Smiddy's speeches which 
have been reprinted and widely distributed in the literature 
distributed within the company, and many other similar 
documents. Most of the philosophy was developed and dis­
tributed before Borch became President. If one sifts 
through this literature and reads carefully, one finds a 
clear and consistent philosophy behind General Electric 
that meets all the requirements for defining "common pur­
poses. . .for the protection and preservation of the common 
interests of individual. . .and society in general."
The thorough and deep thinking that has gone into 
the preparation of the philosophy described in Chapters 
III and IV is one of the most significant efforts that has 
ever been made in defining the common purposes of a large 
organization.
The organization structure and the philosophy which 
controls its work are well planned, written, and yet 
subject to change. Because of the dynamics of the firm, 
the philosophy must be somewhat fluid, and strongly 
structured at the same time. The amount of written docu­
ments the company has produced to control the system may 
seem excessive. But it is in these written forms that 
the company broadens the base of learning in its quest 
tp lead its managers out of confusion. The written poli­
cies, procedures and management books and letters repre­
sent simplification. Confusion existed in the absence of 
a written philosophy before 1950 under centralization.
The development, teaching, and implementation of the philo­
sophy brought some understanding of the practice and scope 
of professional management in General Electric. General 
Electric's internationally famous metallurgist and former 
Vice President, Zay Jeffries, in a personal letter to
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Harold Smiddy, explained the need for this simplification. 
In 1952 Jeffries wrote:®
It is obvious that life is becoming more 
complex as our industrial civilization advances.
The sum total of knowledge is increasing at a 
very rapid rate. . . .At the same time human 
beings are changing very little. There is no 
positive evidence that the more able men today 
excel the more able men of yesteryear.
The whole situation would, therefore, get 
out of hand and become unmanageable if it were 
not for the fact that, concurrently with the 
increase in complexity, there is also constant 
progress toward simplification.
Our progress depends to a considerable extent 
on seeing to it that the simplification pro­
cesses move forward in approximate balance with 
the complicating processes, (so that) individuals 
do not become casualties of their own complexi­
ties .
Harold F . Smiddy frequently quoted this personal letter 
which, in a practical sense, may have inspired his intense 
pursuit of developing a sound fundamental approach toward 
managing and organizing the decentralized General Electric 
Company.
The investment in talent and time devoted to this 
research was very great. As to whether it was worth the 
effort— no one can fairly judge since no comparative 
analysis covering the same time span is possible. In 
spite of the tremendous strides made in the overall 
practice of management, there still is no clear-cut 
evidence that at General Electric Company the control func­
tion is any different or better today than it was prior 
to the decentralization of the managerial function. Mills 
may be right when he says, "I don't think a damn thing 
changed, they (top management) never lost centralized
^Harold F. Smiddy, "The Objectives, Work, Organi­
zation and Personnel of Management Consultation Services 
Division," Speech at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, 
New York, January 7, 1954, p. 10.
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financial control; it was there before, and is there 
today. Although there are sharper tools today and data 
gathering is easier, its vast size merely balances the 
scale. Control is still at the top."®
A third point which this paper tried to show was 
that decentralization took years to implement and had many 
difficulties to overcome. Here it should be noted that 
the philosophy in written form was developed over a num­
ber of years; in fact, it is still developing. The 
measurement study which began its investigation almost 
twenty years ago is yet to be completed. The actual organi­
zation structure, which began in 1951, was only basically 
completed in 1955, although a number of changes took 
place after that, as discussed. It was Smiddy who admitted, 
although the philosophy was well publicized by 1955, that 
decentralization was only just beginning to be practiced 
at his retirement in 1961. The difficulty in putting into 
practice real decentralization was caused, as presented 
in Chapter IV, by the cultural clash, the one measurement 
concept, misforecasting, and failure to have the philosophy 
completely developed.
A fourth point which this paper hoped to communi­
cate was that GE is a much bigger and more complex 
organization today than it was before 1950. This is 
shown, especially by the financial figures in Chapter II 
and also by a comparison of the organization structure 
today versus 1947 or 1892.
Also important to understand is the fact that it 
cannot be determined whether or not decentralization 
caused the firm to grow faster or slower than if it had 
not decentralized. The feelings of Cordiner, Smiddy,
®As previously quoted, Paul E. Mills, interview, 
August 7, 1969, Glen Ridge, New Jersey.
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and Phillippe, and so forth, as previously quoted, indi­
cate decentralization has helped the firm financially.
The decade of the 1950's, under decentralization, was 
a period of the greatest growth in the company's history.
The period of the 1960's, although the company doubled 
in size, was not a period of spectacular growth, as indi­
cated in Chapter II.
This investigation was framed basically as a 
case study; therefore, there are not many independent 
conclusions to be drawn. Although most of the conclu­
sions are left to the readers, some comments by this 
writer might be helpful.
Without doubt. General Electric is a bigger and 
more complex organization now than it was before decen­
tralization. GE has been called the most conglomerate 
of all conglomerates by Drucker, and it has been described 
as the most diversified firm in the world by Northrup and 
Cordiner. In spite of many profit centers, the organiza­
tion structure does not seem too complicated. In Chapter 
III is found a description of the three branches— services, 
operations, and the executive office. It is important to 
note that in this huge corporation comprising many busi­
nesses, that, for the most part, only five to seven levels 
of management exist, that there are only eleven groups 
and less than 200 departments.
The depth and scope of the theory behind the 
structure is, in the opinion of this writer, outstanding 
and extremely sound. The quality of the theory is not 
evaluated against those practiced by other firms, such as 
IBM or General Motors, for that would be subject matter 
for another dissertation. The discussion of the philo­
sophy as found in the body of this paper is intended to show 
the wide scope and depth of that formalized managerial 
approach. It is concluded, by this writer, that the
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General Electric philosophy of management is built upon a 
solid foundation of research. The fact that it has changed 
very little since it was introduced may be significant 
substantiation of its conceptual soundness.
On the other hand, it is important to note that 
all of the managerial theory covered in the philosophy is 
not practiced. The concept of eight key result areas for 
measuring an operating department and its manager has, in 
reality, never been practiced. Profitability still seems 
to be the dominating key result area. Vice Chairman of 
the Board, Jack S. Parker, admitted that profitability 
during the decade of the 1960's dominated the other mea­
surements. There is no evidence that it is not today's 
primary concern. With all the emphasis on measuring 
managers on their performance, it is interesting that the 
only measurements that have been developed to any extent 
are applicable to operations solely. The measurements of 
services and the functional areas along with individual 
contributions above or below the profit center level have 
not been developed as yet. Therefore, after twenty years 
of researching and practicing their decentralization 
philosophy, General Electric has not developed a sound, 
generally acceptable measurement for any manager, consul­
tant, or high-level individual contributor, other than 
the manager of a profit center. There are less than 200 
of these positions out of over 400,000 employees.
It is generally agreed that the General Electric 
Company was highly successful before decentralization in 
the 1920's, 1930's, 1940's, and that since decentraliza­
tion during the 1950's and 1960's it has out-stripped 
its nearest competitors. It has more than doubled in 
sales in each decade after decentralization. If the stock 
market can be used as a barometer of public confidence, 
in General Electric's management, including its philosophy
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and structure, then its future looks bright. As to whether 
its control function is better, is worse, is changed 
significantly or not since decentralization is not clear, 
except that profitability measurements have been more 
carefully spelled out for managers of all operation 
components.
Mary Parker Follett once said, "Business practice 
has gone ahead of Business Theory."’ Whether she was 
correct in 1926 when she made that observation, or if the 
statement is correct today, is outside the boundaries 
of this paper. It is important to understand what 
practitioners have done and what theory they have developed. 
Through the understanding of what others think and do, 
it may be possible to advance the general theory of 
management beyond the present. This paper was written 
with that hope in mind. Some of the most influential 
thinkers in the early history of management thought were 
themselves managers— Taylor, Fayol, Barnard, Towne, 
Roundtree, to name but a few— but in recent years it 
seems that most of the influential writers are academicians 
and consultants— Dale, Drucker, Koontz, Argyris, Likert, 
and so forth— and perhaps the modern theoretician does
not appreciate the quality of the theory being developed 
by managers themselves. The General Electric philosophy, 
which this paper presented in part, was developed by 
managers, managers who read the classics in management 
and who consulted with many of the most important academic 
writers, yet the managers who developed the GE structure 
and managerial theory were men who for most of their lives 
had been operating managers. These men had acquired
’Henry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, Dynamic Adminis- 
tration^ The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett 
(New York: Hope and Brothers, 1940), p. 146.
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over years of on-the-job experience, trial and error, 
and formal training, a very substantial reputation as 
successful leaders, managers and thinkers. Therefore, 
the deep thought that went into the General Electric 
organization and philosophy was founded in operating 
knowledge which may have helped to add insight, but also 
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April 24, 1958.
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The Services Officer has Executive Office and Services 
responsibilities. H e is responsible for Executive, Man­
agerial, and Functional types of work, and for Serv­
ices Functional and Appraisal work. He is account­
able to the Chairman of d ie Board and Chief Executive 
Officer for the efficient managing of the Services com­
ponent, and for the quality of Services Functional and 
Appraisal work.
The Services Officer has responsibility and commen­
surate authority for performance of all Services work 
of the assigned Function :
Services Functional a n d  A ppraisa l Work
Services Functional work (as distinguished from 
Managerial, Operating, and Executive work) consists 
of; advancing fundamental Functional Imowledge 
through research, study, and creative development; 
keeping abreast of current Functional knowledge; 
preparation of advanced and current knowledge in 
forms, patterns, designs, etc., usable by organization 
components; policy guidance in the Functional field; 
communication, teaching, developing understanding 
and, by doing so, securing voluntary acceptance 
and use of advanced and current knowledge; operat­
ing a  "clearing house" of current practices, experi­
ences, progress, and standards, to facilitate application 
and also measurement of available knowlei^e; and 
appraising the teaching, understanding, and applica­
tion of such advanced and current knowledge in 
organization components.
Services Appraisal work consists of establishment of 
measuring criteria, and review, evaluation, and 
recommendation with respect to  the effectiveness and 
efficiemy of Operating pofonnance and results in the 
assigned Function, as an aid to  the Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer, President, Group 
Executives, and to Services and Operating Managers 
throughout the Company, as appropriate and required.
ExecuHv* W ork
A Services Officer, as a  member of the Executive 
Office, shares reqwnsibility for Executive work as to 
the Company as a  whole. In  this capacity, a  Services 
Officer thinks and acts in terms of what is good for
the Company as a whole; advises with the Chairman 
of the Board and Chief Executive Officer and with 
other members of the Executive Office; supports 
Company objectives; is watchful for new Company 
opportunities; and p a r tid ^ te s  in national and inter­
national public affairs. H e also has responsibility for 
Executive work—i.e., long-range thinking and plan­
ning—a s  to the assigned Function.
M anogoriai Work
Services Managerial work consists of m an n in g  (that 
is, leading, through planning, organizing, integrating, 
and measuring) the organization components and 
positions required to perform the Services Functional 
and Appraisal W ork, Executive W ork, Functional 
W ork (O perating), and Managerial W ork assigned 
to  the Services component, for accomplishment of de­
sired performance and results.
Functional Work (Oporaling)
The Operating responsibility and commensurate 
authority, as spedfically assigned o r approved by the 
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, 
and as determined by the criteria in P art 3 of this 
Position Guide, consists of: performing Functional 
Operating work in the assigned Functional field for 
the Company as a  whole; conducting contractor-type 
Functional Operating work projects for individual 
Operating Departments ; and conducting pooled Func­
tional Operating work, agreed by the Services Officer 
to be done “for hire" on such pooled basis for some, 
but not all, Operating components, whose responsible 
Managers have elected to  get sulch work accomplished 
in this way rather than by employees on their own 
payroll or by nonaffiliated consultants or vendors. The 
nature of all such pooled work is subject to  periodic 
review by the Division General Managers, the Group 
Executives, the President, and the Chairman of the 
Board and C3iief Executive Officer, to insure to the 
maximum economical extent that permanent Operating 
work be done in Operatiqg rather than in Services 
components, to  fulfill profit responsibility of particular 
Operating components.
The three renuttning generic parts of a '^Position
Guide>':
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"Principal Responsibilities,"
“Authority and Reservation of Authority for 
Decision-making,"
“Measures of Accountability" 
are delineated for each of the four broad functions,
just described:




PART 1 — SERVICES FUNCTIONAL AND APPRAISAL WORK
PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITIES
The Services Officer is responsible for interpreting 
and discharging the following responsibilities:
Services Functional W ork
Recognition should be attained, both inside and outside 
the Company, by the Services Officer personally, and 
by the Managers, Consultants, and Functional person­
nel of the Services component, as the Company’s over­
all experts in advanced fundamental and current Func­
tional knowledge, and its application and measurement 
in the Functional field. This recognition should be 
achieved by reading, concentrated study, collection, ob­
servation, research, participation in affairs of appropri­
ate external organisations and through other means.
Advancement of fundamental knowledge should be 
pursued in the Function, including systems for measur­
ing and evaluating Functional work, through bold, 
imaginative, and creative research and development. 
This pursuit should be directed toward recognizing 
and facilitating the Company’s short- and long-range 
needs for such advanced fundamental knowledge.
Prepare advanced and current knowledge suitable for 
use by organization components and by society in gen­
eral, as and when appropriate. This preparation may 
be accomplished by analysing, evaluating, translating, 
condensing, and programming the necessary steps in 
forms, patterns, designs, and series that may be re­
quired to attain the desired results.
Formulate and recommend to the Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer appropriate Com­
pany policies that deal with subject m atter in the 
Function, after securing the views of Operating and 
Services Officers and Managers. Issue these policies 
after approval of the Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer, and interpret them, as required, 
to Executive, Services, and Operating Officers and 
Managers. Also, aid other Services Officers and the 
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer,
as required, in the formulation of multi-Functional and 
over-all Company policies.
Aid the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive 
Officer, President, and the Group Executives by pro­
viding Functional advice and counsel, as required, in 
the formulation and determination of appropriate 
objectives, policies, plans, programs, and budgets.
Secure voluntary acceptance and use of advanced and 
current knowledge in organization components by 
communicating, teaching, and developing understand­
ing. Aid Operating Officers, Msuiagers, and other 
Services Officers and Managers, as requested, to im­
prove their performance of Functional work by learn­
ing the principles and fundamentals of advanced and 
current Functional knowledge, through advising, 
counseling, teaching, iiupirational questioning, and 
encouragement. They may then apply this additional 
knowledge to specific sittuUions, to make greater im­
provement in their operations at an earlier date than 
otherwise possible. They may then be encouraged to 
overcome the current strangeness of new Functional 
concepts, and to endeavor to leam and apply such 
knowledge wherever applicable and needed.
Contribute advanced fundamental and current knowl­
edge to society, on a  timely basis, through appro­
priate selKtive channels, such as educational institu­
tions, industry, and professional associations of 
importance to the progress of the  Company. The 
contribution of such knowledge to society is one of 
the tangible ‘'plus value/' of common ownership of 
large, diverse businesses, and is one important reason 
for the existence of such businesses in an Industrial 
Society.
Determine current methods and practices, experience, 
progress, achievements, and failures of others, and 
measurement standards both within and outside the 
Company, from surveys, collection, observation, read­
ing, personal contacts, analysis, comparison, etc.
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Services Components
Operate a "clearing house” for collection, analysis, 
condensation, and distribution of such current knowl­
edge, to facilitate application and measurement of 
available knowledge by organization components.
Appraise the teaching, understanding, application, and 
measuring (as distinguished from appraisal of results 
of such efforts) of fundamental and current knowledge 
in Operating and other Services components.
The Services Officer, Managers, and Consultants 
should devote the majority of their personal time, 
available for Company work, toward building Com­
pany leadership in the assigned Function.
Services Appraisal Work
The Services Officer, Managers, and Consultants 
should constantly be prepared to do Services Appraisal 
work, as defined in the Broad Function section of this 
Position Guide. Normally, such work will be done 
upon the request of an  Operating Manager for the 
whole o r any part of his component ; and appropriate 
reports or recommendations will be submitted, in chan­
nels, as requested by the Operating Manager.
It is recognised that emergency conditions may de­
velop under which it appears obvious that required 
effectiveness of the assigned Function has not been 
obtained in a specific Operating component. Such a 
situation may result either from failure properly to 
provide advanced and current Functional knowledge 
or from failure voluntarily to accept, understand, or 
use such knowledge. U nder such circumstances in a  
specific component, it is the responsibility of the 
Services Officer to initiate Services Appraisal work 
on the basis of his “right to look” on behalf of the 
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer.
Relationship R esponsibilities— Internal
W ork with the Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer, President, Group Executives, other 
Services Officers, and General Managers of Operating 
components, as required or requested, with respect to 
matters of m ajor importance within their respective 
areas of responsibility, and which are related to  the 
assigned Functional field. Keep them appropriately 
advised with r% ard to the m ajor activities of the 
assigned Services component, and discuss with them, 
in advance, any contemplated policy, course, and 
expense-creating task that may be requested \iy the
Services component, or any action which may liave 
a m ajor o r unusual effect upon their areas of responsi­
bility or upon the Company as a whole.
Give a realistic appraisal and report of over-all Com­
pany Functional performance, progress, and results, 
a t suitable intervals, to the Chairman of the Board 
and Chief Executive Officer, President, Group Execu­
tives, and General Managers of Operating components, 
as appropriate to  their responsibilities.
Aid Managers— especially those of components in the 
assigned Functional field—to anticipate and define the 
special requirements of the assigned Function. Recom­
mend appropriate objectives, policies, plans, and pro­
grams, and the suggested timing thereof, to meet those 
requirements most advantageously. Render such Func­
tional advice and counsel and other services without 
authority to issue directions o r orders outside of the 
assigned Services component, but rather inform, teach, 
persuade, or recommend. In general, the Services 
Officer and all members of the Services components 
should rely upon the authority of knowledge for results 
in the assigned Function, weU-marshalled and Pre­
sented, and should rely upon the expertness and sound­
ness of their judgment and advice, except as actually 
set forth in specific policies which establish or suggest 
uniform Company-wide approaches.
Advise and aid Operating M anagers and General 
Managers in the advantageous recruiting, selecting, 
developing, inventorying, and utilizing of managerial 
and Functional personnel, within the assigned Func­
tion throughout the Company. This assistance helps to 
make Company-wide advancement available to all 
qualified managerial and Functional personnel—es­
pecially in  accordance with Company Policy on "Pro­
motion or Transfer of Personnel to Manager, or 
Equivalent Professional or Technical, Positions."
Request and obtain such information, aid, or co­
operation, as may be needed to fulfill properly required 
Functions and responsibilities and to discharge ac­
countability—respecting organization channels where 
matters of decision-making character are involved— 
from the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive 
Officer, President, Group Executives, and personnel 
of Division or Department organizations.
Expect the Group Executives o r Operating Division 
General Managers to refer to  the Services Officer for
OATS isstmo s tm m ts s o B S  i s s u s  d a t b d
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review and advice, or recommendations of : (a ) Func­
tional matters of major or inter-Group importance 
which affect Operating Divisions and their Depart­
ments and other components, or the Company as 
a whole; (b ) openings for proposed appointments of 
Function or Section Managers (o r equivalent) or for 
higher level Functional personnel within the Operating 
Departments of each Group, in order that the Group 
Executives or Division General Managers may receive 
the benefit of such Services Officer's knowledge, advice, 
and recommendations, both freely and frankly, as to 
qualified potential candidates —  particularly those 
within other components of the Company; furthermore, 
to ensure that such candidates may have the oppor­
tunity to be considered by the Operating Managers or 
General Managers who are responsible for the selec­
tion and appointment of such personnel.
As required for discharging Services responsibilities, 
follow, represent, support, and interpret over all Com­
pany objectives, policies, and other interests to Officers, 
General Managers, Managers, and other employees of 
Operating components of the Company in the assigned 
Functional held, and thereby aid them to in t^ ja te  
these interests with their own interests and their own 
objectives, policies, programs, and budgets. This 
leadership is to be provided at locations of Functional 
Operating components throughout the Company.
Contact and work freely with the Manager, or General 
Manager, of any Operating component, and review 
with him any problem within the assigned Functional 
field. Recogpiize the right of any such Manager (on his 
own responsibility) to request, accept, or reject advice 
and counsel as he may deem advisable. Likewise, ex­
pect such Managers to respect the responsibility of 
the Services Officer and other personnel of the Services 
component to keep all interested Company Officers in­
formed of Services component activities and recom­
mendations in  their assigned Functional field.
W ork out solutions, primarily a t locations of Func­
tional Operating components, through objective re­
view, advice, and counsel.
Make the fullest practicable use of informal "channels 
of contact,” as described in the Company's over-all 
Organization Chart.
Respect the delegation of Operating responsibility for 
decision-making and operations. Give die interest of
the person who requests Services full consideration, 
and render Services on a  highly professional and, if 
appropriate, confidential basis. Provide a  climate 
where Functional Managers of a particular Operating 
business may individually and collectively discuss their 
plans and problems, and receive advice and counsel 
thereon, but without relieving them of their own 
decision-making or other Operating responsibilities 
and relationships.
Endeavor to reach agreement on any differences of 
viewpoint at the lowest practicable managerial level, 
allowing ample opportunity for consideration and for 
acceptance of, o r specific rejection of, recommenda­
tions at the level immediatdy concerned. Should a 
difference of professional judgment arise between a 
Services Officer, o r a  member of his Services compo­
nent, and an Operating Manager, the Services Officer 
o r M anager may refer ffie matter to  a  higher level of 
Services o r to Operating Managers, o r to  the interested 
Group Executive, or to  the President, or to the Chair­
man of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, as 
appropriate and warranted by the situation, after first 
having advised the Operating M anager involved of his 
intentions. However, this step should be taken only 
after a  Services Officer, or a member of his Services 
component, and an Operating Manager have failed to 
agree after mutual and adequate consideration, and 
when the Services Officer or Manager considers the 
disagreement of sufficient importance from the Com­
pany viewpoint. W here the current interests of the 
person who requests Services run  counter to those of a 
person in  another part of the Company, o r to  the 
apparent over all interests of the Company's share 
owners, the Services Officer and Services component 
personnel who render advice should respect the posi­
tion, objectives, and confidence of the person who asked 
for the advice; However, the Services Officer and 
Services component personnel should urge the broader 
view, and should give serious attention, not only to 
the narrower interests, but also to  those of other 
Company components and of the Company as a whole.
R a l o f i o n s h l p s  f x t a m o l
Interpret and carry out Company objectives and 
policies with respect to, and participation in, com­
munity, scientific, educational, professional, industry, 
and other public organizations’ activities, as appro­
priate to the Services' Functions.
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Services Components
AUTHORITY AND RESERVATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
FOR DECISION-MAKING
The Services Officer’s authority is fully commensurate 
with his responsibilities in Services Functional and 
Appraisal work. H is authority is complete and final in 
all matters for which he is responsible, except as 
decision-making is reserved by Company Policy Guides 
and reserved in General Instructions, until they are 
superseded by additional and new Company Policy 
Guides.
W here decision-making authority is reserved from 
him in his Functional field, the Services Officer has 
authority to make recommendations, to secure decisions 
thereon, and to  take appropriate action thereafter.
The cost of Functional and Appraisal Services per­
formed for the Company as a  whole will be financed 
out of Company resources created by the profitability 
of the ovcr-all businesses of the Company as a  whole.
MEASURES OF ACCOUNTABILITY
The prim ary measures of the Services Functional and 
Appraisal work are :
T he extent of recognition, both inside and outside the 
Company, of the expertness of the Services Officer and 
key Services personnel in their Functional field.
The depth of understanding of the opportunities avail­
able to, and the obligations of, the assigned Services 
component, as evidenced by the Services Officer’s rec­
ommendations, decisions, and actions. This undtrstani- 
ing should coincide with the Compands Services con­
cept, to make basic, important, and continuing contri­
butions to kelp Managers and other professional per­
sonnel themselves to achieve improved Functional per­
formance in Operating components, as well as in other 
Services components and in the Company as a whole, 
and for the benefit of society in general.
The quality, timeliness, and balance between long- and 
short-range requirements of his Services Ftinctional 
objectives, plans, programs, and budgets, as evidenced 
by: the extent to  which ffiey represent difficult but 
attainable achievements; the extent to  which they are 
designed to meet the Fumrtional needs; and the extent 
to which their projected costs are justified tty improve­
ment in performance of organisation components, the 
Company as a  whole, and of society in  general.
The improvement in performance of Operating com­
ponents, which can be determined and measured as a 
result of the application of the assigned Services com­
ponent Further, in view of the required use of Com­
pany resources for providing these Services, the im­
provement should be justified by its magnitude in the 
following areas of Operating accomplishment : profit­
ability, market position, productivity, technological 
lead«3hip, personnel development, employee attitudes, 
and pubfic attitudes.
The extent to which its services aid  Officers and M an­
agers in developing strong and competently perform­
ing Functional organisations; the calibre and improve­
ment in performance of M anagers and key personnel 
in Functional organization components throughout the 
Company; and the Company’s relative position of 
Functional leadership.
The extent to which the Services Officer understands 
the purpose, place, and benefits of Company Policy 
Guides; recognizes the needs for Functional policy; 
stimulates and conveys understanding as to the need 
for such policy ; and obtains agreement among O perat­
ing Managers and General M anagers and others who 
may be affected by the proposed policy. Also, the ex­
tent to  which the Services Officer is successful in 
providing necessary guidance during the initiation, 
formulation, and preparation of the Policy Guides; 
in securing approval for their issuance; and in the 
quality of his interpretation of such Guides after 
issuance.
The quality of performance within the Services com­
ponent itsd f of Functional and Appraisal work. Such 
Services perforTnance is an important measurement cri­
terion-going beyond the actual contribution of Serv­
ices work to improved eurretrt performance of Oper­
ating components—because of the long-time cycles in­
volved in Services work. I t is also important because of 
the extertded period which may be required between an 
individual research project and the date when the 
advanced Imowledge, resulting from that particular 
research, con contribute to improved performance of 
Operating components. Such aub-Functional work is 
measured tty:
The appropriateness of the objectives for funda­
mental knowledge of research w ork in the assigned
Function; the degree to  which well-thought-through
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and directed plans for such research are logical 
accomplishment of established objectives ; the extent 
to which research projects, and increments of re­
search progress within such projects, are in accord­
ance with previously established plans and budgets ; 
and the ultimate l>enefits of such research work, as 
evidenced by its contribution to improved perform­
ance of Operating Departments.
Tl’.e effectiveness of the programming and the clarity 
with which advanced and current knowledge is pre­
sented in forms, patterns, designs, series, and steps, 
and is suitable for use in organization components 
and, as and when appropriate, in society in general.
The value of the advice and counsel of the assigned 
Services component, as is evidenced by the degree to 
which it is accurate, complete, well deliberated, and 
effectively presented, and will readily fit the necessi­
ties of the Chairman of the Board and Chief Execu­
tive Officer, President, and the Group Executives in 
the formulation of appropriate objectives, policies, 
programs, and budgets.
The ((uality and effectiveness of communication and 
teaching activities in developing understanding, and 
in gaining voluntary acceptance and use of advanced 
and current knowledge in organization components.
The extent and quality of contributions of ad ­
vanced and current knowledge, and timing thereof.
to society.
The degree to which the Services Officer and person­
nel of the assigned Services component are cog­
nizant of current knowledge and developments in 
their respective areas of functional responsibility. 
The degree to which the "clearing-house" service fits 
Conijxmy requirements for up-to-date and prompt 
information on current methods and practices, ex­
perience, progress, achievements, and failures of 
others, and for measurement standards, both inside 
and outside the Company, nationally and inter­
nationally.
The extent to which appraisals of Functional Operat­
ing work—both of understanding, acceptance, appli­
cation, and measuring of its effectiveness and 
efficiency, and results thereof—made by the as­
signed Services components are accurate, timely, 
and contain recommendations for improvement
which are helpful to, and usable by, the Chairman 
of the Boatd and Chief Executive Officer and all 
others who may request such appraisals.
The calibre of the Services Officer’s accomplishment 
in keeping the Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer informed, as appropriate, on all 
Functional m atters important to the success of the 
Company ; and likewise in serving the President, the 
Group Executives, as to their respective Groups, 
other Services Officers, and General Managers.
The quality and degree of the Services Officer’s par­
ticipation, as appropriate, to the assigned Services com­
ponent, in professional, industry, public, and similar 
activities at national level.
The extent to  which the Services Officer and the per­
sonnel of the assigned Services component devote their 
time to the performance of functional and appraisal 
Services in the Functional field, and to the building of 
Company leadership in this field.
The quality and timeliness of the Services Officer’s 
decisions and actions in all responsibilities of the 
position, including the quality and timeliness of his 
recommendations where decision-making authority is 
reserved, and in securing decisions thereon, and in 
taking appropriate action thereafter.
The depth of understanding and actual practice, on the 
part of the Services component’s personnel, with regard 
to the professional obligations of Services work in the 
Company. This includes : respecting the delegation of 
Operating responsibility for decision-making and oper­
ations ; working out solutions through objective review, 
advice, and counsel—primarily at locations of Func­
tional Operating components; endeavoring to  reach 
agreement at the lowest practicable level of organiza­
tion structure; making fullest practicable use of in­
formal "channels of contact’’ ; respecting the confi­
dential basis of reviewing activities; respecting the 
position and objectives of individuals lieing counseled, 
while a t the same time urging broader views and inter­
ests of other components and of the Company as a 
whole; and, when it is the judgment of Services per­
sonnel that a  situation warrants referral to a higher 
level in the Operating or Services organization struc­
ture, never failing, first, to  so advise individuals being 
counseled.
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Services Components
part 2  —  EXECUTIVE WORK
PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITIES
A Services Officer is responsible for interpreting and 
discharging the following Executive Responsibilities:
The Company a s  a  Whole
Set aside a measurable portion of time, as a member 
of the Executive Office, during which the Services 
Officer acts as one of a group of Officers, working 
and thinking together, and advising with the Chairman 
of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, in r ^ a r d  to 
the Company’s long-range character, course, dimen­
sions, and growth, and aiding in establishing its ob­
jectives, policies, plans, and budgets.
Represent, support, and interpret over all Company 
objectives, policies, and other interests a t all times.
Participate, personally, in national and international 
affairs, in order to extend the Company’s influence 
and leadership, as appropriate.
Create, recognize, and utilize to the fullest extent the 
"extra values’’ and advantages of common ownership 
of diverse, decentralized businesses, for the benefit of 
the Company’s customers, share owners, employees, 
suppliers, and the public and its representative. Gov­
ernment.
The Assigned Function
Keep informed as to the long-range course, character, 
and dimensions of the business of the Company as a 
whole, and of changing trends, conditions, and circum­
stances, in order to maintain Company leadership in 
the assigned Function.
Develop, within Company policy, long-range objectives, 
policies, plans, programs, and budgets for the assigned 
Function, in order to  provide for greater effectiveness 
of Services work. Such improvements taill contribute 
measurably to the continued growth and success in 
Functional performance of individual Operating com­
ponents and of the Company as a whole.
Relationships
Refer to the Chairman of the Board and Chief Execu­
tive Officer all unusual o r m ajor m atters th a t are 
important to the over all Company’s success, progress, 
and well-being, for the purpose of securing his advice.
guidance, authorization o r approval, as may be 
appropriate.
W ork with members of the Executive Office in dis­
cussing, both freely and frankly, over-all Company 
opportunities and problems, as well as Company objec­
tives, policies, plans, and budgets. Aid, to the fullest 
extent, in the development of the Executive Office into 
a cooperative, effective team, both from over-all Com­
pany and Functional perspective.
Maintain and enhance the Company's good name and 
social responsibilities in industry, in the community, 
and in society in general, as appropriate to the Execu­
tive work of a  Services Officer. M aintain and enhance 
the Company’s reputation for good corporate citizen­
ship and for its favorable relations with customers, 
share owners, employees, suppliers, and the public and 
its representative. Government. T he General Electric 
Company will thus be widely and favorably known 
because of :
Its  fair, constructive, and enlightened objectives and 
policies.
The quality, timeliness, and inherent value of its 
products and services.
The worth of its securities.
Its  fair treatment of all persons with whom it, or 
any of its employees, comes in contact ; and its rec­
ognition and rqpird for the interests of customers, 
share owners, employees, suppliers, and the public 
and its representative. Government (and appropri­
ate international publics and governments).
Its contributions to advanced and constructive 
trends in the physical and social sciences within the 
Comjiany’s Add of activities.
Its  contribution to an  improved standard of living 
and general well-bdng of the country and the inter­
national Add.
Its  contributions to the advancement of the Ameri­
can form of democratic society— based upon rights, 
privileges, and duties w ith respect to  private prop­
erty, free competitive and profitable enterprise, and 
the dignity and freedom of the individual.
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Represent the Chairman of the Board and Chief 
executive Officer in important matters, as appropri­
ate and as required, without diminishing the status 
or importance of managerial or other employees of 
Operating or other Services components.
AUTHORITY A ND  RESERVATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
FOR DECISION-MAKING
The Services Officer’s authority as to Executive work 
is commensurate with his responsibility. His authority 
is complete and final in all matters for which he is 
responsible, except to the extent where decision-making 
authority is reserved in Company Policy Guides.
The Services Officer has authority to make recom­
mendations as to subject matter, in which decision­
making authority is reserved from him in his Execu­
tive capacity, to obtain decisions thereon, and to  take 
appropriate action thereafter.
The Services Officer may not delegate his Executive 
responsibilities, as a  member of the Executive Office 
or as to his assigned Function. In  the latter capacity, 
he may assign certain planning phases to personnel of 
the assigned Services component, to aid him in the for­
mulation of long-range objectives, policies, plans, and 
budgets.
The cost of Executive work performed by Services 
Officers for the Company as a whole will be financed 
from resources created by the profitability of the 
over-all business of the Company as a whole.
MEASURES OF ACCOUNTABIUTY
The primary measures of a Services Officer's perform­
ance of Executive work are:
The C om p an y  a s  o  W holo
The depth of his understanding of Company needs to 
nicci successfully tlie economic, social, political, and 
other forces which impinge upon, o r are likdy to 
impinge upon, the Company.
The soundness, appropriateness, scope, and depth of 
his advice, as a  member of the Executive Office, in 
regard to the long-range character, course, dimensions, 
and growth of the Company as a whole, and in aiding 
to establish over all Company objectives, policies, 
plans, and budgets.
The quality of his representation, support, and inter­
pretation of over all Company objectives, policies, and 
other interests which are required by individual situa­
tions inside or outside the Company.
The quality, degree, and appropriateness of his par­
ticipation in public affairs at the national and inter­
national level through selected industry and public 
organizations.
The degree of his understanding and quality of his 
actions in creating, recognizing, and utilizing the 
“extra values" and advantages which are available in 
common ownership of diverse, decentralized businesses 
for the benefit of the Company’s customers, share 
owners, employees, and the public and its representa­
tive, Government.
Th# Assign#*! Function
The depth of his understanding, as evidenced by his 
recommendations, decisions, and actions, of the oppor­
tunities available for making basic, important, and 
continued contributions to  improved Functional per­
formance in Operating components, in other Services 
components, and in the Company as a whole, including 
the timely benefit to society in general, and the leader­
ship thus obtained by the Company.
The quality of his interpretation of the Company’s 
Services concept, and his interpretation of the sound­
ness and appropriateness of long-range objectives, 
policies, plans, and programs for the assigned Func­
tion.
The quality of his interpretation and performance of 
his Executive work relationships as set forth in P art 2.
PART 3 —  MANAOIRIAl WORK
PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITIES
The responsibilities and measures of accountability 
of the Services Officer for m ajor objectives and for 
relationships in the various types of Services work 
are described in the other parts of this Position Guide. 
The managing of the Services component itself is 
accomplished by performing “T he W ork of a Pro­
fessional Manager," as set forth in the standard Com­
pany chart for this work. Organization and Policy 
Guide, General Plan of Organization No. I.G-3. In 
performing the elements of "The W ork of a  Pro­
fessional Manager," as set forth therein, the Services 
Officer will, with respect to :
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t'iacc emphasis on Services Functional a^id Appraisal 
work, directed toward benefiting future operations 
rather than on current Functional problems of in­
dividual organization components. Such components 
should normally organize to solve their own current 
problems, either with personnel on their own payroll, 
or by contractual or other arrangements with other 
components or suppliers, as may be found best in each 
particular situation.
Organizing
Distinguish clearly between each of the types of 
Services work described in these Position Guides, 
as well as between the sub-functional parts of each. 
Distinguish clearly between each of these types of 
work: Services Functional and Appraisal, Services 
Managerial work. Functional (O perating) work, and 
Executive work, as well as between the sub-functional 
parts of each. Select and appoint Consultants and 
other key personnel who report direct to the Services 
Officer, and review proposed appointments at lower 
levels in accordance w ith Company policy. Give con­
sideration in staffing such positions to  managerial and 
functional employees of components of other Divisions 
and Services (and encourage such other Divisions and 
Services to consider empl(yees of the assigned Serv­
ices component in staffing their components). Also, 
give consideration in staffing positions to men outside 
the Company organization, where necessary or appro­
priate, to develop optimum personnel stature and per­
formance. Remove, after appraisal against performance 
standards and after proper discussion with the indi­
vidual, any person who is inadequate in performance 
or compatibility.
Integrating
Train and develop managerial and functional employ­
ees for promotion and transfer outside the Services 
component, to help meet requirements for continuity, 
growth, and expansion of the Company.
Devote most of personal time, available for Company 
work, to building Company leadership through the 
managing of Functional and Appraisal Services in the 
assigned function.
Mtazwlng
Recognize the need to  measure both the over all Func­
tion and each of its sub-functions in correlation with 
the over-all Company system of measurement. This 
over all system of measurement should provide for 
selection of results to be measured, broken down 
into increments of sub-functional work, and should 
provide for creation of appropriate measuring units 
to  be used. I t  should not resort merely to such in­
adequate and ineffective measures as number of em­
ployees on payroll, num ber of Services man-days spent 
witii Operating component personnel, o r number of 
projects in progress.
RelaHenshIp ResponslblfHlM
The Services Officer is responsible for review m th  
the Chairman of the Board and (Thief Executive Offi­
cer: over all progress and results of Services Mana­
gerial performance against previously established 
objectives, policies, plans, programs, and budgets of 
the Services component; use of its resources; his 
management, as well as that of others of the Services 
component; and m ajor objectives, policies, plans, and 
programs for the future of the Services component.
The Services Officer works with the Chadmian of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer, President, Group 
Executives, other Services Officers, Operating Officers, 
and General Managers, as required o r requested, with 
respect to matters of m ajor importance which are 
related to managing the assigned Services component.
T he Services Officer exercises his Services M an­
agerial authority through M anagers of Functional 
Services or Services components and individual func­
tional positions of the Services components as may be 
established in accordance with sound principles of 
management and organization. These principles of 
management and orgoniMOtion should be based on the 
broad criterion that the basic mission of the Services 
component is: to have and to multiply the use of 
expert knowledge in the assigned Functional field; 
to consider the Company as a whole from the point of 
view of such Functional knowledge; and geturally to 
organise and to use such primary Functional and 
sub-functional fields as the fundamental criteria for 
setting up permanent components and positions within 
the Services component.
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I'lic Services Officer should develop responsibility in 
each Consultant, and in other key employees in the 
Services component, with respect to cooperative and 
effective organizational relationships at all levels; and 
they should recognize the responsibilities and accounta- 
bilities which rest with the respective individual Exec­
utive, Services, and Operating Managers to whom all 
such work of the Company is assigned.
AUTHORITY AND RESERVATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
FOR DECISION-MAKING
The Services Officer’s authority to manage the work 
of the assigned Services component is commensurate 
with his responsibilities. His authority is complete and 
final in all matters for which he is responsible, except to 
the extent where decision-making is reserved by Com­
pany Policy Guides, and in General Instructions until 
suijcrseded by Company Policy Guides. Examples of 
reservations of decision-making authority from Serv­
ices Officers are:
Policy on Creating and Issuing Company Policies 
Policy Guide— General 20.1 
Organisation Nomenclature 
Policy Guide— General 2.1 
Planning of Organisation Structure 
Policy Guide— General 2.2 
Promotion or Transfer of Personnel to Manager, 
or Equivalent Professional or Technical, Positions 
Policy Guide-General 0.1 
Product Responsibility
Policy Guide— General 20.2 
Government Security Requirements 
Policy Guide— General 203  
Salaried Employee Compensation 
Policy Guide—P &  ER  1.4 
1 ncentive Compensation Plan 
Policy Guide—P  &  E R  1.2 
Plant Appropriations
Policy Guide—Manufacturing 3.1 
Subscriptions
General Instruction 13.1 
Pension Board Functions
Pension Plan; and G.O.A. No. B-18.1
The Services Officer has authority to make recom­
mendations in subject matter where decision-making 
authority is reserved, to  obtain decisions thereon, and 
to take appropriate action thereafter.
The Services Officer may delegate appropriate por­
tions of his managerial responsibilities, authority, and 
relationships to any member of his assigned Services 
component, except as otherwise set forth in th is and in 
other Company Otganization and Policy Guides. How­
ever, he may not relieve himself of over-all responsi­
bility and accountalnlity for the results of such dele­
gated managerial responsibilities, nor for proper inter­
pretation and conduct of relationships.
Each Services Officer has the authority and the re­
sponsibility to prepare and issue a supplement to this 
Services Officer Position Guide for his particular posi­
tion, which will describe his work in the assigned 
Services component in terms of its specific work, and 
consistent with this Position Guide.
The cost of managerial work performed by the  Serv­
ices Officer, Consultants, and Managers of the as­
signed Services component will be financed as part of. 
and in the same manner as, the Functional work which 
is being managed.
MEASURES OF ACCOUNTABILITY
T he primary measures of a  Services Officer’s per­
formance of Services Managerial work are:
The depth of his understanding o f:
T he part played by a  large decentralized industrial 
Company in the national and international environ­
ments in which it exists.
The problems—amidst the economic, social, govern­
ment, and competitive forces which continuously 
impinge upon the Company—to produce optimum 
profits and benefits to its customers, share owners, 
employees, suppliers, and the public and its repre­
sentative, Government.
The opportunity available to the Company as a  
whole, to take full advantage of improving the func­
tional effectiveness and eflfidency of each of its 
decentralized Operating businesses, by advancing 
and applying new and existing functional knowledge 
to their operations. The opportunity for making 
such knowledge available, on a  timely basis, to 
society in general, therein achieving greater and 
earlier improvements in Operating performance, and
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in the Compands over-ail contribution to society 
than would otherwise be possible.
The soundness of the objectives, policies, plans, and 
programs for managing the Services component, spe­
cifically a s  they reflect a  broad understanding and a 
determ ined effort to  meet the Services component’s 
managerial challenges and opportunities.
The ex ten t of the successful and timely accomplish­
ment of th e  objectives of the Services component, and 
the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of its opera­
tion, considering both the cost thereof and the expenses 
which Operating M anagers and General Managers 
incur to  achieve related benefits.
T he d% ree of success in maintenance of proper 
balance between long- and short-range managerial 
and other objectives of the Services component; and 
between the  interests of customers, share owners, em­
ployees, suppliers, and the public and its rqiresentative, 
Government.
The calibre of his performance of “The W ork of a 
Professional M anager” ; and the calibre and perform­
ance of the Services component’s Managerial and 
Functional personnel, in acting as true  multipliers of 
knowledge in the Functional work among Operating 
components.
T he calibre of his interpretation and performance of 
the Services Managerial relationship responsibilities 
set forth in  P a rt 3.
T h e  quality and timeliness of his decisions and actions 
with regard to  Services Managerial responsibilities 
of the position, including the quality and timeliness 
of his recommendations where decision-making au­
thority is reserved, and in securing decisions thereon, 
and in  taking appropriate action thereafter.
T he quality of managerial and functional personnel, 
developed and made available, for other organization 
components of the Company.
T he dqp‘ee to which he is successful in utilizing the 
assigned Services component’s resources for Services 
Functional work, and in promptly accomplishing the 
transfer of temporary Operating work to appropriate 
Operating Departments, where it can be performed 
better and more easily.
PART 4 —  FUNCTIONAL WORK (OPERATING!
PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITIES
The Services Officer is responsible for interpreting 
and discharging his Functional Operating responsi­
bilities w ith  respect to  ;
Company-a»-a-W hela Functional Operating Work
This w ork is performed on an over all corporate basis, 
as assigned by the Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer to specific Services Officers, and 
as defined in individual supplements to  Services 
Officer Position Guide. The Company-as-a-whole 
Functional Operating work to  be performed includes 
detailed planning and layout of such w ork; assem­
bling of the human and material resources with 
which i t  is to be perform ed; application of efficient 
and economical use of such resources to accomplish 
the work, and final inspection of the results of such 
work. Examples are: Company institutional advertis­
ing; consotidaHon of accounting data for corporate
purposes; and preparation of corporate income tax 
returns.
The responsibility of managing specific Operating 
work is covered in Part 3 of Serxnces Officer Position 
Guide.
Poolad Functional OporaHng Work
T his work is performed on a pooled basis for some, 
but not all. Operating components, as assigned by 
the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer 
to qiedfic Services Officers, and defined in individual 
supplements to the Services Officer Position Guide. 
T he responsible M anagers of Operating components 
have elected to  get such special work accomplished 
in  this way rather than l y  employees on their own 
payroll, o r  by nonaffiliated consultants or vendors. 
Pooled Functional Operating work includes detaUed 
planning and layout of such work; assembling of the 
human and material resources with which it is to be
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ftcrjoniu’iJ ; application and efficient economical use 
of such resources in accomplishing the work, and in 
final inspection of the results of this work.
Services components will not undertake work which 
O p era tin g  Departments can arrange to do for them­
selves. unless decision to perform specific, limited 
p(X)ied Functional Operating work in the Services com- 
iwnent has been made in conformity with Company 
Policy on “Planning of Organization Structure”— 
cither indefinitely or temporarily, pending determina­
tion on how and where such work can be placed 
advantageously in Operating Departments which have 
profit responsibility.
Services components will not undertake to perform 
Functions—even if in the assigned Functional field of 
the Services components—which have been assigned to 
Functional or geographical Operating components on 
a Company-wide basis. Correspondingly, Operating 
Departments will not duplicate Services work or O p­
erating work that is performed in the Services compo­
nent, after determination has been made and during 
the period when such Functions are being performed 
in the Services components.
The responsibility of managing specific Operating 
work has been included in Part 3 of Services Officer 
Position Guide.
Controctor-typ* Functional OporaHng Work Profocts
This Functional Operating work may be performed 
by the Services component on behalf of individual or­
ganization components, when the Services Officer who 
has responsibility for such Functional work agrees that 
the individual 0]>erating component does not have, 
and cannot Ije expected reasonably to acquire, either 
the skills or the facilities for performing the work 
within its own organization structure.
The Services component may hove such skills and fa­
cilities available temporarily for use on such projects, 
hut it may be found impractical to transfer these skills 
and facilities to the Operating components within its 
organization .structure. Or, it may be that such services 
do not e.vist currently in the Services component, or 
that such nonrecurring work cannot be done reasonably
by outside consultants or by other non-Company per­
sonnel. In either instance, the undertaking of such work 
should be accomplished on the basis of a  separate and 
temporary organization component o r position ; and it 
should be establshed in the Services component in ac­
cordance with G)mpany P o li^  on “ Planning of O r­
ganization Structure.”
The responsibility of managing such specific Operat­
ing work has been included in Part 3 of Services 
Officer Position Guide.
Jtolcrtianihip Raapensibilltias
The Services Officer will review with the Chairman of 
the Board and Chief Executive Officer over all prog­
ress and results of performance of assigned Functional 
Operating work against previously established ob­
jectives, policies, plans, programs, and budgets; use 
of the resources of the Services component, and m ajor 
Functional Operating objectives, policies, plans, and 
pr% ram s for the future of the Services component.
The Services Officer will work with the Chairman of 
the Board and Chief Executive Officer, President, 
Group Executives, Services Officers, Operating Offi­
cers, and General Managers, as required o r requested, 
with respect to  matters of m ajor importance within 
their respective areas of responsibility, and which arc 
related to the assigned Functional Operating work.
The Services Officer will conduct assigned Functional 
Operating work through M anagers of components, 
or through incumbents of individual Functional posi­
tions in the Services component. These positions skoutd 
be established in cucordanee with sound principles of 
management and organisation, and within the au­
thority delegated to the Services Offi.cer in this Posi­
tion Guide.
The Services Officer should encourage each M anager 
and other kqr employees in the Services component to 
exercise individual responsibility and cooperative and 
effective organizational relationships at all levels in 
Functional Operating work. They should recognize also 
that responsibility and accountabilify for all Operating 
work rest w ith the respective individual Executive, 
Services, Operating, and General Managers, to whom 
all such work of the Company is assigned.
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Services Components
AUTHORITY AND RESERVATIONS OF AUTHORITY FOR DEaSION-MAKING
The Services Officer’s authority is commensurate with 
his responsibility in regard to Functional Operating 
work assigned to the Services component. H is authority 
is complete and final in all matters for which he is re­
sponsible, except to the extent where decision-making 
authority is reserved in  Company Polity  Guides.
The Services Officer has authority to make recom­
mendations concerning subject m atter in  which 
decision-making authority is reserved, to  obtain 
decisions thereon, and to  take appropriate action 
thereafter.
T he Services Officer may del%ate appropriate portions 
of his Functional Operating responsibilities, authority, 
and relationships to any member of his Services com­
ponent, except as otherwise set forth in this and in 
other Company Organization and Polity Guides. How­
ever, he may not relieve himself of over all responsi­
bility and accountability for the results of such 
delegated responsibilities, and for the proper interpre­
tation and conduct of relationships.
T he cost of Functional Operating work, performed by 
a  Services component, wiU be financed as follows :
(a ) F o r work to the Company as a  whole—from 
resources created by the profitability of the 
over all business of the Company as a  whole.
(b )  F o r other Operating work—on a  "professional 
fee" basis to the components who require such 
Operating work.
MEASURES OF ACCOUNTABILITY
The prim ary measures of a  Services Officer’s per­
formance of Functional Operating work assigned to 
the Services component will be :
T he quality of his understanding and interpreta­
tion of the Company’s concept of decentralization, 
which places responsibility for Functional Operat­
ing work in O ^ ra tin g  Departments which have 
profit responsibility; and the quality of his inter­
pretation of the criteria for undertaking contractor- 
type Functional Operating work projects in the 
assigned Services component
The quality and the d% ree of attainment of objec­
tives that are established for Functional Operating 
work, assigned to or undertaken by the Services 
component
T he quality of his interpretation and performance 
of the relationship responsibilities set forth herein 
in  P a rt 4.
The quality and timeliness of his decisions and ac­
tions as to the Functional Operating responsibilities 
of the position, including the quality and timeliness 
of his recommendations where decision-making 
authority is reserved, and in securing decisions 
thereon, and in taking appropriate action thereafter.
ISSUID BT THl DATS ISSUID SUPERSEDES ISSUE DATED PACEChairman of the Board
and
Chief Executive OfiScer 4/24/58 5/26/55 13 OP 13
Appendix Exhibit 3-2 
INVESTMENTS IN FACILITIES
This six-page policy statement was issued June 15, 1964 
and explains the dollar value that can be spent by 
managers at various levels without approval from the 
respective supervisors.
G E N E R A L  ( g  E L E C T R I C
ORGANIZATION AND POLICY GUIDE
SUBJECT TAB NO.
INVESTMENTS IN FACILITIES General 2 0 . 6
N E E D  FO R  A D IR E C T IV E  PO LIC Y
T he continuing progress and growth of the Com pany will depend upon the  success of General Electric 
people in searching out and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by  new custom er needs or 
increased Company ability to  serve customer needs. T he long-range character an d  future success of the  
Com pany will be determined by  th e  foresight used in selecting among the  opportunities available and by 
the skill and judgm ent exercised in the development of the  business plans based on the opportunities se­
lected. In  most instances, these plans will anticipate investm ents in p lan t and equipm ent as well as m ajor 
expense outlays. Decisions on investm ents in facilities should be m ade in the context of to tal investm ent 
opportunities including investm ent of funds in inventory and  receivables and in th e  development of new 
products, new processes and new m arkets. In  order to  accomplish healthy  growth and  meet the other ob­
jectives of the Company, efficient utilization and operation of existing facilities is also required and  the  
balanced integration of new facilities into the to ta l C om pany and  the individual businesses is of the u tm ost 
im portance.
A Directive Policy on investm ents in facilities is needed to  ensure the enhancem ent of the  common 
interests of the corporate enterprise as well as continued progress in searching ou t, planning and  imple­
m enting profitable investm ent opportunities in the decentralized businesses.
S T A T E M E N T  O F D IR E C T IV E  PO LIC Y
F unds for p lan t and other facilities shall be appropriated with due consideration of the  other invest­
m ent opportunities and requirem ents of Company components, the availability of funds, and the  over-all 
Com pany objectives in order to  accomplish the  common purpose of the  most efficient and  profitable short- 
and long-range use of capital. Subsequent sections of th is  Directive Policy relate to  the forecasting of in­
vestm ent, obtaining individual appropriations, applying th e  expenditure of funds to  obtain  optim um  bene­
fits, and  measuring progress and  results achieved.
R E SPO N SIB IL IT Y  AND A U T H O R IT Y
D esignation o f Positions Responsible for Applying the  D irective Policy
•  M anagers and General M anagers are responsible for searching out, developing and planning invest­
m ent opportunities and  subsequently preparing proposals for investm ents in facilities in  accordance 
w ith this Directive Policy, and  for the wise and  tim ely expenditure of funds appropriated  thereunder.
•  T he Officer (other than  th e  President and Chief Executive Officer or the  Chairm an of th e  B oard) or 
M anager having au thority  for approval of requests for appropriation of funds for facilities shall, 
prior to  granting his approval, discuss each project w ith his M anager for th e  purpose of obtaining 
over-all Company perspective and such other applicable inform ation as his M anager m ay have. Such 
consultations also serve to  bring up  to  the corporate level, as appropriate, knowledge of individual 
businesses necessary for integrating the over-all Com pany interests. However, th e  Officer or M anager 
having the  au thority  to  approve th e  proposal still re tains full au tho rity  an d  responsibility for the 
decision.
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INVISTMINTS IN rACIUTllS (ConHnwd)
Reservations o f A uthority  fo r A pproval o f A ppropriation P u n d i for PacUitiea
A ppropriations for A uthority  to  G ran t Approval
A. L and or O ther Real P roperty
1. Purchase of land  or o ther real p roperty  for $50,000 
or more and  sale of land  o r o ther real p roperty  for 
which th e  first cost (original cost plus the cost of 
any  im provem ents) w as $50,000 o r more.
2. Purchase of land or o ther real property for less th an  
$50,000 or sale of land or other real p roperty  for 
which th e  first cost (original cost plus first cost of 
any  im provem ents) w as less th an  $50,000.
B. O ther Facilities Purchases and  All Leases
1. I nvestm ent expenditures an d /o r lease com m itm ents 
of $500,000 or more.
2. I  nvestm ent expenditures an d /o r lease com m itm ents 
up  through $499,999:
a . Operations— M eeting C riteria
b. Operations— N ot M eeting C riteria; and  Services
3. Investm ent expenditures a n d /o r  lease com m itm ents 
u p  through $249,999:
a. O perations— M eeting C riteria
b. Operations— N ot h^seting Criteria
c. Services
4. Investm ent expenditures an d /o r lease com m itm ents 
less th an  $100,000:
a. O perations— M eeting Criteria
b. O perations- N ot M eeting Criteria
c. Services
1. B oard  of D irectors
P resident and  Chief Executive Officer or 
C hairm an of th e  Board
1. B oard of Directors
2.
3.
a. G roup Executive
b. P resident and  Chief Executive Officer 
o r C hairm an of th e  Board
a. D ivirion General M anager o r M anager 
a t  equivalent organisation level
b. G roup Executive
c. Services Officer
a. D epartm ent General M anager o r M an­
ager a t  equivalent organization level*
b. One organization level higher th an  
delegated approval for operations m eet­
ing criteria
c. Services Officer*
* Services Officers and D epartm ent General M anagers and  those holding equivalent positions m ay dele­
gate au tho rity  w ithin these lim its to  appropriate m em bers of their organizations who, in tu rn , m ay dele­
gate au th o rity  within designated lim its to  o ther M anagers, in channels.
C riteria  for D eterm ining A pproval Requirem ents
The criteria are based on th e  premise th a t  (1) com ponents which m ake adequate p lans and  ca rry  them  
o u t w ith reasonable perform ance will be free to  invest in  facility  projects w ithin th e  l e g a t e d  au th o rity  of 
p lan t appropriation approval levels, and  conversely (2) com ponents which have not dem onstrated  reason­
able performance in preparing an d  executing business plans will have less freedom w ith  respect to  plant 
appropriations. Accordingly, th e  following criteria  re la te  t o  D epartm ent or equivalent com ponent perform ­
ance and  not to  th e  relative m erits of an  individual p ro jec t or a  group of projects.
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To qualify for maximum au th o rity  fo r approval, a  com ponent w ith profit an d  loss responsibility (1) 
should have realized 90% of budgeted residual income for the  p ast calendar year, and  (2) shall expect to  
realize a t  least 90% of its budgeted residual income for th e  curren t calendar year including im plementation 
of the project.
Operating components which do no t have profit an d  loss responsibility and  cannot, therefore, be meas­
ured on a  residual income basis will be considered as qualifying if operating expenses have been less th an  
budget during the  preceding and  curren t calendar years and  if th e  im plem entation of th e  proposed project 
will no t cause th e  component to  exceed its  budgeted expenses for th e  curren t year.
D istribution components which have sales responsibility, b u t do n o t have profit and  loss responsibility, 
will be considered as qualifying if the  ra tio s  of operating expenses to  sales or orders have been equivalent 
to  or less than  th e  budgeted ra tio  during th e  preceding and curren t calendar years and  if im plem entation 
of the  proposed project will no t cause th e  com ponent to  exceed its  budgeted ra tio  of expenses to  sales o r 
orders for the current year.
Responsibility to  O btain and to  Supply Counsel R elating to  Proposed Facility  A ppropriations
General M anagers and  M anagers of O perating com ponents and  M anagers of Services com ponents in­
itiating facility investm ent proposals are responsible for seeking o u t an d  obtaining th e  m ost expert advice 
and counsel available in th e  course of investm ent opportun ity  planning and  subsequent preparation of all 
appropriation requests. In  connection w ith  all appropriations involving investm ent expenditures or lease 
com m itm ents of $100,000 or more, advice an d  counsel shall be requested from  appropriate Services an d  a  
w ritten record of their comments included in  the  proposal as  subm itted  for approrâls.
Services Officers, Services M anagers an d  o ther appropriate Services personnel have responsibility for 
providing counsel and  advice, upon request, w ith respect to  all facility investm ent proposals. Such counsel 
and  advice shall be subm itted  in w ritten  form  and  included w ith appropriation  requests subm itted  for re­
view and approval. Services appraisals of appropriation requests have th e  purpose o f providing additional 
inform ation and perspective to  com ponent M anagers and  General M anagers for form ulation of bo th  business- 
oriented and over-all corporate decisions, an d  of supplem enting functional com petence available w ithin 
decentralized components. T he M anager or General M anager of each com ponent, however, re ta ins full and  
continuing responsibility no t only to  p lan  investm ent opportunities an d  facility  acquisitions to  serve the  
lim ited an d  im m ediate needs of th e  com ponent b u t also to  gain from  such use o f funds th e  maxim um  long- 
range contribution to  the  over-all Com pany.
The President and  Chief Executive Officer, Chairm an of th e  Board, G roup Executives, Division G eneral 
M anagers, and o ther M anagers as specified, are responsible for reviewing facility investm ent proposals in 
accordance w ith th e  provisions of this D irective Policy.
PL A N T  E X P E N D IT U R E S  FORECA STS
To obtain maximum benefit from  funds expended o n  p lan t facilities, advance planning shall be con­
ducted on a  continuous basis. Each D epartm en t shall provide for th e  developm ent of such facilities pro­
grams in suflScient detail to  itemize every pro ject w ith  investm ent of $10,000 <xt more. T hese jplans, con­
tinuously m aintained and  projected, shall serve as th e  basis for budgets an d  forecasts of p lan t expenditures 
to  be prepared periodically.
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P L A N T  A PPR O PR IA T IO N  REQUESTS
Projects for which appropriation requests are  in itiated  shall be w ithin th e  scope of th e  organization’s 
Business C harter an d  shall derive from, support and  be com patible w ith, the business p lan  of th e  component.
A uthority  for Approval
Reservations of au thority  for approval are based on th e  am ount of investm ent expenditure p lus the 
lease com m itm ent and  expenses associated w ith th e  lease com m itm ent. The to ta l am ount of th e  appropri­
ation, however, shall also include all o ther related  expenses which are not capitalized. A nticipated starting  
costs for which separate accounting records are no t generally m aintained an d  which are connected w ith a  
project shall be shown as a  memorandum. F or th e  purpose of determ ining th e  am ount of investm ent ex­
penditure and  the level of approval required, i t  is no t necessary to  include th e  cost of equipm ent m anufactured 
and  sold by th e  D epartm ent as a  p a rt of its regular product line, if th is  equipm ent replaces sim ilar equip­
m ent which has been displayed for custom ers under a  plan for regularly converting to  equipm ent of the  
latest design, and  th e  replaced equipm ent will be disposed of through regular sales channels a t  a  substan tial 
portion of its  original equipm ent value.
Investm ent
Investm ent expenditures under facility appropriations represent am ounts which will be capitalized in 
plant and  equipm ent and  leasehold cost accounts. A ny facility investm ent am ounting to  $10,000 o r more, or 
any purchase o r sale of land shall be supported b y  an  approved p lan t appropriation request before any 
com m itm ent is made.
Lease C om m itm ents
The approval level for an  appropriation covering leasing of facilities will be determ ined b y  th e  aggre­
gate am ount of the firm lease com m itm ent (or one year’s rental if the  lease com m itm ent is for less th an  one 
year b u t plans provide for a t  least one year’s use of th e  facilities) plus re la ted  expenses. F o r leases covering 
buildings and  o ther structures, th is includes leasehold and  relocation costs an d  costs norm ally borne b y  the  
landlord b u t which are being assumed by the  lessee. F or com puter and o ther equipm ent leases, th e  level of 
approval required will be determ ined by the  aggregate cost of th e  lease com m itm ent plus related  expenses 
including program ming an d  system  im plem entation effort necessary to  utilize th e  equipm ent to  a  degree 
th a t will economicaliy justify  th e  installation. An approved appropriation will be required before a  lease, 
commitment can be m ade on any  project w ith investm ent, ren t, and re la ted  expense to taling  $10,000 or 
more. However, it will no t be necessary to  prepare subsequent appropriation requests for continued ren ta l 
of the equipm ent beyond th e  first year unless the  ren ta l com m itm ent exceeds $250,000 a t  an y  one tim e and 
covers a  period in excess of one year.
Scope o f  P ro ject
In determ ining the  scope of a  project and the  am ount to  be requested, all purchases, costs and  ac­
tivities essential to com plete the planned undertaking shall be included; namely, all item s of investm ent 
and all item s of unusual expense. For example, accessories should be included w ith th e  tnain equipm ent, 
machines should be groujxid for appropriation approval if they  are  p a rt of an  expansion o r m odernization 
program, or cost of rearrangem ent required by  installation of new equipm ent should b e  conridered an  in- 
tegrsl p a r t of a  project.
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Change in Scope or Reaulta, Requirements for Addltlonsl Fuads
After an  appropriation has been granted, a  change of scope o r a  significant change in  resu lts to  be 
obtained shall receive the sam e careful planning tmd correlation of investm ent opportunities an d  approvals 
as the  original proposal.
A revised request shall be subm itted in  accordance w ith th e  reservations of au th o rity  established in 
th is D irective Policy if (1) investm ent expenditures an d /o r lease com m itm ents are expected to  exceed ap­
proved am ounts by 10% or $100,000 whichever is smtdler, (2) to ta l expenditures and  lease com m itm ents 
are expected to  exceed the  to ta l  approved am ount by 10%, o r (3) i t  is determ ined th a t  th ere  wiU be a  rig- 
nificant change in th e  am ount or tim ing o f cost reductions, profitability, sales increase o r  o ther benefits to  
be realized from  th a t  which w as included in  th e  appropriation a t  th e  tim e ^>proval was granted.
Separation in to  Phases
In  some instances, extensive or long-range projects are developed in tw o o r more phases and  i t  is logical 
to  subm it individtuJ appropriation requests for each phase. In  these cases, th e  ex ten t of the  com plete pro­
gram  and  totfd estim ated funds required shall be outlined in each of the requests. Approval level for the 
proposed project shall be determ ined on th e  basis of to ta l  p ro jec t estim ates including previously approved 
am ounts and estim ated fu tu re  requests.
Feasibility Studies
Projects specifically identified in approved budget an d /o r long-range forecast exhibits c*m be carried 
through the developm ent of preliminEuy fEicility design Emd the  acquisition of s ite  options in  advsmoe of 
to ta l project approval. All o thers should be lim ited to  determ ination of project feasibility and to  th e  studies 
and  planning necessary to  prepare appropriation estim ates. A pproval of funds fo r feasibility studies should 
be on th e  basis of a  separate appropriation request approved b y  th e  appropriate M anager as indicated in 
Reservations of A uthority  for A pproval of A ppropriation F unds for Facilities as contained in th is  Directive 
Policy. W hen such am ounts a re  appropriated in  advance of to ta l project approval, th ey  shall be shown as 
previously approved portions o f the  proposed to ta l project.
Failure to  Conomit Funds
If a t  lefwt a  partia l com m itm ent is n o t m ade under an  appropriation w ith in  a  period of six m onths 
following its approvEd, the  appropriation shall be canceled by th e  interested com ponent unless such delay 
was planned and  explsiined in  th e  appropriation request. I t  can  be resubm itted, however, if an d  when th e  
project is reactivated.
PL A N T  A PPR O PR IA T IO N  R E PO R T S
Status reports shall be prepm ed periodically on projects covered by open appropriations. T hese shall 
refiect and  explain revisions from  th e  approved appropriation request w ith respect to  estim ates o f tim ing, 
am ount of expenditures and  benefits to  be realised.
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After appropriations are closed and results can be appraised, reports will b e  prepared which summarize 
and  explain variances between estim ated an d  actual expenditures an d  benefits.
Above reports will be prepared  in  accordance with functional procedures a s  defined herein. Accounting 
.Services will prepare suitable sum m aries for members of the  Executive Office.
FU N C T IO N A L  PR O C E D U R E S
Functional Procedures issued by  Accounting, M anufacturing, and  o ther Services, will delineate from 
tim e to  time consistent procedures and forms, and  reporting as required.
O perating and Services com ponents shall further supplem ent th is  D irective Policy in  accordance w ith 
the internal needs of each com ponent.
Appendix Exhibit 3-3
HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATION DEMONSTRATING 
SENSITIVITY OF RESIDUAL DOLLAR PROFIT 
AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT INDEXES
APPENDII EXHIBIT 3-3
ffiffCIBEIICAL. HfUBTR^IQW DBWffSTRATIWg REI.attto RRNsniyirY OF 
BESIDDAI HQLLftR PROFIT AMD RglTON OH PTVESTMEWT
AMKnamtlonn
1. Profit Taries directly vlth changes In sales volume. Ratio to sales remains constant.
2. InTostnsnt consists of 40$ ($10 300) fixed and 60$ ($15 000) variable. Variable portion varies directly vlth changes
In sales volume.
Sales Profit Investnent
Return on Residual dollar 
nrofltv$ V$ Vfe Bate vt A^gunt
Base period $100 000 $10 000 $25 000 40.0$ $8 750
80$ of base period So 000 (20.0)$ 8 0 0 0 (20.0)$ 22 000 (12.0)$ 36.4 ( 9.0)$ 6 900 (21.1)$
60$ of base period 60 000 (25.0) 6 000 (25.0) 19 000 (13.6) 31.6 (13.2) 5 050 (26.8)
*•0$ of base period *10 000 (33.3) 4 000 (33 3) 16 000 (15.8) 25.0 (20.9) 3 200 (36.6)
20$ of base period 20 000 (50.0) 2 000 (50.0) 13 000 (18.8) 15.4 (38.4) 1 250 (60.9)
10$ of base period 10 000 (50.0) 1 000 (50.0) 11 500 (11.5) 8 .7 (*»3.5) 425 (66.0)
5$ of base period 5 000 (50.0) 500 (50.0) 10 750 ( 6.5) *».7 (46.0) (38) (108.9)
w•«j•u
V $ s Variance from preceding perled.
In this exhibit we have assumed that the business is able to 
maintain its rate of profit to sales in the face of declining 
volume and that the variable portion of its investment decreases 
proportionately with the reduction :ln sales, both of which are 
optimistic assumptions. Ton will daeerve from the percentages 
showing the variations between the two indexes from period to 
period that Residual Aoflt falls olff faster than Rate of Return 
and thus is more likely to alert the appraiser earlier to the 
need for remedial aetion
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Appendix Exhibit 3-4
COMPARISON OF PROFITABILITY INDEXES
Illustrations Showing Return on 
Investment and Residual Dollar Profit 
Indexes Moving in Same Direction
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C0MBAMS0I6 OP PBOPITABILrrY TimigCKS - SELECTED OPEBATIIR DEPARTMENTS 
Illmtratlw»» Showing Beturn oa Iweetment »na Be«ldual Dollar Profit Indexes Morlag In the Direction
Department No. 1 Department No. 2
(Amount* In thou**ed«] 1951 1952 . 1953 1954 1951 1952 1953 1954
OpontiiiK Stntlatles 





































Ret '.neome (after tazea] $455 $4 042 $5 239 $3 330 $2 767 $2 171 $1 740 $301
f Ret income to aalea 1.3$ 8.5$ 10.3$ 8.0$ 2.7$ 2.5$ 1.7$ 0.3$
Return on taveatment 5.7 51.7 106.8 85.6 7.7 9.4 8.5 1.4
Realdual dollar profit $57 $3 651 $4 994 $3 135 $971 $1 015 $720 $(749)
f reaidual profit to 
contributed value 0.2H 9.3$ 13.2$ 10.0$ 2.4$ 3.0$ 1.7$ (2.0)$
(Aaounta in thouaaada)
Department Ho. 3 Department Ho. 4
1951 1952 1953 19)4 1951 1952 1953 1954
Dseratini Statlatica 
























$99 437 $185 596 
52 432 89 978 
42 868 47 490 
1 161 13 097




Bet income (after 50> tazea) $5 218 $4 998 $5 587 $3 202 $1 U 4 $580 $6 549 $7 977
% net income to aalea 8.4H 8.7$ 8.7$ 5.0$ 1.7$ 0.6$ 3.5$ 4.0$
Return oa invaatmeut 36.6 34.8 37.9 18.2 3.6 1J4 13.8 17.9
Reaidual dollair profit $% 504 $4 260 $4 850 $2 324 $(437) $(1 562) $4 174 $5 744
% reaidual profit to 
contributed value HA 15.5$ 14.3$ 7.(3$ (1.3» (3.0)$ 4.6$ 6.5$
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A p p e n d i x  Exhibit 3 - 5
COMPARISONS OF PROFITABILITY INDEXES
Illustrations of Conflict Between 
Return on Investment and Residual 
Dollar Profit Indexes
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KM?;̂ go:g OT PrCFJ/jnmr rrogns - ̂ rrr/rm nrn̂ riSG rEPAariean-s 
m u r t w i q a  o f  C o n flic t»  r c tv e e n  Setanx oa  ""/i Rn a ld n a i  D o I iftT - P r o r i |  In ie x e »
D epartm ent So. 5 DenartBS n t  Bo. 6
L 's s u n t j .  In  tb o u sen d s) 1951 1(52 1953 1951 1951 1952 1953 1951 1951 1952 1953 1951
Ç s E o U a e - ï lB U s U s g
n e t  s a le s  b i l l e d  
C o D trlb u tad  va lu e  
Average lo v e s ta e n t 
Income from  s a le s










M l  627
31 S i t
7 050
8  511



























9 l i e
2 911
1 9 1 :
p r f l i t a b i U t y  ladTAgg 
Met income ( a f t e r  ta x e s ) $k  416 $1 SB*» $ 1 2 5 5 $1  891 $1  130 $696 $1 352 $1  519 $1  116 $955
^  Het Income t o  s a le s 11 .15 13.25 13.25 9 .75 8 .0 5 1 .1 5 7 .15 7 .65 7 .3 5 3 - r .
R etu rn  on Investm ent 6 3 .9 72 .9 60.1 53 .1 51 .2 21 .1 39 .9 3 1 ,9 12 .0 32 5
R es id u a l d o l l a r  p r o f i t $1  123 $1 337 $3 902 $1 717 $1  298 $553 $1  183 $1 327 $1  217 $808
^  r e s id u a l  p r o f i t  t o  
c o n tr ib u te d  va lu e 13 . 7 t 12.55 12-35 U .8 Î 9 .8 5 1 .15 11.95 13 35 12. 8 .6 '
(Anounts In  th o u san d s) D e se n m e rt s o .  8 n e c e r ta e n t  S o . 9
1951 13% 1953 1951 1951 1952 1953 1951 l y i 1952 19S1 1051
CSgjEaUCC-SXeJitotlSi
L et s a le s  t i l l e d  
C o n tr ib u te d  va lu e  
Average in vestm en t 

















































P r o f l t a b l l l t v  Indexes 
Net Incooo ( a f t e r  50$ ta x e s ) $12 897 $15 555 j l 9  093 $23 116 $1  312 $861 $1  712 $2 953 $8 673 $18 553 $19  960 $17 08:
% n e t  In c a se  t o  s a le s 11.95 12-35 13.15 13 % 5.7 5 1 .5 5 6 .8 5 8 .7 5 3 . # 1 .25 3 .5 5 1.15
R e tu rn  on In e e s ta e n t 51 3 1 5 .5 15 .3 5 1 .1 19.5 13 .1 57.5 32.8 39 .7 35 .5 58 .1 55 .0
R e s id u a l d o l l a r  p r o f i t $11 6kO $13 831 $16 97D $21 318 $ 752 $ 639 $ 1 591 $ 2 502 $ 7 582 $15 977 318 270 $15 529
$  r e s id u a l  p r o f i t  t o  
c o n tr ib u te d  v a lu e 15.35 15 .25 16.85 18.15 7 .2 5 5-35 10 .35 11.55 5 .1 1 7 .1 5 B .65 8.25
W-J00
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Jmaij,  195^, B chlb lt No, j.
Appendix Exhibit 3-6
MEASUREMENTS — PRODUCT LEADERSHIP APPRAISAL OF 
PRODUCT IN COMPARISON WITH COMPETITION RADIO AND 
TELEVISION DEPARTMENT 
(7 Page Exhibit)
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C. Coomtnfctloo 1. Brtdaea of fsod 
bnaie daatgn
(a) Inapaetlon (Bator'a opinion)
(b) Cnatonv mraaya
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taetorr wvauaip
(a) Inapaetlon (later'a opinion)
(b) Cuatoav aarvaja
Sacallant 5 Vary good 9 A3 ï« r y  good 9 A3 i T«7 good 9
t
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Tot ai aaiaif act trim* cost
Variaoc# io mmufaeturlAg cost 
attrlbutabl* to dlffarcocM la 
parfonanea, faatw##, and/or attraetlranass :*
1. Spaakar (tooa)2. Phono Jack
3* Tamiar drira (aaaa of tualod)4. GriUa eiotb (ganarai attractlvaoaaa)
3. Additional colora (variatj of oolora)
6. Cabiiiat (gaoaral attractiranasa)
7 . Clock rmrdw&ra ( fa n a ra l  a ttra e t iT a n a s s )
8. Dial baam tuning and llla&ijutad dial
Tarlanca in aamfaeturlng coat attributahla 
to daaifn diffaraocaa that do not affact parformanea, faaturaa, <r attraetlwaaara !• Output trasaforaar
2. Tuning capacitor3. SlaatrolTtics4. Oaciliator coil 
5 If coUa6. Clock7. Clock ahiald8. All other
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(a) Mat variaoca Loiii L à .  LdL
a- Higbar (lo«v) cost eonparad idtb coat of Sat A.
1. ttai ml&tlv# «tftttdlBK ot tto teur clock radio ##to •imluoted la aa follow#:
• t foatir##,and AttrectirsDSss Nsnufacturiat Cost Cî si site
fcftS.
Set i 82à 3 IU.98 1 3Set B 878 1 15.53 A 1Set C B2A 3 15.20 2 ASet D 83A 2 15.21 3 2
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ScMral attraetlTcoaaa
Dial -baaa and lUoalnated
PbDoo Jack and "cuA^mflc" volam#
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Set 8 is th« only ooo ̂ diich has tbaso fcakurss. Yb# additional points (1)) galosd by tbass f sat arcs Justify tbs aW^ti^ml cost.
Tbs 10 additional points graced for the so dsslrabls fas turcs fklly justifies tbs smll additional met lafolved.
A smsl 1 advantage (S points) In stain and btra resistance aod dust repulsion was obtained in tbs se sets by pbsooBA
*Ms*™mds for tbs cabiast. This sdTsotsge, bowsssr, doss aot justify the substaotlal addltiomi oast laeurted la obtaiaiag tbs adrsntage.
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PRODUCT LEADERSHIP SUMMARY 
1955
Product l ine Total
A B C D  Department
Served market -a)-b) $8 000 $15 000 $8 000 $2 500 $33 500
Products superior to 
competition 
Sales -a)
% of total sales 
% of served market 
Gross margin %
400 $ 600 $ 600 $ 100 $ 3 700
60% 20% 30% 10% 37%
30 4 7 1/2 4 11
42 40 29 50 40
Products equal to 
competition
Sales -a) $1 200 $ 1 500 $1 200 $ 700 $ 4 600
% of total sales 30% 50% 60% 70% 46%
% of served market 15 10 15 28 14
Gross margin % 44 37 23 55 38
Products inferior to
competition
Sales -a) $ 400 $ 900 $ 200 $ 200 $ 1 700
% of total sales 10% 30% 10% 20% 17%
% of served market 5 6 2 1/2 8 5
Gross margin % 18 12 18 28 16
All products
Total sales -a) $4 000 $ 3 000 $2 000 $1 000 $10 000
% of total sales 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
% of served market 50 20 25 40 30
Gross margin % 40 30 25 49 35
(a- In thousands
(b- For purposes of this illustration, it was assumed that all products in a 
given product Une were intended to serve the same market.
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ABC DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFICATION OF MARKET POSITION BY P R O D U C T  LEADERSHIP RATING
Product line A 
(9 0 %  of served morket)
Product line 8 
(20%  of served morket)
5 %
1 5 %
M i l M M  1 0 %  
6 %
Product line C 
( 2 5 %  of served morket)
Product line D 
( 4 0 %  of served morket)
Totol department 




^ 4 %  __________________
8 %
^ 5 %
I ■ * I » I « I 
0  10 20  3 0  4 0
%  of served market
Superiar to competition 




CLASSIFICATION OF SALES BY PRODUCT LEADERSHIP RATING
Product line A 
(Soles: $ 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 )
Product line C 
(Soles; $ 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 )
Product line 0 
(Soles: $ 1 ,000,000)
Product line B 







] 6 0 %
2 0 %
3 7 0 %
J  1 I I « I
20 40
%  of soles
60 80
1 % ^  Superior to competition 




CLASSIFICATION OF G R O S S  MARGIN RATIO BY PRODUCT LEADERSHIP RATING
Product lint A 
( 4 0 %  grots morgin)
Product lint 8 
(3 0 %  gross margin)
Product iins C 
(2 5 %  gross morgin)
1 8 %
[4 2 %





i i i i i m # i 0 2 3 %
Product iins D 
(4 9 %  gross morgin)
Totoi dsportmsnt 





J I L J
0  2 0 %  4 0 %  6 0 %
Gross margin rotio
 Supsrior to compstition
î;;;;;il| Equol to compstition 
Infsrior to compstition
Appendix Exhibit 3-8 
DEPARTMENT PRODUCT LEADERSHIP TREND
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 3-8
XYZ DEPARTMENT 
PRODUCT LEADERSHIP TREND 
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ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE - HOURLY 
(9 pages)
395
ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE - HOURLY 
(Questions arranged by categories)
COMPENSATION
♦DA ♦IA ID DD 1. My job pays about what it should compared with 
other jobs in the plant.
DA IA ♦ID ♦DD 5. The pay here is less for the same kind of work than 
it is in other companies in this area.
♦DA ♦IA ID DD 9. All in all, I am satisfied with the pay I get.
DA IA ♦ID ♦DD 13. I often do jobs that higher paid people do, but 
with no increase in pay.
♦DA ♦IA ID DD 17. Pay rates are set up on a fair and accurate basis.
WORKING CONDITIONS
♦DA ♦IA ID DD 2. Temperature and ventilation a re  good in my work 
place.
♦DA ♦IA ID DD 6. The layout of space and facilities is  convenient.
DA IA ♦ID ♦DD 10. It’s too noisy in my work place.
♦DA ♦IA ID DD 14. Our work area is kept clean and neat.
DA IA ♦ID ♦DD 18. I t’s too crowded at my work place.
FUTURE OPPORTUNITY
DA IA ♦ID ♦DD 3. It takes ’’pull” to get ahead here.
♦DA ♦IA ID DD 7. It’s not hard to get ahead here.
♦DA ♦IA ID DD 11. If a person wants a transfer to another job, he can 
usually get it.
DA IA ♦ID ♦DD 15. Too many good jobs are  filled from outside the 
plant or department.
♦DA ♦IA ID DD 19. The right amount of importance is given to
seniority in upgrading and promotions.
Legend: DA - Definitely Agree ID - Inclined to Disagree
IA - Inclined to Agree DD - Definitely Disagree
* Indicates the favorable answer choice (s).
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SUPERVISION - ADMINISTRATOR
*DA *IA ID DD 4. My foreman always let me know beforehand of
changes that affect my work.
*DA *IA ID DD 8. My foreman gives clear instructions and explana­
tions.
29. Does your foreman try to make advance arrangements for needed tools 
and equipment?
*( ) 1. Always
*( ) 2. Usually
( ) 3. Sometimes
( ) 4. Practically never
30. When things go wrong, how often does your foreman know what to do?
*( ) 1. Practically always
( ) 2. Usually
( ) 3. Sometimes
( ) 4. Practically never
SUPERVISION - LEADER
31. How much of an interest in you as an individual does your foreman show?
*( ) 1. A great deal of interest
*( ) 2. An average amount of interest
( ) 3. Very little interest 
( ) 4. No interest at all
32. How many jobs does your foreman know well enough to teach to employees?
♦( ) 1. All of our jobs
*( ) 2. Most of them
( I 3. Some of them
( ) 4. None of them
33. How much have you learned from your foreman?
*( ) 1. A great deal
( ) 2. A fair amount
( ) 3. Practically nothing
* Indicates the favorable answer choice (s).
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34, How often does your foreman discuss with you on an individual basis the 
future plans concerning your work or the work of your section?
*( ' 1. Every day
*( ) 2. Once or twice a week
*( ) 3. Once or twice a month 
( ) 4. Rarely or never
SUPERVISION - DISCIPLINE
35. When it comes to disciplining an employee, how does your foreman 
usually act?
( ) 1. It depends on his mood.
*( ) 2. It depends on how often the employee has done the same 
thing before,
( ) 3. It depends on whether he likes you.
( ) 4. He trea ts a given incident in the same way.
36. How does your foreman usually go about trying to change the way som e­
one in your gi oup wants to do something?
( ) 1. He uses his authority as boss.
*( ) 2. He really  persuades them that his way is  better.
*( ) 3. He prom ises to try it both ways.
*( ) 4. He suggests a compromise.
*( ) 5. He gets the others in the group to help him 
convince the person.
( ) 6. None of these applies.
37. How does your foreman usually handle differences of opinion between em ­
ployees and management?
( ) 1. He takes higher management’s point of view.
( ) 2, He takes our point of view.
*( ) 3. He tries  to make each side see the other’s point of view.
( ) 4. He does not take either side,
38. How does your foreman treat employees when it comes to discipline?
*( ) 1. He trea ts  everyone alike.
( ) 2. He lets some get away with things.
( ) 3. You can’t tell what he will do.
* Indicates the favorable answer choice (s).
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GROUP HARMONY
39. If it were possible for you to pick the "ideal" group of people with whom 
you would like to work, how many of your present group would you include?
( ) 1. None of the present group,
( ) 2. A few of the present group.
*( ) 3. A majority of the present group.
*( ) 4. Practically all of the present group.
40. If you were to choose a work group of people who would be able to get the 
greatest amount of work done, how many of your present group would 
you include?
( ) 1. None of the present group
( ) 2. A few of the present group.
♦ ( ) 3. A majority of the present group.
*( ) 4. Practically all of the present group.
41. If you were to choose a work group of people who would be able to do top- 
quality work, how many of your present group would you include?
( ) 1. None of the present group.
( ) 2. A few of the present group.
*( ) 3. A majority of the present group.
*( ) 4. Practically all of the present group.
42. How many people in your group go out of their way to help each other?
*( ) 1. Almost all of them.
( ) 2. Over half of them.
( ) 3. About half of them.
( ) 4. A few.
( ) 5. Practically none.
COORDINATION WITHIN WORK GROUPS
43. How many people are there in your group who keep the others from doing 
their best work?
( ) 1. More than half of them.
( ) 2. About half of them.
( ) 3. A few.
*( ) 4. Practically none.
* Indicates the favorable answer choice (s).
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44. How often does work in your group tend to pile up all at one tim e, instead 
of being spread out?
( ) 1. Almost every day.
( ) 2. Once every few days.
( ) 3. Several tim es a month.
*( ) 4. P ractically  never.
45. During the past month on how many occasions was there a question or a
quarrel, over who in your work group should do a particular job or piece
of work?
( ) 1. Almost every day.
( ) 2. About once a week.
( ) 3. Once or twice during the month.
*( ) 4. None at all.
COORDINATION BETWEEN WORK GROUPS
46. Adding it up, how much time do you have to spend going after supplies 
and m aterials or waiting for them to be brought to you?
( ) 1. An hour or more a day.
( ) 2. An hour or two a week.
*( ) 3. A few minutes a day.
*( ) 4. P ractically  none.
47. In the past month how often have you received conflicting o rders about 
your work from different people?
( ) 1. Several tim es a day.
( ) 2. About once a day.
( ) 3. A few times during the month.
*( ) 4. P ractically  never.
48. How often does your group get ’’rush” jobs?
( ) 1. Nearly every day.
( ) 2. Every two or three days.
*( ) 3. About once a week.
*( ) 4. Once or twice a month.
*( ) 5. P ractically  never.
* Indicates the favorable answer choice (s),
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49. How often do you have to wait for employees in another group to get their 
work done before you can go ahead to do your p art of the job?
( ) 1. Several times a day.
( ) 2. About once a day.
( ) 3. Two or three tim es a week.
( ) 4. About once a week.
*( ) 5. P ractically  never.
WORK METHODS AND CHANGES
*DA *IA ID DD 12. The work runs smoothly here.
*DA *IA ID DD 16. There seem to be good reasons whenever changes
are made here.
*DA *IA ID DD 20. When new methods of doing the work are  installed,
we get a satisfactory explanation of the expected 
benefits.
*DA *IA ID DD 21. I may not always like what management does, but
I feel they are  always trying to be fair.
INCENTIVE CLIMATE
*DA *IA ID DD 22. When employees where you work come up with
useful, new ideas about the job (6r turn in sug­
gestions), the foreman helps these employees to 
keep on bringing in such ideas.
*DA *IA ID DD 23. When employees in your work group come up with
useful, new ideas about the job (or turn in sugges­
tions), management arranges to help such em ­
ployees to keep on bringing in more useful ideas.
*DA *IA ID DD 24. When an employee in your group is often absent
without good reason, the foreman tries  to help 
such an employee so he can come to work regu­
larly.
DA IA *ID ♦DD 25. When an employee in your group often wastes or
spoils m aterials or tools, the foreman tr ie s  to get 
the employee moved out of the group by having 
him laid off, transferred  to another job, or d is­
charged.
* Indicates the favorable answer choice (s).
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*DA *IA ID DD 26. When employees often waste or spoil m aterials
or tools, management explains to such employees 
why they a re  expected to be m ore careful.
*DA *IA ID DD 27. When an employee regularly turns out better
quality work than your foreman expects of him, 
the foreman lets the employee know that he is 
well pleased about it.
*DA *IA ID DD 28. When an employee where you work regularly turns
out better quality work than your foreman or the 
management expect of him, the other employees 
show that they think i t 's  a good thing.
VALUE PERCEPTIONS
50. Below is a lis t of reasons for which an employee might get criticized by
supervisors and management. Check the one for which an employee is
most likely to get criticized if he does it.
( ) 1. Not turning out a lot of work.
( ) 2. Not turning out high quality work.
( ) 3. Not coming up with new ideas.
( ) 4. Being absent a lot.
( ) 5. Being new on the job.
( ) 6. Not watching costs or the amount of
waste.
( ) 7. Not being friendly.
51. For which of these reasons is an employee most likely to get fired?
(Check one)
( ) 1. Not turning out enough work.
( ) 2. Not turning out good quality work.
( ) 3. Not bringing in new ideas.
( ) 4. Being absent a lot.
( ) 5. Having less seniority than most.
( ) 6. Being careless about costs and waste.
( ) 7. Not being friendly.
( ) 8. There is no likelihood tiiat 
anyone here will be fired for 
any of the above reasons.
* Indicates the favorable ansv/er choice (s).
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52. For which of these reasons is  an employee most likely to be unpopular with 
other employees? (Check one)
( ) 1. Turning out too little work.
( ) 2. Turning out poor quality work.
( ) 3. Not bringing up new ideas.
( ) 4. Being absent a lot.
( ) 5. Being new on the job.
( ) 6. Wasting a lot of material.
( ) 7. Not being friendly.
( ) 8. Turning out too much work.
( ) 9. Turning out work of too 
high quality.
53. For which of these reasons would an employee most probably be liked by 
supervisors and management? (Check one)
( ) 1. Doing a lot of work.
( ) 2. Doing high quality work.
( ) 3. Coming up with new ideas or ways of doing things.
( ) 4. Having a good attendance record.
( ) 5. Having been here a long time.
( ) 6. Being careful of costs and waste.
( ) 7. Being friendly.
54. For which of these reasons is  an employee most likely to get the respect 
of other employees? (Check one)
( ) 1. Turning out a lot of work.
( ) 2. Turning out high quality work.
( ) 3. Having lots of new ideas.
( ) 4. Having a good attendance record.
( ) 5. Being an old-timer here.
( ) 6. Watching costs carefully.
( ) 7. Being friendly to others.
55. For which of these reasons is  an employee most likely to get more pay? 
(Check one)
( ) 1. Turning out a lot of work.
( ) 2. Doing high quality work.
( ) 3. Thinking up new ideas.
( ) 4. Having a good attendance record.
( ) 5. Having been here a long time.
( ) 6. Keeping costs down.
( ) 7. Being friendly.
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56. For which of these reasons is an employee most likely to get promoted? 
(Check one)
( ) 1. Turning out a lot of work.
( ) 2. Doing high quality work.
( ) 3. Thinking up new ideas.
( ) 4. Having a good attendance record.
( ) 5. Having been here a long time.
( ) 6. Keeping costs down.
( ) 7. Being friendly.
Appendix Exhibits 3-10 and 3-11
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Appendix Exhibits 3-10, 3-11*
Appendix Exhibits 3-10 and 3-11 are taken from General 
Electric's Operational Measurements Key Result Area No» 6 - Employee 
Attitudes issued in 1958. These two Exhibits show how the tabu­
lation is presented enabling a foreman to see how his group responded 
and how the group compares to other foremen's groups.
The questionnaires (Appendix Exhibit 3-9) are scored and 
summarized using tabulating equipment. A tabulation is prepared 
for each manager summarizing the results for the employees reporting 
to him. The summary shows the percentage of favorable responses 
for each question, each category and the total questionnaire.
To compare the relative standing of a particular group 
with all other groups in the plant or department, summary charts 
are prepared. Exhibit 3-10 is a copy of one type of summary 
chart. Each dot represents the category score of one work group 
within the department or plant location. Thus, the category 
scores of all work groups are represented on the chart. This 
form provides a very broad summary of the survey results and 
clearly demonstrates the range of differences between work groups 
for each attitude area.
This form can also be used by individual managers to 
evaluate the standings with the groups reporting to them. On 
Exhibit 3-10, the numerals (l), (2), and (3) indicate the category 
scores of the three foreman groups reporting to a given general
♦Measurements Project, Operational Measurements Key Result 
Area Mo. 6 - Employee Attitudes. Measurements Service, Accounting 
Services, General Electric Co., Schenectady, N.Y., January, 1958.
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foreman. This permits the general foreman to compare the 
differences between the foreman groups with all other groups 
in the plant or department without disclosing the identity 
of any of the other groups. It is, of course, possible to 
make charts of this type to suit the needs of any level of 
management.
A somewhat different kind of summary is shown in 
Exhibit 3-11. In this type of chart, each bar represents 
a specific group, identified by name and number of employees.
The letters within each bar represent a category score, as 
explained in the legend at the foot of the chart. Each letter 
is placed opposite the point in the percentage scale which 
corresponds to the category score. The general plan for arranging 
these groups is in an ascending order according to the questionnaire 
average (A). The reader can see at a glance the similarities and 
differences among the scores for the various groups, by plotting 
the profile for each category (as illustrated by Compensation 
on Exhibit 3-11). The chart also provides a quick view of the 
range of the group category scores, through examination of their 
relative position within each bar. Finally, the chart shows 
the reader which scores are above or below the group's average 
of all categories combined.
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C o m p a n y  O bjectives
1. To carry on a diversified, growing and profitable vvorid>wide manufacturing business in el ctrical 
apparatus, appliances, and supplies and in related materials, products, systems and services for 
industry, commerce, agriculture, government, the community and the home.
2. To lead in research in all fields of science and in all areas o f work relating to the business, includ­
ing managing as a distinct and a professional kind of work, so as to  ensure a constant flow of new 
knowledge and of resultant useful and valuable new products, processes, services, methods and 
organizational patterns and relationships; and to make real the Company theme that “Progress Is 
O ur Most Important Product.”
3. To operate each business venture to achieve its own favorable customer acceptance and profit­
able results; especially by planning the product line or service through decentralized operating man­
agement, on the basis of continuing research as to markets, customers, distribution channels and 
competition, and as to product or service features, styling, price range and performance for the 
end user, taking appropriate business risks to meet changing customer needs and to offer customers 
timely choice in product and service availability and desirability.
4. To design, make and market all Company products and services with good quality and with 
inherent customer value, at fair prices for such quality and value.
5. To build public confidence and continuing friendly feeling for products and services bearing 
the Company's name and brands through sound, competitive advertising, promotion, selling, service 
and personal contacts.
6. To provide good jobs, wages, working conditions, work satisfactions and opportunities for 
advancement conducive of most productive performance and also the stablest possible employment, 
all in exchange for loyalty, initiative, skill, care, effort, attendance and teamwork on the part of 
employees—the contributions of individual employees that result in “Value to  the Company” and 
for which the employee is being paid.
7. To manage the enterprise for continuity and flow of progress, growth, profit and public service 
through systematic selection and development of competent managerial personnel for effective 
leadership through persuasive managerial planning, organizing, integrating and measuring for best 
utilization of both the human and material resources of the business; using a clear and soundly 
designed organization structure, and clearly expressed objectives and policies, as a vehicle for freeing 
the abilities, capacities, resourcefulness and initiative of all managers, other professional workers 
and all employees for dynamic individual efforts and teamwork, encouraged by incentives propor­
tionate to responsibilities, risks and results.
8. To attract and retain investor capital in amounts adequate to finance the enterprise successfully 
through attractive returns as a continuing incentive for wide investor participation and support; 
securing such returns through sound business and economic research, forecasting, planning, cost 
management and effectively scheduled turnover of all assets o f the enterprise.
9. To cooperate both with suppliers and also with distributors, contractors and others facilitating 
distribution, installation and servicing of Company products, so that Company efforts arc construc­
tively integrated with theirs for mutually effective public service and competitive, profitable progress.
10. To adapt Company policies, products, services, facilities, plans and schedules to meet con­
tinuously, progressively, foresightedly, imaginatively and voluntarily the social, civic and economic 
responsibilities commensurate with the opportunities afforded by the size, success and nature of the 
business and of public confidence in it as a corporate enterprise.
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 3-12
The General Electric Company objectives were first published 
in 195U and stood unaltered as of June 1, 1971.
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NEED FOR A DIRECTIVE POUCY
I t  is the’personal obligation and responsibility of each General Electric employee to  ac t in the conduct 
of any of the  Com pany's affairs in  accordance with high ethical standards and  in  compliance with all ap ­
plicable laws. Employees who fail to  fulfill th is obligation jeopardize th e  repu ta tion  and success of the 
Company and, depending upon th e  circumstances, subject themselves to  severe disciplinary or o ther ap ­
propriate action, including discharge. I t  is th e  responsibility of each M anager to  exercise care, diligence, 
and leadership to  the end th a t  all employees within th e  area of his responsibility observe these principles 
in the course of their work for th e  Company.
Fulfillment of these obligations and responsibilities w ith respect to  every aspect of the  Com pany’s 
business to  which the an titru st laws apply is of such v ital im portance to  th e  Com pany th a t  a  specific Direc­
tive Policy prescribing a m andatory  course of action for all employees w ith respect to  such laws has here­
tofore been and continues to  be appropriate.
The character of our free society and th e  unm atched success of the  economy of the  United States is 
based solidly on the concept of a  free and  com petitive m arket. T he fu ture of the  G eneral Electric Company 
depends upon the  continued existence of such a  free, com petitive m arket. O ur growth and success will 
reflect the ex tent to  which we are  able to  innovate, to  provide superior products and  services to  our cus­
tom ers and  to  show com petitive initiative in all areas of th e  C om pany’s business. In  General Electric, the 
only effective and enduring business philosophy is one of fair, vigorous com petition. As a  m atter of good 
business judgm ent, there is no excuse for coUusive activities in  violation of the an titru s t laws. As a  m atter 
of economic, ethical and  legal principle, i t  is the  unequivocal policy of th e  Com pany to  avoid actions which 
in any  way restrain or restrict com petition in  violation of the  an titru s t laws.
Experience has dem onstrated th e  need for continuous teaching by M anagers a t  all levels within the 
organization and especially teaching and discussions b y  Officers, Division and  D epartm ent General Managers 
of the  principles upon which th e  policy is based. Employees in  positions of responsibility m ust be continu­
ously aw are of the fact th a t  the  Com pany’s compliance w ith the an titru s t laws depends upon their conduct 
and th a t  there are penal provisions under which they m ay be individually and personally subjected to  sub­
stan tia l fines or imprisonment.* T hey  m ust likewise be continuously aw are of th e  fact th a t  violations of 
the law  in any  area of the C om pany’s operations m ay have far-reaching effects beyond th e  D epartm ent or 
Division in  which th ey  occur, and  m ay result in  great in ju ry  to  the Com pany through lengthy and  expensive 
litigation, treble dam age liability, and  injunctions or orders drastically affecting th e  C om pany’s property 
or its  business.
STATEMENT OF DIRECTIVE POUCY
1. General
I t  is the policy of the G eneral Electric Company to  compete vigorously and fairly  and  in  compliance 
with the an titru st laws, including, specifically, th e  Sherman Act, the C layton Act, as amended, th e  Robinson- 
Patm an  Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, state  an titru st laws as applicable, and  th e  provisions of all 
an titru st decrees or orders which have been entered against th e  Com pany.
The provisions of this D irective Policy prescribe m andatory courses of action upon all Company 
em ployees.t No employee has any  au thority  to  ac t in an y  m anner inconsistent w ith  th e  provisions of this 
D irective Policy, to  qualify or compromise it, nor to  authorize, direct, or condone violations of its  term s 
by another.
* Violation of the Sherm an Act constitu tes a  crime which m ay be punished by  a  fine of up to  $50,000 or 
up  to  one year imprisonment, o r both, 
t  The term  '‘employees” , as used herein, includes all Com pany Officers and  M anagers.
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DIRECTIVE POLICY O N  THE COMPLIANCE BY THE COMPANY 
AND ITS EMPLOYEES WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS (Continued)
2. Relationships with Competitors
(a) T he law generally prohibits entering into, and  no General Electric employee shall enter into, any 
understanding, agreem ent, plan or conspiracy, expressed or implied, formal or informal, with any com petitor 
limiting or restricting com petition w ith  respect to  such m atters as prices, term s or conditions of sale, pro­
duction, d istribution, territories o r custom ers.
(b) T he law does no t prohib it discussions among com petitors of prices and  other competitive m atters 
which do not result in an  expressed or implied agreement, understanding, plan or conspiracy to  lim it or 
restrict com petition. However, any  discussions or exchange between com petitors of their respective prices, 
term s or conditions of sale, or o ther com petitive inform ation, may provide the basis for inferring a  violation 
of law although there m ay have been no intention of entering into any  im proper agreement. Such discussions 
may, in addition, jeopardize the best business interests of the Company b y  prem aturely disclosing proposed 
C om pany plans, products and business strategies. Therefore, no employee shall give to  or accept from a 
com petitor, nor discuss w ith a  com petitor, any  inform ation concerning prices, term s or conditions of sale, 
or other com petitive inform ation. T he provisions of th is  Paragraph 2 do no t preclude any discussions, con­
duct, or activities
(i) which are relevant or necessary to  a  bona fide prospective or existing buyer-seller relationship: 
or
(ii) where the circum stances are such th a t in the opinion of Com pany counsel, the  discussions, 
conduct, or activities would be proper and  there would be no reasonable basis for inferring 
a violation of the  an titru s t laws.
(c) There exist m any organizations serving legitim ate and proper purposes, participation in which 
by C om pany personnel will result in  association w ith representatives of com petitors. Among such organiza­
tions are Professional Societies, M anagem ent Associations, T rade Associations and  Governm ent Advisory 
Com m ittees. T he provisions of th is  Policy affect m embership in, and  a ttendance a t  m eetings of, any  such 
organizations as follows:
(i) E very employee m ust tak e  special care to  insure observance of th e  provisions of Paragraph 
2(a) and  (b) above, when present in any  kind of group or m eeting a t  which com petitors arc 
also present. W hether th e  m eeting is for governm ental, business o r  social purposes, is casual 
or planned, is formal or informal in character, any  employee who has any  question concerning 
the  propriety  of any  m atte r under discussion in  light of th is Policy shall im m ediately and 
unequivocally disassociate himself from such discussion, leaving th e  meeting, if necessary to 
do so. In  no event an d  in no circum stance shall any  employee a tten d  o r rem ain present a t 
any  kind of concealed, disguised o r surreptitious m eeting of com petitors.
(ii) Each D epartm ent G eneral M anager shall adopt and publish a  policy, approved in writing 
by his Division M anager, or, in the  alternative, a Division M anager m ay adopt and  publish 
a policy which shall establish criteria for determ ining which employees of his component 
shall be eligible to  a tten d  meetings of m anufacturers’ trade  associations o r o ther organizations 
where representatives of the com ponent’s com petitors m ay be present. Similarly, Services 
Officers shall adopt and  publish policies applicable to  employees w ithin their respective com­
ponents who m ay a tten d  such meetings. Such policies shall set fo rth  th e  procedures to  be 
followed to  assure th a t all participation in such meetings is lawful and in  the best business 
interests of the  com ponent and  th e  Com pany. These policies should be designed so as to  pro­
m ote observance of th is  Policy by minimizing th e  occasions when those m arketing employees 
who have au th o rity  to  establish prices, term s, and conditions o f sale of the  com ponent’s 
products m ay be placed in contact w ith m arketing employees o f their competitors. Such 
policies need not, however, prevent the attendance of sales or m arketing personnel a t  trade 
shows, custom er associations or o ther meetings of custom ers in furtherance of custom er 
relations or o ther legitim ate and proper business purposes.
ISSUED BY THE
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3. Other C!oadact InTolviof tibe Antitrust Laws
In  addition to  prohibiting the restrictive kinds of agreem ents referred to  in  P aragraph  2(a) of th is Policy, 
the an titru st laws app ly  to  m any aspects of the C om pany’s business. U nder th e  C layton  A ct an d  the  Robin- 
son-Patm an Act, for example, the  legality or illegality of certain  contracts, unilaterally  established prices, or 
o ther conduct m ay depend upon whether the  effect thereof “m ay be” to :  substan tially  “lessen com petition”  
or “ tend to  create a  m onopoly”, o r “ injure com petition” . U nder these laws, as  u nder Section 2  of th e  Sher­
man Act, a  practice which m ay be legal in one com petitive situation  m ay be illegal in another. M oreover, 
the precise meaning and  effect of certain  provisions of the  a n titru s t laws has n o t been definitively decided by  
the courts and others depend upon the facts of each particu lar case. Therefore, each employee responsible 
for the C om pany’s conduct or practices which m ay involve application of th e  an titru s t law s shall have 
made available to  him  through educational meetings, discussions, and  general legal advice, inform ation 
which will instruct him  on the  m anner in which the an titru st laws and  any  applicable a n titru s t decrees or 
orders apply  to  his activities. I t  shall be the  responsibility of each employee to  be  guided b y  the  general 
instructions he receives, to  observe the program s designed b y  his com ponent to  comply w ith  these laws, 
decrees and  orders and  to  consult with and  be guided by  th e  legal opinion of C om pany counsel assigned 
to  his com ponent w ith respect to  questions on which he has doubts. In  no event, a n d  under no circum stances, 
shall any employee take any action o r engage in any  conduct on behalf of the C om pany which, in the opinion 
of Com pany counsel, violates any of the an titru s t laws o r th e  term s of any  applicable a n titru s t decree or 
order.
4. Good Faith Rdiance upon Advice of Counsel
W here an  employee who has acted in  good fa ith  upon th e  advice of Counsel for the  C om pany never­
theless becomes involved in an  an titru st proceeding, the  C om pany will assist h im  to  th e  fu llest ex ten t per­
missible and  appropriate.
5. Company Discipline for Violations
Any employee who violates, or who orders or knowingly perm its a  subordinate to  violate, th is  Policy, 
shall be subject to  severe disciplinary or o ther appropriate action, including discharge.
6. General Procedures
Sixty days after th e  issuance of this Policy, no employee shall be hired into, transferred  in to , o r  con­
tinue to  be employed in any salary position of Level 12 or above, o r any  o ther position in w hich h e  has 
responsibility for recommending or establishing prices, term s o r conditions of sale o r preparing o r  subm itting 
bid quotations who has not acknowledged in writing, in  th e  presence of his superior, receipt of a  copy of 
this Directive Policy—General 20.5.* A t the  tim e of each such w ritten  acknowledgment, th e  employee 
shall be informed of th e  name of th e  Company Counsel assigned to  his com ponent and  advised th a t  i t  is his 
responsibility to  consult with such Counsel concerning questions he m ay have as to  the  application of the  
an titru st laws and  an y  an titru st decrees o r orders to  his activities, and  to  be guided b y  legal opinions 
received from  such Counsel.
Each employee required to  acknowledge receipt of th is  Policy shall have delivered to  him , a t  th e  tim e 
of such acknowledgment or as soon as practicable thereafter, a  copy of th e  appendix to  th is  Policy  entitled 
“Guide to  Compliance with the  A ntitrust Laws” and  revisions which m ay be m ade jn  i t  from  tim e to  tim e.
* W ith respect to  employees who m ay be ill or who are rem ote from  headquarters, th e  d a te  fo r compliance 
w ith th is provision m ay be extended a  reasonable period of tim e w ith  the  w ritten  approval of th e  ap­
propriate G roup Executive o r Sendees Officer.
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RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
The Cliairman of the Board of Directors shall from  tim e to  tim e issue procedures to  be followed to
im plement this D irective Policy.
Every employee within the Com pany is responsible for personal s tric t adherence to  th is Directive 
Ptjlicy and every M anager is responsible for institu ting measures designed to  obtain  understanding and 
acceptance of, and compliance with, this Directive Policy among all employees w ithin the  com ponent he 
manages. Any employee who has knowledge of facts which cause him  to  believe Paragraph 2 of th is Policy 
is being violated within any com ponent of the  Company shall review the  m atter w ith the  General Counsel 
' »f the Company or w ith Counsel assigned to  his com ponent who shall, in tu rn , review th e  m atter w ith the 
General Counsel. I t  shall be the responsibility of the  General Counsel to  inquire in to  the  facts reported 
and to  advise the appropriate officer of the C om pany of his legal opinion. Counsel and  the  General Counsel 
shall hold in s tric t conhdence the  nam e of th e  employee who reviews such m atters  w ith him.
6 E N E R A L « i  ELECTRIC
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PROCEDURE
PROCEDURE FOR 
COMPLIANCE BY THE COMPANY AND ITS 
EMPLOYEES WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS
TAB
G en era l 
To be filed after 
Directive 'Policy 20.5
NEED FOR A PROCEDURE
D irective Policy 20.5 provides for issuance from  tim e to  tim e of a  Com pany Procedure to  be followed 
to jm p lem en t th e  Policy. A Company-wide Procedure is necessary t o  assure full use of Com pany m ana­
gerial resources in  fulfilling the  Policy objectives of a n titru s t com pliance sta ted  in D irective Policy 20.5. 
Procedural le tte rs  and m em oranda have been issued from tim e to  tim e and th is  Procedure supersedes 
these previous com m unications, including letters to  members of th e  Executive OfiSce dated : M ay 13,1964, 
April 23, 1964, and  Jan u a ry  4, 1963. Existing Services, Division and D epartm ent In struc tions and 
Procedures a re  n o t superseded.
STATEM ENT O F PROCEDURE
•  A t th e  request of th e  General Counsel and in  consultation w ith  him, th e  Com ptroller has devised 
and p u t in to  effect a  continuing program  whereby the T raveling A uditors on his staff expand 
the scope of their regular aud its  to  examine in  depth  an y  records which m ay indicate the failure 
of employees to  abide by th e  C om pany’s Directive P o licy  20.5. In  those instances in which 
such expanded review indicates the  possibility or likelihood of noncompliance, the Comptroller 
will report the facts to  the General Counsel for his legal opinion. T h e  General Counsel o r his 
designee shall m ake such fu rther inquiry in to  the  facts a s  m ay be necessary to  the formulation 
of such opinion. The President, upon being advised of th e  facts an d  opinion of General Counsel, 
shall d irect such action or fu rther investigation as m ay  appear appropria te  to  p ro tec t the 
in terests of the C om pany and  its share owners.
•  E very  employee who receives a  copy of D irective Policy 20.5 shall be  responsible for fully 
com m unicating w ith  both  those who report to  him  and  those to  whom  he reports concerning 
any  activ ities relevant to  th e  objectives of th is  Procedure and  of D irective Policy 20.5.
Furtherm ore, it is the  basic responsibility of each M anager to  ask  each employee, directly, any 
specific questions concerning th e  subject m atte r of, and compliance w ith . D irective Policy 20.5 
which m ay seem appropriate in  the light of th e  duties of th e  particular employee. Each M anager 
should, b y  thoughtful questioning, tailored to  the  p articu la r circum stances affecting each 
individual's work, encourage free and meaningful com m unication b y  employees. I t  is one 
objective of this Procedure to  develop a t  an  early stage inform ation on  any  areas of operations 
which are generating doubts among our own people before such doub ts arise outside the 
Com pany. W here an  individual employee has doubts o r suspicions, these should be prom ptly 
and fully disclosed, leaving to  higher m anagem ent an d  th e  General Counsel’s office th e  re­
sponsibility for deciding w hether such doub ts or suspicions ju stify  fu rther inquiry.
•  Careful exam ination and inquiry will continuously be m ade by each G eneral M anager in to  any 
circum stances which m ight evidence lack of vigorous com petition in  th e  business of any 
D epartm ent. M ore specifically: annual reviews will be conducted b y  each Division G enerd  
M anager w ith each of his D epartm ent M anagers, a ttended  b y  th e  Division Counsel; these will 
be followed by  discussions in itiated  by each G roup E xecutive w ith each of his Division General 
M anagers, with either the  General Counsel present or a  m em ber of his office; finally, th e  
President, with th e  partic ipation  of the General Counsel, will schedule an  individual session 
with each Group Executive—all w ith the objective of an in tensive coverage of the perform ance 
of the  Operating com ponents under the an titru s t laws. S im ilar annual reviews will Ix  conducted 
by  th e  Chairm an of the  Board w ith Services Officers.
•  Each Division will, in 1965, w ith the  assistance of Legal Services and  M arketing an d  Public 
R elations Services, in itiate an  inventory of its  areas of special economic sensitivity  and  re­
sponsibility, w ith em phasis on :
—Identification of key m arketing decisions and th e ir im pact on custom ers, distributors, 
vendors and com petitors.
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—Identification of exactly who m akes o r effectively recommends such decisions, how they  
are m ade, and on th e  basis of w hat facts an d  judgm ents.
—The prelim inary developm ent of Divisional and  D epartm ental pricing policies, focused on 
the specific problems of each individual business.
Several D ivisions and D epartm ents have underw ay specific studies in  such areas as approaches 
to  pricing stra tegy  and commercial intelligence. Further, such studies should be encouraged in 
other com ponents as th ey  recommend themselves to  the  specific concerns of particu lar businesses.
•  W henever any  m ajor price change has been m ade w ith respect to  a  product line o r a m ajor 
part thereof, i t  shall be the  responsibility of the  D epartm ent General M anager to  have a  report 
made and re ta ined  in the  D epartm ent’s files describing th e  change and  the  business reasons 
involved. Each such report shall have attached  to  i t  a  certification of th e  D epartm ent General 
Manager, and any  other employee responsible for the  change or for recommending th e  change, 
th a t the pricing decision has been independently arrived a t  and is in  no way re la ted  to  any  
implied o r expressed agreem ent or understanding w ith com petitors. D eterm ination of w hat 
constitutes "m ajo r price changes" and  "m ajor p a r ts  of a  p roduct line" shall be m ade b y  the 
D epartm ent General M anager after consultation w ith his Division General M anager.
RESPONSIBILITY F O R  PROCEDURE
E ach employee is specifically charged w ith  responsibility for exerting his maximum efforts on behalf 
of th e  Com pany as a  whole to  ensure th a t  th e  objectives of th is Procedure and of Directive Policy 20.5 
are fully  realized. N o au tho rity  is w ithheld in th is respect, and each employee shall be held strictly  
accountable for his performance under th is Procedure and  under D irective Policy 20.5.
REVIEW  OF PROCEDURE
T h e  above Procedure will be reviewed by A ugust 1,1966. I t  will continue in effect un til a  superseding 
Procedure is issued.
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